CHAPTER 7

Conclusion

Summary

Although over the last three decades several international relations schol-ars have started to actively analyse the role of religion in international affairs, research on the role of religion in governmental policies is still under-researched. Both the positive and the negative perspectives of the role of religion in international affairs have been analysed (Appleby 1999).[1] The positive role of religion includes the works of faith-based institutions and leaders in attaining domestic and international peace through mediation, fighting poverty and post-conflict reconciliation. On the other hand, religion can play a negative role such as inspiring extrem-ism and radicalisation, acting as a source of identity and a mobilisation factor in ethno-religious conflicts. Studies of religion in international development have focused on the role of faith leaders and faith-based organisations in the fight against poverty[2] but such studies did not extend to studying how the donor countries were working with faith groups in their international development agenda. In the UK, which is the main focus of this book, there have been studies of faith communities and UK government policies but most of these studies focus on domestic policies (Greg 2004; Lowndes and Chapman 2005). The studies on faith groups and international development in the UK also exist but they (i) do not categorise different types of faith groups and their analytical implications;

(ii) do not focus on the policy level in particular examining the change process in policy with regard to opportunity for faith groups to engage.

This book has sought to contribute to the study of the role of religion in international affairs by analysing the relationship between the UK government and faith groups with regard to the international development agenda. It focuses on the policy covering the period from 1992 to 2019. The Bosnian War (1992) marks the starting point, which was one event that reminded the world of the force of religion in international affairs in the post-Cold War era. In the same year, there was an election in the UK, which is also relevant to this book's analytical framework. The analysis in this book considers elections as 'critical moments'. The period covered in this book involves four governments: the Conservative government under the leadership of John Major (1992–1997); the New Labour government under the leadership of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown (1997–2010); the Conservative-led coalition government under the leadership of David Cameron (2010–2015); and finally the Conservative government under the leadership of David Cameron, Theresa May, and Boris Johnson (2015–2019).

To examine the relationship between the government and faith groups in each time-period, faith groups are placed into two groups: faith-based organisations (FBOs) such as Christian Aid and Islamic Relief; and faith communities such as the Church of England or the Muslim Council of Britain. The research drew on the theory of new institutionalism, in particular the historical institutionalism approach. An historical institutionalist analytical framework was designed to guide the analysis of policy continuity and change with regard to the government's interaction with faith groups. The framework was designed in order to answer the research question:

What explains the relationship between the UK government and faith groups in relation to international development policies?

To answer this question, the book first sought to determine whether this relationship exists, and then moved on to determine what it entails. If there is a relationship, it can either be a bad or a good relationship. There are also times where this relationship deteriorates, and times when it improves. The analysis was framed through the following propositions:

- The resurgence of religion in international politics explains the relationship between the government and faith groups

- The attitudes of political parties and politicians towards the third sector (e.g. civil society organisations, voluntary and private sectors) explain the relationship between the government and faith groups
- The increasing prominence of the international development agenda in British politics explains the relationship between the government and faith groups

The research for the book traced all expressed international development policies through documentary analysis. The documents included published policy papers, strategic papers, parliamentary debates (Hansard), legislation, speeches and the election manifestos of the major political parties. Documentary materials from faith groups were also analysed which included lobbying materials, annual reports, press releases and other publications. In addition, interviews were carried out with the former DFID officials and advocacy officers in some of the biggest Christian and Non-Christian FBOs in the country.

In the next section, the main findings are summarised. The summary begins with the findings regarding 'faith and development' as a concept, suggested as one of the indicators of the resurgence of religion in international affairs. This section describes the contribution of the book at a conceptual level and is the first step in the empirical research. This is followed by the findings from the empirical research, that is, the relationship between the government and faith groups (FBOs and faith communities). The theoretical contribution of the book is discussed in the section after that, in which the outcome of the analysis in relation to the propositions and the literature is discussed. Following that is the section that covers policy lessons, which recommend how a state can or should respond to the resurgence of religion in international affairs and to the issues of global poverty, through working with FBOs and faith communities. The section also suggests ways in which faith groups can effectively engage with the government in matters of international development. The last section poses potential future research questions and finally the chapter conclusion is presented.

Summary of the Findings

The 'Faith and Development' Agenda

The role of religion in the fight against poverty and other international development issues is part of the emerging literature on international relations and religion. Religion, through religious institutions and communities, has been active in the fight against poverty as well as in finding solutions to other relatively new security issues such as civil conflicts, diseases, climate change and terrorism triggered by religion. Faith institutions and leaders have also been active in post-conflict reconciliation and peacebuilding. The role of religion in such matters might be labelled 'faith and development'.

One of the indicators of the resurgence of religion in international politics in the post-Cold War era is the fact that international organisations such as the UN and the World Bank are embracing the 'faith and development' concept by inviting religious institutions and leaders to work together on efforts to solve global poverty issues. As discussed in Chapter 2, in 1998 the World Bank's president co-chaired a 'World Faiths Dialogue on Development' meeting with the Archbishop of Canterbury. In addition, one of its commissioned studies, 'Voices of the Poor' suggested that poor people have greater trust for religious organisations and leaders than other institutions, including governments. As a result of these findings, the Bank established a unit known as the 'Directorate for Faith', which later changed its name to 'Development Dialogue on Values and Ethics'. This unit served as the World Bank's focal point on the intersection of faith and development. One example of this unit's work is the World Bank's arrangement to work with faith groups. Other multilateral organisations, such as UN agencies, have made similar moves. During the formulation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), a task force (the interfaith working group) was formed to ensure inclusivity and active engagement of faith groups in developing the goals and in implementing them. Nevertheless, it is not only the multilateral agencies that have been bringing faith groups into their policies, but also individual countries in trying to engage faith in their development agenda. For this reason, this book sought to explore and analyse the UK government's engagement with faith groups with regard to its international development agenda.

The book separated faith groups into two categories: Faith-based organisations (FBOs) and faith communities. The studies that discuss the government's engagement with faith groups on the UK international

development agenda, such as the Gerard Clarke's (2006, 2007), do not distinguish between different types of faith groups, referring rather to faith groups as a whole. There is a discrepancy between the ways in which the government deals with each of these groups according to their different nature in terms of operations and goals. In the light of this, Chapters 4 and 5 focused on an analysis of the government's relationship with those groups, respectively. The main findings are summarised below.

The Relationship Between the Government and Faith-Based Organisations (FBOs)

Since the beginning of the period examined by this book (1992–2019), the UK government has had a relationship with FBOs. The relationship has mainly been based on funding and advocacy. DFID funds FBOs to deliver and carry out development projects in the global south. On their side, FBOs lobby and recommend policies to DFID on matters of international development. Although DFID does not always agree or accept FBO recommendations, it nevertheless respects their voice and invites them to submit recommendations and to participate in policy consultations. DFID can also support FBOs to carry out advocacy work in developing countries in order to bring about and ensure good governance and that other democratic ideals are respected by the recipient governments.

The relationship between the government and FBOs fluctuated at different points of time due to a number of factors. In the first period (1992–1997), the government-funded FBOs but the funds were limited and there was only one funding scheme, the Joint Fund Scheme, to which FBOs could apply. In addition, the government of the time focused on 'political conditionality,' including 'democracy,' 'rule of law,' and 'good government', which the state had to comply with in order to be eligible for British aid. In that way, the British government was working directly with recipient states, which in turn led to a diminished relationship with FBOs along with other NGOs.

In the second period (1997–2010), the government's relationship with FBOs heightened. This was due to a number of factors. First, the government embraced 'partnership' policies, which encouraged DFID to work with various aid agencies in the fight against poverty. The 'partnership' policies were encouraged both at international and domestic levels. At the international level, the UN adopted the 'Millennium Development Goals' in 2000, which called for 'collective responsibility'. It was agreed

that fighting poverty requires effort from various groups including state and non-state actors. For these reasons, FBOs were also recognised and invited to work with other aid agencies in order to reduce global poverty. At the domestic level, 'partnership' fit the New Labour government's 'third way' ideology, which encouraged government partnerships with the third sector, including private and voluntary sectors, in delivering public services. In connection to this, the government started a partnership fund known as the Programme Partnership Arrangements (PPAs) by which a considerable number of FBOs received huge amounts of funding. Although PPA funding was not only granted to FBOs but to many other development NGOs, on some occasions, FBOs justified their funding application on the basis of their faith identity and its connection (partnership) with faith communities in the Global South. In the third period (2010–2015), the relationship between the government and FBOs was more or less the same as in the previous government. However, the Conservative-led coalition government changed its approach to development from 'partnership and poverty reduction' to 'value for money, results and wealth creation'. Alongside that, the government favoured the private sector. DFID continued to work with FBOs as they did under the previous government. The PPA funding was still in operation and FBOs were still getting funds. However, the government started to phase out some of the core funding schemes. The phasing out process was incremental with more change seen in the next period. In the fourth period (2015–2019), the government relationship with FBOs was becoming more distant, together with other NGOs, because of its changing approach to funding. DFID ended the PPA funding schemes and closed other funding schemes such as the Civil Society Challenge Fund (CSCF). These changes had a significant impact, leading to one of the biggest FBOs to shut down after 76 years of operations and another one to reduce its operations by closing down some of its country offices. In addition, the government approach to aid budget spending changed. It decided on cross-departmental aid budget spending, whereby the aid budget is allocated to other departments beyond DFID. Advocacy relations continued. FBOs continued to lobby and push for better policies while challenging new approaches of aid budget spending. The referendum and subsequent politics occurred in this period leading to uncertainty.

The Relationship Between the Government and Faith Communities

The UK government's relationship with faith communities with regard to international development was mainly focused on 'creating and building support' for development. In the first period (1992–1997), this relationship was almost non-existent. Although faith communities such as the Church of England were already involved in international development issues, their activities were not in collaboration with the government. The Jubilee debt campaign, which was carried out by faith communities, was organised from the early 1990s. At that time, there was very little collaboration with the government. These campaigns were very effective and managed to mobilise many people to march on the G8 meeting in 1998. The G8 meeting agreed to discuss third world debt, which was a great step and, to an extent, an achievement by the Jubilee debt campaign. Although it was clear that the government and also DFID did not want the demonstration to happen, especially outside the G8 meeting,[3] the turnout and the effectiveness of the campaign highlighted the strength of faith groups. It is difficult to know how many people who demonstrated were actually believers, but the main point is the fact that the campaign was, largely, organised by faith groups, and demonstrated the power they had to convince a huge number of people to turn out in order to tackle issues of world poverty. Following that, DFID recognised the energy and potential of faith groups to build support for international development within the UK. Partly as a result of this, a closer relationship between faith communities and the government can be seen in the second period (1997–2010). In 1999, DFID published a strategy paper known as 'Building Support for Development Strategy' (BSDS). In the BDSD, faith groups were among the four groups that were mentioned as key areas to build support for development in the UK. The other groups were the media, education, and trade unions. DFID, for example, funded a faith community event, known as Greenbelt, which is an annual Christian festival for the arts. The funding to Greenbelt was mainly for the purpose of raising awareness about international development issues among festivalgoers. In the third period (2010–2015), DFID ended the BDSD. The focus was on quantifiable results and value for money. DFID did not see the need to continue raising awareness. This could also be for the reason that the government had already decided, and it actually did, to spend 0.7 per cent of GNI to aid. A target set by

the UN. However, DFID published Faith Partnership Principles in 2012, signalling its appreciation of the work of faith groups in pushing the international development agenda. In the fourth period (2015–2019), DFID introduced new funding schemes through which faith communities and other small charities stood a chance of accessing funding. With the cross-departmental spending of the aid budget, faith communities stand both a chance and a risk. A chance because other departments such as the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and Home Affairs have more established units and programmes with faith communities than DFID. For instance, already using the aid budget, the FCO is working with faith communities in addressing issues of freedom of religion and worship. On the other hand, it is a risk, since redistributing aid budget across different departments might reduce the capacity of DFID to choose various actors/stakeholders through which the department can work.

Comparative Discussion

Theoretical Contribution

Using the historical institutionalism analytical framework, as discussed in Chapter 2, this book has examined changes in policy, which in turn affect the relationship between the government and faith groups. For example, the analysis in Chapter 3 shows an incremental change in the mid-1990s, a change in policy focus from 'political conditionality' to 'partnership', which led to a heightened relationship between the government and faith groups. Similarly, the change in government in 1997, for example, led to the establishment of DFID, which opened 'windows of opportunity' for more funding for voluntary groups including faith groups. Along the same lines, the analysis also helped to show the changes in 2010 when the Conservative-led coalition took over government and there was a shift in policy focus which seems to have led to incremental changes in the government's engagement with faith groups, and in particular faith communities. In 2015, with the fully fledged Conservative government further changes with regard to aid budget management (cross-governmental) were seen, as well as the closing off of former funding schemes and the introduction of new ones, with implications for faith groups funded by the government.

Thus, historical institutionalism helps to determine and analyse a change of 'policy path' (i.e. from 'political conditionality' to 'partnership

and poverty reduction' to 'value for money' and 'cross-governmental' aid budget management), 'windows of opportunity' and/or 'critical moments' such as elections and also Brexit, in which analysis can be made as to whether or not faith groups seized these moments to strengthen their relationship with the government, either by obtaining more funds or recommending policies.

Historical institutionalism presents the notion that an outcome can be caused by various factors that incrementally accumulate. This book has shown that the government started to work with faith groups as a result of various factors, which individually could not have explained the outcome. This was particularly clear in the analysis of the government's decision to engage with faith communities, which do not have international development as their primary goal (unlike the FBOs which have international development as their core goal). The government started to work with them for various reasons including: the 'Voices of The Poor' report, the desire to explicitly analyse what works best in international development, and to build support for international development. These various rationales for the government's closer relationship with faith communities could best be identified by an historical institutionalism approach. This approach traces the policy process and identifies where and why policy changes happened. Furthermore, the historical institutionalism approach has enabled the research to evaluate the extent of the government's reaction or policy change due to certain issues, such as the September 11, 2001 attacks.

Thus, through the historical institutionalism analytical framework, this book has not only been able to assess which of the three propositions has more explanatory power but has also shown that none of the propositions can explain the relationship between the government and faith groups on its own. The three propositions are not mutually exclusive, and each one of them has contributed to a strengthening or weakening of the relationship between the government and faith groups at different points in time.

With regard to the first proposition (that the resurgence of religion in international politics explains the relationship between the government and faith groups), the book shows that the government's decision to include faith groups in the 'Building Support for International Development Strategy' was due to the 'resurgence of religion in international affairs'. That was due to the international recognition of the role of religion in fighting global poverty—the 'faith and development' concept—which had influenced decision-makers in the UK government to consider

faith groups as potential partners in achieving international development goals. As Scott Thomas writes, "the way culture, religion and spirituality increasingly impact on the debate over the meaning of international development is an aspect of the resurgence of religion" (Thomas 2004: 136). The findings of the 'Voices of the Poor' project had a particular impact on the UK government's view on faith groups in matters of international development (Interview 2011):

> *although the government had been working with faith based organisations such as Christian Aid and the Catholic organisation (CAFOD), the World Bank's 'Voices of the Poor' findings, that poor people trusted faith leaders and faith organisations more than any other groups or government, led me to think that was a very serious development and that we can do something about that - and that was to try and mobilise the energy and strengths of faith groups towards fighting global poverty.*

In addition, the Jubilee 2000 debt campaign, which can also be described as an indicator of the resurgence of religion in international politics (as it was a campaign organised by religious groups that sought to influence the policies of the biggest economies (G8) of the world on the debts owed by poor countries) had an impact on the UK government's relations with faith communities. In Chapter 5, it was shown how this campaign impressed key leaders, such as Clare Short, who would go on to consider the role that faith communities could play in helping to create and build support for DFID's ambitious aim to 'eliminate world poverty'. In Chapter 5, the analysis shows, again, that the attention to the widespread religious persecution and the need to protect the freedom of religion and worship is bringing the government back to working with faith communities in addressing this problem. This is further enhanced by the fact that the aid budget, since 2015, has been allocated to other departments including the FCO and Home Affairs, which have a more established framework for working with faith communities. Thus, in addressing the issue of religious persecution, the FCO is working with faith communities and the budget to do so is from the aid budget. In the 2019 Conservative Party election manifesto, the party promised to take on board all the recommendations given by the Bishop of Truro commission on ways to address religious persecution.

The events of September 11, 2001 also had an impact on the relationship between the government and faith groups, in particular the Islamic

aid agencies. As discussed in Chapter 4, funds to Islamic faith agencies were scrutinised more amid fears of money-laundering. However, none of the UK Islamic aid agencies were found guilty of this, and the relationship between the government and major Islamic aid agencies such as Islamic Relief was still good.

On the other hand, it could be argued that the rise of new terrorism as a whole has strengthened the relationship between the government and some Islamic aid agencies. For example, Islamic Relief received funds to carry out projects in Pakistan. These projects have long-term goals of countering radicalisation and extremism. As the reviewed literature in Chapter 2 shows, policymakers have been linking poverty to terrorism particularly due to grievances and the creation of safe havens for terrorists in fragile states. Thus, international aid has been used to fight poverty partly in order to curb terrorism. This is why aid has been given to fragile countries to ensure that good governance and democratic ideals are strengthened so as to reduce the risk of radicalisation, extremism and recruitment of terrorists. This is without neglecting the nascent terrorist approach to recruitment from Western countries. Nevertheless, attention to fragile states—which are safe havens for terrorist organisations cannot be ignored. In most cases, it is the faith groups that can access such fragile states. Islamic Relief, for example, has good access to Palestine, Pakistan and Somalia.

Nevertheless, the resurgence of religion alone cannot explain the relationship between the government and faith groups. The attitudes of political parties and politicians towards the third sector also explain the relationship between the government and faith groups. The Bosnian War occurred between 1992 and 1995. Although this was an indicator of the resurgence of religion in international politics, no change in governmental policies was seen with regard to the engagement with faith groups. Faith groups, such as the Muslim community in Nottingham, were active in delivering humanitarian aid to Bosnia but there was no governmental collaboration with them. Although the sending of humanitarian aid to Bosnia was the first time that Islamic Relief had received funding from the government, the government treated them as any other development NGO. The role of development NGOs was recognised but there was no specific expression of the uniqueness of faith groups in delivering aid to Bosnia.

The Conservative government of the time placed great emphasis on the 'political conditionality' policies, which guided the Overseas Development Administration (ODA) to deal directly with the recipient state instead of working through NGOs. The 'political conditionality' policies were aimed at improving the 'state institutions' through the imposition of conditions such as the requirement to have a multi-party system, and other democratic ideals. In addition, the Conservative government was also more interested in the commercial interests of aid. In this period, as seen in Chapter 4, the ODA opened up more doors for the private sector, through Aid and Trade Provision (ATP), than they did for voluntary groups.

In the period between 1997 and 2010, a closer relationship is seen, because the New Labour government embraced 'third way' ideas in which the government sought to partner with both the private and the voluntary sectors. In this respect, faith groups were also encouraged to engage with the government. This can be seen, not only in international development, but also in other domestic policies such as the 'Faith Communities Unit' within the Department for Communities and Local Governments. The combination of 'third way' and 'partnership and poverty reduction' arguably opened up more 'windows of opportunity' for faith groups as compared to the private sector. In connection with this, mention may be made of the link between the 'third way' and 'communitarianism'. Communitarianism refers to a political agenda that promotes community inclusiveness in political, economic, and social processes to overcome the forces of individualism or authoritarianism (Etzioni 1995; Tam 1998; Miller et al. 1992). The New Labour 'third way' aimed at achieving a communitarian rather than individualistic vision of society in which individuals are embedded in social relations which give structure and meaning to people's lives (Driver and Martell 2000: 149).

In the period from 2010 to 2015, it was observed that the Conservative-led coalition government's emphasis on 'value for money', being 'results focused' and 'wealth creation' brought the private sector closer to the government as compared to the voluntary groups, including faith groups. Although the coalition government had adopted the 'big society' concept (which includes giving communities more power such as giving neighbourhoods more power over the planning system, and supporting charities and social enterprises) (Pattie and Johnston 2011), the implementation of the 'big society' plans faced difficulty, not least due to the budget cuts and other austerity policies that the coalition government

imposed in response to economic deficits. Even though the aid budget was ring-fenced, the spirit to work with the voluntary sector in partnership was not as strong as in the previous period. This was also evident when the Faith Partnership Principles were published, yet with no evidence of substantial engagement of faith groups in the policy formulation and implementation. That led to the conclusion that the coalition government's international development approach ('value for money', 'wealth creation' and 'quantifiable outcomes') weakened the relationship between the government and faith groups.

In the last period between 2015 and 2019, there is continuity in the coalition government approach but with a lot more change. This continuity is with regard to the focus on 'value for money', 'quantifiable results' as well as more interaction with the private sector. The changes with regard to the closing of core funding schemes that supported NGOs including FBOs as well as the decision to allocate aid budget across various departments in Whitehall. In this period, the relationship with faith groups became shaky alongside the rest of NGOs. There has been substantial concern from civil society and NGOs (which include FBOs) about the direction of the aid budget spending approach, which seems to be favouring non-traditional development stakeholders who may not adhere to existing international rules and standards of development assistance. This could be the reason why the Conservative government wants to change the international rules, as they promised in the 2017 election manifesto and dilute the independence of DFID since they did not promise to uphold it in their 2019 manifesto.

The relationship between the government and faith groups can also be explained by the increasing prominence of the international development agenda in British politics. In Chapters 4 and 5, there was a heightening of this relationship from the second period starting in 1997. That was not only due to the 'resurgence of religion in international politics' or 'the attitudes of New Labour towards the third sector' but also due to the rising prominence of international development in British politics. The establishment of DFID in 1997 meant an increase in aid budget and the profile of international development in British politics, yet also meant that an increased budget needed increased public support. The 1999 Building Support for Development Strategy was meant to ensure that British taxpayers supported the department and the increasing budget. This strategy not only opened doors for faith groups to work with the government, but also strengthened their relationship.

All in all, none of the propositions could explain the relationship between the government and faith groups exclusively. Each of these factors was necessary for the government's engagement with faith groups but none of them is sufficient on its own.

Policy Lessons

The primary policy implication of this book comes from the evidence that faith groups can be effective in the fight against poverty. Although the book focuses on faith groups that are registered in the UK, it is evident that the activities of faith groups in places outside the UK have contributed to the government's recognition of the role of faith groups in international development, which has been explained as the 'faith and development' agenda. This explains why, with the focus on results from aid assistance, the Conservative government is able to work with faith groups in recipient countries due to their ability to produce results. Thus, this book puts forward an argument that faith groups, both in the UK and outside the UK have to be empowered if their potential role is to be fully realised. In this light, there are two major lessons that can be learnt by the government and faith groups.

First, for DFID to effectively utilise the potential role of faith groups in the fight against global poverty and in the attempts to reach the 2030 Goals (the SDGs), DFID should establish a unit to deal with faith groups. This is not necessarily because faith groups are more effective than other groups, but because faith groups may have different thinking on some issues. The 2012 Faith Partnership Principles are not adequate if they remain on paper. For instance, tackling HIV/AIDS is a common goal for both DFID and faith groups, but some of the ways DFID has approached a reduction of the spread of HIV differs from the way some faith groups have approached it, especially with the use of condoms and debates about 'abstinence'. Thus, if DFID wants to effectively engage with these groups there should be a special strategy or unit that is designed to work with them. Although the use of condoms is one effective way of reducing HIV infections, there are other ways of reducing the rate of infection that are offered by faith groups and have proven to be effective. In South Africa, as it was acknowledged in DFID's 2004 HIV/AIDS strategy 'Taking Action', faith groups were working towards countering stigma against HIV/AIDS-infected people. In addition, faith groups provide health services to HIV/AIDS-infected people in Africa

and many other places. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), at least 40 per cent of health services offered in sub-Saharan Africa are provided by faith-based organisations.[4] In addition, one in five organisations working on HIV/AIDS programmes is faith-based (WHO 2004). For these reasons, the role of faith groups in fighting a killer disease cannot be ignored, even if they use different methods to the 'conventional' ones. It is thus important to have a guideline that will direct policymakers in their engagement with faith groups in order to utilise their strengths rather than sidelining them due to their different opinions. There are many other similar examples in which faith groups are more effective and reliable for sustainability purposes.

Furthermore, a faith unit within DFID can facilitate dialogue between the government and faith groups in order to work together in solving issues in the Global South that the government cannot easily access. For example, the situation in Somalia proved to be difficult, as aid agencies could not deliver humanitarian aid. Islamic Relief, however, was there for a long time and had access to most parts of Somalia due to their Islamic identity. When the Somali famine was declared in July 2011, the British Prime Minister, David Cameron, and the Secretary of State for International Development, Andrew Mitchell, went to meet with Islamic Relief and the Muslim community of Somali origin in Birmingham to discuss the best ways to deal with the Somali situation. This was an excellent move, but should not have had to wait until the situation progressed from hunger to famine. If the government had a unit that deals with faith groups this issue might have been raised earlier, allowing greater coordination of aid delivery and so saving more lives.

In addition, faith groups can be useful in international development areas such as in countering terrorism by working to support stable governments in fragile states to ensure that they do not become 'safe havens' for terrorists. Faith groups, for example, have access to countries like Syria and Pakistan. They can discourage support for terrorism. Also a faith unit can work with faith leaders and communities in the UK to prevent recruitment. For example, the proposed faith unit within DFID could have programmes such as faith-based volunteers from UK communities to work in implementing UK Aid in fragile states and to counter hate sermons and sentiments that are used to radicalise and recruit terrorists. It is therefore better to not only give funds to these groups, but to sit with them, discuss strategy and have a common plan. This could be sustainably and best be

done through a unit that will be focused and consistent in working with faith groups.

Second, faith groups have to adopt a number of approaches to strengthen their relationship with the government and make it more efficient. Faith groups need to understand how the government works in order to organise themselves in such a way as to allow the government to interact with them more significantly. For example, faith groups should be able to come together and raise their issues collectively with the government. Most of the time, FBOs join other development NGOs through Bond and submit policy recommendations to DFID. This practice has proved to be successful and should continue. However, they should also come together as faith groups and lobby the government rather than waiting for the government to invite them. Faith groups should make more efforts to inform policymakers about their strengths and access to poor countries. A good example of this is the Muslim Charities Forum (MCF), which is an initiative by Islamic aid agencies to come together in order to have a collective voice in trying to influence government policies. In addition, the MCF seeks to empower the smaller member organisations in matters such as funding applications. Other faith groups can learn from the MCF and form a multi-faith structure that is focused on dealing with the government in matters of international development. Big Christian FBOs should assist smaller Christian charities in order to widen their influence. This should also happen with the other FBOs. Having a consortium of faith groups for development regardless of their creed, will enhance the voice of faith groups in policy engagement. For example, FBOs should not have accepted their long-time fellow, Progressio, to shut down just because of the absence of funding from the government after 76 years of its operations.

All in all, it is in the interest of both the government and faith groups to work together, especially in this era where religion is also posing a threat and there are a number of emerging moral issues that give religion a testing time—and further enhance its double-sided nature. Faith groups should be at the forefront of showing the positive side of religion. They should call on the moral obligations of leaders both in developed and developing countries. Contemporary political trends such as post-truth and post-shame politics are having an adverse impact on development, and faith groups should use their moral authority to counter such negative trends. Islamist groups (such as Al-Shaabab and ISIS) as well as

other pariah leaders have, at times, prevented aid agencies from delivering humanitarian aid. These groups are hostile to the West. For example, Al-Shaabab claimed that the humanitarian aid was simply a means by which the West could enter Somalia (Rice 2011; Tran 2011). Another such example was the 2003 situation in Kano, Nigeria, where parents were reluctant to have their children vaccinated for reasons such as fear of sterilisation (Robbins 2011; Walsh 2007). The British government had to work through Muslim leaders in Kano to persuade the parents to let their children get vaccinated. This relates to the 'Voices of the Poor' finding that poor people sometimes trust faith leaders and institutions more than other institutions.

Thus, it is important for the government and faith groups to work together in the fight against global poverty, especially in this era, where development aid is securitised to deal with new security issues that are partly brought about by the transnational negative side of religion. This is mainly because—much as religion can bring problems across borders, it can also solve problems across borders. Systematic engagement, instead of loose interaction, is what is needed between government and faith groups. DFID can do so within its result-based approach by documenting, assessing, monitoring and measuring the outcomes of its systematic engagement with faith groups.

Future Research

Future research should first focus on disentangling religion and its role in international affairs further. This may include two things: First, future research can try to analyse the role of decision-makers' personal faith on policy. The issue of decision-makers' personal faith is apparent, but it is difficult to analyse the extent of such influences on policies. There are 'cognitive decision making' theories that could probably assist in analysing the role of personal faith in decision-making (Mintz 2003). Second, it would also be useful to look at other aspects of religion, for instance from its theological viewpoint and analyse its impact on policies and other matters of international affairs. This research analysed religion from its socio-cultural point of view, but it is important to examine the doctrine side of religion in relation to issues in international affairs. This is especially important since faith groups are influenced by the theological doctrine of their faiths. In addition, analysis of the role of 'theological doctrine' on society and international affairs may shed more light on the increasingly

topical debates on fundamentalism and extremism and how to deal with them. Extremism and radicalisation have more to do with the theological part of religion than the sociocultural part. That is why there are radicalised people not only in Muslim majority countries such as Pakistan but also in Muslim minority countries like Britain. In fact, research shows the current trend for ISIS is now to recruit in Western countries such as in the USA and Britain. Some of the recruits are newly converted people. Radicalised people on both sides of the world are inspired by the same theology. Another viable aspect for future research is to analyse the role of religion on other government policies. This book, for example, only looked at one government policy (successive UK international development policies), but in the future, one might look at other policies within the UK or even in other countries. Future scholars can systematically compare the relationship between the UK and other donor countries in their dealings with faith groups. The USA and in particular USAID can formulate a strong case for such an analysis. This could also form the basis for a comparative analysis between the UK and the USA particularly their aid departments—DFID and USAID. From that, research may benefit from understanding how other countries deal with faith groups and strengthen the case for working (or not working) with faith groups on international development policies.

Finally

Analysing religion in international affairs is an imperative task that scholars of politics and international relations should not marginalise. There are increasing efforts to do so in particular with efforts to see how existing international relations theories can be useful in analysing religion as a variable. However, there is still a big gap in the literature and an existing bias against religion. Scholars need to rise above their expectations and frameworks. Religion needs to be considered for its explanatory power and not from its belief perspective. The relative newness of religion in international relations poses many questions that have yet to be answered. This book was an attempt to answer some of the questions and to contribute to the literature on the 'faith and development agenda'. There are still many more questions that need attention. Although it seems that scholars have only shown interest in religion when there is an event, such as the rise of political Islam and the terrorist attacks, consistent analysis needs to be carried out. That will help to avoid surprises in international affairs. In

1979 when the Iranian Revolution occurred, scholars analysed the religious factors but only for a short term. Religion was then forgotten until its forces became visible again in the post-Cold War era. This came at a cost. If religion receives attention like other elements in the discipline of international relations, scholars and policymakers will be able to tackle its negative side and capitalise on its good side.

Notes

1. Refer to discussion in Chapter 2.
2. Please refer to the 'Faith and Development' section in Chapter 2.
3. See the account of the event as narrated by Ann Pettifor, one of the key organisers of the Jubilee debt campaign, at http://www.jubileedebtcampaign.org.uk/16%20May%201998+280.twl. Accessed 7 Mar 2011.
4. WHO, Faith-Based Organizations Consultation Towards Primary Health Care: Renewing Partnerships with Faith-Based Communities and Services, *Report*, Geneva, December 2007, available at http://www.chagghana.org/chag/assets/files/FBO%20Meeting%20report%20_2_.pdf. Accessed 29 Aug 2011.

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