



---

FAITH AND  
DEVELOPMENT  
IN FOCUS  
**NIGERIA**

*Supported by the International Partnership on  
Religion and Sustainable Development*

*May 2018*

**WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE**



## ABOUT THE WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE

The World Faiths Development Dialogue (WFDD) is a not-for-profit organization working at the intersection of religion and global development. Housed within the Berkley Center in Washington, D.C., WFDD documents the work of faith-inspired organizations and explores the importance of religious ideas and actors in development contexts. WFDD supports dialogue among religious and development communities and promotes innovative partnerships, at national and international levels, with the goal of contributing to positive and inclusive development outcomes.

## ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL PARTNERSHIP ON RELIGION AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (PaRD)

PaRD brings together governmental and intergovernmental entities with diverse civil society organizations and faith-based organizations, to engage the social capital and capacities vested in diverse faith communities for sustainable development and humanitarian assistance in the spirit of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. PaRD aims at greater and institutionalized communication and coordination between secular and non-secular actors, while fostering collaboration of its members as well as promoting cooperation with existing networks and initiatives. The partnership has three areas of engagement: knowledge exchange, capacity building, and joint advocacy.

PaRD is supported by an international secretariat located in Bonn and Berlin in Germany and hosted by Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ). The secretariat is financed by the German Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This report is prepared by the World Faiths Development Dialogue at the request of and in partnership with GIZ. WFDD hosted a consultation in October 2017 with scholars and practitioners, who provided valuable feedback on research plans, initial hypotheses, and questions. Participants included Dr. Pauline H. Baker, Ambassador John Campbell, Foluyinka Fakoya, Pastor Nathan Hosler, Dr. Marinus Iwuchukwu, Father Ludovic Lado, Amy Lillis, Dr. Omobolaji Olarinmoye, Oge Onubogu, and Dr. Damaris Seleina Parsitau. Preliminary findings were presented at an International Partnership on Religion and Sustainable Development (PaRD) meeting at Wilton Park, United Kingdom, in November 2017. The Nigeria research program included in-depth interviews, several of which are online at <https://berkeleycenter.georgetown.edu/themes/nigeria>. WFDD works in collaboration with the Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs at Georgetown University and acknowledges its support for the project. Ulrich Nitschke and Thomas Lawo provided invaluable guidance. We appreciated comments on drafts of the report from Alan Berg, Rosalind Hackett, Stephen Heyneman, and Paul Isenman.

Katherine Marshall, WFDD executive director, managed the report’s development and is its principal author. Lauren Herzog and Wilma Mui oversaw desk and field research. Osuolale Joseph Ayodokun provided research support and conducted fieldwork in Nigeria. Additional research support was provided by Erin Collins, Danielle Gantt Hudgins, Wakaha “Sarah” Sampei, and George Wong.

The wisdom and perspectives of the many colleagues who provided inputs are gratefully acknowledged.

*Cover Photo Credit: Flickr user/UK DFID*

## FOREWORD

“Faith and Development in Focus: Nigeria” was commissioned by GIZ to explore how Nigeria’s complex and dynamic religious institutions perceive the country’s development challenges and are involved across the spectrum of development strategies and programs, and vice versa for non-religious development actors. The report builds on the work of WFDD and Georgetown University’s Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs to analyze and document religious engagement in development in specific countries. Work to prepare this report involved limited original research in Nigeria and elsewhere, and thus is primarily based on review of available documentation across several disciplines and types of materials. It is designed to serve diverse actors interested in Nigeria’s development. These actors include national authorities and official and private development partners, especially civil society; religiously linked organizations; and others interested in religious dimensions of various facets of society and economy. It is especially designed to serve the members and partners of the International Partnership on Religion and Sustainable Development (PaRD).

The report provides an accessible overview of Nigeria’s religious landscape—history, contemporary institutions, and the dynamics of change—all in relation to major issues for development. It is a background document. Thus for operational purposes (for example policy discussions and program design) more detailed analysis is required. We welcome feedback on content, approach, and presentation, particularly on how to make this and similar documents more useful.

Religious involvement in Nigeria’s development is enormously complex and contentious. In this diverse and dynamic society where religious institutions play vital roles, religious involvement deserves explicit attention. Ignoring or minimizing religious factors can detract from development programs, while more

positive and informed engagement has the potential to contribute to virtually any development endeavor. The fragmented nature of engagement, both among religious actors and with the Nigerian government and its international partners, can undermine their potentially positive contributions. Examples of the possible consequences of gaps in understanding include failures to learn from experience, often through lack of knowledge about what others are doing; missed opportunities due to limited engagement with communities; and programs that are counterproductive through failure to appreciate the motivations of religious actors and organizations.

Nigeria, like many countries, is grappling with questions involving the values that underlie its development strategies and policies, as well as a range of urgent social and political tensions that include the reality of large inequalities, governance challenges, social friction, and violence. A host of questions around development results (that include the ugly spectacle of widespread corruption) are at the center of development debates. Religious leaders and institutions are deeply involved in many ways in these questions. They see themselves (and are commonly seen) as responsible for defining and upholding values that reflect the best in Nigerian society. Others, however, view them as a brake to forward momentum, an impediment to progress, or a contributor to significant social tensions.

We hope that a solid base of information—recognizing diversity and the immense cumulative impact of religious actors on issues ranging from education to climate change adaptation—will challenge an all-too-common narrative of an inherent opposition between religion and development.

*Katherine Marshall, Executive Director, World Faiths Development Dialogue, and Senior Fellow, Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs at Georgetown University*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreword .....1

Tables..... 3

Figures and Maps ..... 3

Boxes ..... 3

Acronyms.....4

Political Map of Nigeria .....7

A Timeline: Key Events in Nigerian History.....8

Executive Summary .....11

Chapter 1: Introduction.....19

Chapter 2: Nigeria’s Development Strategies and Partnerships.....24

Nigeria and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)..... 25

Current Development Challenges ..... 26

Official Development Strategies ..... 27

Development Partnerships..... 28

Development and Religion ..... 34

Chapter 3: Nigeria’s Religious Landscape .....35

National Context: Issues Involving Religion ..... 37

Chapter 4: Religious and Faith Organizations Working for Development.....50

Chapter 5: Priority Development Issues Where Religious Issues and Actors Have Special Importance .....61

Poverty: An Underlying and Cross-cutting Issue ..... 62

Health ..... 62

Women’s Rights and Religious Beliefs and Institutions..... 73

Fighting Corruption: Engaging Religious Leaders ..... 78

Other Issues Whose Religious Dimensions Could Usefully Be Explored..... 82

Chapter 6: Education: Religious Roles and Issues .....84

Chapter 7: Working for Peace in Nigeria: Faith-inspired Organizations, Religious Bodies, and Communities.....101

Chapter 8: Looking Forward .....120

Appendix 1: List of Interviews.....124

Appendix 2: Suggested Reference Materials .....125

Tables

Table 2.1: Nigeria: Some Key Development Facts/Indicators	Table 4.1: FIOs Working in Ibadan Region
Table 2.2: Nigeria: Official Development Aid (ODA) Flows 2014-2016	Table 5.1: Nigeria’s Population Profile
Table 2.3: Global Fund Investments in Nigeria	Table 5.2: Nigeria: Global Gender Gap

Figures and Maps

Figure 2.1: Top Ten Donors of Gross ODA for Nigeria, 2015-6 average, US\$ million	Map 5.1: Total Fertility Rate by Zone (births per woman)
---	--

Boxes

Box 1: Increasing Polarization and Conflict: <i>Excerpted from Harvard Divinity School Religious Literacy Project’s Country Profile, Nigeria (2016)</i>	Box 18: Nigerian Interfaith Action Association: A Story and Lessons
Box 2: University of Birmingham/NISER Research Program 2005-2009	Box 19: Eradicating Polio in Nigeria: Religious Obstacles, Religious Engagement
Box 3: Conclusions from the Nigeria Literature Review: <i>Excerpted from the University of Birmingham’s Religions and Development Program</i>	Box 20: What Do Nigerian Public Figures Say About Religion and Family Planning?
Box 4: Economic Recovery and Growth Plan	Box 21: Reflections on Religion and Gender: Lessons Learned and Implications: <i>Excerpted from “Religion, women’s movement and legal reform” in Nigeria</i>
Box 5: Germany/GIZ Development Assistance	Box 22: Religious Dimensions of Female Genital Cutting (FGC) in Nigeria
Box 6: Interfaith Challenges	Box 23: Modern Slavery
Box 7: Religion in Nigeria’s Constitution	Box 24: Addressing Ills Linked to Witchcraft
Box 8: Religion and Law	Box 25: Setting Accountability Standards (African Council for Accreditation and Accountability - AfCAA)
Box 9: Religious Freedom: Legal Framework: <i>Excerpted from the U.S. State Department’s 2016 Report on International Religious Freedom: Nigeria</i>	Box 26: A Practical Example of Fighting Corruption
Box 10: Indigeneity and Identity	Box 27: Basic Facts and Data on Education in Nigeria
Box 11: Islamic Actors in Northeastern Nigeria	Box 28: Integrated Qur’anic Schools (IQS)
Box 12: Boko Haram: <i>Excerpted from CFR Backgrounder</i>	Box 29: Reviving Christian Education in Anambra State
Box 13: Christian Denominations	Box 30: Boko Haram’s Attitudes Towards Education
Box 14: Church of the Brethren: Origins and Structure	Box 31: Pew Study of Attitudes Towards Religion and Conflict in Nigeria
Box 15: Some Prominent Nigerian Religious Leaders	Box 32: <i>Boko Haram: The History of an African Jihadist Movement</i> by Alexander Thurston
Box 16: Nigeria’s Pentecostal Revolution: <i>Excerpted from Elisha P. Renne’s review of “Political spiritualities: the Pentecostal revolution” in Nigeria by Ruth Marshall</i>	
Box 17: Pentecostal and Charismatic Movements: Characteristics, Roles of Media: <i>Excerpted from Rosalind Hackett’s “Charismatic/Pentecostal Appropriation of Media Technologies in Nigeria and Ghana”</i>	

# ACRONYMS

<b>ADB</b>	African Development Bank
<b>AfCAA</b>	African Council for Accreditation and Accountability
<b>Afdf</b>	African Development Fund
<b>AIDS</b>	acquired immunodeficiency syndrome
<b>CAN</b>	Christian Association of Nigeria
<b>CBOs</b>	community-based organizations
<b>CEDAW</b>	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
<b>CHAN</b>	Christian Health Association of Nigeria
<b>CPIA</b>	Country Policy and Institutional Assessment
<b>CPR</b>	contraceptive prevalence rate
<b>CRS</b>	Catholic Relief Services
<b>CSO</b>	civil society organization
<b>DAC</b>	Development Assistance Committee (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development)
<b>DFID</b>	Department for International Development (U.K.)
<b>DHS</b>	Demographic and Health Survey
<b>ECHO</b>	European Commission Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
<b>ECWA</b>	Evangelical Church Winning All
<b>ERGP</b>	Economic Recovery and Growth Plan
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>FBO</b>	faith-based organization
<b>FCT</b>	Federal Capital Territory
<b>FDI</b>	foreign direct investment
<b>FFP</b>	Food for Peace
<b>FGC</b>	female genital cutting
<b>FGM</b>	female genital mutilation
<b>FIO</b>	faith-inspired organization
<b>GBV</b>	gender-based violence
<b>GDP</b>	gross domestic product


# ACRONYMS (cont.)

<b>GII</b>	Gender Inequality Index
<b>GIZ</b>	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
<b>GNI</b>	gross national income
<b>HDI</b>	Human Development Index
<b>HDS</b>	Harvard Divinity School
<b>HIV</b>	human immunodeficiency virus
<b>HTP</b>	harmful traditional practice
<b>IBRD</b>	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
<b>ICT</b>	Information and Communications Technology
<b>IDA</b>	International Development Association
<b>IDPs</b>	internally displaced persons
<b>IMF</b>	International Monetary Fund
<b>INEC</b>	Independent National Electoral Commission
<b>INGO</b>	international non-governmental organization
<b>JDPC</b>	Justice, Development, and Peace/Caritas
<b>KAICIID</b>	King Abdullah al-Aziz Center for Interreligious and Intercultural Dialogue
<b>LDS</b>	Church of Latter-day Saints
<b>LLIN</b>	Long-lasting insecticide treated net
<b>MDGs</b>	Millennium Development Goals
<b>NBS</b>	National Bureau of Statistics
<b>NGO</b>	non-governmental organization
<b>NIFAA</b>	Nigerian Interfaith Action Association
<b>NISER</b>	Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research
<b>NRN</b>	Nigeria Research Network
<b>ODA</b>	official development assistance
<b>OECD</b>	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
<b>OFDA</b>	Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance
<b>OIC</b>	Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (formerly Organisation of the Islamic Conference)

ACRONYMS (cont.)

<b>OVC</b>	orphans and vulnerable children
<b>PaRD</b>	International Partnership on Religion and Sustainable Development
<b>PPP</b>	public-private partnership
<b>PTSD</b>	post-traumatic stress disorder
<b>RfP</b>	Religions for Peace
<b>SDA</b>	Seventh-day Adventist
<b>SDGs</b>	Sustainable Development Goals 2015-2030
<b>SGBV</b>	sexual and gender-based violence
<b>SIGI</b>	Social Institutions and Gender Index
<b>SME</b>	small and medium enterprise
<b>TBA</b>	traditional birth attendant
<b>UDHR</b>	Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948)
<b>UMC</b>	United Methodist Church
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme
<b>UNFPA</b>	United Nations Population Fund
<b>UNHCR</b>	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
<b>UNICEF</b>	United Nations Children’s Fund
<b>UNJP UNFPA-UNICEF</b>	Joint Programme on Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme
<b>UNFPA</b>	United Nations Population Fund
<b>UNICEF</b>	United Nations Children’s Fund
<b>USAID</b>	United States Agency for International Development
<b>USIP</b>	United State Institute of Peace
<b>WASH</b>	water, sanitation, and hygiene
<b>WBG</b>	World Bank Group
<b>WFDD</b>	World Faiths Development Dialogue
<b>WFP</b>	World Food Programme
<b>WHO</b>	World Health Organization

POLITICAL MAP OF NIGERIA



# A TIMELINE: KEY EVENTS IN NIGERIAN HISTORY

<b>700 CE onwards</b>	Regionally, Arabians and Persians trade ivory, rhino horn, gold, shells, and slaves. Arab traders settle and bring Islamic influences to the culture.
<b>circa 1100 CE onwards</b>	City states, kingdoms, and empires form, including the Hausa kingdoms and Borno dynasty in the North and Oyo and Benin kingdoms in the South.
<b>1472</b>	Portuguese navigators reach the Nigerian coast. Attacks and a blockade killed more than one million people.
<b>1600s-1800s</b>	The slave trade forcibly sends millions of Nigerians to the Americas.
<b>1809</b>	Sokoto caliphate is founded in the North.
<b>1830s-1886</b>	Civil wars in Yorubaland in the South.
<b>1850s</b>	Britain establishes a presence around Lagos.
<b>1861-1914</b>	Britain consolidates its hold over the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria, which it governs through local leaders.
<b>1916-1960</b>	Nigeria continues under colonial rule.
<b>1960</b>	Independence. Prime Minister Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa leads a coalition government.
<b>1962-1963</b>	A controversial census fuels regional and ethnic tensions.
<b>1966</b>	January: Balewa is killed in a coup. Major-General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi forms a military government.
<b>1966</b>	July: General Ironsi killed in a counter-coup; Lieutenant-Colonel Yakubu Gowon replaces him.
<b>1967</b>	Three eastern states secede as the Republic of Biafra, sparking a bloody civil war.
<b>1970</b>	Biafran leaders surrender.
<b>1975</b>	General Gowon is overthrown by Brigadier Murtala Ramat Mohammed.
<b>1976</b>	General Mohammed is assassinated in a failed coup attempt. Lieutenant-General Olusegun Obasanjo replaces him and helps introduce a U.S.-style presidential constitution.
<b>1979</b>	President Alhaji Shehu Shagari is elected.
<b>1983</b>	August-September: President Shagari is re-elected amid accusations of irregularities.
<b>1983</b>	December: Major-General Muhammad Buhari seizes power in a bloodless coup.
<b>1985</b>	Ibrahim Babangida seizes power in a bloodless coup, curtails political activity.
<b>1993</b>	June: The military annuls elections when preliminary results show victory by Chief Moshood Abiola.

# TIMELINE (cont.)

<b>1993</b>	August: Power is transferred to the Interim National Government.
<b>1993</b>	November: General Sani Abacha seizes power and suppresses opposition.
<b>1994</b>	Moshood Abiola is arrested after proclaiming himself president.
<b>1995</b>	Ken Saro-Wiwa, writer and campaigner against oil industry damage to his Ogoni homeland, is executed. The European Union imposes sanctions until 1998; the Commonwealth suspends Nigeria’s membership (through 1998).
<b>1998</b>	General Sani Abacha dies, succeeded by Major-General Abdulsalami Abubakar. Moshood Abiola dies in custody a month later.
<b>1999</b>	Parliamentary and presidential elections are held. Olusegun Obasanjo is sworn in as president.
<b>2000</b>	Several northern states adopt sharia law in the face of opposition from Christians. Hundreds of deaths in clashes between Christians and Muslims.
<b>2001</b>	Tribal war in Benue State, in eastern-central Nigeria, displaces thousands. Troops, sent to quash the fighting, kill more than 200 unarmed civilians.
<b>2002</b>	February: Some 100 people are killed in Lagos in clashes between Hausas and Yorubas.
<b>2002</b>	November: Over 200 people die in riots stoked by Muslim fury over planned Miss World beauty pageant in Kaduna State. The event is relocated to Britain.
<b>2003</b>	April: First legislative and civilian-run presidential elections since the end of military rule in 1999, marked by delays and allegations of ballot-rigging. Obasanjo’s People’s Democratic Party wins a parliamentary majority. Obasanjo is elected for a second term with more than 60 percent of the vote. Opposition parties reject the result. EU poll observers cite “serious irregularities.”
<b>2004</b>	May: State of emergency declared in the central Plateau State after more than 200 Muslims are killed in attacks by Christian militia; Muslim youths launch revenge attacks in Kano.
<b>2006</b>	January: onwards Militants in the Niger Delta attack pipelines, other oil facilities, and kidnap foreign oil workers. Rebels demand more control over the region’s oil wealth.
<b>2006</b>	February: More than 100 people killed when religious violence flares in Muslim-majority towns in the North and in the southern city of Onitsha.
<b>2006</b>	April: Nigeria becomes the first African nation to pay off debt to the Paris Club; two-thirds of the US\$30 billion debt is written off.
<b>2007</b>	April: Umaru Yar'Adua of the People’s Democratic Party wins the presidential election.
<b>2009</b>	July: Hundreds die in northeastern Nigeria after the Boko Haram Islamist movement launches a campaign of violence in a bid to have sharia law imposed on the entire country. Security forces storm Boko Haram’s stronghold and kill the movement’s leader.

# TIMELINE (cont.)

- 2010** May: President Umaru Yar'Adua dies after a long illness and is succeeded by Vice-President Goodluck Jonathan.
- 2010** December: Christmas Eve bomb attacks near the central city of Jos kill at least 80 people. Attacks claimed by Boko Haram spark clashes between Christians and Muslims. Some 200 are killed in reprisal attacks.
- 2011** March: Vice-President Goodluck Jonathan wins in presidential elections.
- 2011** August: A suicide bomb attack on UN headquarters in Abuja kills 23; Boko Haram claims responsibility.
- 2011** December: Christmas Day bomb attacks by Boko Haram on churches kill about 40 people. President Jonathan declares a state of emergency.
- 2012** January: Boko Haram tells Christians to quit the North; more than 100 are killed in a single day of coordinated bombings and shootings in Kano.
- 2013** May: The federal government declares a state of emergency in the three northern states of Yobe, Borno, and Adamawa; sends in troops to combat Boko Haram.
- 2013** September: Boko Haram murders more than 150 people in roadside attacks in the northeast. Separately, security forces fight Boko Haram insurgents in Abuja.
- 2014** April: Boko Haram kidnaps more than 200 girls from a boarding school in the northern town of Chibok, drawing major national and international outrage.
- 2014** November: Boko Haram attacks in northeastern Nigeria; several towns near Lake Chad captures. Raids into Chad and Cameroon in early 2015. Boko Haram switches allegiance from Al-Qaeda to the Islamic State.
- 2015** February–March: A military coalition of Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, and Niger pushes Boko Haram back into Sambisa Forest.
- 2015** March: Muhammadu Buhari wins the presidential election, the first opposition candidate to do so in Nigeria's history.
- 2016** November: Niger Delta Avengers rebels bomb three oil pipelines.
- 2017** January: The Nigerian air force accidentally bombs refugee camp, resulting in many deaths.
- 2017** May: Over 80 schoolgirls kidnapped in Chibok are freed in a prisoner swap with Boko Haram.
- 2018** February: More than 100 girls are feared abducted by Boko Haram in Yobe state; most are later returned.
- 2019** A presidential election is scheduled for February 16, 2019.

# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

*The report:* This report explores actual and potential engagement of religious actors and institutions to advance Nigeria's development strategies and program implementation. It addresses development issues defined broadly, focusing on priority topics that include conflict prevention, gender equality, improving governance, education quality, responses to climate change, and employment prospects for youth. The report's main purposes are: (a) to provide a general landscape of religious issues and actors that are especially pertinent for development actors (religious and non-religious); (b) to make accessible sources and brief summaries of issues likely to arise for development actors in engaging with religious topics; (c) to explore several critical issues through an analysis that illustrates possible approaches and short cases profiles; and (d) to suggest agendas for future analysis, dialogue, and research.

*Why focus on religion?* Ignoring or minimizing religious factors can detract from development programs, while more positive and informed engagement has the potential to contribute to virtually any development endeavor. Religious actors are significant for nearly every development challenge that Nigeria faces, from governance structures to gender relations, regional balance to community resilience, and educational curricula to climate change. Religious beliefs and institutions are integral parts of national and community life, with positive and less positive facets. For example, many attribute Nigerians' resilience in the face of adversity to faith, even as Nigeria's complex conflicts are accentuated by religious divides. Religious institutions have shaped Nigerian social and political approaches—notably in health and education—and they play major political and economic roles, both within Nigeria and internationally. Nigerians look to religious leaders for moral direction and practical support, especially as Nigeria confronts conflict and poor governance. Fragmented engagement, both among religious actors and with the Nigerian government and its international supporters, can undermine potentially positive contributions; examples include failure to learn from experience, missed opportunities to engage local religious communities, and misinterpreting the motivations of religious actors and organizations.



*Development context.* Mixed economic performance and uneven social development are common themes in Nigeria’s history. Prosperity and human development vary widely across the country and have fluctuated over the years. Overall social indicators are low, given Nigeria’s income level and its history of extensive development efforts since independence in 1960. Nigeria ranked 152 of 188 countries in the 2016 United Nations Human Development Index, falling among the lowest group of countries.<sup>1</sup> Immediate prospects are uncertain: following a recession in 2016, economic growth in 2017 was estimated at 1 percent. Various forecasts, including by the World Bank in January 2018, project growth in 2018 in the 2.5 percent range.

*A focus on inequalities between the North and South.* Perceived and actual economic and social divides between Nigeria’s northern and southern states are a crucial theme for Nigerian development strategies, and they explain the sharp focus on measures to redress regional inequalities. The issues have political and material importance, complicated by contested causes and implications of inequalities. The disparities have distinct, if also disputed, religious dimensions, given Nigeria’s religious demography and history (predominantly Muslim in the North, majority Christian in the South).

*Development strategies.* With Nigeria’s development strategy firmly anchored on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), there is broad consensus on priorities: to boost economic growth, improve low social indicators, address inequalities, and diversify the economy away from heavy dependence on oil. There are, however, substantial differences as to how to achieve these objectives, including the respective roles of public and private sectors. Weaknesses in governance, including deeply-embedded corruption, are widely seen to erode development performance. As a lower middle-income country with abundant natural resources, Nigeria’s dependence on concessional international assistance is likely to decline sharply. While Nigeria, with a wealth of natural resources, should be able to meet its developmental needs, active external support is explained by Nigeria’s political and economic importance for Africa, the massive humanitarian crises it faces, and persistent poverty. Major partners include the World Bank; African Development Bank; Islamic Development Bank; International Monetary Fund; bilateral agencies of the United Kingdom, the United States, and Germany; and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Malaria, and Tuberculosis. Even so, significant humanitarian and security assistance focused on northeast Nigeria falls well short of the needs of affected populations.

*Development strategies and religion.* The strategies of Nigeria’s federal and state governments, and of its major development partners, rarely highlight or analyze religious institutions as contributors or impediments to development programs. This reflects limited structured dialogue and few deliberate efforts to engage religious actors at a strategic level.

*Religious landscape.* Nigeria’s complex religious landscape includes large numbers of distinct congregations and communities; dynamic change is a key feature. Nigerians

are notably religious by several different measures; for example, high numbers of people report that religion is very important in their lives, compared to other countries. Basic data about religious affiliations are, however, unreliable, partial, and contested. This is partly due to politically motivated decisions not to include questions about religion in national censuses. Nigeria is one of the few countries whose populations are roughly evenly divided between the world’s two largest religious communities, Muslim and Christian (though the Muslim population is thought to be larger). Balancing the interests of the two communities is a central force in Nigerian politics. Several umbrella organizations—interreligious and intrareligious—purport to represent religious communities as a whole or in part, and to contribute to interreligious harmony, but their capacity and authenticity as representatives of religious communities overall is unclear, as is their impact—hardly surprising given the enormous diversity of the religious landscape. In short, there is no widely accepted “religious voice” at the national or more local level.

*Muslims and Christians* are by far the largest and most influential religious communities. Indigenous religious beliefs and traditional religious leaders play key roles, often overlapping with other traditions. Small communities of other faiths are also active—Hindu, Baha’i, and Buddhist, for example. Nigeria’s complex Muslim communities include several Sufi orders, various Sunni traditions, and smaller Shi’a communities. Various groups are extremist in their orientation, with some involved in violent conflicts; Boko Haram is the most prominent among them. The Christian communities include a large Catholic population (25 percent of Christians); mainline denominations, including Anglicans and African Instituted Churches (AICs—also known as Independent and Initiated); and fast-growing charismatic churches, many counted as “born again” or Pentecostal. Several Nigerian religious leaders, Christian and Muslim, play powerful roles in Nigeria and globally. Nigerian churches are significant among diaspora communities, with influence extending well beyond Africa. Nigeria’s religious media and culture also have global influence, both in communications and through music and other art forms.

*Legal issues* involving religious institutions, law, and identities have significant implications for development. While the 1999 Nigerian Constitution guarantees religious freedom, plural legal systems and local practice in fact restrict different religious communities. Therefore, the United States and other countries view limits on religious freedom and belief with concern. Complex issues around citizenship and identity are reflected in laws and practice on indigeneity, which center primarily on ethnicity but often carry religious implications. The application of sharia law in northern states gives rise to some tensions, both for human rights and minority rights.

A wide and diverse array of *faith-inspired organizations (FIOs)* work on development-related topics in Nigeria. There is no systematic analysis of their structure, much less of their work. Most organizations are Nigerian initiated and run, but many large

international FIOs work in Nigeria (though some have decided deliberately not to operate there). An uncounted number of smaller internationally-linked organizations, for example church-to-church and diaspora-supported organizations, also operate. In general, most Muslim-linked organizations are based (and have the widest influence) in the northern states, while most Christian-inspired organizations are in the South, although neither is confined to these geographical regions. Most organizations provide some type of specific social service, while others are engaged in broader activities, such as community development or support for women or youth.

*Controversial proposed legislation* under review and debate since 2014 aims to introduce a tighter regulatory framework, requiring registration and regular reporting for all NGOs, including faith-inspired NGOs. The proposed legislation is criticized as an effort to restrict civil society space, especially for organizations focused on human rights and broader advocacy. Its proponents argue that unrestricted NGOs are supporting extremist and violent activities. Some critics see the legislation as aimed at restricting Christian NGOs.

*A sample review in the Ibadan region* highlights the diversity of FIOs and some patterns of focus and approach. Their work overall is poorly known and patchily documented. Exploratory research, including in-depth interviews with 10 organizations, highlights their diversity, the degree to which their inspiration and drive is linked to religious beliefs, and their efforts to support social welfare objectives, albeit rarely as part of government-supported development programs. The FIOs are part of Ibadan's complex social, political, and religious fabric, shaped by traditional religious practices, active roles of Christian missionaries for 150 years, and Islamic scholars and traders.

*Major international FIOs* working in Nigeria are especially focused on humanitarian aid, with particular emphasis on northeastern states, where internally displaced populations are concentrated. HIV/AIDS programs have also been and remain a significant focus. Some organizations concentrate on specific topics—for example, the Salvation Army's focus on trafficking. Leading transnational NGOs include Caritas and Catholic Relief Services, Christian Aid, Tearfund, and the Salvation Army.

*Poverty, vulnerability, inequality, and injustice* are themes that cut across virtually all the development approaches involving faith actors. Broadly and comparatively, poverty levels in Nigeria today are high, and people are poor across all parts of the country. There is a widespread perception that inequalities are rising. There does not appear, however, to be a robust debate about the phenomenon within religious communities beyond a recurring theme that links high levels of poverty to poor governance and political machinations; poverty and injustice are commonly linked in religious narratives. Many national and international FIOs describe their motivation and focus in terms of efforts to address problems associated with poverty.

The deep historical association of religious, and particularly Christian, denominations

in developing *Nigeria's health and education systems* is apparent in active contemporary involvement, especially in the health sector, which is an important entry point for operational dialogue and action.

Religious institutions are active in healthcare delivery. Further, important controversies around health policy and delivery have involved religious actors; these include Muslim opposition to vaccination campaigns perceived to involve threats to women's fertility and tensions around approaches to HIV/AIDS. The active involvement of international partners in ambitious public health programs—the Global Fund, World Bank, the U.S. President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation—has put a spotlight on religious roles. Three areas where deliberate efforts to engage religious actors are successful include vaccination campaigns, malaria programs, and HIV/AIDS. Promising areas for action include action on tuberculosis and strengthening of basic healthcare. Family planning programs (with demographics a central development challenge) involve issues where religious communities often shape behavior and attitudes, and thus growing awareness that religious actors need to be involved if programs are to succeed in certain communities.

The picture for education is complex and religious roles are sensitive, notwithstanding a consensus that religious schools and approaches to education deserve support. There are wide variations both in how faith-run schools work by state and religious community, and in their engagement in the broader (and troubling) challenges facing education overall. Coordination among religious schools and strategies for teaching about religion in public schools—vital to address religious tensions in Nigeria—lack coherence and drive. Education policies and realities reflect historic legacies that have contributed to wide gaps in education systems and outcomes between northern and southern Nigeria. The linchpin of colonial education was Christian missionary schools, and although mission schools were nationalized after independence, national education approaches are often seen as Christian shaped or dominated. In northern Nigeria, both during and after the colonial period, Islamic education was the dominant mode. Despite efforts at modernization, Islamic schools and generally traditional approaches to education continue to dominate in the region; most Islamic schools are still not part of the national education system. The Boko Haram insurgency, which is driven in large measure by antagonism toward “Western” education, has resulted in widespread destruction of schools. Its direct threats and kidnappings, especially of girls, have dampened education efforts across the board in the affected regions. Religiously run schools, mostly private, are attractive to many families, but costly. Dialogue about how best to engage religious actors in advancing education that promotes both religious tolerance and civic values deserves a high priority. Large, displaced populations with little access to education are a critical humanitarian concern.

Religious beliefs and institutional approaches are important to the goal of *advancing women's equal rights and welfare*. Some religious communities are at the forefront of

both advocacy and action programs, for example, addressing domestic violence, fighting trafficking, and supporting livelihood training and initiatives. Others explicitly or tacitly accept or even support women's subordinate status. This applies across different traditions. Some Christian churches, for example, preach female submission, as do some Muslim communities. The most visible challenges to women's rights come from extremist groups, notably Boko Haram, with their direct opposition to girls' education and advocacy for sex slavery. Specific topics where faith communities can play especially significant roles include child marriage and female genital cutting (both widespread in Nigeria) and efforts to combat trafficking and persecution linked to allegations of witchcraft.

*Corruption* is widely and continuously lamented as a central obstacle to development and, still more, a social cancer. Religious communities speak to the issue but rarely engage in combatting corruption in meaningful ways. This offers important opportunities for dialogue, collaboration, and action. The promising efforts launched (with U.S. government support) in early 2016, in collaboration with NGOs like BudgIT and the MacArthur Foundation, should be pursued.

*Violence and conflict* are central issues for contemporary Nigeria, disrupting development work in many areas. The Boko Haram uprising in northeast Nigeria has caused untold suffering, leaving millions in temporary camps. Farmer-herder conflicts in the Middle Belt contribute to even more deaths, violent incidents, and displacements of people. Continuing violence in the Delta region has deep roots and extensive impact, and organized crime and domestic violence affect countless Nigerians. Across all these topics, there is a common and plausible narrative that "religion is not the problem," but religious elements are clearly involved in many ways, directly (for example through individual roles of religious actors and extremist ideologies that speak to religious traditions) or indirectly (affecting community attitudes). A robust analysis of the complex links between religious identities and conflict is an essential prerequisite to a widely shared objective of engaging religious actors more effectively in conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and building peace.

Nigeria's complex patterns of conflict and violence need to be understood at many levels: international, national, state, community, and family. They involve heavy doses of politics, history, economics, anthropology, psychology, environmental science, and theology, to cite only a few perspectives. Religious links to underlying causes of violence are in all cases part of broader phenomena. Most, if not all, of the links are widely disputed. The same comments apply to religious roles in peacemaking and peacebuilding, with many of the initiatives linked to conflict resolution and peacebuilding led by or directly involving religious actors.

Given the complex religious links to violence and conflict, it is hardly surprising that a wide range of religiously-inspired efforts aim to resolve conflicts. These efforts run a gamut from international and national multifaith action efforts; collaboration between

government and communities reflected in peace pacts; specific efforts to address problems such as reintegration of former militants; local community initiatives; and longer-term efforts to promote cooperation among communities. Religious leaders (who are mostly men) are most often visible, but women's initiatives are especially active across Nigeria. Significant research efforts have focused on better understanding the roots of conflicts and motivations for joining or supporting extremist groups, as well as highlighting promising approaches to peacebuilding. *With numerous initiatives seeking to address different facets of conflicts and tensions, it is difficult to find common threads and to evaluate impact. Poor coordination is a significant challenge.*

*Looking toward overall conclusions*, no clear consensus exists about how religious actors should be engaged in development strategies in Nigeria. Broadly their significant social and political roles are acknowledged, but how this translates into specific policies is fiercely debated. It is rare to see religious actors deliberately included as central partners in development debates. One reason is that historically, religious topics have been the subject of tensions and controversy, but another important explanation for ambivalence is the strikingly different appreciations of the role that religious beliefs, leaders, and institutions do and should play. The fragmentation of religious authorities is another explanatory factor. Religious dimensions of various topics affecting Nigeria are both overemphasized and oversimplified in some settings, while in others they are overlooked or deliberately ignored.

That said, *a robust appreciation for religious dimensions as they affect development policies and programs should be a central analytic element for both Nigerian development actors and their partners.* This is sometimes well understood, and examples of best practice exist, notably in some sensitive and thoughtful approaches to peacebuilding and interfaith action on malaria and other health issues. However, in many instances religious topics are either deliberately or inadvertently ignored or omitted from the dialogue and action.

The common focus in Nigeria on *interfaith approaches and mechanisms* generally makes good sense, explained by underlying concerns about tensions between Islam and Christianity and a desire by the government and its various partners to ensure that actions and programs do not favor one group over another. Interfaith approaches, especially those that center on pragmatic programs (for example in health) and shared interests, hopefully can encourage interaction among leaders and communities, and thus help to alleviate or temper the misunderstandings and tensions that underlie many conflicts. However, interfaith experience is decidedly mixed and the interfaith landscape is in flux. There are effective approaches and institutions, especially at the local level. Some of these are led by women and young people. Some face the very real underlying tensions within and among religious communities. There is nonetheless a tendency for efforts to become mired in Nigeria's notorious governance traps.

The sheer complexity of the country and its religious landscape and the highly politicized environment suggest that broad efforts have less chance for success than

more focused, topic-driven approaches. These are exemplified by ongoing efforts on anti-corruption and malaria, and point to promise on topics like tuberculosis and early childhood education, as well as early marriage and domestic violence, which have obvious links to religious teachings and practice. Community-level programs in many areas show promise, though they can founder when it comes to efforts to take them to scale. An approach that targets specific topics, like education, and involves thoughtful approaches to who is (or is not) at the table—for example, ensuring that women are not excluded—could represent a good start.

From a development perspective, *a strong case can be made for action on three critical topics* that this report examines in some depth. Education, fighting corruption, and addressing roots of conflict and strengthening conflict resolution are unquestionably very high on Nigeria's national development agendas, as well as those of key development partners. In all three cases, historic and contemporary religious engagement have resulted both in quite rich, if dispersed, research and direct engagement at a programmatic level. There is knowledge and experience to build on; however, clear gaps in knowledge are an obstacle, and there is a need for research and robust consultations in order to move ahead.

*Purposeful efforts at national, state, and local levels could clarify the actual and potential roles that religious institutions play in delivery of education, both public and private.* A priority could be the social cohesion challenges that are so critical to the education mission, as well as addressing practical problems related to financing the modernization of Islamic schools.

*Promising initiatives to engage religious institutions in fighting corruption, most recently in collaboration with BudgIT, offer considerable promise and should be pursued.* With corruption widely understood as a critical challenge for Nigeria's future and for development programs, engaging religious actors constructively in anti-corruption efforts makes eminent sense.

*The conflict resolution landscape is bewildering in its complexity, and there appears to be ample room for stronger information sharing and collaboration.* Given the depth of social tensions, there is scope for varying approaches, but a general stocktaking could help ensure that the many efforts underway both to understand and address conflict add up to significant results.

This review was not designed to recommend a specific action program. Its aim was to gather available knowledge and present it in ways that are useful to practitioners. It highlights and illustrates priority topics to help advance policy discussions and research plans. Feedback on the report is welcomed. Discussions in Nigeria with pertinent leaders would clearly be appropriate. These would need to be handled with some caution given the sensitivities involved, but could point to important actions that, with wisdom, knowledge, and an inclusive approach, could open new windows to cooperation and identify unspoken issues.

## CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Nigeria's vibrant and dynamic religious landscape plays many roles in the nation's life and development.<sup>2</sup> It is also a factor, albeit a complex one, in conflicts and violence that many see as linked to religious divides. Religious institutions have deep historic roots and are unquestionably a vital part of communities at all levels. They have shaped Nigerian social and political approaches—notably in health and education. They play significant political and economic roles, both within Nigeria and internationally. Nigerians look to religious leaders for moral direction and practical support, especially as Nigeria confronts conflict and poor governance. In short, religious actors are significant for virtually every development challenge facing Nigeria, from governance structures to gender relations, regional balance to community resilience, and educational curricula to climate change.

This review addresses central and distinctive features of Nigeria's religious institutions as they affect development issues. Core questions include:

- What information (academic research and documentation about operational engagement) is available about the development work and engagement of different religious actors? What is the quality of knowledge and where are the gaps?
- What is the nature and focus of religious engagement in current urgent humanitarian and peacemaking/peacebuilding work? What can be said about its impact?
- What is the state of relationships among faith-linked actors, broader civil society, and government, both formal and informal?
- How do faith actors see priority development issues and areas of particular sensitivity or promise?
- What are the primary links between faith and secular development actors and among faith networks? Do they work effectively?
- What attitudes do development partners bring to religious issues and institutions and what are levels of mutual knowledge (“literacy”)? What issues are especially contentious and how does that matter?



*Dominican Chapel in Ibadan;  
Photo Credit: Flickr user Andrew Moore*

- What innovations and best practices among religious institutions and actors might offer ideas for broader application?

The objective is to present information about actual and potential engagement of religious actors and institutions to support more effective development strategies and program implementation. The scope is broad as it extends across the contemporary development agenda, addressing the vital topics of conflict prevention, gender equality, improving governance, education quality, income inequality, responses to climate change, and employment prospects for young people.

Nigeria was and remains the subject of considerable research and discussion on religious roles for development and peace. Two specific endeavors to direct and drive such

### BOX 1: INCREASING POLARIZATION AND CONFLICT

*Excerpted from: Harvard Divinity School Religious Literacy Project's Country Profile, Nigeria (2016)<sup>5</sup>*

**A focus on economic inequalities and elite behavior:** Contemporary conflicts are frequently cast in narrowly-defined religious terms, but this representation fails to include how great economic disparities give shape to tensions. It is more accurate to say that those who have consolidated power and political influence—often by leveraging their religious and ethnic affiliations—have benefited economically, while the vast majority of the population is economically marginalized and competes for limited resources in a context of economic injustice and widespread corruption. Though economic development, particularly that derived from the 1970s oil boom, has enriched some communities in the North and the South, wealth tends to be mainly controlled by a small, wealthy minority found in both the northern and southern parts of the country, with very little trickling down to the vast majority of the population.<sup>6</sup>

**Religious aspects of conflicts:** The disproportionate balance of political power and wealth in the country and the efforts of religious exclusivists—those who maintain that their particular religious tradition is the right and only tradition—have contributed to a rise in conflict. Between 2011–13, violence initiated by Boko Haram against other Muslims as well as Christians, reached crisis proportions in the Northeast. There has also been continued Muslim-Christian strife in the Middle Belt,<sup>7</sup> resulting

in thousands of deaths and increasing numbers of refugees reported in both of these regions. Anti-corporate protests in the South against multinational oil companies continues until the present day, and is taking on religious overtones as one of the largest groups also threatened to attack Muslim targets in retaliation for Boko Haram violence against Christians in the North. It is important to note, however, that there are multiple anti-corporate resistance groups led by Christians, Muslims, and followers of indigenous religions.

**Polarization and instability:** Most Nigerians celebrate the impressive diversity of their nation and many support integrative policies to heal the deep divisions left in the wake of British colonialism. However, the increasing polarization and stratification along religious, ethnic, and regional lines are a serious threat to stability. While former president Goodluck Jonathan repeatedly expressed his commitment to religious freedom, insiders and outsiders questioned his offensives in the North against Boko Haram by military forces that led to the deaths of countless innocent civilians and caused many to flee as refugees. Additionally, Jonathan's economic policies failed to stimulate significant growth or opportunity for everyday Nigerians, and thus conflict with religious overtones continued as resources dwindled under his leadership.

research stand out. The U.K. Department for International Development (DFID) financed the University of Birmingham's Religions and Development program (2005–2010), which focused on four countries: Pakistan, India, Tanzania, and Nigeria. The Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research (NISER) was the partner for Nigeria work. Outputs included literature surveys, analysis of some faith-based organization (FBO) work, and assessments of religious organizations' engagement in economic policy discussions and in peacebuilding.<sup>3</sup> The work was somewhat patchy and is outdated, but it represents a significant body of analysis. Second, Harvard Divinity School (HDS) is developing a religious literacy program with Nigeria as one of the first cases. The HDS website includes a quite detailed Nigeria profile.<sup>4</sup> Boxes 1, 2, and 3 give highlights of these two research endeavors.

Other organizations that have focused systematic work on religious dimensions of Nigerian challenges include the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), the Tony Blair Faith Foundation, and the King Abdullah al-Aziz Center for Interreligious and Intercultural Dialogue (KAICIID). WFDD has undertaken considerable research on health and religion for Nigeria, focused on malaria, HIV/AIDS, and tuberculosis. Nigeria was a focus country for the Center for Interfaith Action on Poverty (CIFA), now part of Religions for Peace (RfP). Recent Search for Common Ground work in Nigeria has focused on protection of holy sites. The Network of Religious and Traditional Peacemakers is among organizations that have focused particular attention on drivers of extremism (which often include development issues). The Council on Foreign Relations has a long-standing specific focus on Nigeria that includes religious dimensions.

### BOX 2: UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM/NISER RESEARCH PROGRAM (2005–2010)

The Religion and Development (RaD) research program comprised a series of interconnected projects carried out between 2005 and 2010. Components relevant to Nigeria are:

- Relationships between religious values and development concepts and practices<sup>8</sup>
- Religion, ethics and attitudes towards corruption<sup>9</sup>
- Religions, politics, and governance<sup>10</sup>
- The role of faith communities in contemporary social movements<sup>11</sup>
- Faith communities and the development process in Nigeria and Tanzania<sup>12</sup>
- Mapping the terrain: the activities of faith-based organizations in development<sup>13</sup>
- Faith-based service providers and their changing relationship with the state<sup>14</sup>
- The development activities, values, and performance of FBOs and NGOs<sup>15</sup>
- The role of faith communities in conflict transformation and long-term development<sup>16</sup>

**Coordinator:** Professor Olakunle Odumosu, Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research

The Nigeria Research Network (NRN), based at the University of Oxford’s Department of International Development, connects European, American, and Nigerian academics who have extensive experience with empirical and development-oriented research in northern Nigeria. The NRN collaborates closely with the development Research and Project Centre in Kano, which works to design and implement community development projects in Nigeria’s northern states.

Scholarly research on Nigeria abounds, with many pertinent publications. Noteworthy recent examples in relation to the complex links between development challenges and religious institutions are *This Present Darkness* by Stephen Ellis, which explores the central issues of corruption and criminal networks in depth, and Ruth Marshall’s work on the rise of evangelical/Pentecostal churches in Nigeria, especially since the 1990s. Various scholars have explored Nigerian Islamic movements and their link to the crisis with Boko Haram (Alexander Thurston is a prominent example). The lists of relevant publications and of scholars, Nigerian and other, are long. A highly selective list of publications is in Appendix 2.

The wealth of grey literature on operational experience involving religious institutions offers a primary source of information, especially on current development-linked operations. However, the material is often difficult to locate, and some material is more designed as reporting and advocacy rather than for robust and objective analysis. Especially noteworthy are accounts of the purposeful efforts to engage religious

institutions in national campaigns against malaria and HIV/AIDS involving the World Bank and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Malaria, and Tuberculosis. Focused review of such information (for example by sub-region or sector) is important since it tends to be quite fragmented.

The topic of religious dimensions of Nigeria’s development is near infinite in its possible ramifications, and this review merely scratches the surface. A significant review objective is to suggest an agenda for future analysis, dialogue, and research. Partially as a reflection of priority, partly as illustrations, the report goes into some depth on specific issues, notably Nigeria’s education challenges and religious roles in preventing and resolving conflicts.

The report is structured with three purposes in mind:

(a) to serve an introductory document that provides a general landscape of religious issues and actors that have special pertinence for development actors (religious and non-religious); (b) to provide sources and brief summaries of issues that are likely to arise for development actors in their engagement with religious topics; and (c) to explore several critical issues in greater depth through analysis that illustrates possible approaches and through short cases profiles.

*“The reality is that in Nigerian society, religion functions as a double-edged sword, making a contribution to nation-building but at the same time with a strong potential for imparting negative and disintegrative values.”*

**-Religions and Development in Nigeria: A Preliminary Literature Review**

**BOX 3: CONCLUSIONS FROM THE NIGERIA LITERATURE REVIEW**

*Excerpted from The University of Birmingham’s Religions and Development Program<sup>17</sup>*

*Religion as a double-edged sword:* [The review] “suggests that few direct connections were made between religious values and mainstream development theory and practice, although some studies make rather trite connections with various facets of development. With respect to moral issues, there is unanimity of sorts that there is a connection between the religious ideas possessed by members of Nigerian society and social changes that are taking place. The exact impacts are not only variable in relation to the tenets and teachings of the three major religions (Christianity, Islam and traditional religion) and their interaction with the geography of Nigerian ethnicity, but also the uses to which such tenets and teachings are put; thus the reality is that in Nigerian society, religion functions as a double-edged sword, making a contribution to nation-building but at the same time with a strong potential for imparting negative and disintegrative values.”

*Limited empirical research, bias.* “The literature is mostly characterized by normative and prescriptive discourses that border on advocacy, and most of the discussion is theoretical. Rarely are there “findings” based on empirical research and a significant portion of the sources reviewed lack an empirical core; yet this is not to say that there are no rigorous studies of a highly abstract nature. What is clear is that most studies with a bearing on religion and development identify critical questions that need to be explored more rigorously, logically and systematically. The prevailing weaknesses in the Nigerian literature present a strong argument for the launching of empirical research on the very rich and dynamic field of religions and development in Nigeria.”



Photo Credit:  
Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung

## CHAPTER 2: NIGERIA’S DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES AND PARTNERSHIPS

Consensus about Nigeria’s development history and trajectory is elusive. Some highlight a collapse of basic infrastructure, social values, and public services; others paint a more promising and positive picture of progress and hope. There is little dispute, however, that Nigeria could and should be a leading force and powerhouse for the African continent, given its large population (an estimated 193 million in 2017) and economy, abundant resources, and the widely acknowledged ingenuity and energy of its people. Nigeria’s obvious potential spurs the common lament that overall performance has consistently fallen short of expectations.

This chapter provides context and background for exploring religious roles on development issues. It summarizes basic parameters of Nigeria’s development and leading challenges, setting them in the context of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) that the United Nations General Assembly approved in September 2015. It highlights the government’s strategic plans for development, which involve both the federal and state levels (Nigeria’s 36 states and Federal Capital Territory have significant development responsibilities). It briefly reviews the strategic priorities and assistance of major international partners.

The question of how far secular and religious actors agree or disagree on development challenges and priorities was posed in various ways. How far and in what forms are development strategies understood by various religious actors? How far do federal and state government-articulated development strategies reflect participation by religious actors? With limited structured dialogue among the actors involved, areas of disagreement and accord are rarely articulated clearly and positions on topics large and small vary widely. An exception might be seen in more extreme religious communities’ opposition to “modern” development, including education. In Nigeria’s robust civil society and media environment, religious actors engage in

lively debates about specific topics, for example on conflict resolution, relative priorities, and addressing corruption, but there is nothing approaching a “religious view.” The SDG framework appears to offer a quite widely accepted foundation for dialogue and a starting consensus at least on direction.

### NIGERIA AND THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS (SDGS)

Nigeria participated actively in framing the 2030 Global Goals, known as the SDGs. The government highlights the SDG framework in managing the nation’s development, and a quite elaborate institutional structure serves this end. The UN Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform reports on and highlights development issues; provides information on progress and the status of implementation of the SDGs in Nigeria; and highlights key policy, institutional, and regulatory measures that help integrate SDGs in national policies, plans, and programs, and for coherent coordination. The 2017 report “is the outcome of wide and in-depth consultations organized by the Office of the Senior Special Assistant to the President on SDGs (OSSAP-SDGs) with a wide array of stakeholders drawn from line ministries, civil society organizations, organized private sector, academia, development partners, youth groups, women organizations, persons with disability, and media organizations.”<sup>31</sup>

The senior special assistant to the president on SDGs is responsible for ensuring horizontal and vertical understanding between development policies, plans, and strategies. An Inter-Ministerial Committee on the SDGs and operational guidelines guide the coordinated engagement with ministries, departments, and agencies. Similar structures are being established at the state level. A Private Sector Advisory Group (PSAG) and a Donors’ Forum on the SDGs are to fully harness the resources and ideas of stakeholders and create a platform for effective engagement. The CSOs Group on SDGs works towards some SDGs targets, “with giant strides on inclusive education, in collaboration with the Joint Association of Persons with Disability and Women 2030 in Nigeria.”<sup>32</sup>

Table 2.1: Nigeria: Some Key Development Facts/Indicators

Indicator	Current Status (Year)
Population	190.9 million (2017) <sup>18</sup>
Area	910,770 sq. km. (2017) <sup>19</sup>
Population Growth Rate	2.6% (2016) <sup>20</sup>
Urban Population	90,386,000 (about 48% of total) <sup>21</sup>
Population aged 0-14	44% (2016) <sup>22</sup>
Gross Domestic Product	US\$405.1 billion (2016) <sup>23</sup>
GDP Per Capita	US\$2,176 (2016) <sup>24</sup>
Human Development Index	152 out of 188 (2016) <sup>25</sup>
Corruption Perceptions Index	148 out of 180 (2017) <sup>26</sup>
Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA)	3.3 (2016) <sup>27</sup>
Doing Business Rank	145 out of 190 countries (2018) <sup>28</sup>
Social Progress Index	50.01, rank 109 (2017) <sup>29</sup>
Mo Ibrahim Index (governance)	35 out of 54 (2017) <sup>30</sup>

The Senate and House of Representatives have two select committees on SDGs to enhance the legislative and oversight roles of parliamentarians on the SDG implementation process.

As part of the national SDGs advocacy and campaign program, the OSSAP-SDGs office has entered into partnership with the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) to train graduating youths to become SDGs champions in their local communities and areas of national service they are deployed to upon graduation.

**Nigeria's Economic Recovery and Growth Plan (ERGP)**, on which medium- and short-term budgeting frameworks are based is, to a large extent, aligned to the SDGs. Many State Development Plans (SDPs), including Benue, Taraba, Yobe, Kaduna, Ebonyi, Kano, Jigawa, Anambra, and Delta, are aligned to the SDGs. An SDGs data mapping exercise has been concluded and a data supply responsibility framework agreed upon.

## CURRENT DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES

Mixed economic performance and uneven social development are common themes in Nigeria's history. Prosperity and human development are notably uneven, with significant variation over the years and by region. Overall social indicators are low given Nigeria's level of income and its history of extensive development efforts since independence in 1960; Nigeria ranked 152 of 188 countries—falling among the lowest country grouping—in the 2017 United Nations Human Development Index. Immediate prospects are uncertain: following a recession in 2016, economic growth in 2017 was estimated at 1 percent. Various forecasts, including by the World Bank in January 2018, project growth in 2018 in the 2.5 percent range.

In narratives about development issues and challenges, the perceived and actual economic and social divides between Nigeria's North and South have particular political, as well as material, importance. These are in significant measure a legacy of British colonial policies that involved differential approaches, notably indirect rule through local authorities in the North versus direct rule in the South. Post-colonial developments have, if anything, accentuated the divides and associated tensions. The disparities have links to Nigeria's religious composition (predominantly Muslim in the North, majority Christian in the South), though these links are complex and contested (see Chapter 3).

There is general consensus on challenges facing Nigeria, though with nuances among priorities and framing. Nigerian blog site *Naijaquest* presents a popular view of the top 10 social problems:<sup>33</sup>

1. *National Identity*. “Nigeria still struggles with having a national identity given her differences.”
2. *Poverty*. “Over 70 percent of the Nigerian population lives below two US dollars a day.”

3. *Corruption*. “Corruption can be said to be a cankerworm that has eaten deeply into the fabric of the country. From the leaders to the followers majority have their hands deep in corruption.”
4. *Inequality*. “The ethnic groups are not treated with equity. This causes conflict and enmity which can lead to destruction of lives and property.”
5. *Terrorism*. “Terrorism attacks such as the Boko Haram insurgency has destroyed a lot of lives and property.”
6. *High child mortality rate*. “Due to the high level of poverty in the country, a lot of children die of malnutrition, diseases, and the like.”
7. *High unemployment rate*. “The number of unemployed persons is continuously on the rise. The hope of getting a job after graduation for the average Nigerian is growing dimmer by the day.”
8. *Low standard of education*. “Education for the average Nigerian child is nothing to write home about.”
9. *Tribalism*. “Nigerians find it hard to accept each other because of their different ethnic groups.”
10. *Domestic violence*. “This is a major cause of social problems in Nigeria.”

Challenges emerging from WFDD's analysis (thus viewed through a religious lens) include:

- *Insecurity*: assuring security and addressing insecurity's root causes; this includes weaknesses in rule of law as well as physical insecurity
- An urgent and large *humanitarian crisis* where famine and insecurity are tightly linked
- *Narrow economic base* (heavy dependence on oil) and need for diversification; low *taxation* limits revenues to implement policies
- *Youth bulge*: with particular ramifications for the challenge of high unemployment and combating radicalization
- *Engaging Nigeria's dynamic diaspora communities* systematically in development
- Issues around *women's status*
- *Environmental degradation*
- *Population growth* that outstrips development progress: over the last 50 years, Nigeria's population grew from 53.5 million to over 190 million
- *Nigeria's regional roles* (*West Africa, Africa*), in political and social terms
- *Nigeria's role in the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC)*

## OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES

A long series of development plans and programs since Nigeria's independence have aimed to reflect and direct national strategies. The most recent, the Economic Recovery

and Growth Plan (ERGP), developed by President Muhammadu Buhari’s government, covers the years 2017 to 2021. A government question and answer format (Box 4) highlights practical and ethical issues underlying current official development strategies. ERGP is squarely focused on restoring economic growth, while leveraging “the ingenuity and resilience of the Nigerian people.”

## DEVELOPMENT PARTNERSHIPS

Nigeria has benefitted from financial and technical assistance from partner countries

and agencies over the years (albeit with interruptions and ups and down), much on concessional terms. However, there is a growing awareness that such flows will not continue indefinitely and that as a middle-income country, Nigeria will benefit from less concessional aid. Since Nigeria has been quite dependent on such aid, with low domestic resource mobilization, this presents an increasingly urgent challenge.

Nigeria benefits at present from significant assistance from leading transnational organizations, both multilateral and bilateral. There are also important private aid

### BOX 4: ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND GROWTH PLAN

*From Frequently Asked Questions<sup>34</sup>*

The following Question and Answer presentation highlights Nigerian government perspectives on development strategies, especially as linked to the ERGP, linking it to the SDGs. The framework is that “the economy is likely to remain on a path of steady and steep decline if nothing is done to change the negative trajectory”, so that the ERGP is to tackle the causes of the recession and “ultimately change the national economic trajectory in a fundamental way.” The ERGP “builds on existing sectoral strategies and plans such as the National Industrial Revolution Plan, and the Nigeria Integrated Infrastructure Master Plan” and strengthens successful components of these previous strategies and plans. Central objectives are defined as: “sustained inclusive growth to consolidate national cohesion; a structural economic transformation; improving efficiency in both public and private sector; increasing national productivity; achieving sustainable diversification of production; to significantly grow the economy and achieving maximum welfare for the citizens by ensuring food and energy security.” ERGP focuses on agriculture (national self-sufficiency in rice and wheat), *energy sufficiency* (power and petroleum products), *transportation infrastructure*, and driving *industrialization focusing on Small and Medium Scale Enterprises*. Creative industries, especially music and film, are seen as having great growth potential, as do both financial services and tourism.

*Q: In which values or ideology is the ERGP rooted?*

The ERGP is rooted in the core values that define the Nigerian society as enshrined in the 1999 Constitution namely discipline, integrity, dignity of labour, social justice, religious tolerance, self-reliance and patriotism. It requires all citizens and stakeholders to adhere to these principles...

*Q: What are the main priorities for economic recovery and growth*

A: To achieve the objectives of the ERGP, the key execution priorities are:

*Stabilizing the macroeconomic environment* with low inflation, stable exchange rates and sustainable fiscal and external balances. This will be achieved by aligning monetary, trade and fiscal policies in a coherent manner and effective coordination. Non-oil revenue will be accelerated through improved tax and Customs administration and the introduction of tax on luxury items. Cost-cutting measures will be pursued through rationalization of overheads and recurrent expenditures and sub-national fiscal coordination.

*Q: What are the tools that will drive the achievement of those objectives?*

A: This Plan will use science, technology and innovation to drive growth. It also provides a blueprint for laying the foundation for future generations by focusing on building the capabilities of the youths of Nigeria to be able to take the country into the future.

*Q: Is the Plan designed to resolve the major impediments to economic growth such as fuel and power shortages?*

A: Yes. The Plan has provisions for tackling impediments to economic growth in Nigeria, especially fuel scarcity, unstable power supply, high cost of transportation, scarcity of foreign exchange, unfriendly business regulations and shortage of requisite skills and appropriate technology.

*Q: Is the Government the sole driver of the ERGP or is there a role for the private sector in achieving the objectives of the Plan?*

A: Government cannot do it alone. The Plan will leverage the power of the private sector to effectively achieve the desired economic recovery and transformative growth. It is essential to harness the dynamism of business and the entrepreneurial acumen of Nigerians, ranging from the MSMEs to the large domestic and multinational corporations to achieve the objectives of this Plan. The Plan prioritizes the provision of a more business friendly economic environment. Additionally, the Plan prioritizes the use of the market as a means of resource allocation, where appropriate. However, the Plan also recognizes the need to strengthen regulatory oversight to minimize market abuse.

*Q: As market forces interplay to allocate resources within a framework of regulatory oversight, are there specific measures to cater for and protect the most vulnerable segment of the society?*

A: Yes. There are specific measures to cater for and protect the vulnerable in the society. The ERGP will increase social inclusion by creating jobs and providing support for the poorest and most vulnerable members of society by investing in social programs and providing social amenities. Targeted programs will reduce regional inequalities, especially in the North East and Niger Delta. Furthermore, the ERGP will improve the accessibility, affordability and quality of healthcare and will roll out the National Health Insurance Scheme across the entire country


*Q: The youth constitute a large proportion of the population. What is there for them in the ERGP?*

A: Youth empowerment is a major component of the ERGP. Interventions to create jobs, especially among youth, are part of the ERGP. The ERGP prioritizes job creation through the adoption of jobs and skills program, including deepening existing N-Power programs and encouraging procuring made-in-Nigeria goods that were produced using local content and labour intensive production processes. All initiatives under job creation would prioritize youths as beneficiaries. Therefore, all capacity building and skills acquisition interventions will be targeted at youth-dominated sectors such as ICT, creative industries and services. Moreover, concerted efforts would be made to encourage youths to venture into other labour intensive sectors such as agriculture and construction.

Table 2.2: Nigeria, Official Development Aid (ODA) flows 2014–2016<sup>35</sup>

	2014	2015	2016
Net ODA (US\$million)	2478.6	2431.5	2500.7
Share bilateral	42.8	44.9	46.2

Figure 2.1: Top Ten Donors of Gross ODA for Nigeria, 2015–6 average, US\$ million<sup>36</sup>



flows. Debt relief has been a key theme in partner relationships in recent years. Table 2.2 shows OECD/DAC aid flows to Nigeria (note that non DAC aid, including for example from China, is not included). Figure 2.1 shows the largest aid partners.

Abimbola Akosila, a Nigerian journalist, describes Nigeria’s relationship to official development assistance in graphic terms: “Nigeria is hooked on aid, especially foreign aid. And like a junkie who is hooked on both cheap and expensive dangerous drugs, the country is not willing to let go of the delicious thrill obtained from continuous free external support for her development process.”<sup>37</sup> From the 1960s until the present day, “Nigeria’s “socio-economic progress in critical social sectors like health, education, poverty alleviation, and infrastructural development has largely been bolstered by billions of dollars from grants, soft loans and donor funding from abroad.” However, Nigeria faces a downward trend in donors’ resources, including recent decisions by some partners, notably the European Union, to withdraw funding for social sectors. An underlying argument advanced by many, Nigerian and others alike, is that Nigeria, with the wealth of natural resources, should have enough resources to meet her developmental needs.

Highlights of strategies of leading partners are summarized below. There is considerable consistency in diagnosis of priority issues, though operational priorities are quite distinct.

The [World Bank’s Country Partnership Strategy FY14–FY17](#) (CPS, endorsed by the executive directors in September 2013) highlights several assistance priorities:<sup>38</sup>

- Promoting diversified growth and job creation.
- Increasing opportunities for youth, women, and the poor, particularly in marginalized areas.

- Improving the quality and efficiency of social service delivery at the state level to promote social inclusion.
- Strengthening governance and public sector management with gender equity and conflict sensitivity as essential elements of governance.
- Restoring macroeconomic resilience and growth through development policy financing and performance-based lending.
- Increasing agricultural productivity and access to finance for the sector.
- Enhancing engagement in conflict-affected northeast Nigeria;
- Addressing service delivery gaps, livelihood deficits, and social cohesion issues.
- Advancing structural reforms for private sector-led, non-oil growth;
- Increasing engagement in the climate resilient agenda.

Nigeria has significant, if complex, relationships with the [International Monetary Fund \(IMF\)](#). An IMF Article IV Consultation mission that visited Nigeria in December 2017 issued a guarded report on economic management and prospects:<sup>39</sup>

“The authorities have begun addressing macroeconomic imbalances and structural impediments through the implementation of policies underpinning the Economic Recovery and Growth Plan (ERGP). Supported by recovering oil prices, the new Investor and Exporter foreign exchange window has increased investor confidence and provided impetus to portfolio inflows, which have helped to increase external buffers to a four-year high, and contributed to reducing the parallel market premium. Important actions under the Power Sector Recovery Program increased power supply generation and ensured government agencies pay their electricity bills. Welcome steps were also taken to improve the business environment and to address longstanding corruption issues, including through the adoption of the National Anti-Corruption Strategy in August 2017.

“However, in the absence of new policies, the near-term outlook remains challenging. Growth is expected to continue to pick up in 2018 to 2.1 percent, helped by the full year impact of greater availability of foreign exchange and higher oil production, but to stay relatively flat in the medium term. Risks to the outlook include lower oil prices, tighter external market conditions, heightened security issues, and delayed policy responses.

“Containing vulnerabilities and achieving growth rates that can make a significant dent in reducing poverty and unemployment requires a comprehensive set of policy measures.”

The [African Development Bank \(ADB\)](#) gives special importance to food security in its country strategy:<sup>40</sup>

“Of the 9.6 million people in need of food and nutrition assistance in the Sahel and West Africa (March–May 2017), some 7.1 million live in Nigeria: 3.2 million in Borno

State, 800,000 in Adamawa State and 600 000 in Yobe State and the rest in other northern states. Some 44,000 more Nigerians currently face the threat of famine, mostly in Borno State.”

**U.K. Department for International Development (DFID)** has deep and long roots in Nigeria. The planned budget for 2018/2019 is 235 million pounds.

An excerpt reflects strategic issues around the partnership:<sup>41</sup>

“Nigeria is Africa’s biggest country by population and its second largest economy. It has the world’s 10th largest proven oil reserves and the 9th largest natural gas reserves. The UK-Nigeria trade relationship was worth £4 billion in 2015 and has the potential to grow significantly in future. Nigeria is therefore a significant trade and investment partner for the UK in Africa.

*“However, Nigeria faces a number of challenges to its future growth and development. Conflict continues to affect its oil-rich delta region and there is a violent Islamist insurgency in its north-east, which has caused a humanitarian crisis. Despite significant natural resources, around a third of Nigerians (60 million) live below the national poverty line with around another third just above; many of them are highly vulnerable and at risk of being trafficked to the UK. The government of Nigeria is taking the lead to tackle these issues, but struggles with corruption as well as the capacity and resources necessary. The UK is focused on helping Nigeria overcome these challenges.”*

Box 5 presents German development strategies.

In the **United States Agency for International Development (USAID)** 2015-2017 Integrated Country Strategy, the U.S. Government Mission in Nigeria identified four priority goals: to improve governance, further economic development, enhance stability, and expand opportunity.<sup>46</sup>

**The Islamic Development Bank Group (IDBG)** formally opened its Nigeria Country Gateway Office in Abuja with a mission to focus its services on health, agriculture, infrastructure, small and medium-scale enterprise, and regional integration.<sup>47</sup> The education sector, particularly bilingual education, is among its priority service areas, as a key tool to counter extremism. “These are what we aspire to do as IDB Group and what we stand for,” its president, Ahmad Ali, said in his statement at the opening ceremony in Abuja. Opening the office in Nigeria was to reinforce the cooperation between IDBG and Nigeria as the largest member in Africa. The group’s presence in Nigeria, he said, would strengthen socioeconomic, technical, and commercial cooperation between the bank and member countries in Africa. While expecting Nigeria to play a key role in realizing these objectives, Ali highlighted the importance of the completion of the last portion of Trans-Sahara Highway linking Algiers in North Africa and Lagos.

**BOX 5: GERMANY/GIZ DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE**

GIZ has worked in Nigeria since 1974, with the framework based on a bilateral agreement between the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Federal Republic of Germany. GIZ has maintained a country office in Abuja since 2004. A federally owned enterprise, the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) supports the German government in achieving its objectives for international cooperation for sustainable development. GIZ offers “workable, sustainable and effective solutions in political, economic and social change processes.”<sup>42</sup> It aims to “enhanc[e] the capacities of individuals, organizations, and societies” and aid the Nigerian government “to articulate, negotiate and implement its ideas for reform and development.”<sup>43</sup> GIZ is guided by the principle of sustainability. Accordingly, “only by combining social responsibility, ecological balance, political participation and economic capability will current and future generations be able to lead secured and dignified lives.”<sup>44</sup>

“Nigeria is Africa’s largest economy. With a population of over 177 million people, an abundance of natural resources, and a diversifying economy, Nigeria is not only a regional power but is set to become an increasingly important player in Africa and the world. However, Nigeria faces major challenges. So far, its substantial oil revenues have had little impact on poverty, as more than two-thirds of the population still live in extreme poverty. Of recent, falling oil-prices, a devaluating currency, slow job creation and rising inflation remain major concerns.

“As agreed between the Nigerian and German Governments, GIZ’s activities since 2002 have focused mainly on sustainable economic development and energy. The ‘Pro-poor Growth and Employment Promotion in Nigeria’ (SEDIN) program aims to increase employment and income generation for Micro, Small and Medium-

sized Enterprises, and to improve access to financial services. The program is currently being implemented in Abuja and in Niger, Ogun and Plateau states.

“In the energy field, GIZ provides advisory services to Nigerian partners on how to improve conditions for access to, application of and investments in renewable energy, energy efficiency and rural electrification.

“GIZ also engages in education, security, agriculture and regional integration. Apart from a program to support National Police structures, GIZ is assisting the Nigerian Government’s Safe Schools Initiative, which aims to provide schooling for students affected by the insurgency in the country’s North-East.

“GIZ supports the Nigerian component of a global program improving income, employment and food security in the agricultural sector.

“On the regional level, GIZ supports the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Commission in the areas of organizational development; trade and customs policy; and peace and security. Two regional agricultural programs support the competitiveness and market access of rice and cocoa smallholders, providing sustainable improvements in the livelihoods and food security of poor farmers.

“A distinctive feature of GIZ’s activities in Nigeria is the high level of financial contributions obtained from other sources - primarily the European Union (EU) and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. These funds make it possible to broaden the scope and intensity of the programs being implemented, thereby boosting the effectiveness of German Development Cooperation with Nigeria.”<sup>45</sup>

**The Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria** highlights its Nigeria focus: “Nigeria is one of the biggest Global Fund investments. Despite varied health challenges, the country registered successes in its swift response to the Ebola epidemic of 2014, as well as its near elimination of polio. Nigeria used an existing surveillance system for polio to trace all people who had come in contact with the people infected with Ebola, stopping the outbreak. The country faces significant health challenges, with malaria remaining one of the most significant challenges. Despite significant progress made in increasing coverage of long-lasting insecticidal mosquito nets over the last decade, Nigeria contributes more than a quarter of the global burden of malaria. The country has the world’s fourth-largest TB burden. Given these challenges, Nigeria needs more investment in health both from domestic and international sources.”<sup>48</sup> Table 2.3 summarizes Global Fund Investments to date:<sup>49</sup>

Table 2.3 Global Fund Investments In Nigeria			
Component	Signed	Committed	Disbursed
HIV/AIDS	US\$837,896,113	US\$754,845,665	US\$721,037,647
Tuberculosis	US\$300,724,121	US\$245,997,701	US\$245,997,701
Malaria	US\$1,314,206,788	US\$994,354,439	US\$950,531,723
Other	US\$20,975,288	US\$20,975,288	US\$20,975,288
Total	US\$2,473,802,310	US\$2,016,173,094	US\$1,938,542,360

DEVELOPMENT AND RELIGION

The review of major partner strategies identified few references to religious institutions as contributors or impediments to development efforts and policies, and little to no robust analyses of religious dimensions of development strategies and challenges.

CHAPTER 3: NIGERIA’S RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE

Nigerians are notably religious by various measures (for example, high numbers of people reporting that religion is very important in their lives) compared to other countries. The religious landscape is remarkably complex and dynamic; there are large numbers of distinct congregations and communities, which change significantly over time. Several umbrella organizations (interreligious and intrareligious) purport to represent religious bodies overall or specific religious communities (Christianity or Islam) or regions. However, it is difficult to assess how far they represent the spectrum of institutions and beliefs, or their impact. Nigeria is one of the few countries whose populations are roughly evenly divided between the world’s two largest religious communities, Islam and Christianity. This feature figures quite prominently in narratives about Nigeria’s religious landscape and carries special political significance as it drives efforts to identify and “balance” the two communities.

Commentaries on Nigeria’s religious landscape highlight uncertainties surrounding basic data; statistics around religion are unreliable, partial, and contested. This is in part due to politically motivated decisions not to include questions about religious affiliation in national censuses.

A general operational consensus holds that Nigeria’s population is roughly equally divided between Muslims and Christians (though again the academic consensus is that Muslims in fact are more numerous than Christians). The tacit assumption of equal numbers underlies a general strategy aimed at “balance.” Northern Nigeria is predominately Muslim, with substantial Christian minorities in several states. Nigerian Islam is far from monolithic, with several distinct Sufi orders, small Shi’a communities, and Salafi interpretations of Islam reflected in various movements. International influences are important, both historically and presently. The Boko Haram insurgency is the best known of several radical Islamic movements. Christian denominations include Catholics (about a quarter of Christians); Anglicans and other “mainline” Protestants; African Instituted (or Initiated or Independent) Churches; and a host of decentralized Pentecostal churches (often termed “born agains”), whose numbers and roles



Grand Mosque in Abuja;  
Photo Credit: Flickr user Mark Fische

have shown remarkable and continuing growth, especially since the 1980s. The prosperity gospel, which many of the latter propound, links wealth to religious adherence. Extremist views among some churches and leaders are quite common. Likewise there are widespread concerns—reflected in a barrage of press commentary—about the political influence of religious leaders and ostentatious displays of wealth of some among them.

Traditional religious beliefs remain a powerful influence, but statistics are especially weak on numbers and impact, in part because for many Nigerians traditional beliefs and practices and their adherence to Christian or Muslim communities are both important.<sup>50</sup> There are communities of other global traditions (for example Hindu, Baha’i, and Buddhist), but the numbers are quite small.

Nigerians are proud of a history of religious tolerance; however, religious tensions are a notable feature of the contemporary scene, especially in the North and Middle Belt. The origins of those tensions and how they play out are the subject of extensive analysis and fierce debate: in essence, how far do the various conflicts that affect Nigeria, especially

### BOX 6: INTERFAITH CHALLENGES

The following editorial commentary describes tensions (“a storm”) within a central Nigerian interreligious entity.<sup>51</sup>

“The Nigeria Inter-Religious Council (NIREC) is an independent union voluntarily formed by the leaders of the nation’s two recognised religious faiths – Christianity and Islam. It is composed of 50 members, made up of 25 Christian and 25 Muslim leaders and co-chaired by the Sultan of Sokoto, the leader of the Muslims in Nigeria and his counterpart, the President of the Christian Association of Nigeria.

“When leaders of the two groups came together to form this organisation in 1999, former President, Olusegun Obasanjo, was very supportive because he saw it as a very good thing. One of its cardinal mandates is to provide a platform for regular interaction and understanding between leaders of the two faiths to reduce the religious conflicts that have bedeviled the nation down the decades.

“The Council carried on very well in the past sixteen years until recently. It has organised seminars on conflict management and resolution, international relations and terrorism and offering advice to government on ways of governing to impact positively on the lives of people. In fact, as

recently as the first quarter of 2013, NIREC had perfected plans to organise a youth summit to sensitise our young ones to the need for mutual peaceful co-existence.

“However, it seems the National Conference organised during the President Goodluck Jonathan administration drove a wedge between the Christian and Muslim leaders of the Council. While the Muslim Leaders, with Ishaq Oloyede as spokesman, complained that the Conference was skewed against the interest of Muslims, his counterpart, Sunny Oibe, retorting that Sultan Sa’ad Abubakar (III) has frustrated attempts to convene meetings of the Council until the tenure of his co-chair, Pastor Ayo Oritsejafor ends.

“The effects of Boko Haram terrorism has also heightened suspicion between the two sides, with Oibe saying that most Northern Muslim leaders are secret supporters of the terrorists.

“Though the Council has not been able to stop religious conflicts, one of its clear benefits is that it has helped to arrest the possibility of reprisal attacks since Boko Haram went haywire in 2011. Though their interfaces have not always been smooth, at least that they meet is beneficial.”

the Boko Haram insurgency and tensions in the Middle Belt, have religious roots? Clearly, religious beliefs per se are intricately mingled with historical narratives, economic factors, competitive politics, and, perhaps above other reasons, the interplay of religious adherence and ethnicity. Some commentators see different divides, whether along ethnic, class, or regional lines, accentuated by differing religious identities. They emphasize also that once religious dimensions enter the picture, tensions can be more difficult to address. Other observers see the religious manifestations of conflicts as pretexts, fueled by irresponsible political leaders. Religious factors clearly play significant roles in the polarized politics of Nigeria and in underlying power dynamics. Many point to a Muslim concern about secular or Christian domination of politics and economics, while some Christian denominations likewise fear Muslim domination. Various narratives portray either Muslims or Christians in demonic terms, with such fears exacerbated and fueled both by social media and political rhetoric.

A host of intra- and interreligious efforts have emerged, prompted especially by interreligious tensions in Nigeria. Some have achieved significant results, others less so (Box 6 and Chapter 7). Efforts focus on areas with the most acute conflicts, notably the Middle Belt. Several interreligious initiatives focus specifically on development challenges, for example the Nigerian Interfaith Action Association’s (NIFAA) work on health. Efforts following the polio vaccine crisis to bring together groups around improving healthcare, and long-standing work to curtail the HIV/AIDS epidemic, are examples of interfaith work centered on pragmatic common approaches to shared problems.

## NATIONAL CONTEXT: ISSUES INVOLVING RELIGION

Several issues related to religious institutions and roles have particular relevance for development work. Topics which relate to the legal regime and its application are briefly introduced below:

- a) Constitutional status
- b) Religion and customary law
- c) Religious freedom issues
- d) Indigeneity

### BOX 7: RELIGION IN NIGERIA’S CONSTITUTION

Constitution of Nigeria, Article 38: Freedom of Religion<sup>52</sup>

(1) Every person shall be entitled to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, including freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom (either alone or in community with others, and in public or in private) to manifest and propagate his religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice and observance.

(2) No person attending any place of education shall be required to receive religious instruction or to take part in or attend any religious ceremony or observance if such instruction ceremony or observance relates to a religion other than his own, or religion not approved by his parent or guardian.

(3) No religious community or denomination shall be prevented from providing religious instruction for pupils of that community or denomination in any place of education maintained wholly by that community or denomination.

(4) Nothing in this section shall entitle any person to form, take part in the activity or be a member of a secret society.

Nigeria’s constitution (1999) explicitly guarantees freedom of religion (Box 7). However, there are important complexities affecting religious institutions and practices. These include legal pluralism arising from different legal traditions or legal cultures, pluralism linked to differences in law among states, and pluralism arising from Nigeria’s history (Box 8). These have given rise to concerns reflected in U.S. government assessments of religious freedom (Box 9). The issue of indigeneity affects intergroup relations at the state level (Box 10).

The U.S. Commission on Religious Freedom took a stronger position than the State Department recommending that the U.S. government designate Nigeria as a “country of particular concern (CPC)”:<sup>55</sup>

“Religious freedom conditions in Nigeria remained poor during the reporting period. The Nigerian government at the federal and state levels continued to repress the Shi’a Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN), including holding IMN leader Sheikh Ibrahim

**BOX 8: RELIGION AND LAW**

Legal pluralism in Nigeria is complex, taking three distinct forms. These are outlined in “*Religious and Customary Laws in Nigeria*.”<sup>53</sup>

“First, there is the legal pluralism arising from the multifarious legal traditions or legal cultures in the country. Laws in Nigeria are derived from three distinct laws or legal systems: customary law, Islamic law, and English-style laws. Customary law is indigenous to Nigeria with each of the various ethnic groups in the country having its own distinctive customary law. Islam was common by the end of the eighteenth century and subsequently emerged as state law in the Kanem-Bornu and Sokoto Caliphates, which now constitute northern Nigeria. Within the caliphates, there were large pockets of non-Muslim peoples to whom customary law, not Islamic law, applied and still applies. Islam also penetrated into the south, but apart from some isolated instances, there was no state enforcement of Islamic law in the precolonial south. The English laws owe their antecedents in the country to colonialism. Apart from the common law that formed the nucleus of received English law, many statutory laws in both the colonial and postcolonial era would be included among English-style laws simply because the laws are largely reflective of English laws.

“The second form of legal pluralism in the country

arises from the country’s federal system, whereby the federal and state governments share legislative power. This has resulted in differences between federal and state laws as well as differences among the individual states’ laws. For example, federal laws govern statutory marriages, while state laws govern Islamic and customary law marriages.

“The third expression of legal pluralism in the country is connected to the country’s political history. Colonial authorities administered the northern and southern protectorates separately until their amalgamation in 1914. With the introduction of regionalism in 1954, the country was divided into three regions: northern, western, and eastern. These regions had a large measure of autonomy and thus developed along slightly different lines. Despite the subsequent creation of states beginning in 1967 (Nigeria now has thirty-six states and a Federal Capital Territory), this regionalism holds the key to understanding the current legal arrangements in the country. Until the regions were broken into states, uniform laws applied in each of the regions. Today, the bulk of the laws in the states owe their origin to the era of regionalism. Uniformity of laws in the northern states, particularly regarding Islamic and customary laws, continued largely until 1999, when twelve of the nineteen states in the north adopted Islamic law as the basic source of laws in their states in a largely uniform manner.”

**BOX 9: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: LEGAL FRAMEWORK**

*Excerpted from the U.S. State Department’s 2016 Report on International Religious Freedom: Nigeria*<sup>54</sup>

“The constitution [1999] stipulates neither the federal nor the state governments shall establish a state religion and prohibits discrimination on religious grounds. It provides for freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, including the freedom to change religion and to manifest and propagate religion “in worship, teaching, practice, and observance,” provided these rights are consistent with the interests of defense, public safety, order, morality, or health, and protecting the rights of others. The constitution also states it shall be the duty of the state to encourage interfaith marriages and to promote the formation of associations that cut across religious lines and promote “national integration.” It prohibits political parties that limit membership on the basis of religion or with names that have a religious connotation.

“The constitution provides for state-level courts based on common or customary law systems, which have operated in the region for centuries. It specifically recognizes sharia courts of appeal in any states that require it, with jurisdiction over civil proceedings such as marriage, inheritance, and other family matters, where all the parties are Muslims. Sharia courts hear criminal cases in 12 northern states. State laws on sharia criminal courts vary, but at least one state, Zamfara, requires that criminal cases in which all litigants are Muslim be heard in sharia courts. According to state laws, sharia courts may pass sentences based on the sharia penal code, including *hudood* offenses (serious criminal offenses with punishments prescribed in the Qur’an) and prescribe punishments, such as caning, amputation, and death by stoning. State laws dictate non-Muslims have the option to try their cases in sharia courts if involved in civil or criminal disputes with Muslims. Common law courts hear the cases of non-Muslims and Muslims (in states where they have the option) who choose not to use sharia courts. Sharia courts do not have the authority to compel participation by non-Muslims. Aggrieved parties can appeal sharia court judgments to three levels of sharia appellate courts. According to the constitution, decisions by the state sharia courts of appeal (the highest level of the sharia courts) theoretically can be appealed to the Federal Court of Appeal and then to the Supreme Court, although none has been.

“Kano and Zamfara’s state-sanctioned Hisbah Boards regulate Islamic religious affairs and preaching, distribute licenses to imams, and attempt to resolve religious disputes between Muslims in those states. The states of Bauchi, Borno, Katsina, and Yobe maintain state-level Christian and Muslim religious affairs ministries or bureaus with varying mandates and authorities, while many other state governors appoint interfaith special advisers on religious affairs.

“Registration of religious groups is required for groups to build places of worship, open bank accounts, receive tax exemptions, or sign contracts. Religious groups planning to build places of worship must register with the Corporate Affairs Commission as an incorporated trustee, which involves submitting an application form, proof of public notice, a copy of the organization’s constitution, a list of trustees, and a fee of 20,000 naira (\$66).

“Both federal and state governments have the authority to regulate mandatory religious instruction in public schools. The constitution states schools may not require students to receive religious instruction or to participate in or attend any religious ceremony or observance pertaining to any religion other than their own. State officials and many religious leaders have stated students have the right to request a teacher of their own religious beliefs to provide an alternative to any instruction offered in a religion other than their own. The constitution also says no religious community will be prevented from providing religious instruction to students of that community in any place maintained wholly by that community.

“Several states have laws requiring licenses for preachers, places of worship, and religious schools of registered religious groups. A Katsina State law establishes a board with the authority to regulate Islamic schools, preachers, and mosques, including issuing permits, suspending operations, and imprisoning or fining violators. The Katsina law stipulates a punishment of one to five years in prison and/or a fine of up to 500,000 naira (\$1,600) for operating without a license.

“The country is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.”

Zakzaky without charge, imposing state-level bans on the group’s activities, and failing to hold accountable Nigerian Army officers who used excessive force against IMN members in December 2015. Sectarian violence between predominately Muslim herders and predominately Christian farmers increased, and the Nigerian federal government failed to implement effective strategies to prevent or stop such violence or to hold perpetrators accountable... Finally, other religious freedom abuses continue at the state level. Based on these concerns, in 2017 USCIRF again finds that Nigeria merits designation as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, under the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA), as it has found since 2009. Nigeria has the capacity to improve religious freedom conditions by more fully and effectively addressing religious freedom concerns, and will only realize respect for human rights, security, stability, and economic prosperity if it does so.”

*Religious Landscape*

*The Country Profile: Nigeria*,<sup>57</sup> developed by the Harvard Divinity School Religious

Literacy Project, provides a comprehensive account of the “state of the art” on Nigeria’s religious landscape, including historical legacies and contemporary religious movements. It explores significant issues, including links to economic policies. It presents case studies on health and peacebuilding.

The following sections highlight issues with special significance for appreciating religious roles for the design and implementation of Nigeria’s development programs. These include specific tensions around the roles of Islam in society and government, accentuated by the Boko Haram insurgency and its direct assault on “Western-style” education, and the complex dynamics linked to the rise of Pentecostal Christianity. The many social roles of religious institutions are marked by the active roles of religious communities at the grassroots level, as well as by active, complex, and shifting roles of religious institutions in service delivery—notably in health and education—and as a core part of social safety nets—for example, care of vulnerable children and orphans. Box 11 introduces leading Islamic actors. Box 12 focuses specifically on Boko Haram. Box 13 summarizes the complex Christian landscape. Box 14 introduces a specific Christian

**BOX 10: INDIGENEITY AND IDENTITY<sup>56</sup>**

A long-standing challenge with distinctive Nigerian features is policies on indigeneity. The topic is primarily about ethnic identity. However, since ethnic and religious identities are often linked, it has religious ramifications. This issue is of special concern because it is closely linked to conflicts and to basic questions of identity and equal justice.

An “indigene” is a person who belongs to the group of people who were the original inhabitants of a particular place and who therefore claim to be its rightful “owners.” Every Nigerian is either an indigene or a non-indigene of the place where they live, and controversies about what this means—in policy, law, and practice—date back to before independence and continue to this day. Because the lines between indigene and non-indigene are drawn along ethnic or cultural lines, a non-indigene cannot in practice become an indigene. Many in Nigeria are considered non-indigenes, even though they can trace their connection to the land they occupy back more than a century.

The concept of “indigeneity” is highly significant for the lives of all Nigerians. State and local governments throughout Nigeria—along with, to

a lesser extent, the federal government—have implemented policies that deny many people of the rights and opportunities guaranteed to all Nigerians by the country’s constitution to anyone who cannot prove that they are indigenes. State and local governments have free rein to pick who is an indigene. Abuse of the label can foster deep socioeconomic inequalities, since indigenes benefit from preferential access to land, schools, development spending, and public jobs. Further, Nigeria’s parallel system of traditional governance includes chieftaincies and emirates. Traditional leaders generally represent only their own ethnic communities. They are recognized by the government, but are not elected in the same manner as government officials; they are selected according to different traditions in different communities. Despite not holding formal positions in the government, they wield considerable political influence, especially at the local level.

Controversies arise around where the lines between indigene and settler are drawn. Many non-indigene communities dispute the interpretations of history that label them as second-comers. Others refuse to accept their second-class status because after

generations or centuries of continuous residence, their communities simply cannot “trace their roots” back to where they may belong. Being classified as a non-indigene can mean exclusion from any real prospect of socioeconomic advancement. Disputes around indigeneity have fueled some of Nigeria’s bloodiest episodes of intercommunal violence in recent years. These conflicts may be growing deadlier and more numerous with time.

The indigene-settler distinction reinforces and is reinforced by other identity-based divides in Nigeria. These differences in ethnicity, language, religion, and culture can be longstanding and deeply felt, but how they factor into violence is not well understood. Poor law enforcement responses also help entrench violence between indigenes and settlers. Official complicity and indifference make prosecutions rare. Destructive conduct by the Nigerian security forces itself often becomes a structural cause of violence.

The issues reflect Nigeria’s complex ethnic geography, which is exacerbated by a long history of mobility. Tensions are especially live in Nigeria’s Middle Belt region. There, many Christian minority groups have a historical tradition of resistance to

conquest, oppression, and frequent slave raids by the more powerful Hausa states to their north. As Nigeria’s people tend to be divided along religious lines, the boundaries between Muslim and Christian often overlap with significant ethnic and cultural divides.

These divisions are linked to frequent episodes of intercommunal violence that have plagued Nigeria since independence. Most dramatically, violent North-South ethnic tensions helped drive forward the events that ultimately dragged Nigeria into the Biafran civil war—a conflict estimated to have claimed between one and three million lives. Nigeria has been unable to resolve ongoing patterns of intercommunal violence that have sparked hundreds of clashes and claimed thousands of lives.

Serious thought about how to prevent or resolve indigene-settler violence has barely started in Nigeria. Addressing inequality between indigenes and settlers calls for micro-level analyses of local economic dysfunctions and opportunities, along with real official commitment to make and enforce better policies.

## BOX 11: ISLAMIC ACTORS IN NORTHEASTERN NIGERIA<sup>58</sup>

The interactions of various cultures, notably colored by the introduction and spread of Islam, have played vital roles in state formation in northeastern Nigeria. An extensive process of Islamization and growing diplomatic contacts with the Muslim world began with the declaration of Islam as the official state religion in Kanem Borno in 1096 CE.

There is significant diversity amongst Muslims in the six northeastern Nigerian states of Borno, Yobe, Adamawa, Gombe, Bauchi, and Taraba. Traditionally the Sunni practice has been considered the predominant form of Islam in northeastern Nigeria. Among Sunni Muslims, the Tijaniyya today is the region's major Sunni Sufi order. The Quadiriyya, the first Maliki Sufi order to arrive in West Africa, are also present but less influential in the region. Other Sufi groups include Muhammadiyya, which has more limited coverage and is confined to Gombe State and the small village of Wiringile-Bajoga in Borno State. Unlike other Sufi orders in Nigeria, the Muhammadiyya group is relatively secluded from the wider society.

Jama'atu Izalatul Bid'a wa Ikamatu Sunna (JIBWIS), or Izala school of thought, is Sunni but distinct from Sufism. It has posed significant challenges to the practices of the Sufi orders. It is present across the northeast.

The so-called "Neutral Muslims," often categorized as Sunni, are a group of individual Muslims who choose to practice Islam without aligning themselves to the main Islamic groups. They are found in all six states.

Shi'ite Muslims are often treated as religious outcasts in northeastern Nigeria. Amongst the Shi'ites, two prominent groups are the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN), which is present throughout the region and particularly in Yobe and Baucha States, and the Rasulul A'azam Foundatino (RAAF), strongest in Gombe and Bauchi States. The two differ in their stance on the government, with IMN unsupportive of the Nigerian state, seeing it as secular in nature, and RAAF regarding the state as legitimate.

Other Muslim groups that do not fall under the Sunni and Shi'ite groups are difficult to classify using conventional Islamic group classification. The most prominent include the Maitatsine, the Quraniyyun, the Yoruba Islamic Groups, and the Jama'atu Ahlul Sunna li Da'awati wal Jihad, more commonly known as Boko Haram.

denomination as an illustration. Box 15 introduces several prominent Nigerian religious leaders. Box 16 introduces the phenomenon of Nigeria's Pentecostal revolution by means of a review of a recent book on the topic. Box 17 explores the significance of charismatic Christian movements in Nigeria, including roles of media.

## BOX 12: BOKO HARAM<sup>59</sup>

*Excerpted from CFR Backgrounder<sup>60</sup>*

Boko Haram, an Islamist militant group, has attacked Nigeria's police and army, politicians, schools, religious buildings, public institutions, and civilians, with increasing regularity since 2009. More than ten thousand people have been killed in Boko Haram-related violence, and 1.5 million have been displaced. Some experts view the group as an armed revolt against government corruption, abusive security forces, and widening regional economic disparity. They argue that Abuja should do more to address strife between the disaffected Muslim North and the Christian South. The U.S. Department of State designated Boko Haram a foreign terrorist organization in 2013.

Boko Haram's brutal campaign includes a suicide attack on a United Nations building in Abuja in 2011, repeated attacks that have killed dozens of students, the burning of villages, ties to regional terror groups, and the abduction of more than two hundred schoolgirls in April 2014. The Nigerian government hasn't been able to quell the insurgency, and violence has spread to Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. The African Union authorized a joint force of 7,500 from Nigeria, Benin, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger to fight Boko Haram.

Boko Haram was created in 2002 in Maiduguri, the capital of the northeastern state of Borno, by Islamist cleric Mohammed Yusuf. The group aims to establish a fully Islamic state in Nigeria, including the implementation of sharia criminal courts across the country. Paul Lubeck, a University of California, Santa Cruz, professor who researches Muslim societies in Africa, says Yusuf was a trained Salafist (an adherent of a school of thought often associated with jihad), and was strongly influenced by Ibn Taymiyyah, a fourteenth-century legal scholar who preached Islamic fundamentalism and is an important figure for radical groups in the Middle East.

Boko Haram is so diffuse that fighters associated with it don't necessarily follow Salafi doctrine.

The sect calls itself *Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad*, or "people committed to the propagation of the Prophet's teachings and jihad." It is widely known as Boko Haram, which is colloquially translated as "Western education is sin," for the group's rejection of Western concepts such as evolution and the Big Bang theory.

Before 2009, the group did not aim to violently overthrow the government. Yusuf criticized northern Muslims for

participating in what he saw as an illegitimate, non-Islamic state. But clashes between Christians and Muslims and harsh government treatment, including pervasive police brutality, encouraged the group to radicalize. Boko Haram's hundreds of followers, also called *Yusuffiya*, consist largely of impoverished northern Islamic students and clerics, as well as professionals, many of whom are unemployed.

Attacks continued, and by 2013 some analysts began to see greater influence by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in Boko Haram operations. Nigeria assembled a joint task force (JTF) of military and police units to battle Boko Haram and declared a state of emergency in three northeast states—Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa—in May 2013. The move pushed the militants out of cities, but attacks in rural areas continued [PDF]. Members of the JTF, augmented by vigilantes who were folded into its officially sanctioned civilian units, have been implicated in extrajudicial killings of militants and civilians, which may have galvanized support for the insurgents.

While Boko Haram cannot be neatly characterized as an insurgency or terrorist organization, its origins appear rooted in grievances over poor governance and sharp inequality in Nigerian society. "The emergence of Boko Haram signifies the maturation of long-festering extremist impulses that run deep in the social reality of northern Nigeria," writes analyst Chris Ngwodo. But the group itself is an effect and not a cause; it is a symptom of decades of failed government and elite delinquency finally ripening into social chaos."

Efforts by the central government to address dissatisfaction among Muslims in northern states, such as the reintroduction of sharia criminal courts, were not successful because the courts were not considered fair. Human Rights Watch said in a 2011 report that "corruption is so pervasive in Nigeria it has turned public service for many into a kind of criminal enterprise."

Police brutality and impunity added to the tensions. A 2009 Amnesty International report said Nigerian police were responsible for hundreds of extrajudicial killings and disappearances each year that largely "go uninvestigated and unpunished." The group said in a later report that nearly one thousand people, mostly Islamist militants, died in military custody in the first half of 2013.

BOX 13: CHRISTIAN DENOMINATIONS

The figures below<sup>61</sup> represent the approximate strength of the different denominations relative to one another; their overall accuracy is unprovable, and above all the overall estimate of share of Christian population is open to question.

- Christian: 52.6% (Mostly in the South and in the so-called Middle Belt)
- Protestant: 26%
    - Pentecostal: 10.9%
    - Anglican: 10.1%
    - Evangelical Church of West Africa: 4.1% (outgrowth of the Sudan Interior Mission)
    - TEKAN: 2.8% (outgrowth of the Sudan United Mission)
    - Baptist: 1.6%
    - Methodist: 1.5%
    - Other Protestant: 2.7%
  - African Christian: 18.25% (Denominations with no Western ties)
    - Christ Apostolic Church: 1.8%
    - Church of God Mission International: 1.25%
    - The Church of the Lord (Aladura): 1.1%
    - Cherubim and Seraphim: 0.7%
    - Deeper Life Bible Church: 0.7%
    - Other African Christian: 12.7% (more than 4,200 denominations)
  - Roman Catholic: 13.45%
  - Marginal Christian/Unaffiliated Christian: 2.1%
    - Jehovah's Witnesses: 0.5%
    - Other Marginal Christian: 1.6%

The Fellowship of Churches of Christ in Nigeria (TEKAN)<sup>62</sup> includes the following:

- Church of Christ in Nigeria (COCIN)
- The Lutheran Church of Christ in Nigeria (LCCN)
- The Christian Reformed Church of Nigeria (CRCN)
- United Methodist Church of Nigeria (UMCN)
- Evangelical Reformed Church of Christ (ERCC)
- Ekklesiyar Yan'uwa a Nigeria (EYN)<sup>63</sup>
- Nongo Krist Ken Sudan hen Tiv (NKST)
- United Church of Christ in Nigeria (HEKAN)
- Mambila Baptist Convention of Nigeria (MBCN)
- Nigerian Reformed Church(NRC)
- Evangelical Church of Christ in Nigeria (ECCN)
- Reformed Church of Christ in Nigeria (RCCN)
- All Nations Christian Assembly (ANCA)

BOX 14: CHURCH OF THE BRETHREN: ORIGINS AND STRUCTURE<sup>64</sup>

Ekklesiyar Yan'uwa a Nigeria (EYN), the Church of the Brethren in Nigeria, is the largest national body of the Church of the Brethren in the world. With a vibrant history of more than 90 years, EYN has placed a high emphasis on education, health, and agriculture. Today EYN is being ravaged by attacks from the militant group Boko Haram.

Before the destruction by insurgents, EYN had nearly one million people attending services and has carried out mission efforts in neighboring countries. The church's ministries include its peace witness, aid to those affected by the crisis, leadership development, Women's Fellowship (ZME), and youth programs. EYN is a member of the World Council of Churches and the

Christian Association of Nigeria.

The Church of the Brethren in the United States partners with EYN in several ways: Kulp Bible College (KBC), the major training institution for Nigerian church leadership; the church-sponsored Comprehensive Secondary School; and Hillcrest School in Jos, a K-12 school started by the Church of the Brethren and now run by a consortium of missions groups. The U.S. church provides leadership grants to more than 200 people each year as they prepare for pastoral ministry. In addition, the Theological Education by Extension (TEE) program trains more than 1,500 people in basic Christian education.

BOX 15: SOME PROMINENT NIGERIAN RELIGIOUS LEADERS

**Sultan Muhammadu Sa'ad Abubakar III** is the twentieth Sultan of Sokoto, Nigeria, head of Jama'atu Nasril Islam (Society for the Support of Islam), and president-general of the Nigerian National Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs. The sultan is the ruler of the Sokoto Caliphate. The post has been mainly ceremonial since British colonial rule, but the sultan is considered a spiritual leader in the Muslim community in Nigeria. The Sultan of Sokoto is also the leader of the Qadiriyya Sufi order, historically the most important Muslim position in Nigeria and senior to the Emir of Kano, the leader of the Tijaniyya Sufi order. The sultan is especially influential among the Fulani and Hausa people from northern Nigeria.

**Emir Muhammadu Sanusi II** is the fourteenth Emir of Kano, crowned in June 2014 after the death of his granduncle Ado Bayero. He was previously a successful banker and governor of Nigeria's Central Bank.<sup>65</sup>

**Olasupo Ayokunle** has been president of the Christian Association of Nigeria since 2016. Established in 1976, CAN<sup>66</sup> is the largest ecumenical body in Nigeria and in Africa. It is made up of five blocs: the Christian Council of Nigeria, the Catholic Secretariat of Nigeria, the Pentecostal Fellowship of Nigeria, the Organisation of African Instituted Churches, and the Evangelical Fellowship of West Africa. A pastor, teacher, and sociologist, Ayokunle was born in Oyo town and studied at the University of Ibadan. In 1986, he enrolled for a post-graduate diploma in education.

He went on to earn a master of divinity degree in theology in 1992 at the Nigerian Baptist Theological Seminary in Ogbomosho.

**Cardinal John Onaiyekan**, Archbishop of Abuja, Nigeria, serves as a co-president of the World Council of Religions for Peace (RfP) and co-chair of the African Council of Religious Leaders. He was elevated to cardinal in 2012. Cardinal Onaiyekan was ordained in 1969 and served in various posts as a priest before he was ordained titular bishop of Tunusuda and auxiliary bishop of Ilorin in 1983. He was bishop of Ilorin and coadjutor bishop of Abuja, then archbishop of Abuja from 1994. He has served as president of CAN and president of the Catholics Bishops' Conference of Nigeria, as well as president of the Symposium of Episcopal Conferences of Africa and Madagascar. He is a member of the Presidential Committee of the Pontifical Council for the Family.

**Archbishop Matthew Hassan Kukah** is bishop of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Sokoto. Educated at St. Augustine Major Seminary Jos, Plateau State, he was ordained a Catholic priest in 1976. Between 1999 and 2001 he served as a member of the Nigerian Investigation Commission of Human Rights Violations. He was secretary of the National Political Reform Conference (2005), and from 2005 onwards he has been serving as a leader in Ogoni-Shell reconciliation efforts. Additionally, between 2007 and 2009 he worked in the committee for electoral reform set up by the Nigerian government.

## BOX 16: NIGERIA'S PENTECOSTAL REVOLUTION.

*Excerpted from Elisha P. Renne's review of "Political spiritualities: the Pentecostal revolution in Nigeria" by Ruth Marshall<sup>67</sup>*

*Political Spiritualities* reflects Ruth Marshall's long-standing engagement with Pentecostal Christianity in Nigeria over more than fifteen years. Her work coincides with the growing popularity of Born-Again Christianity, particularly in southern Nigeria, as well as with changes in the Born-Again movement itself – from the first, anti-materialist churches of the 1980s to the second-wave prosperity churches of the 1990s. She relates these changes and the Born-Again expansion to the history of Christianity in Nigeria and situates them within the present-day political economy.

While the concept of Born-Again underscores the importance of natality, of a new beginning and break with the compromised politics of illicit wealth, violence, and inequality associated with the contemporary Nigerian state, Marshall examines how 'the Born-Again project both questions this history and participates in its ongoing elaboration. The moral disorder and economic difficulties facing ordinary Nigerians in the wake of the oil boom years of the 1970s led some to seek an alternative religious-political order during the first wave of the Pentecostal Movement in southwestern Nigeria. Born-Again leaders questioned orthodox Christian churches' association with the reigning political elite and traditional, albeit reformed, religious practices. Born-Again church members were treated in kind as many were expelled from mainline churches, thus confirming their conviction of the

righteousness of the Born-Again movement.

Marshall astutely makes a connection between Born-Agains' discontent with the failures of development and its association of progress (or *olaju*, as discussed by J.D.Y. Peel<sup>68</sup>), Christian mission conversion, and Western education. They do not reject this trajectory – indeed, first-wave Born-Agains' concern with being public and egalitarian echoes earlier missionary concerns with the Bible being open to all, unlike the secret, hidden quality of Yoruba religious knowledge. Rather, they see their efforts as underscoring the need for new, non-secular, ways of ordering society so as to reap development's benefits.

In the six chapters, conclusion, and appendix which constitute this volume, the author exhaustively discusses the meaning and political context of Pentecostal practice – past and present – in Nigeria in theoretically rich and ethnographically informed ways. Marshall examines the ruptures which have characterized Christianity in Nigeria's past and present as well as how postcolonial political disorder, economic decline, and associated moral disarray have contributed to Born-Again converts' sense of contributing to social renewal. None the less, the theological solution to these problems has changed, with an 'economy of miracles' represented by the faith and prosperity doctrine prevailing by the mid-1990s. This shift reflects

the connection of Nigerian Born-Again leaders with Pentecostal Christianity in the US and its practitioners' use of media technologies, which emphasize a blurring of local and global spaces. These connections also stress the importance of individual prayer, the witnessing of miracles, and signs of divine grace, which enables Born-Again converts legitimately to free themselves from constraining social obligations – from family, friends, and neighbours. Yet despite these personal transformations and associated critiques of the prevailing political economic order, belief in the possibility of occult powers of unknown others has contributed to uncertainty and violence. Thus 'Born-Again' Christianity as presently practised in Nigeria is deeply ambivalent about the miraculous wealth which is both admired and suspected as having occult origins, which is paralleled in members' views of the problematic behaviour of Nigerian politicians and, at times, of Born-Again church leaders.

Finally, Marshall considers how the expansion of Born-Again churches in the south corresponds to the establishment of the Islamic reformist groups in north Nigeria, which has contributed to increasing tensions between Christians and Muslims. Despite the violence that these tensions have generated and the glaring contrast between the ostentatious prosperity of some Born-Again church leaders and the extreme poverty of many Nigerian church members, Marshall concludes that

Born-Again Christianity offers hope of justice and transformation in contemporary Nigeria. Magisterial is the term that comes to mind when summarizing the scope and depth of this volume, yet it is not flawless. While Marshall is not exceptional in her use of language, sentences such as 'Without the old external supports, evangelicalism had to be self-referentially veridical' (p. 55) make one long for George Orwell's five rules of writing. However, another aspect of the author's arguments is more seriously troubling. Marshall begins the book by airing her dissatisfaction with social-scientific analysis of religion: 'The first and most challenging question is thus how to clear an analytical space in which we might be able to understand practices and forms of life that are otherwise impossible to recognize from the standpoint of the secular vocabularies instituted in public debates and underwriting social scientific knowledge' (p. 3). This dismissal of secular social-scientific analysis undermines the study of religion, which, as others have shown, may include an empathetic ear for religion as well as a critical anthropological approach. It leads to Marshall's disclaimer, preceding the moving testimony of Grace Ihere presented in the volume's appendix, that 'I have intentionally refused to make any analysis of this testimony, preferring to let her speak for herself: its radical excess of meaning defies all reduction'. Fortunately, this refusal of social analysis has not been applied to the body of her text.

To summarize this overall landscape briefly, religious beliefs and institutions are omnipresent in Nigeria, with both formal institutions and “lived religion” playing complex and significant roles across most facets of daily life. Thus they are intertwined with development in countless ways. Religious leaders are often influential both within

their communities and beyond. Nigerian churches are significant forces among diaspora communities with international influence extending well beyond, both in Africa and other regions. Nigeria’s religious media and culture have wide-ranging influence.

## BOX 17: PENTECOSTAL AND CHARISMATIC MOVEMENTS: CHARACTERISTICS, MEDIA ROLES

*Excerpted from Rosalind Hackett’s “Charismatic/Pentecostal Appropriation of Media Technologies in Nigeria and Ghana”<sup>69</sup>*

**Terminology:** In Nigeria, ‘pentecostal’ is more commonly used as a form of self-designation for various revivalist movements, denoting the centrality of the Holy Spirit in all church affairs. ‘Charismatic’ has tended to describe those renewal movements within the churches, such as the Roman Catholic Church. The label is gaining wider currency and so it is my preferred term to distinguish this new type of religious collectivity from the earlier spiritual and independent African church. (The latter still exist but are being eclipsed by the newer charismatic churches who criticize them fiercely for compromising ‘true Christianity’ with their incorporation of purportedly nefarious traditional’ or ‘pagan’ beliefs and practices.) ‘Fundamentalist’ is inapplicable as a general label and usually resented by most Christians for its connotations of extremist Muslim factions. The non-denominational evangelical movements, such as the Scripture Union, the Christian Union, and the Student Christian Movement, which flooded the schools in the 1940s from Britain, with their emphasis on personal salvation, a strict Bible-centered morality, and soul-winning, laid the foundations for the later charismatic movements. It has been the livelier, spirit-filled and empowering worship of the charismatics which has revitalized and to some extent revolutionized Christianity in these areas... The para-church agencies-Full Gospel Business Men’s Fellowship International, Women’s Aglow, the Haggai Institute, the Morris Cerullo School of World Ministry-are extremely influential in cultivating interest in Christian revivalism more generally and stimulating new developments.

**Why the rise?** “*Only God can save us*”: Political trajectories, ... failed civilian governments, and unpopular, longstanding military regimes, have entailed many frustrations. Religious organizations have provided outlets for expression and action-but

more cathartic and veiled, rather than of a directly critical nature. Economically, Ghana and Nigeria have gone through hard times... ‘Only God can save us’ is a common refrain. Marxist observers and cynical journalists have pointed fingers at the money-making activities of many of the churches, and the conspicuous salvation/consumption lauded by some of the more flamboyant leaders. Their gospel of prosperity is an obvious draw in hard times, but the benefits of the organizational skills they impart and the social networks they offer should not be downplayed. Their progressive, goal-oriented attitudes attract the youth, disillusioned with the empty moral claims of their elders and leaders. Those churches with more holiness origins such as W.F. Kumuyi’s Deeper Life Bible Church, with headquarters in Lagos, have a much more stringent moral outlook, but still (or because of this) attract large numbers of members.

**How do they see the world?** The charismatic movements constitute highly motivated and mobilizing communities. In trying to reshape the lives of their members along biblical lines, they can be somewhat merciless toward ‘traditional’ and ‘ancestral’ cultural beliefs and practices. ...A writer in a Christian magazine describes the major Festival of Black Arts and Culture (FESTAC 77) held in Nigeria in 1977 as a ‘demonic invasion of our dear country’. In addition to being, in his opinion, a waste of money, it was ‘an insignificant show of nakedness and idolatry.’ But worse than that, it was the beginning of Nigeria’s downward trend in every sphere of life. This was because through this ‘lavish and glamorous festival,’ he argues, ‘Nigeria had given an open invitation to the very Kingdom of the Devil to invade her and perpetuate his reign of terror.’ He fears a repeat of the events if Nigeria is to stage the Delphic Games (a regional music festival) for ‘[t]he type of music involved is not the contemporary and refined type but those roots

music [tic] that are down to earth traditional that are mostly used in idol worships.’

**And Nigerian traditions? And women?** The charismatics characteristically give their traditional cultural heritage a wide berth. They want to be seen as ‘progressive’ and ‘modern’ and their predominantly young congregations reflect this. This is an important factor... in accounting for their enchantment with the electronic media. Yet their conservative moral stance leads them to fear secularist and modernist tendencies which would downplay the role of religion in the public and private spheres. In their advocacy of the paradigmatic importance of the Christian (nuclear) family,” they can be disruptive of (extended) families, in their quest for converts and avoidance of the unsaved. There are very ambivalent attitudes toward women—at one level they may enjoy greater participation and leadership opportunities in God’s army, at another level, they are frequently stigmatized and demonized (notably those of the unmarried, ‘liberated’ variety).

**Using media?** The charismatics do not just preach in churches or heal the masses at crusades, but ...are driven to exploit human encounters both privately and in public places such as buses and taxis, markets, offices, hospitals, schools and prisons. Their texts circulate, their car stickers bedazzle and their sermon tapes are sought after. Their gospel music rings out on television and on the radio. Music is in fact one of the most important ways in which the charismatics construct their own identity and invade public space. The gospel music sector now dominates the music industry in both Ghana and Nigeria. Gospel singers become celebrities. Their songs appeal to a wider audience than that delimited by the movements themselves. When a major ‘secular’ musician of international renown, Chief Ebenezer Obey, became a committed Christian in the early 1990s, the cause of the new Christians

received a major boost. Lyrics of romantic love and money are displaced by those of divine love and new life. The electronic synthesizer now overrides the church organ.

**Material culture:** The accoutrements speak of success whether it is jewelry, attaché cases, fine clothes or cars. The ultimate icon of conspicuous salvation is the Mercedes Benz, which has developed an almost mystical value (surely unanticipated by its stolid German makers) in Nigeria and Ghana. The salvific value of the automobile is heightened when it is a gift of God, i.e. from a wealthy parishioner who either has one to spare, a sin to atone or a miracle to be thankful for these ‘kingdoms of God’ are very much predicated on and reinforced by a sense of the Other, whether nominal, ‘dead’ Christians, Muslims (often euphemistically referred to as the ‘common enemy’), or ‘pagans.’ The failings, the wiles, and the ignorance of these non-Christians are vividly described and depicted as a warning to believers and unbelievers. While there are stricter controls on direct condemnation of other religious groups in the electronic media, representations of the Other in less controlled environments provide evidence of an aesthetics of violence

**Electronic media:** [...] seem to hold a particular enchantment for these Christian groups which emphasize the primacy of experience, blessings, and evangelism. We can see how wholeheartedly they are embracing these powerful, transnational forces while negotiating their own contribution to these new religious publics-both local and international. New media technologies, with their intriguing, and ever-growing, possibilities for the transmission of symbolic forms and creative self-representation, have not only facilitated these processes but they have taken them to a new scale. They show every sign of continuing apace.

## CHAPTER 4: RELIGIOUS AND FAITH ORGANIZATIONS WORKING FOR DEVELOPMENT

An array of Nigerian organizations can be said to be faith-inspired (WFDD terms them faith-inspired organizations, or FIOs).<sup>70</sup> There is no systematic analysis of their structure, much less their work. A sample review in the Ibadan region highlights the diversity of these organizations and some patterns of focus and approach. In general, most Muslim-linked organizations are based (and have the widest influence) in Nigeria's northern states while most Christian-inspired organizations are in the South, although neither are confined to these geographical regions. Most organizations provide some type of specific social service; others are engaged in broader activities, such as community development or support for women or youth. The following sections introduce leading organizations and summarize their work, where information is readily available; the presentations therefore focus on larger institutions and those with a transnational character. The final section notes several transnational organizations that deliberately do not operate in Nigeria.

### *Regulation of NGOs and FIOs in Nigeria*

Beginning in 2014 efforts have been underway to pass legislation in the Nigerian National Assembly to create a regulatory framework for NGOs working in Nigeria. A 2016 draft bill, the "NGO Regulation Bill," proposed an NGO Regulatory Commission that would require all NGOs to be registered with the commission, with a license to operate within the country. The proposed law's title is: "An act to provide for the establishment of the non-governmental organisations regulatory commission for the supervision, coordination and monitoring of non-governmental organisations, civil society organisations, etc. in Nigeria and for related matters."<sup>71</sup> The legislation was pending as of early 2018.

The proposed law's stated purpose is to "give the Commission

regulatory powers on registration, implementation of projects, financial and assets reporting, and control with monitoring and evaluation powers."<sup>72</sup> It would require renewal of registration every two years; without the board's license, no NGO could operate. Registration with the Corporate Affairs Commission is no longer sufficient. A clause requires work permits for prospective employees, and all NGOs must submit reports to the board of their financials. Before an NGO spends any money received, it must secure the permission of the NGO board. The justification for introducing the bill was a lack of any framework to supervise NGO operations. The draft bill states, "It shall be an offence for any person to operate a Non-Governmental Organisation in Nigeria for welfare, research, health relief, agriculture, education, industry, the supply of amenities or any other similar purposes without registration and certificate under this Act."<sup>73</sup>

The proposed legislation was and is controversial. Nigeria's *Guardian* newspaper commented, "Since churches are categorised as NGOs or civil society organisations, the NGO Regulatory Bill is patently a political subterfuge to bring Christianity under government control with a grand design to arrest its growth and expansion by supervising and monitoring its operations as well as superintending the activities of its clerics."<sup>74</sup> The debates inside and outside the legislature focus on the bill as an effort to restrict civil society space, beyond the religious interpretations. As Reuters reported in December 2017, the Nigerian NGO Spaces for Change argued that "For organizations that engage in human rights advocacy, government accountability, and the promotion of democracy, interference in their operations portends grave risks to both their work and on the lives of their personnel."<sup>75</sup> Nigeria's Policy and Legal Advocacy Centre (PLAC) warned that "there is no doubt that the first victims of the bill would be NGOs that are traditionally active in the area of ensuring accountability and transparency of government to its citizens."<sup>76</sup> The sponsor of the bill in the House of Representatives, Nigeria's lower parliamentary chamber, has alleged that some NGOs were using donated funds to support the activities of armed militants and insurgents such as Boko Haram in the country's northeast.

### *Faith-inspired Organizations at Work in Ibadan*

Many organizations with faith links today play diverse roles in Ibadan, one of Nigeria's largest cities. Their work, however, is poorly known and patchily documented. Exploratory research, including in-depth interviews with 10 organizations, highlights their diversity, the degree to which their inspiration and drive is linked to religious beliefs, and their efforts to support social welfare objectives, albeit rarely as part of government-supported development programs. The FIOs are part of Ibadan's complex social, political, and religious fabric, shaped by traditional religious practices, active roles of Christian missionaries for 150 years, and Islamic scholars and traders.

Faith-inspired organizations sometimes, but not always, have an official status conferred through government registration. The first point of registration for any FIO is the local

*Female health workers travel to a remote village to vaccinate children;  
Photo Credit: Stacie Dunkle/CDC*

Table 4.1. Select FIOs Working in Ibadan Region

Faith-Inspired Organization	Areas of Work
Federation of Muslim Women's Associations of Nigeria (FOMWAN)	Education, child care, women's development and empowerment, family economy
Christian Care for Widows and the Aged	Education, child care, women's development and empowerment, orphans, welfare of the aged
Tabitha Care Mission	Education, child care, women's development and empowerment, family economy, youth empowerment, welfare of the aged
Hands of Love	Education, child care, women's development and empowerment, family economy
Field Mission Evangelical Ministries	Education, child care, women's development and empowerment, family economy, youth empowerment, welfare of the aged
Heart Clinic Global Mission	Women's development and empowerment, family economy, youth empowerment, welfare of the aged
Center For Growth and Development	Leadership training for entrepreneurs, intervention programs in health, educational programs, economic research and publications
Living Word Mission	Education, family economy, youth and women's empowerment, home shelter for orphans and vulnerable youth, skills training
Isabatudeen Women Society	Education, child care, women's development and empowerment, family economy
Grace Leadership	Leadership training for entrepreneurs, intervention programs in health, educational programs, economic research and publications, advocacy
Christian Health Association	Advocacy, interventions, medical missions
Jesus Kids	Education, family economy, youth and women's empowerment, home shelter for orphans and vulnerable youth, skills acquisition
Christian Mission for the Deaf	Education, advocacy, interventions, skills training, economy, empowerment
Christian Goodwill Library	Education, youth interventions, advocacy, motivation for reading and research culture
Muslim Ummah of South West Nigeria	Leadership training for entrepreneurs, intervention programs in health, educational programs, economic research and publications, advocacy
Purity Group	Advocacy for development participation, interventions, empowerment
Baptist Women's Missionary Union	Leadership training for entrepreneurs, health, education, economic research and publications, advocacy
Edawah Foundation	IT skills training, interventions, education, youth leadership, capacity building, empowerment
Scripture Grace	Education, child care, women's development and empowerment, family economy, youth empowerment, welfare of the aged
Children of Promise Ministries (CHIPROM)	Education, shelter for orphans and vulnerable children
Ad-Deen Yustru Muslim Society	Leadership training for entrepreneurs, programs in health, education, economic research and publications

government, with filing done through the Department of Community Service. This registration grants organizations permission to operate within the local government area and provides legal recognition. If the local government has development projects, the organization is eligible for access. Registration is supposed to confer rights to those who work for the organization. State government registration is done with different department and ministries at the state government headquarters. The Ministry of Women Affairs and Social Development has the most organizations registered; other involved ministries include the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Ministry of Health, and Ministry of Local Government and Chieftaincy Matters. Registration with the national government is with the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC).

At each level, there are specific paperwork requirements and fees. The names of directors and trustees are submitted and listed in a national newspaper as a test of character before the registration is approved.

FIOs and other NGOs generally operate with little government interference or involvement. Each level of government is expected to monitor and regulate the actions and works of the FIOs, which in turn are expected to submit an annual report of activities, including a financial report. The government ensures compliance by penalizing defaulters and denying participation in any government-supported project or program. A few FIOs work directly with transnational organizations in implementing development programs.

There is no comprehensive listing or accurate estimate of FIOs working in Ibadan, nor is there any kind of umbrella body. The FIOs are quite diverse, with wide variation in structure, scope of work, and areas of activity. A rough estimate based on fieldwork in Ibadan is that approximately 50 larger FIOs operate actively. Some of the most significant are listed in Table 4.1.

General observations include the following:

- a) Most FIOs were founded by individuals based on their religious convictions, with a goal of providing welfare and development services to specific population groups to which they are linked. Most of the initial resources come from the founder and those within his or her circle of influence. As the organization grows, funding becomes more diversified.
- b) The personal convictions of an organization's founder tend to shape the vision and activities.
- c) The founder of the FIO is usually the chief initial financier of the organization, at least initially.
- d) Few of the organizations engage in rigorous accounting, but those that did were more likely to attract the support of close relations and friends.

- e) All the FIOs involved in the study denied ever having received a governmental grant.
- f) A small number of FIOs in Ibadan receive grants from international organizations.

### ***The Work of Major FIOs in Nigeria*** ***ACT Alliance***

ACT Alliance, a coalition of more than 140 churches and church-related organizations, works in 100 countries, focused on humanitarian aid, development, and advocacy. Its members are associated with the World Council of Churches and the Lutheran World Federation. It mobilizes around US\$1.5 billion each year for its programs.

In Nigeria, the ACT Nigeria Forum includes the Christian Council of Nigeria, Christian Aid, and World Renew (formerly the Christian Reformed World Relief Committee); Bread for the World, Baptist World Aid, and the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America also support work in the country. The alliance's work in Nigeria is predominantly in humanitarian response; its most recent emergency appeal in 2017 was for US\$2.86 million for the six states of northeastern Nigeria involved in eight years of violent conflict. Funds provide food assistance through cash transfers, WASH activities, essential hygiene kits, and community strengthening and protection support.

### ***Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA)***

ADRA, the humanitarian arm of the Seventh-day Adventist Church, works in over 130 countries on longer-term development programs and on emergency response. Its long-standing activities in Nigeria are spread throughout the country, with offices in Lagos, Abuja, Ile-Ife, Aba, Maiduguri, and Yola.

ADRA's current activities center on emergency relief programs in northeast Nigeria (especially Borno and Adamawa states), where it has supported victims of the Boko Haram insurgency since 2014. It targets affected households with immediate food aid, livelihood support materials, non-food items, educational materials, and clean water and sanitation. ADRA has reached over 62,000 people with community health awareness; clean water and sanitation programs; and food, livelihood, and farm inputs. It distributes food to about 1,500 internally displaced persons (IDPs), provides psychosocial support to displaced children, and helps mitigate diarrheal disease among children under the age of 5. Prenatal mentoring is provided to pregnant women in Kwana Waya Camp.<sup>77</sup> Looking forward, ADRA plans to increase its presence in the northeast, giving priority to food assistance, shelter and non-food items, education, livelihood support, WASH activities, and disaster relief reduction support.

### ***Bread for the World (Germany)***

Bread for the World (Brot für die Welt), a global development and relief agency of the Protestant Churches in Germany, focuses on food security; it also works to improve

health, education, access to water, democracy, human rights, and peace. It coordinates closely with local, often church-related organizations, responding to their requests to provide specialists and volunteers on the ground. It currently works in close to 100 countries and performs lobbying, public relations, and education across Germany and Europe.

In 2016, Bread for the World received EUR3.33million to support nine ongoing projects in Nigeria for combating poverty and hunger through peacebuilding in conflict zones and fragile states. It supports churches within Nigeria, which together with village imams, organize discussions and joint projects between Christians and Muslims to encourage greater understanding and tolerance. These discussions have helped prevent people from splitting into opposing groups following attacks by Boko Haram so that villages avoid acts of retaliation or internal conflicts.

### ***Caritas Nigeria***

Caritas Nigeria officially registered in 2010 and has a country office in Abuja, with regional offices in Benue State and Sokoto State. There are a total of 56 local (diocesan) Justice, Development and Peace/Caritas offices across Nigeria's 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory. Priority areas include emergency response and humanitarian services, health and HIV, agriculture and livelihoods, good governance, and institutional development.

Caritas Nigeria is the only organization currently offering the APMG-accredited Project Management for Development Professionals training and certification in Nigeria. Its Capacity Strengthening Programme has trained thousands of health facility staff in rural communities, local partners in dioceses, and over 500 development professionals. Current projects include:

- Voices for Compliance and Legality (VOCAL), a good governance intervention aimed at driving accountability of public institutions in Cross River State;
- Sustainable HIV Care and Treatment Action in Nigeria (SUSTAIN), an HIV/health program that has been ongoing since 2012;
- The intervention for Sustained Testing and Retention in HIV-infected women (iSTAR) study, which is aimed at demonstrating the effectiveness of the intervention in achieving UNAIDS' 90-90-90 treatment goal in a prevention of mother-to-child transmission setting;
- An Energy-Saving Cook-Stoves Project, aimed at reducing deforestation and minimizing deaths from smoke inhalation. It is focused on 19 rainforest communities in the Oban corridor of Cross River State National Park.

Through a partnership between Caritas, PEPFAR, and UNAIDS a June 2017 gathering in Abuja, Nigeria focused on FIO roles in HIV prevention, care, treatment, and support across Africa, especially pediatric HIV.

### *Catholic Relief Services (CRS)*

CRS works with partners in 32 of Nigeria's 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory.

Priority areas are (a) agriculture and livelihoods, with support to households, communities, and farmer groups to increase agriculture production and diversify incomes and an impact-investing initiative to strengthen social enterprises and bolster economic growth; (b) health, including HIV/AIDS, malaria, nutrition, routine immunization, and polio eradication; (c) support to orphans, vulnerable children, and their caregivers; and (d) emergency response and recovery, such as providing access to food and shelter, along with WASH resources and services, for IDPs and conflict-affected host communities in northeastern Nigeria.

Current projects include:

- Sub-recipient of Global Fund HIV grants since July 2011;
- Sub-grantee with the Global Fund in support of malaria prevention and treatment;
- Through funding from the Global Alliance provides intensive advocacy and program management training to the Association of Civil Society Organizations on Malaria Immunization and Nutrition;
- Two USAID-funded initiatives: Core Group Partners Project (CGPP), which supports Nigeria's polio eradication and routine immunization strengthening efforts at the community level (focuses on five high-risk states in the North), and Coordinating Comprehensive Care for Children (4Children) Project to improve access to HIV-sensitive services for vulnerable children;
- Multi-sectoral agriculture-led livelihoods project to empower very poor households, specifically in northwest Nigeria;
- With Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation funding, the Strengthening Cassava Seed Systems and the follow-on BASICS program helps farmers improve revenue and food supply with cassava stems through a traceable value chain;
- Emergency Response in Yobe State (launched in 2014) initially provided WASH and malaria programming, then transitioned into a USAID Food for Peace emergency food security program and OFDA-funded WASH program;
- In 2016 CRS launched a multi-sectoral response to provide food, WASH, and shelter assistance as well as agriculture support to facilitate a return to livelihoods in Borno State.

### *Christian Aid*<sup>78</sup>

Christian Aid (an ACT member) has been operational in Nigeria since 2003 with priority areas that include southeast and north-central Nigeria (Anambra, Enugu, Kaduna, Edo, and Benue States and the Federal Capital Territory), and, since Boko Haram emerged there, northeast Nigeria (including: Adamawa, Gombe, and Borno

states). Partnerships and projects currently cover 10 out of Nigeria's 36 states. The country office is in Abuja, with field offices in Anambra, Benue, and Edo. Distribution of food and non-food items, including water containers and purifiers, mosquito nets, sanitary towels, and cooking utensils, as well as support for psychosocial counseling and health education, are among the key activities related to the ongoing humanitarian crisis in the northeast.

Christian Aid's main areas of expertise and current projects include the following:

- Community health and HIV: Strengthening Community Health and HIV Response project (funded by UK Aid), Partnering with Association of Women Living with HIV/AIDS in Nigeria (ASWHAN) to campaign for legislation to prohibit discrimination and provide legal protection for Nigerians living with HIV, and Nets for Life program, where partners distribute mosquito nets and provide follow-up education to targeted communities;
- Accountable governance: Voice to the People (V2P) supports communities in Anambra to hold government and their leaders to account, take part in decision-making, and demand rights and services; and founding member of the Tax Justice and Governance Platform that calls for an effective, fair, and progressive tax system;
- Support for gender equality through studies and operational programs;
- Humanitarian response: interventions in Adamawa, Borno, and Gombe States to improve food security and livelihoods for IDPs; WASH facilities and sensitization in Adamawa, Borno, and Benue States, and In Their Lifetime (ITL), a seed fund set up by Christian Aid to pioneer new approaches to fight poverty and to scale up the solutions that work best.

Past projects include the USAID-supported Community Care in Nigeria, which provided a comprehensive support package to more than 15,000 OVCs and caregivers from 2007 to 2010; Copenhagen and Beyond project (funded by the U.K. Foreign and Commonwealth Office), which supported the formulation of Nigeria's position on climate change, including development of the first African Climate Change Commission Bill from 2009 to 2011.

A Christian Aid Nigeria document highlights this analysis of the roles of faith for development:

"Christian Aid believe society changes through people's increased knowledge and capacity to make choices which influences beliefs and behaviours, alongside collective action which challenges the systems and structures that perpetuate poverty and inequality. Christian Aid's work in Nigeria is targeted at poor, marginalised and voiceless people, and at duty bearers, including government, the private sector, community/traditional leaders as well as religious leaders. We seek partnership with faith leaders and faith-based organisations (Islam and Christianity) –churches of all denominations,

Islamic networks and the diaspora, to inspire religious institutions to engage in rights-based approach to development and promote interfaith understanding and acceptance.”<sup>79</sup>

#### ***Christian Health Association of Nigeria (CHAN)***

Founded in 1973, the Christian Health Association of Nigeria’s current priorities are to unify and support church-based health services nationwide among its 358 members; promote best practices, information-sharing, and cooperation; coordinate government advocacy at the local, state, and national level; and serve as a key implementing partner for NGOs and international organizations. CHAN has spearheaded the Global Fund-supported National Tuberculosis and Leprosy Program, designed to expand knowledge about TB prevention and treatment, raise TB detection and treatment rates, and reduce TB among people living with HIV/AIDS. The Nigeria Indigenous Capacity Building Project, funded by PEPFAR/USAID, is a three-year project working in six states to help faith-based healthcare institutions and community groups respond effectively to HIV/AIDS.

CHAN MEDI-PHARM is a daughter organization that coordinates drug and medical supply distribution.

#### ***Federation of Muslim Women’s Associations in Nigeria (FOMWAN)***

FOMWAN has members from 36 Nigerian states and is affiliated with over 500 organizations. Its current work links Islamic women’s groups in Nigeria and promotes Muslim women’s viewpoints on a national stage. It advocates for Muslim girls’ education and positive social behavior, as well as for improved status of Muslim women and children. FOMWAN sees girls’ education as a way to eradicate poverty and thus engages in programs to increase the retention rate of girls at school, continue education for married women, and integrate literacy and vocational training into established Qur’anic schools.

#### ***Latter-day Saints (LDS) Charities***

LDS Charities has run programs in Nigeria since 1985 and has supported a total of 177 projects. Current programs include community projects that work with local partners and beneficiaries on planning and implementation. These efforts include maternal and newborn care; working with local organizations to initiate a perpetuated train-the-trainer program for doctors, nurses, and midwives; providing necessary equipment to delivery rooms and midwives to practice and implement new techniques; partnering with global and local partners to provide support to refugees, including immediate relief, long-term aid, and resettlement support; and working with local organizations to improve services for the physically disabled and provide manual wheelchairs or walking aids. The Mobility Aid and Appliances Research and Development Centre (MAARDEC), a Nigerian nonprofit organization, provides disabled individuals with a variety of physical and social services, including mobility aids such as wheelchairs.

Past programs have focused on developing fresh water systems and latrines for communities; emergency response involving a combination of food, water, shelter, and clothing, as well as medical, school, and hygiene supplies; immunizations; working with local organizations to initiate and financially support village parades; television announcements, pamphlet deliveries, and radio advertisements to publicize immunizations available in the area; and vision care, where specialists volunteer their time in a short-term program to provide training, equipment, and supplies to assist local eyecare professionals and programs.

Insecurity from the Boko Haram insurgency, displacement, and disruptions in agricultural activities and cross-border trade undermine communities’ livelihoods and have resulted in serious food insecurity for 10 million people in northeastern Nigeria. The number of children with severe acute malnutrition is expected to reach 450,000 in the conflict-affected areas. In partnership with CARE International, LDS Charities provides funding to address the immediate food needs of the most at-risk populations, particularly women and children under the age of two. LDS Charities is helping the International Rescue Committee provide 1,000 gas tanks to selected heads of households. Each household will also receive nine refills over the next six months. It works with UNICEF USA to support UNICEF’s treatment of severely malnourished children under the age of five.

#### ***Salesian Missions***

The Salesian Missionaries have been working in Nigeria since 1982 with a focus on youth. Recent projects include the Bosco Boys Home in Ibadan (Oyo State), launched in January 2017, which aims to address the rising issue of street youth. The program will accommodate up to 40 youth. Salesian missionaries are also setting up schools, boarding homes, and running water for poor youth in Koko (within Kontagora).

#### ***Salvation Army Nigeria***

The Salvation Army Nigeria (SA) operates from a head office in Lagos, with five operational locations in Akwa Ibom, Edo, Rivers, and Lagos states. Current projects include a community awareness and recovery (CAR) project that aims to prevent modern slavery and trafficking of people and to improve quality of life for victims of trafficking. SA recruits families to host trafficking victims during their recovery. Support includes skills training, livelihood support, and links to community support systems. SA, in collaboration with the United Kingdom and Ireland, is developing a response to issues of human trafficking victims deported to Nigeria from European countries.

Since 2009, SA has also focused on addressing the impact of the current insurgency, responding to the needs of over 500 affected families in Maiduguri (Borno State), 250 families in Jos (Plateau State), and 150 families in Bauchi (Bauchi State) with food items and basic survival essentials. Local corps officers have visited various IDP camps to provide counseling and spiritual care. More specialized treatment and surgical services are delivered from two hospitals, with a rehabilitation center for the disabled. An HIV/

AIDS awareness project aims to stop stigmatization of people living with HIV and to empower and promote self-sufficiency. The SA has opened new schools for less privileged and vulnerable children to receive quality education (though the government has taken over all of the Salvation Army's existing primary schools and the land they occupied). Programs address women's health issues, particularly family planning and care and support for pregnant women and those of childbearing age. The SA operates a children's home.

#### *Samaritan's Purse*

While it does not have a Nigeria office, Samaritan's Purse has worked since 2014 with local churches and local mission organizations (e.g. Serving in Mission). It has hosted volunteers to work on the ECWA Hospital Egbe's revitalization project.

#### *Tearfund*

Tearfund's Nigeria headquarters is in Jos in Central Nigeria. Humanitarian work with partners includes provision of relief to IDPs, many of whom are living in host communities that are stretched thin. Support is provided to families in the form of access to clean water, sanitation, and vital essentials, as well psychosocial support. Tearfund supports a promoting peacemaking solutions project that involves working with partners to build peace between Christians and Muslims. One partner, Scripture Union West Africa, creates opportunities for dialogue between Muslim and Christian leaders.

#### *United Methodist Committee on Relief (UMCOR)*

UMCOR is the humanitarian relief and development arm of the United Methodist Church (UMC). Currently in Nigeria it works with Mission 21 to provide more than 600 men, women, and children with nutrition and essential non-food assistance. Past projects include its assisting the Nigeria Annual Conference in 2011 to distribute relief supplies to those displaced by election-related violence, particularly in the Kano/Bauchi District. UMCOR funds supported the coordination of distribution of food, supplies and health kits to 250 people in three communities.

#### *United Muslim Relief*

United Muslim Relief works in Sumaila in Kano State. Current projects focus on maternal health centers, including equipping and stocking delivery rooms in primary healthcare facilities to ensure they can provide comprehensive obstetric care.

A number of leading international FIOs **do not currently operate** in Nigeria. Reasons vary and include the challenges of working in Nigeria and the fact that Nigeria is viewed as sufficiently wealthy that assistance is not justified. These include World Vision, Lutheran World Federation, Episcopal Relief and Development, Islamic Relief Worldwide, American Jewish World Service, the Aga Khan Development Network, Church World Service, Compassion International, DanChurchAid, Friends Peace Teams, Habitat for Humanity, and Lutheran World Relief.

## CHAPTER 5: PRIORITY DEVELOPMENT ISSUES WHERE RELIGIOUS ISSUES AND ACTORS HAVE SPECIAL IMPORTANCE

This chapter focuses on several topics central to national and global development agendas where faith communities have particular interest and concentrated activities; the following two chapters (6 and 7) explore two additional topics—education and peacebuilding—in greater depth. The discussion expands on the specific programmatic illustrations in the previous chapter that summarized ongoing programs of both local and leading faith-inspired organizations, especially transnational organizations. The topics selected are not all encompassing and reflect advice received on shared priorities of development and faith communities and areas where religious actors are either leading the way or present obstacles. The cross-cutting theme of vulnerable communities and poverty, a long-standing faith community concern, is reflected in the substantial current focus on humanitarian work in conflict-affected areas, supporting internally displaced populations, and vulnerable populations (especially women and children). Nigeria has a long history and well-established institutional structures for faith delivery of healthcare as well as keen interest in health-related topics; this applies especially for Christian denominations. Several religious institutions focus specifically on supporting women and, more broadly, on links between religion and gender equality. Specific issues linked to welfare and rights have complex religious links, and thus religious institutional involvement: female genital cutting (FGC), slavery, trafficking, and witchcraft among them. A final section lists topics that merit further exploration; these include child marriage and nutrition.



*A student at a DFID-supported midwifery training program;  
Photo Credit: Flickr user UK DFID*

## POVERTY: AN UNDERLYING AND CROSS-CUTTING ISSUE

Nigeria's widespread poverty and its manifestations in terms of vulnerability and suffering are leading issues for most religiously-inspired development actors. Many faith-inspired organizations, national and international, describe their motivation and focus in terms of efforts to address problems associated with poverty. Broadly and comparatively, poverty levels in Nigeria today are high, and many people are poor across all parts of the country. There is a widespread perception that inequalities are rising. There does not appear, however, to be a robust or structured debate about the phenomenon within religious communities, beyond a recurring theme that high levels of poverty are linked to poor governance and political machinations. Poverty and injustice are commonly linked.

The nature and causes of poverty in Nigeria are reflected in various measures, although efforts to capture details suffer from the generally poor quality of available data. Multi-dimensional poverty indicators give a sense of high poverty levels, as well as the fragility of quality of life for many Nigerians. The most recent publicly-available survey data for Nigeria's multidimensional poverty index (MPI) estimation refer to 2013. The MPI (the share of the population that is multidimensionally poor), adjusted by the intensity of the deprivations, is 0.279 (the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Ethiopia have MPIs of 0.369 and 0.537 respectively).<sup>80</sup> In Nigeria, 50.9 percent of the population (88 million people) was considered multidimensionally poor, while an additional 18.4 percent lived near multidimensional poverty. The breadth of deprivation in Nigeria, which is the average deprivation score experienced by people in multidimensional poverty, is 54.8 percent. Comparing multidimensional poverty with income poverty (the percentage of the population living below US\$1.90 per day) shows that income poverty only tells part of the story. The fact that the multidimensional poverty headcount is 2.6 percentage points lower than income poverty implies that individuals living below the income poverty line may have access to non-income resources.

## HEALTH

The health sector is an important entry point for operational dialogue about religious roles in development. This is because religious institutions, especially Christian, have long played significant roles in healthcare delivery. Further, important debates and controversies around health policy and delivery involve religious actors; these include Muslim opposition to vaccination campaigns perceived to carry threats to fertility and tensions around approaches to HIV/AIDS. International partners in ambitious public health programs work with religious bodies—including the Global Fund, World Bank, PEPFAR, and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation — and have spotlighted religious roles.

Three areas where active efforts to engage religious actors have met success are vaccination campaigns, malaria programs, and HIV/AIDS. Promising areas for action include tuberculosis diagnosis and care and strengthening of basic healthcare. Family planning, a vital strategic issue for Nigeria, involves issues where religious communities often shape behavior and attitudes. Involving religious health providers and communities more broadly and strategically in achieving the SDG goal of universal healthcare deserves attention and priority.

### *Context*<sup>81</sup>

Nigeria's performance is among the world's lowest when measured by many national health indicators, with some indicators suggesting that the population's health status has declined over the past decade. Life expectancy at birth is 53 years, well below the least developed countries' 64 years average. With high under-five mortality, approximately one million children under 5 years old die every year from preventable diseases such as malaria, diarrhea, and pneumonia. Almost 3.5 million people live with HIV/AIDS; Nigeria has the third-largest population of people living with the disease globally. Rates of non-communicable diseases such as sickle cell, mental health, heart disease, diabetes, and cancer are rising.

Nigeria's complex health sector includes public, private for-profit, NGOs, community-based organizations (CBOs), FIOs, and indigenous healthcare providers. Healthcare providers include unregistered and registered providers and range from traditional birth attendants and individual medicine sellers to sophisticated hospitals. The federal government attempts to regulate this heterogeneous and broad health sector at federal, state, and local levels.

Nigeria's public healthcare service delivery system includes over 34,000 registered health facilities across the three tiers. Tertiary facilities, the highest level of healthcare and about 0.25 percent of all registered health facilities in Nigeria, include specialist locations, teaching hospitals, and federal medical centers. Special expertise and well-developed technological capacity allow them to serve as referral centers for patients from the primary and secondary levels and resource centers for knowledge generation and diffusion. Each state has at least one tertiary facility under the mandate of the federal government. State governments are responsible for secondary care facilities, which include general hospitals that provide general medical and laboratory services, as well as specialized health services such as surgery, pediatrics, obstetrics, and gynecology. They represent about 12 percent of Nigeria's health facilities and serve as referral centers for primary healthcare facilities. Each local government is expected to have at least one secondary-level facility.

The decentralized health system roles are not well coordinated among the three levels of government, leading to fragmentation, weak infrastructure, and poor service delivery. The majority of registered healthcare facilities in Nigeria (88 percent) are primary healthcare



**ABOVE**  
*A rural health center in Katsina State checks the circumference of a child's mid-arm as part of a community-based management of malnutrition program*

*Photo Credit: Flickr user UK DFID*

facilities that are communities' entry point into the healthcare system. They include health centers and clinics, dispensaries, and health posts which typically provide general preventive, curative, promotive, and pre-referral care. The expectation and practice is that local governments finance and manage primary healthcare under the supervisory oversight of the state government. However, the local government level is the least funded and least organized government level and is unable to properly finance and organize primary healthcare, creating a weak base for the healthcare system.

Nigeria ranks low on government spending on public health as a proportion of GDP. The African Union's 2001 Abuja Declaration committed AU countries to allocating at least 15 percent of their budgets toward improving the health sector, but health expenditure as a share of GDP in Nigeria (2014) was only 3.7 percent. Nigeria's per capita expenditure on health is among the lowest globally, at US\$117. Less than 5 percent of Nigerians were covered by any form of health insurance (end 2013). Household out-of-pocket expenditures represent 65.9 percent of healthcare financing, followed by the government at 26.1 percent (federal 12.4 percent, state 7.4 percent, and local government 6.4 percent), firms at 6.1 percent, and development partners at 1.8 percent.

The government is the primary provider and financier of health training through its 18 fully and 5 partially accredited medical schools. Federal Ministry of Health of Nigeria figures indicate that about 39,210 doctors and 124,629 nurses were registered as of 2006, which translates into 30 doctors and 100 nurses per 100,000 people, significantly higher than the sub-Saharan Africa average of 15 doctors and 72 nurses per 100,000 people.<sup>82</sup> Nigeria's health workforce is concentrated in southern states, particularly in Lagos, and other urban centers; thus the densities of healthcare professionals are too low to deliver health services effectively to the growing population, more than half of which are in rural areas. Mortality and morbidity data indicate greater unmet health needs in rural and remote regions than in urban areas. Migration of health workers to higher-income regions, a major setback for Africa as a whole, is an issue for Nigeria, with health workforce density estimated at 1.95 per 1000 population. However, out-migration of health workers is less critical for health workforce shortages in Nigeria's rural and remote areas than low government health spending, limited facilities and medications to deliver clinical services, and burned-out, overworked, and underpaid rural clinicians. Health facilities are severely under-equipped (underfunding is a major explanation). A 2001 survey showed that only 25 percent of health facilities had more than half of the minimum equipment package and 40 percent had less than a quarter. Although requirements for health facilities are defined, supervision, especially for the private sector, is weak throughout Nigeria, particularly in the northern zones.

### *Private and Faith-based Healthcare*

The private sector, including faith-inspired facilities, plays a large role in providing care through a wide range of providers, including physician practices, maternity homes, clinics, and hospitals; 33 percent of all registered health facilities in the Federal Ministry of Health facilities database are privately owned, with most specializing in primary healthcare services. Private for-profit health facilities have proliferated since the mid-1980s and, together with the faith-based facilities, are reported to provide 80 percent of health services to Nigerians. Private for-profit facilities provide mostly curative services, while the faith-based facilities provide a wider range of preventive and health promotion services. Traditional medicine practitioners and informal medicine vendors play significant roles, though often unacknowledged and with poor data.

The Christian Health Association of Nigeria (CHAN), founded in 1973 by the Catholic Bishops Conference of Nigeria, the Christian Council of Nigeria, and the Northern Christian Medical Advisory Council (they are known as the "Founding Fathers"), is the umbrella organization for some 358 entities that operate Nigeria's 4,400 church-based health centers and hospitals, distributed across Nigeria. CHAN's original function was to represent the views of Nigerian voluntary medical organizations to the government, advising on the integration of these organizations in overall government planning and acting as a central point for an exchange of views and expression of new ideas. Today, CHAN is a not-for-profit service organization, coordinating church-sponsored healthcare throughout Nigeria. CHAN assists member institutions in reaching more people, especially the unreached, with good quality, affordable, and patient-friendly health services. CHAN also coordinates government advocacy at the local, state, and national level. A key implementation partner for NGOs and other international organizations, CHAN has received substantial external support, notably for the National Tuberculosis and Leprosy Program, designed to expand knowledge about TB prevention and treatment, raise TB detection and treatment rates, and reduce TB among people living with HIV/AIDS. The three-year Nigeria Indigenous Capacity Building Project, sponsored by PEPFAR/USAID, worked in six states to help faith-based healthcare institutions and other community groups respond more effectively to HIV/AIDS. CHAN MEDI-PHARM is a daughter organization that coordinates drug and medical supply distribution.

The ambitious faith-linked program managed by the Nigerian Interfaith Action Association illustrates well both the scope and potential for national-level engagement on major health issues (Box 18).

Another important example of engaging faith communities on public health issues is the case of polio eradication (Box 19).

#### BOX 18: NIGERIAN INTERFAITH ACTION ASSOCIATION (NIFAA): A STORY AND LESSONS<sup>83</sup>

With malaria a leading cause of deaths of children under five, especially in Africa, a major global campaign launched in 2008 aimed to tackle the scourge on a global scale. It involved a wide range of institutions: within the United Nations system, the Global Fund, multilateral banks (especially the World Bank), bilateral agencies (notably the United States President's Malaria Initiative), and private civil society and business entities.

This effort and campaign spurred a deliberate effort to engage religious communities in new and significant ways. A Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs and WFDD review highlighted the logical case for religious engagement—building on religiously-run health networks and designed to support changing community behavior, especially through systematic use of bednets—and to articulate and elaborate the ethical imperatives for action. The search for new partnerships led to a leadership consultation in December 2008 convened by the Center for Interfaith Action (CIFA) at Georgetown University aimed at “Scaling Up Faith Community Impact on Malaria.” A central conclusion was that addressing malaria in Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of the Congo was vital to success in the malaria campaign at an African and global level. Since the World Bank was preparing to launch an ambitious malaria program in Nigeria, attention focused on building on promising interfaith alliances there to engage religious communities in the national and global program.

In 2009, a new entity, sponsored by two of Nigeria's leading religious leaders, the Sultan of Sokoto and Catholic Cardinal John Onaiyekan, was established; NIFAA, the Nigerian Interfaith Action Association, had malaria as its central goal (though the aspiration was and is broader interfaith action). GHR Foundation seed funding to CIFA supported capacity development, and the Nigerian government/World Bank malaria program included partnership with NIFAA as a central element. Bishop Sunday Onuoha took on leadership of NIFAA, established a board, and helped to build the team, thus translating the idea into reality. CIFA played a catalytic role in

NIFAA's establishment, working to connect NIFAA to key players on malaria prevention in Nigeria, including the Federal Ministry of Health, World Bank, National Malaria Control Programme, and other Nigerian counterparts, in Washington and Abuja, and to commission evaluation of the intervention. The commitment by the Nigerian government and religious communities plus external support made possible focused and high quality work. Nigerian ownership was a priority objective, though this involved continuing challenges in navigating political obstacles and varying interests and perspectives of the interfaith partners.

The NIFAA-led program focused on training faith leaders about core elements of the national malaria program. This included recognizing causes and symptoms, the importance of obtaining a long-lasting insecticide treated net (LLIN), and the use of LLIN especially for children and pregnant women. Faith leaders incorporated public health messages in their sermons or messages to followers.

Evaluations point to impressive results. Preliminary results from the Lot Quality Assurance Survey conducted in seven states during June and July 2010 showed that in Akwa Ibom state, where NIFAA trained over 6,000 religious leaders, more than twice as many children under 5 slept under a LLIN (51.6 percent) as in nearby Anambra State (25.1 percent) the night before the survey.<sup>84</sup> These results suggest that the faith engagement should be understood as a contributor to remarkable national success: in Nigeria, from 2007 to 2015, the proportion of children under 5 sleeping under insecticide-treated mosquito nets rose from 4 to 74 percent.

The NIFAA experience suggests important lessons. The link to the national program made possible large-scale faith engagement that contributed and was seen to contribute to a successful effort. Intensive and sustained capacity-building efforts were vital. Methodical evaluation was essential in persuading sometimes skeptical partners of the merits of faith involvement. Sustaining the interfaith framework, a central program goal, demands ongoing efforts.

#### BOX 19: ERADICATING POLIO IN NIGERIA: RELIGIOUS OBSTACLES, RELIGIOUS ENGAGEMENT<sup>85</sup>

Nigeria is in the spotlight in the global campaign to eradicate polio (Global Polio Eradication Initiative, GPEI), one of only three countries still affected by the disease—the other two are Afghanistan and Pakistan. GPEI now focuses on what some describe as “removing the last hairs”—the few remaining cases, located (not surprisingly) in difficult-to-reach, often conflict-plagued places. When in 2003 five northern Nigerian states boycotted the oral polio vaccine, large international resources were mobilized to address a crisis that threatened to derail the global campaign. The direct impact of the stall in the Nigeria campaign included significant increases in polio cases and costs to the global campaign estimated at over US\$500 million.

While the crisis attracted considerable attention including scholarly articles,<sup>86</sup> observers including Nigeria's former Minister of Health Muhammad Ali Pate, argue that narratives are largely driven by anecdotes rather than robust analysis. Careful research is needed both to understand why opposition to the polio vaccination campaign took such a virulent form, what actions caused fears to abate, and what lessons can be drawn for more effective public health strategies and approaches.

The fears that caused the boycott are quite well understood, but how they caught fire less so. Misinformation (for example that the vaccine was an American plot to spread HIV and sterilize Muslim girls) and deliberate rumors fed conspiracy theories, in an environment where trust in both the government and international partners was low. The intensive and visible mobilization of vast resources to address a problem that was not perceived as a priority issue locally (because there were so few polio cases) in a region where public health services were abysmally poor meant that the polio vaccination campaign was ripe for backlash. Opposition came from both religious and traditional leaders as well as some scientists and opinion-makers.

International responses were swift and broad-based. Then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan sent his senior African advisor on an urgent mission to meet local leaders, including the respected Sultan of Sokoto. Government partners (the British government, for example) mobilized resources, as did UN agencies like the WHO and UNICEF. The Organisation for the Islamic Conference (as it was known at the time), the African Union, and other bodies moved to counter the rumors. Saudi Arabia announced that it would require vaccination for the hajj, the pilgrimage to Mecca. Procurement provisions were waived to allow authorities to purchase vaccines from a Muslim-majority nation, Indonesia. National resources in Nigeria—including the president—were mobilized.

With well-targeted encounters and solid information, influential leaders including the Sultan of Sokoto and respected religious leaders were convinced to support resumption of the vaccination campaign. However, new

fears erupted in 2008 and renewed efforts were required. This time a visit by Bill Gates, founder of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, was part of a broader response that sought to engage traditional and religious leaders in institutionalized committees in six northern Nigerian states. These new entities (Emir Committees) had significant influence on planning and implementation of public health service delivery, including allocation of “basket funds” and accountability for their use.

The key game changer in the turnaround was this engagement of the northern Nigerian traditional leadership. A task team of the Northern Traditional Leaders Committee on Primary Health Care Delivery spearheaded an effort to engage communities systematically. It was the first time that these leaders had supported a major government development program, and it highlighted the large untapped potential. The committee emerged as an influential platform to engage with traditional institutions that represented over 150,000 units spread across 19 northern Nigerian states and the Federal Capital Territory. The keys to success included effective communication and mobilization. That meant active participation in launches, reviews, and monitoring and accountability, efforts to resolve conflicts as they arose, and specific efforts to engage networks of faith-inspired organizations and women's groups. The outreach created a space for dialogue that was sorely missing.

Dr. Pate played an instrumental role in this effort, but when he left his position as minister of health in 2013 he was concerned that the base of knowledge about how trust and influence were involved was insufficient. He continued as the President's honorary special adviser on polio and primary healthcare until May 2015, funded by Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, and as a visiting professor at Duke University. He continues to oversee an ambitious research effort that has involved network analysis and over 18,000 interviews in six northern Nigerian states. This landscape mapping of traditional and religious leaders will contribute to a better understanding of who is influential and how that influence applies in practice. Preliminary results highlight the diversity of the maps; patterns differ significantly from state to state. The interactions of traditional and religious leadership vary, as do the patterns of the scope of their contacts and influence. The results point to a large underutilized potential for a broad multi-stakeholder approach to public health, but also to other development fields.

Better understanding of networks of influence has critical importance because the impediments to development campaigns are a symptom of a wider dysfunctionality, linked not only to weaknesses in governance but also to aspects of the mass culture. Engagement of the broader networks including religious actors is a vital prerequisite to the whole society coming together.

An area with substantial but largely untapped potential for faith engagement is tuberculosis.<sup>87</sup>

A report released by the National Tuberculosis and Leprosy Control Programme, a parastatal under the Federal Ministry of Health, ranks Nigeria the fourth country worldwide with the highest cases of tuberculosis. Over 80 per cent of tuberculosis cases in Nigeria are still undetected; TB claims over 1.5 million lives annually.<sup>88</sup>

A WFDD/Berkley Center policy brief recommended active consideration of engaging with faith communities purposefully to address the challenge. Engaging faith communities alongside other public, private, and civil society actors can and should be an integral part of TB interventions. The National Strategic Plan for Tuberculosis Control 2015–2020 (NSP) highlights first points of contact like religious leaders in identification and referral of people with TB symptoms; it outlines training sessions, formal agreements like memoranda of understanding, and field visits by public officials to use the assets of these actors more effectively. Faith-inspired providers can deliver excellent patient outcomes, and there is room to improve faith actor coordination with the public sector. The NSP outlines areas where the government can better support the various faith-inspired organizations and private health facilities in establishing TB diagnostic services and drug susceptibility testing.

Sharing lessons learned and coordinating interventions is a significant path to improving health outcomes for TB patients. Strategic coordination and networking are keys to future success. Solid information is crucial to move in this direction. Connected through organizations like CHAN and NIFAA, the extensive networks of Nigerian faith-linked institutions can be more effective, notably by strengthening interfaith and public-private coordination. Networks mobilized for polio and malaria can and should also address TB, drawing on their community knowledge and healthcare capacity.

*Religious Dimensions of Reproductive Health*

Nigeria’s population of over 190 million (2017),<sup>89</sup> the largest in Africa, coupled with projections that it could soar to 410 million by 2050,<sup>90</sup> position demographic factors as central to Nigeria’s development. (see Table 5.1) Many Nigerians recognize the dangers of rapid population growth, but also the risks of addressing these challenges, notably given the presence and perception of cultural and religious reticence on family planning. To illustrate, Zamfara state governor Abdul’aziz Abubakar Yari observed that “the way we are going, we are bound to have a problem,” but acknowledged that promoting smaller family sizes is “political suicide” and that he “would be stoned” if he did so.<sup>91</sup>

Reproductive health indicators highlight the sensitive divides between Nigeria’s northern and southern regions. These include an underlying concern for the relative size of Muslim and Christian populations and implications for balance of power. The concerns spill over into debates about data, for example the respective fertility rates

of different religious communities. It is nonetheless generally agreed that fertility rates are markedly higher in northern states (see Map 5.1); rates of contraceptive prevalence and knowledge of any contraceptive method (particularly among women) are much lower in the northern than in the southern states.<sup>92</sup>

While experts recognize that engaging with religious actors on demographic issues and policies is important, operational and strategic approaches in Nigeria to such engagement has been limited. One reason is the divides and inequities between Muslim and Christian populations that color debates about demography and relevant policies. Policymakers must also take into account the differing beliefs and formal positions of different religious communities toward family planning—both positive and negative—and the practical involvement of faith communities and institutions in delivering family planning programs or their outright opposition. In practice, this means that engagement of both religious communities and faith-inspired organizations on reproductive health and family planning is rather fragmented. There is no robust and reliable assessment of the overall status of programs and impact.


*Policy and Partnerships on Family Planning*

Formal positions of the Nigerian governments on family planning have evolved over time. The demographic challenges facing the country were recognized as early as the 1962–68 National Development Plan.<sup>105</sup> The consequences of rapid population growth have come into increasingly sharp focus, with the 1988 population policy going so far as to propose reducing the number of children to four per woman. The proposal was seen as controversial—not only did it suggest birth limitation, but it was viewed by some Christians as favoring Islam, as Muslim men could take up to four wives.<sup>106</sup> Following the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD, also known as the Cairo Conference), family planning policies, including associated issues like child marriage, were more explicitly addressed, including a recognition that both public and private institutions were involved. The National Policy on Population for Sustainable Development (NPP), launched in 2005, “embedded the rights-based tenets and narrative of ICPD.”<sup>107</sup> The 2014 Nigeria Family Planning Blueprint (Scale-up Plan) set out the approaches Nigeria should take to achieve the ambitious

*Table 5.1: Nigeria’s Population Profile*

Indicator	Current Status (Year)
Total population <sup>93</sup>	190.9 million (2017)
Projected 2050 population <sup>94</sup>	410.6 million
Population growth rate (annual %) <sup>95</sup>	2.6% (2016)
Birth rate, crude (per 1,000 people) <sup>96</sup>	39.4 (2015)
Fertility rate <sup>97</sup>	5.59 (2015) vs. 6.49 (1990)
Population between ages 0–14 <sup>98</sup>	44% (2016)
Maternal mortality ratio (modeled estimate, per 100,000 live births) <sup>99</sup>	814 (2015) vs. 1,350 (1990)
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) <sup>100</sup>	66.9 (2016) vs. 126.2 (1990)
Contraceptive prevalence rate, modern methods (married women ages 15–49) <sup>101</sup>	9.8% (2013) 1990: 3.5; 2003: 8.2; 2008: 9.7
Contraceptive prevalence rate, any method (married women ages 15–49) <sup>102</sup>	15.1 (2013); 1990: 6.0; 2003: 12.6; 2008: 14.6
Knowledge of any contraceptive method <sup>103</sup>	All women: 84.6% (2013) All men: 97.0% (2013)
Unmet need (married women 15–49) <sup>104</sup>	16.1% (2013)

Map 5.1: Total Fertility Rate by Zone  
(births per woman)



Source: Bolatito Ogunbiyi, "Nigeria: Population and Demographic trends," Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C., April 25, 2012

targets established at the 2012 London Summit on Family Planning, notably achieving a contraceptive prevalence rate of 36 percent by 2018. The 2014 plan, albeit as a brief comment, signaled the importance of religious leaders as stakeholders, noting that religious prohibitions are one of the reasons that 63 percent of Nigerian women do not intend to use family planning in the future.<sup>108</sup>

A 2015 NPP assessment report<sup>109</sup> pointed to cultural and religious barriers to family planning:

- Respondents recognized gender roles as practiced and Nigeria's patriarchal structure as at odds with the NPP, notably as obstacles to promoting girls' education.
- Nigeria's municipal law did not respect tenets established in the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, slowing women's empowerment and the elimination of harmful practices and norms.
- Religious practices and beliefs posed obstacles to health-seeking behavior and limited data collection.

Some respondents remarked that open discussion about sex was limited by religious objections, preventing children from receiving family life education.

Women's access to contraception was also said to be limited by religious objections.

Several development organizations work with local religious leaders and organizations on issues of reproductive health. Pathfinder, in particular, has a history of collaboration with religious organizations in Nigeria. Pathfinder supported Nigerian ulama in developing *Reproductive Health Issues in Nigeria: The Islamic Perspectives*, a document that was released in 2004 with the support of prominent Islamic scholars and leaders, including the Sultan of Sokoto.<sup>110</sup> More recently, Pathfinder has collaborated with the Federation of Muslim Women Associations of Nigeria in Kaduna, the Sunni Hospital Maiduguri, and the Church of Christ in Nigeria in Borno State to improve the quality of services in their respective health centers, largely through skills development for staff and provision of supplies.<sup>111</sup> Christian Aid (CA) takes a different approach, with its deliberate view of religious leaders as gatekeepers to the communities. The organization works with communities to determine the most pressing needs and take action together. In its family planning work in Nigeria, CA works with Marie Stopes international (MSI); CA focuses on demand creation, mobilizing communities and working to address social and cultural norms, while MSI works on the supply side.<sup>112</sup>

Box 20 highlights differing views of Nigerian public figures on the topic.

#### BOX 20: WHAT DO NIGERIAN PUBLIC FIGURES SAY ABOUT RELIGION AND FAMILY PLANNING?

Religious attitudes on family planning are mixed. The following examples illustrate the reality of both strong support and opposition, as well as the challenges and opportunities in working with religious communities on family planning.

There is a lack of consensus not only on which family planning practices are permissible within religious teachings, but also whether or not family planning is permissible at all:

- "When you push a Muslim to say he must plan for his children, it means you push him to violate the rule of his religion."<sup>113</sup>  
- Gudaji Kazaure, Member, Nigeria's House of Representatives
- "Family planning is biblical. I think it is in one of the letters to St. Paul. The church does not support artificial insemination and such other methods as contraceptives. But there is what we call natural family planning and discipline in marriage."<sup>114</sup>  
- Rev. Fr. Joseph Nwanua, Parish Priest, SS Joachim and Anne Catholic Church
- "Family planning has nothing to do with being biblical or not. It's only wisdom that will tell you to do what is right as a family. The Bible says that wisdom is profitable to direct [...] If you are faced with an issue you ask wisdom to direct you."<sup>115</sup>  
- Evangelist Elishama Ideh, President/Founder, Christ The Ever-present Ministry
- "FAMILY planning is permissible in Islam, but it depends on what you understand as family planning. Islam teaches that Muslims should have as many children as possible because of the need to have more people who would live their lives in accordance with the directives of God on earth. [...] However, it also guides us not to undertake anything that is beyond our ability to see through."<sup>116</sup>  
-Prof. Dawud O. S. Noibi, Executive Secretary/CEO, Muslim Ummah of South West Nigeria
- If you marry and you don't apply common sense or family planning, you can end up having 10 or even 15 children. But for the health of the woman, who is not a baby machine, family planning is acceptable."<sup>117</sup>  
-Rt. Rev. Dr. Olusola James Odedeji, Diocesan Bishop, Diocese of Lagos West, Anglican Communion
- "We should apply wisdom given to us by God. We are already 180 million people and we don't have light and water. And you want to produce without planning. If you can't plan for your family, how do you plan your local government? How would you plan for the state? To plan effectively for this nation begins from the family. If you don't plan for your family that means the country is in danger."<sup>118</sup>  
- Bishop (Dr.) Chris E. Kwakpovwe, publisher of *Our Daily Mannar*, ODM/General Overseer, Manna Prayer Mountain Ministry Interdenominational

Some religious leaders have offered suggestions and advocated for family planning promotion:

- At the 5th Nigeria Family Planning Conference in 2017, some traditional and religious leaders urged the government to increase family planning advocacy and implementation.<sup>119</sup>
- The Emir of Shonga, representing the Sultan of Sokoto, said that religious roles in family planning were "over-represented" and that communication was the issue. He encouraged clerics to read *Islamic Perspective on Family Planning in Nigeria* and share the knowledge with their communities. The document investigates Islamic teachings on family planning, and the scholars investigated "if there is any point where family planning negates the tenets of Islam, especially in the aspect of population control."<sup>120</sup>
- A representative from the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) called for less talk and more action, reiterating that the Bible is not against family planning.<sup>121</sup>

Religious Engagement in the HIV/AIDS Response

Nigeria has seen important progress on HIV/AIDS but still faces significant challenges. The HIV prevalence rate (ages 15-49) has dropped from 4.1 percent at its highest point in 2001 to 2.9 percent in 2016.<sup>122</sup> The incidence rate (ages 15-49) has fallen from its peak at 0.57 percent in 1997 to 0.2 percent in 2016.<sup>123</sup> However, an estimated 220,000 adults and children are newly infected with HIV each year.<sup>124</sup> Currently, 3.2 million Nigerians are living with HIV, but only 30 percent are accessing antiretroviral therapy.<sup>125</sup> Some 2.6 million children (0-17) have been orphaned by AIDS.<sup>126</sup>

Religious leaders and communities and faith-inspired institutions have played varying roles in addressing HIV in Nigeria. Both Christian and Muslim leaders and communities in Nigeria have contributed to the belief that HIV is punishment for sin and immorality.<sup>127</sup> When individual Christian churches imposed mandatory pre-marital HIV testing for couples, some critics argued that this violates basic human rights. UNAIDS and WHO affirm that they “do not support mandatory or compulsory testing of individuals on public health grounds.”<sup>128</sup> Stigma remains a serious problem that often involves religious factors. In contrast there are many positive stories of care and leadership within religious communities.

Nigeria’s National HIV/AIDS Stigma Reduction Strategy underscores the importance of a multisectoral approach, with faith communities and organizations recognized as key stakeholders. The strategy notes that faith communities have at times contributed to stigma and discrimination of those living with HIV.<sup>129</sup> Recognizing the moral authority of religious leaders, it points to the positive roles that they can play. Key objectives are to build the capacity of religious leaders and institutions to promote attitude and behavior changes in their communities and to encourage their involvement in national dialogue.<sup>130</sup>

Various FIOs have been involved in the response. Examples include:

- Tearfund and its partners have worked to help FBOs move beyond the common strategy of promoting abstinence and fidelity to providing more comprehensive education. They promote safer practices, stigma reduction, and greater understanding of confidentiality to protect those living with HIV.<sup>131</sup>
- The Nigerian affiliate of the International Network of Religious Leaders Living with or Personally Affected by HIV/AIDS, known as NINERELA+, is active in HIV prevention and stigma reduction in both Christian and Muslim communities. NINERELA+ trains religious leaders who serve as champions to promote HIV testing and counseling.<sup>132</sup> It works with trained mentor mothers and volunteers to prevent mother-to-child transmission. NINERELA+ uses the SAVE model<sup>133</sup> rather than the more widely known ABC model. It sees its role in stigma reduction as one of its greatest achievements. It played a key role in advocating for Nigeria’s first stigma reduction strategy and developed a faith-based tool to help faith communities understand Nigeria’s anti-discrimination policies.<sup>134</sup>

WOMEN’S RIGHTS AND RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AND INSTITUTIONS

The wide-ranging issues facing women in Nigeria are reflected in the following table:<sup>135</sup>

The paradoxical fact that religious institutions, practices, and theologies affect women’s roles as both “part of the problem” and “part of the solution” features in many lively debates about Nigeria’s development. Approaches among religious communities (and often within them) range widely, about the significance of equal relationships between women and men and on specific topics affecting, for example, women’s employment and political roles. Many FIOs focus on addressing specific problems facing women, such as widowhood or trafficking. Box 21 includes a state of the art summary (albeit somewhat dated) from the University of Birmingham Religions and Development Project about gender

Table 5.2: Nigeria: Global Gender Gap Index

	2016 Rank (of 144)	2016 Score	2006 Rank (of 115)	2006 Score
Overall	118	0.643	94	0.610
Economic participation and opportunity	52	0.700	59	0.612
Educational attainment	134	0.814	104	0.816
Health and survival	135	0.961	99	0.966
Political empowerment	109	0.097	99	0.049

BOX 21: REFLECTIONS ON RELIGION AND GENDER: LESSONS LEARNED AND IMPLICATIONS

Excerpted from “Religion, women’s movement and legal reform in Nigeria”<sup>136</sup>

A policy brief on gender issues that reflected findings of a University of Birmingham Religions and Development Programme studyhighlights practical priorities for advocacy and action.

Case studies demonstrate that, although religion is implicated in gender inequalities and religious opposition may block legal reform designed to protect women’s rights, constructive engagements between some religious actors and women’s rights agendas are possible. Campaign coalitions recognize the need to take stock, re-position the CEDAW<sup>137</sup> domestication campaign, and ensure implementation of the widowhood rights legislation in Anambra State. Lessons include:

- Secular and FBO activists believe that a more pragmatic approach to domesticating CEDAW may be necessary.

This could imply abandoning the attempt to domesticate CEDAW in favor of focusing on the African Union Protocol of the Rights of Women in Africa (2004) which Nigeria ratified in 2004.

- Involvement by religious organizations can help to bridge the elite-grassroots divide that has weakened the Nigerian women’s movement.
- Legal reform is necessary but not sufficient to reduce discrimination against women; ongoing action is needed to tackle inconsistencies (for example, between statutory and customary law), to ensure implementation of new laws, and to secure long term changes in the social attitudes that underlie and reproduce gender inequalities.

issues and some religious dimensions. It focuses on matters of law, involvement in the economy, access to and performance in education, protection against violence and abuse, and leadership roles, including within religious institutions.

The kidnapping of girls by Boko Haram (including the well-known incident in Chibok, but also far more broadly across affected regions) has shone a spotlight on the special challenges of violence against women in conflict settings. Various religious communities and institutions are involved in many forms of advocacy to spur action for those directly affected and to address the basic grievances and attitudes that permit such violence to occur.

Parallel efforts aim to address broader issues of domestic violence and violence against women that are common in the society overall. Several faith-inspired programs address

problems of domestic violence specifically. An example is the gender-based violence response and prevention to conflict-affected populations in Nigeria project supported by Norwegian Church Aid (NCA), part of the Gender-based Violence Sub-Sector Working Group Strategic Objectives. The aim is to increase meaningful access to life-saving gender-based violence (GBV) response services, including case management and psychosocial support. NCA works with community stakeholders to initiate and expand upon community-based GBV prevention activities through risk mitigation, community sensitization, and economic empowerment activities targeted towards women and girls at risk of GBV. The goal is building local capacity in GBV response and prevention through training in specialized GBV response and mainstreaming into WASH activities. Beneficiaries total 6,600 women and girls at risk of GBV.

BOX 22: RELIGIOUS DIMENSIONS OF FEMALE GENITAL CUTTING IN NIGERIA

The organization 28 Too Many’s detailed *Country Profile: FGM in Nigeria* (2016)<sup>138</sup> addresses religious dimensions involved in FGC but does not focus primarily on them. It includes a rich bibliography on the topic and analysis of related issues, such as education and health, where gender bias is significant. The following draws on its analysis.

FGC is a common practice in Nigeria: an estimated 20 million women have been cut—some 10 percent of the global total—and 24.8 percent of women in the 15 to 49 age bracket (2013 DHS the primary source). FGC appears to be declining but slowly. Uncertainties surround reasons why the practice persists. It is linked to issues involving women’s roles in society, health, and levels of education. The practice varies widely across Nigeria. More women in cities have been cut (an estimated 32.3 percent versus 19.3 percent of women living in rural areas). The South East and South West Zones have the highest prevalence (49 percent and 47.5 percent respectively), while North East Zone has the lowest prevalence, at 2.9 percent. Ethnicity is the primary factor: the Hausa-Fulani have an average prevalence of 16.3 percent; the Yoruba 54.5 percent, and the Igbo 45.2 percent. Prevalence is highest among women who practice traditionalist religions (34.8 percent), and higher among Christians than Muslims. FGM is most likely to take place in Nigeria during childhood, except that women in certain ethnic groups undergo FGM during the birth of their first child, because of a

belief that it is critical that a baby not touch its mother’s clitoris.<sup>139</sup> Many girls are cut as infants (16 percent of girls aged 0 to 14 undergo FGC before their first birthday), and most women (82 percent) aged 15 to 49 who have had FGM state that they were cut before the age of five. The most common type of FGC in Nigeria is ‘cut, flesh removed.’ ‘Cut, no flesh removed’ is experienced by 5.8 percent of women who undergo FGC, and ‘sewn closed’ (i.e. Type III – infibulation) by 5.3 percent of women who undergo FGC. *Angurya* cuts are performed on 24.9 percent and *gishiri* cuts on 5.1 percent of women who experience ‘other’ or ‘unclassified’ types of FGC. Most instances of FGC are carried out by traditional practitioners.

The most common reason/benefit reported for FGC is to ‘preserve virginity/prevent premarital sex,’ though 58.1 percent of women and 51.8 percent of men believe that FGC has no benefits. Fifteen percent of women and 23.6 percent of men believe that it is a requirement of their culture or religion.

A federal law passed in May 2015 bans FGC and other harmful traditional practices (HTPs), but the Violence Against Persons Prohibition Act (VAPP) only applies to the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) of Abuja. It is up to each of the 36 states to pass similar legislation in its territory. Thirteen states have similar laws in place; however, enforcement is sporadic and depends on state and federal police capacity and willingness.

Religious factors are not seen either as a major reason for FGC or as a major impetus in campaigns to end the practice. However, in the 2013 DHS, responses to the question “Do you believe that female circumcision is required by your religion?” were that 15 percent of women and 23.6 percent of men who had heard of FGM said they believe it is:

Religion	Women (%)	Men (%)
Catholic	16.0	22.2
Other Christian	10.5	15.5
Islam	17.8	30.0
Traditional	33.1	39.9

Religious leadership in projects to end FGC in Nigeria is important both at national and grassroots levels, and a quite wide range of NGO initiatives to combat FGC have religious leadership. Action Health Incorporated (AHI), for example, targets traditional and religious community leaders as part of a community dialogue approach, and CHAI visits religious leaders to raise awareness and educate about the harms of FGC. Some religious actors play negative roles, considering campaigns to end FGC as an “attack” on the work of God.

28 Too Many recommends the following directions and actions to speed the decline of FGC:

- Adopt culturally relevant programs. National messages against FGM are strong but need to be reinforced at state and district levels.

- Long-term funding is needed to sustain institutions and efforts.
- Situating efforts to end FGC in the SDG framework can reinforce action.
- Facilitating education and supporting girls through secondary and further education is vital.
- Improve access to healthcare and provide healthcare professionals training and guidance on managing health complications related to FGC.
- Introduce and increase enforcement of relevant laws at state level, and ensure those responsible for FGC are prosecuted.
- Foster effective and diverse media campaigns.
- Encourage faith leaders and faith-based organizations to act as agents of change, challenge misconceptions that FGM is a religious requirement and be proactive in ending FGM.
- Engage with men and boys when conveying the anti-FGM message.
- Facilitate federal-wide and cross-state network of organizations working towards the elimination of FGC.
- Further work and research is required to inform anti-FGM programs and analyze trends and practices across Nigeria.

Discussions about LGBTQ rights and efforts to address discrimination and violence are difficult in Nigeria at present, and opposition to such rights is commonly associated with religious attitudes and the specific position of different religious institutions. A common response (heard from senior religious leaders, both Christian and Muslim) is that action does not at this stage in Nigeria's history have a high priority because there are so many

**BOX 23: MODERN SLAVERY**

Nigeria is a focal point for concern about modern slavery, named by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime as among the world's eight countries considered the highest in human trafficking. The most visible issues (with substantial press coverage) concern Nigerian migrants in Libya forced into slave conditions (including even organ harvesting), reports of networks of women trafficked to Europe for prostitution, and girls kidnapped and forced into marriage or treated as sex slaves (notably by Boko Haram). Various religious institutions are actively involved. Some aspects of slavery are linked to religious beliefs and practices, notably subordinate roles for women, tacit acceptance of de facto slavery, and the bondage of traditional spells cast on victims that lead them to hesitate to escape.

Nigeria is considered to have Africa's largest number of people living in conditions of modern slavery. In the 2016 Global Slavery Index Nigeria ranks 23 of 167, with an estimate of 875,500 people living in modern slavery.<sup>140</sup> Nigeria's total estimated people living in modern slavery is about 15 percent of the 6.4 million people living in modern slavery in Africa. Africa as a whole accounts for about 17 percent of all the people trapped in modern slavery today.<sup>141</sup>

The data covers a wide range of victims of modern slavery: women tricked into migrating for non-existent jobs (who are then forced to work in brothels or enter into forced marriages), household workers who are promised paid work (but are then forced to work without wages and often without legal immigration status), and others. It also includes children who are forced to work as street vendors or beggars and boys who are forced to work in mines, stone quarries, and domestic service. The definition covers children who are forced to fight for military groups. In Nigeria,

increasingly frequent reports suggest that the northern insurgency is more heavily incorporating child soldiers. In April 2014, Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau threatened to sell the kidnapped Chibok girls into slavery. Many girls are trafficked out of Nigeria, with or without the northern insurgency. The European Union has estimated that 60 percent of all sex workers in Italy and Belgium are Nigerian women.<sup>142</sup>

Press reports highlight Nigerian bishops who have condemned the enslavement of Nigerians who traveled to Libya for work, calling the practice a horrific abuse of human dignity. Bishop Joseph Bagobiri of Kafanchan, retired Archbishop Alaba Job of Ibadan, and retired Bishop Julius Adedokun of Oyo called on the Nigerian government to act on behalf of Nigerian nationals in Libya and elsewhere who have been victimized by modern-day slave traders. They also suggested that the government discourage Nigerians from traveling to other countries for work because of dangers posed by illicit labor markets. Their comments came after Nigerian officials had repatriated 3,000 Nigerians from Libya through December 4, 2017 following reports of inhumane treatment there.<sup>143</sup>

Several orders of Catholic sisters support Nigerians who face conditions of modern slavery in Europe.<sup>144</sup> A study by the Community of Pope John XXIII, one of several church organizations helping people on the "ragged edge of society," reports that a third of women in slavery conditions arrived as minors. With 250 shelters spread across Italy, Catholic nuns are pivotal to the lives of women seeking an escape to stable lives from a sex trade that for many of them is outright slavery. A reported 120,000 women now work as prostitutes in Italy, and more than a third of these women come from Nigeria, by far the largest number from any country outside Italy.<sup>145</sup>

other critical, life-or-death issues that affect the population overall.

Female genital cutting (FGC) is prevalent in Nigeria (Box 22). Different figures are cited: WHO and the Nigeria Demographic and Health Survey (NDHS) report between 50 and 60 percent, contrasted with a UNICEF survey indicting a prevalence rate of 27

**BOX 24: ADDRESSING ILLS LINKED TO WITCHCRAFT<sup>146</sup>**

Spiritual explanations for many phenomena are inherent to African social worldviews, and this includes belief in witchcraft. Such beliefs persist in many parts of Nigeria, conveyed through popular media (the Nigerian movie industry, for example), as well as cultural traditions. Witches are seen to impoverish, harm, or kill other human beings. Those suspected are subject to harsh persecution. Witchcraft can contribute to family and social conflicts, with the focus traditionally on the elderly or women. From the early to mid-1990s, however, child accusations have increased. Elements of the Christian Pentecostal movement in Nigeria contribute to this trend, as failures and misfortunes are attributed to Satan. Child witches can readily be blamed for economic hardships and the ills of poverty. Witchcraft accusations are especially directed at orphans and the disabled.

The stigma of witchcraft is a human rights concern and is seen as a social evil. The UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions has reported on the issue and associated harms. Of special concern are children suspected as witches who may be abandoned or rejected, and communities and even responsible government bodies may hesitate to intervene, affected both by their personal beliefs and fears of community backlash. Nigerian law prohibits accusations of witchcraft against both adults and children, but the child rights-specific Children's Rights Act does not. Not all Nigeria's states have criminalized accusations of witchcraft. Various religious bodies have long worked to end the practice.

Various organizations focus explicitly on the problems of witchcraft and particularly on children who are accused. Stop Child Witch Accusations, a network based in the United Kingdom with a strong Christian focus, enlists the active support

of a coalition of churches. The first goal is to publicize what is happening; the second is to make clear that it has no place in a civilized, Christian community. Smaller organizations work directly at community level. An inspiring example is Stepping Stones Nigeria, also with Christian roots. It works both at the local level, in Nigeria's delta region, and internationally, to mobilize awareness and concern about the phenomenon. Its focus is on empowering stigmatized and abused children, especially those living in the streets. A first step is safety and where possible reintegration with family and community. A drop-in facility for children provides food, clothing, healthcare, counseling, and education. Their goal is to raise awareness within the community, reaching out to traditional leaders, government departments, the police, and the judiciary.

Global campaigning is also part of Stepping Stones' effort. PACT is a global campaign to give a voice to the voiceless and bring about long-term change for the Nigerian child, particularly those at risk of child rights violations including witchcraft-related abuse and trafficking. Tools include media campaigns, demonstrations, and conferences. *The Fake Prophet*, a Nollywood film that premiered in Nigeria in July 2011, tells of the abuses associated with witchcraft accusations. *Eno's Story*, a children's book, centers on Eno, a young girl branded as a witch by an uncle. Her courage and imagination help her overcome her challenges.

Solutions to the tragic consequences for those accused as witches will need to come from better knowledge and education; dialogue with communities to understand what is at work in the culture, faith, and politics; patient work to help the affected and amplify their voices; and a determined commitment to the principles of human rights and human dignity.

percent (equating to approximately 30 million girls and women aged between 15 and 49).

Issues of trafficking and slavery are significant concerns both in Nigeria and internationally (Box 23), as is witchcraft (Box 24). Both topics involve significant gender as well as some religious dimensions.

## FIGHTING CORRUPTION: ENGAGING RELIGIOUS LEADERS

Nigeria is sadly often equated with corruption, and the government and its development partners highlight fighting corruption as a leading priority. President Buhari has made this effort a leading objective for national strategy. A pertinent question is how and to what extent religious leaders and institutions could contribute more effectively to the national effort, both because their roles are associated with ethical and moral leadership, because of their wide presence and community engagement, and because there are relatively high levels of trust in religious leaders. With extensive religious networks at all levels of society, direct involvement in service delivery, and capacities for moral suasion, religious leaders and communities could potentially play major roles in turning the situation around.

Common debates around corruption include alleged links to cultural norms and traditional practices, a reluctance to address small-scale corruption while mega-corruption persists, and a general despondence because of its endemic and deep-rooted nature. Religious leaders also focus on the moral formation of citizens and civic education as both a symptom of the problem and the path towards solutions. Clearly long-term solutions must be pursued alongside efforts to build systems that minimize corruption or hold corrupt officials accountable in the near-term. An example is financial reporting requirements that are a tool for ensuring greater transparency in use of public funds. A practical step to enhance the credibility of religious actors would be measures that strengthen their own accountability mechanisms, taking this as an opportunity to develop transparency and accountability mechanisms within churches and other religious organizations.

A promising initiative recently explored purposeful religious roles in support of anti-corruption work. Workshops in January 2016 in Lagos and Abuja organized by the U.S. State Department Office of Religion and Global Affairs and the Consulate General engaged influential Nigerian Christian and Muslim leaders on the topic. Follow up has focused on a program in collaboration with a secular Nigerian NGO, BudgIT that focuses specifically on transparency and accountability of financial flows, with expertise in making federal and state budgets accessible. More specifically, the workshops included 25 Christian leaders and 17 Muslim leaders, with an estimated reach to more than one

million Nigerians. Topics discussed included identifying the elements of corruption that are most problematic to religious leaders, and what work was already being done to address the issue. Separate workshops with Christian and Muslim religious leaders encouraged frank discussion of sensitive intra-religious issues related to corruption, transparency, and accountability.

The workshop series and follow up efforts aim to leverage the power and influence of religious communities and to mobilize Christian and Muslim leaders to take an active role in combating corruption, while at the same time providing concrete and practical tools. The underlying hope and belief is that religious leaders and communities can be a powerful voice against corruption. The anti-corruption theme often resonates deeply with religious actors and during the 2016 workshops, participants pledged to take a stand on corruption and to engage their congregations and communities through education, training, and other anti-corruption initiatives.

Both Christian and Muslim leaders asserted that they favor a multifaceted approach involving actions ranging from collective advocacy and public education campaigns to public asset declarations and anti-bribery pledges. Some suggested that religious actors and institutions should play a more forceful role in advocating for regulations and systems with stronger checks and balances to guard effectively against corruption. The following, similar themes emerged point to possible next steps:

- *Empower Congregants' Civic Engagement through Training and Tools:* The religious leaders expressed a strong desire for resources they could present for use by their followers to build their civic engagement capacity. Both Christian and Muslim leaders requested that BudgIT train their community members on how to use tools to read and understand national and state budgets, report progress on infrastructure projects, and submit freedom of information act requests. Religious leaders expressed interest in developing media and social media campaigns, including a year focused on anti-corruption.
- *Engage Government Leaders:* “If all religious leaders begin to hold government accountable ... there will be major change,” said one pastor. Religious leaders and communities could advocate at the federal, state, and local level, as well as suggesting changes in legislation and in the judicial sector. With senior government leaders members of their communities, there are clear opportunities for engagement.
- *Educate Citizens, Especially Youth:* Churches and mosques can take the lead in developing educational materials that promote integrity from a religious standpoint. An interfaith group working with the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission has developed “Anti-Corruption Preaching/Teaching Manuals” for both Christians and Muslims but they have not had wide dissemination.

- *Eradicate In-house Corruption:* Christian participants in particular discussed the need for internal record-keeping and financial transparency to legitimize their leaders' efforts to engage on this topic. In one pastor's words, "What bothers me most is that religious leaders are involved in corruption... they romance with corrupt government leaders and accept stolen money." The African Council for Accreditation and Accountability (Box 25) offers a model for how churches can demonstrate good financial management, and churches were invited to go through the accreditation process.
- *Mentor Public Officials:* Groups can develop formal mentoring programs to promote anti-corruption principles among public officials in their congregations and religious communities.

#### BOX 25: SETTING ACCOUNTABILITY STANDARDS: THE AFRICAN COUNCIL FOR ACCREDITATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY (AFCAA)

*"Lack of transparency and accountability paves the way for corruption and we are clear in stating that if that is not addressed, Christian organizations will become irrelevant as public trust is eroded."*

–Valentine Gitoho, Chair, AfCAA board

AfCAA aims to "unlock Africa's potential through adherence to Biblical Standards,"<sup>147</sup> bringing about public trust in organizations through awareness raising, advocacy, and accreditation. Nigeria is among the eight founding country members, and AfCAA's steering committee includes three African umbrella organizations: Association of Evangelicals in Africa (AEA), All African Conference of Churches (AACC), and Organization of African Instituted Churches (OAIC). An expressly Christian body, the goal is "to do all for the Glory of God," by, inter alia, "being excellent and blameless, wise careful planning, and being self-disciplined." AfCAA headquarters are in Nairobi.

AfCAA works to create awareness amongst Christian organizations about the need for compliance to the biblical standards that apply to the mobilization and stewardship of resources, provide training and periodic guidance on applying these standards in specific industries and sectors, advocate with lawmakers and governments on resource mobilization and resource management issues pertaining to Christian non-profits and churches, promote biblical values in the marketplace, and provide accreditation that attests to compliance with AfCAA standards.

AfCAA grew in part from the Africa-wide Stewardship and Accountability Commission of the Association of Evangelicals in Africa, which wanted to develop accountability standards for the membership.<sup>148</sup> The Evangelical Council for Financial Accountability (ECFA) in the United States, which oversees accountability standards, was a model. Following the 2010 Lausanne Conference, the idea of setting up a Missions Africa Trust Fund arose. The founders saw as a central challenge the need for a credible accreditation body that would support and serve Christian organizations. AfCAA started through building on networks across countries, with discussions beginning in December 2012. From a modest proposal it grew to continent-wide scope. In April 2013, an Inaugural Steering Committee meeting including representatives of several Christian bodies (AEA, AACC, OAIC) was held. AfCAA was registered with the Registrar of Companies on January 2015 as a Company Limited by Guarantee. AfCAA shares the same values of transparency and accountability as the ECFA in the United States.

- *Unite for Power and Protection:* Christian and Muslim participants emphasized the importance of uniting behind a shared anti-corruption platform. There are concerns about retribution when political corruption is exposed. One person emphasized that "When you fight corruption, it fights back." Fighting corruption as a group would present a more challenging target than a lone activist.
- *Preach Anti-Corruption Values:* There are religious leaders who are frustrated with their colleagues who focus their attentions and preaching on material wealth instead of moral values, thus the prosperity gospel. It is telling that leaders called on fellow religious leaders not to celebrate the corrupt, but rather to praise good stewards of public trust and funds, using their influence to "redefine the moral compass of the society." Preaching alone, however, is obviously not enough: "We've been preaching and corruption never stops," one observed. Actions such as public anti-bribery pledges are concrete steps that could help to change widespread cultural acceptance of corruption, in addition to developing systems that discourage corruption.

The central question is how far, individually and collectively, religious leaders will truly take on the complex issues surrounding corruption. A related question is how far questions about accountability are addressed systematically within religious organizations themselves. Box 25 describes a significant effort, Africa-wide but initiated in Nigeria, to improve accountability within evangelical Christian organizations led by the African Council for Accreditation and Accountability, a Nairobi-based organization that promotes transparency and accountability within churches. It is becoming operational and should begin accrediting religious organizations that have transparent funding and governance practices.

#### BOX 26: BUDGIT: A PRACTICAL EXAMPLE OF FIGHTING CORRUPTION<sup>149</sup>

BudgIT was invited to give a 2-day training and workshop for the Catholic Congregation at Our Lady of Good Counsel Catholic Church, Kano. The training, in October 2017, touched on topics ranging from (but not limited to) the budget process and participation, access to the budget, tracking of various capital constituency projects, corruption overall, and the role of citizens in the fight against corruption and in ensuring accountability. In Catholic participants engaged with BudgIT's Project Manager, Abayomi Akinbo and Project officer, Oyebola Agunloye. A centerpiece was Tracka's engagement in sensitizing the citizenry in different states on the various constituency projects contained in their budget and how, with this information, the organization was able to challenge their elected officials to deliver.

The attending congregation appreciated the workshop and agreed on the need to join hands in the unrelenting fight against corruption. They committed to passing on the information gained from the 2-day workshop to others. "Father Vitalis gave a vote of thanks and the program was rounded up with church activities."

The Catholic bishop of Sokoto Diocese, Bishop Matthew Kukah, offered an insightful, if discouraging, commentary on Nigerian attitudes towards their leaders on corruption, in an interview with Punch:

*“Indeed, the Buhari project presents us with an interesting view. The average northerner has become far more impoverished under Buhari than he was under (former President Goodluck) Jonathan. But they will still vote for Buhari because they see him as the only one who can help bring their derelict elite to order. It is a strange appeal but that is it. They believe their corrupt elite are above the law. They were seduced with Sharia because they believed it was going to help them punish their own elite, who they see as being above the law of Nigeria. These are the issues.”*

## OTHER ISSUES WHOSE RELIGIOUS DIMENSIONS COULD USEFULLY BE EXPLORED

*Child Marriage:* This issue lends itself especially well to religious involvement since religious leaders are commonly directly involved in performing marriages. Measures of child marriage in Nigeria are high; 43 percent of girls are married before their eighteenth birthday and 17 percent are married before they turn 15. The prevalence of child marriage varies widely from one region to another, with figures as high as 76 percent in the northwest region and as low as 10 percent in the Southeast (Girls not Brides and statistics).<sup>150</sup> The share of women who married as children has declined over time, as has the share of girls marrying very early (before the age of 15).<sup>151</sup> Child marriage is associated with lower wealth, lower education levels, and higher labor force participation.<sup>152</sup>

*Child Mortality.* High infant mortality (100 per 1,000 in 2003) is explained in part by the persisting low numbers of births occurring in health facilities and the low number of births attended by trained healthcare service providers. In 2003, two-thirds of the births in Nigeria still occurred at home and only slightly more than one-third of births were attended by doctors, nurses, or midwives. Religious leaders could potentially play significant roles in the behavior changes needed to save children’s lives.

*Maternal Mortality.* The high maternal mortality ratio in Nigeria (800 per 100,000 live births in 2000) reflects lack of access to or use of quality delivery services. Problems include obtaining money for treatment, distance to a health facility, and having to take transport.

*Child Nutrition:* Child nutrition in Nigeria has improved in recent years, but an estimated 11 million children under the age of five are stunted. Regional and social disparities are large, with particularly high levels of stunting in the northeast and

northwest and among the poorest quintile. Nigeria has made progress in micronutrient deficiency control, but about half the children aged 6 to 59 months do not receive vitamin A supplementation. WHO and UNICEF recommend exclusive breastfeeding during the first six months of life but in Nigeria, the rate is just 15 percent. Conflict in the northeast aggravates the nutrition situation. Fields have been destroyed, farmers are afraid to return to their land, and hundreds of thousands of people have fled.<sup>153</sup> Religious networks could support changes in behavior, especially during the critical first 1000 days of children’s lives, that could give children a better chance at a fulfilling life.



## CHAPTER 6: EDUCATION: RELIGIOUS ROLES AND ISSUES

Quality education is one of Nigeria’s leading challenges and the focus of major efforts by the government and other concerned entities. Yet, Nigeria lags far behind where it aspires to be and behind other countries at similar development levels, both in Africa and other regions. Over 10 million children are not in school, and the education sector in its entirety, notwithstanding examples of excellence, faces problems that some Nigerians describe as colossal. These include wide inequalities among different communities and regions, overcrowded classes, poor school infrastructure, underfunding, doubts as to how far education curricula fit national needs, and poor overall quality and learning results. Among criticisms of education approaches are their failure to support Nigeria’s mission to develop positive citizenship values and national cohesion. An explosion of private schools—including many run by religious institutions—reflects parents’ desire for quality education for their children, but their growth presents challenges, notably as to how far privately managed education advances national educational objectives like equity and social cohesion.

This brief review explores questions about actual and potential religious roles in education. Real and perceived gulfs between Muslim and Christian approaches to national education are a central problem for Nigeria. The grievances expressed by some extremist groups towards what they view as Western education, ambivalence about education of girls by some religious communities, and concerns that national education policies are unduly shaped by Christian legacies and approaches mean that these gulfs have specific religious significance. The tensions that result are nested within broader challenges facing Nigerian education, including meeting national education goals, as they are reflected, for example, in the SDGs. The review points to areas that demand further research and dialogue. These include how quality religiously-provided education can be supported and how to draw clear distinctions between education and religious advocacy.

More specific questions include:

- How is it most useful to define and treat various types of religiously-provided education: for example, education financed almost entirely by religious institutions and parents, hybrid arrangements—for example, where states finance teacher salaries but management is provided by religious bodies, preschool and adult education? How significant are religious roles in ancillary topics like vocational education and job training?
- What key education goals could religiously-provided education best help achieve—for example, tolerance, respect, and civic values?
- To what extent does/can teaching about religion in schools take place and does it engender respect among different communities?
- How can religious institutions, through their educational missions, support development of conflict resolution skills? Where are they falling short? Is there merit in identifying cases of best and worst practice related specifically to questions around education and conflict resolution?
- How does religious involvement (Christian and Muslim) influence national efforts to achieve gender equality goals? Which policies and programs work well and which do not?
- What is the significance for educational policy and institutions of the upheavals and population displacements facing Nigeria? What actions are being taken and should be taken, including by faith-inspired organizations, to meet the educational needs of those who are displaced and of communities disrupted or threatened by violence?
- How can meaningful reforms of various Islamic educational institutions be promoted and supported (this includes overall structure of systems and content and pedagogy)? Which programs are working well and which less well? What are the best paths to reform?
- What specific challenges do Catholic educational institutions face at all levels? With early childhood education a national priority, what can be learned from Catholic preschool educational programs?
- What impact is the rising use of social media having on religious education?
- What might be learned from the experience of Anambra State, which “returned” schools to Christian churches, with reportedly excellent educational outcomes?
- What would be needed to develop an operational database for education provided by religious institutions in Nigeria? What key data should be included? What are significant information gaps?
- What audiences might find a robust analysis of religious roles in education most interesting?

*Children born into the Kwayam tribe do not attend formal Western or Islamic schools.  
Photo Credit: Fati Abubakar*

The structure of contemporary education in Nigeria is summarized in Box 27.

*Historical Context*

Nigeria’s political and governance history has influenced educational policy, complicating the impact of specific policy initiatives and shaping the evolution of religiously-provided education. In colonial Nigeria, as in most former English colonies, the state was barely involved in education. Christian missionaries founded modern schools, so religious organizations were the linchpin for education in Nigeria as it developed through independence. However, the evolving modern education system largely involved Christian organizations, and traditional Islamic education remained the primary focus in large parts of northern Nigeria. The fault lines on education approaches between Nigeria’s Christian and Muslim communities established during the colonial period persist to this day, notwithstanding a succession of reform efforts aimed at establishing equitable national standards and approaches. Four historical legacies are particularly significant.

The first is the *colonial inheritance*. “Mission schools” in many parts of Nigeria, founded by mainly European missionaries from mainline Protestant and Catholic churches, formed the backbone of the system and dominated until the 1970s. In 1942, some 97 percent of Nigerian students counted in official data as enrolled were in Christian mission schools.<sup>159</sup> British and French colonialism differed dramatically in the role that the state played in supplying education. In the former, it was left to churches; in the latter it was a government function. Mission schools purported to impart quality education that included religious instruction and character formation, but this education was often perceived (not unjustly) as aimed at conversion to Christianity. In northern Nigeria, Islamic schools were common before, during, and following the colonial era (though oversight weakened over time as the authority of traditional leadership declined). They remain so, but for the most part were not part of the formal system insofar as it has been run by the government. In most areas of northern Nigeria, Christian schools were restricted, by design and policy. The lasting historical effects

**BOX 27: EDUCATION IN NIGERIA: BASIC FACTS AND DATA<sup>154</sup>**

Education in Nigeria today is administered by the three tiers of government: federal, state, and local. Each level has distinctive authorities to tax, finance, provide curriculum, certify teachers, and test students in primary, secondary, tertiary, and vocational education. At the federal level, the Ministry of Education is responsible for overall policy formation and ensuring quality control; its primary direct involvement is with tertiary education. Secondary education is primarily the responsibility of the state governments, and primary education falls largely under local governments. Overall government spending on education (with different government tiers responsible for specific segments) is low by any measure: Nigeria has not come close to spending the UNESCO standard of 26 percent of the national budget on education (estimated education spending has fluctuated, from 8.21 percent of the total budget in 2003 to 6.42 percent in 2009 and 8.7 percent in 2013). Education quality is inconsistent, reflected for example in Nigeria’s adult literacy rate of 59.6 percent (2015).

Nigeria’s Universal Primary Education policy, first implemented in 1976 and reinstated and expanded in 1999 and in 2004,<sup>155</sup> mandates free, compulsory basic education (primary plus junior secondary). There are still gaps in achieving universal enrollment, with over 10 million children out of school (OOS). OOS include some who attend religious schools that have not been integrated

into the formal education system and do not teach formal academic subjects such as mathematics, English, social studies, or science; these schools account for approximately 18 percent of OOS boys and 27 percent of OOS girls. Conflicts affecting some regions also explain shortfalls in school enrollment.

*Primary*

- A large and growing primary school-age population totals 28,804,474 (2014).
- There are over 62,000 primary schools.
- Six years of compulsory and free primary education (between ages 6 and 11) is to be provided to every child.
- Enrollment rates vary widely. Overall over 50 percent of children in northern zones do not attend school, versus less than 20 percent in the South; enrollment rates (2010) were as high as 95 percent in southern zones and as low as 19.91 percent in northern zones (in Jigawa, Kebbi, Katsina, Sokoto, and Yobe, primary school enrollment is less than 25 percent).
- Approximately two-thirds of children ages 6 to 11 attend primary school (68 percent among males versus 67 percent among females), but with wide variations among states.

- Thirty-three percent of primary school students were in private schools in 2015 (an increase from 26 percent in 2010).

*Secondary*

- Public junior secondary schools (three years) number 11,874; attendance is compulsory and free.
- Post-basic secondary education includes three years of senior secondary school.
- There are 7,104 secondary schools with 4,448,981 pupils; the teacher-to-pupil ratio is about 32:1.
- In 2015, 57 percent of females were likely to be attending secondary school, compared with 55 percent of males<sup>156</sup>
- At the junior secondary level, 29 percent of students were in private schools in 2015, up from 17 percent in 2010.

*Tertiary*

- In 2017, 152 universities were recognized as degree-granting institutions (in 1948, there was only one university-level institution in Nigeria; by 1962, federal universities had increased to five):<sup>157</sup>
  - 40 federal universities
  - 44 state universities

- 68 private universities as accredited degree-granting institutions
- Private institutions constituted some 45 percent of all Nigerian universities as of 2017.
- About two-thirds of private universities are religiously affiliated.<sup>158</sup>
- Nigerian students studying abroad increased by 164 percent between 2005 and 2015 (from 26,997 to 71,351).

Gender equity, a national policy objective, has links to religious demography that contribute to the marked differences among regions. About 60 percent of children not attending school are girls, concentrated in northern states. Female enrollment is generally higher than male enrollment in some southern states and on par with male enrollment in the Southwest.

Drop-outs are pronounced at grade six, when more than 17 percent of children drop out of school every year. More girls drop out of school early in the North in order to marry, while more boys than girls drop out in the East to take up commercial activities.

of the patterns of missionary education on contemporary economic and educational outcomes are substantial, notably reflected in varying levels of education and literacy, attitudes towards schooling, income levels, and composition of the civil service. These lasting effects figure prominently in Nigeria's noteworthy regional and sectarian inequalities.

The second legacy was *upheavals following the government takeover of church schools*. Some mission schools were taken over in the years after independence in 1960, but 1975 was a turning point. The 1975 action was partly prompted by the role of churches—and specifically the Catholic Church—in the Biafra War (the Church supported Biafra during its secession efforts), but the nationalization also reflected a desire to foster a common Nigerian identity through public education. The takeover created a lasting disruption of systems. In some places where government schools were unable to cater to the influx of students, the takeover was at least partially reversed at different points in time.<sup>160</sup>

The third legacy was the *delegation of responsibility to states* for outlining and running the school system, which took place at different points in time. With the weakening of national authority and differing administrative capacities and approaches among states, this resulted both in significant diversity among states and varying financial support for public education.

The fourth legacy was the *reopening of the education sector to competitive public and private schools*. This contributes to today's diverse and complex situation. Motivated both by deteriorating educational standards and public appeals, the government has allowed voluntary agencies and individuals to establish and run schools again, as long as state and national policies and curricula are followed.

### ***Religious Involvement in Education Today***

Nigeria's many religious communities almost universally support the goal of education for all. Approaches, however, vary among and within religious communities. Muslim versus Christian approaches to education are the central fissures, though there are significant intrafaith debates, for example, around the differing approaches of the expanding evangelical churches and the Catholic Church to education policies. Muslim approaches to education policy are especially complex: there is quite wide agreement by the government and parts of the ulama (Muslim scholars) that reforms of Islamic schools are vital for development of northern Nigeria (and of Nigeria overall), but mutual isolation of communities combined with weaknesses in Nigeria's educational bureaucracy have blocked a common operational framework.<sup>161</sup> Challenges are accentuated by the perceived dominance of Christian involvement in education policy and by the fragmentation of Christian communities.

A complex policy-making landscape affects religiously-provided education today, with

multiple actors involved. These include the different levels of government (federal, state, and local), major religious institutions (notably the Catholic Church, various religious orders and Islamic organizations), international organizations that support education programs, local bodies like teachers' unions, and NGOs that provide education services. There is no central authority with a mandate covering religiously-provided education as a category nor one that addresses the broader questions of education touching knowledge about religion. Acute tensions around Boko Haram's assault on Western education, as well as physical attacks on schools and students and threats to communities who send children to school, color broader and long-standing debates about how religious institutions and teachings relate to national education goals, notably the role of Islamic education.

Many religious bodies are involved directly in educational service delivery, running schools, universities, seminaries, and religious studies programs (like Sunday schools and holiday study). Many advocate for specific reforms of public education: for example, increased budget allocations or curriculum content. Some advocate for wider reliance on religiously-provided education. How far schools instill positive values in students is debated, the gist being that there is an urgent need for more focus on values, though often without specifying which values and how they are best instilled. In addition to religious denominations, various faith-inspired organizations, national and international, focus specifically on education in their operational programs. However, basic data about programs and facilities—notably the number and location of schools—and on their impact and challenges they face in delivering education is poor (beyond various, specific research assessments).

It is fair to say that overall there is a national consensus on the fact that religion should play some role in education. In two areas, however, consensus is weak: (i) whether the school should be a source for establishing loyalty to a particular faith; and (ii) whether the state at any level should have the authority to dictate curriculum. In practice, the state role in Christian areas tends to be reasonably clear, but it is far less so with respect to Islamic education. Further, policies have shifted vis-à-vis religious schools and associated issues, including religious content in public school curricula. This is reflected in wide variations in approaches and on-the-ground realities by state and even within states.

### ***Education and North-South Divides***

Wide educational gaps between Nigeria's northern and southern regions have religious links. The northern states, where the majority of the population is Muslim, have long lagged behind Nigeria's southern regions, educationally and economically; there, Christian denominations are in the majority, and historically, missionary activities that involved education were concentrated. The gaps have historical, economic, and religious roots. Protracted insurgencies, especially in the North, further challenge the proper functioning of educational institutions. Thus a vicious circle arises where conflicts are

linked in part to tensions around education (most visibly in Boko Haram’s signature opposition to Western education as contrary to Islamic values), which limits both enrollments and dialogue about reform. Large populations (above two million) are displaced and school infrastructure has been damaged or destroyed. The tensions, in turn, deter school attendance even in areas where violence is less significant. The historical legacies of Christian missionary roles in education (and their concentration on southern regions), various Muslim educational approaches and schools, and the appropriate balance between public and private roles in education are central concerns. North-South divides therefore permeate many debates about how to achieve Nigeria’s education goals, including what roles religious beliefs and institutions should play in education.

*Christian Education*

Christian schools include schools run by various denominations (Catholic, Anglican, Baptist, Presbyterian, Adventist, etc.). To some and often varying degrees schools taken over by the government and run as public schools retain some Christian character. For the religious private schools, each denomination manages its schools independently and there are significant differences in key approaches, including responsibility for and level of fees, responsibility for curriculum, how far students and faculty are expected to adhere to the beliefs and rituals of the specific denomination, and requirements for faith observance. Most religious schools today are private, fee-paying schools and follow each state’s requirements that apply to private schools. Some religious schools focus on serving poor communities and find various means of supporting those who cannot afford to pay school fees.

Catholic schools today are the largest group within private, religiously-organized education.<sup>162, 163</sup> The Catholic Church has reentered the education field in many parts of Nigeria (following the closing of schools by the government), establishing new schools, especially nursery/primary and secondary schools (both junior and senior), colleges of education, and universities. At the nursery/primary and secondary levels, the Catholic Church is the private organization with the greatest number of schools. Catholic tertiary education in Nigeria is a more recent development; the first Catholic university, Veritas University, admitted the first class of students for the 2008/2009 academic session in September 2008. Other institutions, generally regarded by the public as Catholic schools though not classified as such, were established and run by priests, notably, Madonna University. The Catholic Institute of West Africa is a tertiary institution, located in Nigeria, for the Anglophone countries of West Africa. The numerous seminaries located in Nigeria are regulated by the Sacred Congregation for Catholic Education (SCCE) and qualify as tertiary institutions; given their specialized nature of formation, they are not open to the general populace. Catholic education includes informal activities (adult education, for example) through which the Church educates and cultivates civic norms.

In the contemporary phase (after Catholic and other churches were allowed to establish and run new schools), new problems have emerged. These include insufficient numbers

of trained teachers, competition from other private schools, and inability of poor families to pay fees. Religiously-run education went from being free with varying sources of financial support to being “private,” meaning that schools must be self-supporting. Catholic schools now must compete for pupils, convincing parents to send their children to Catholic schools instead of public primary education schools, which in many states are (at least nominally) free. Many Catholic parents therefore chose to send their children to public schools. Following the 1975 upheavals, critics maintain that the Catholic school system has lost its high level of discipline and orthodoxy and is similar to the thousands of public schools. Various observers point to neglect and a collapse of moral discipline and culture, linked to deteriorating educational standards.

Catholic schools that principally serve the poor face the burden of providing good quality education while heavily subsidizing fee income from parents. A government program in some southwestern states has created further challenges for Catholic schools by providing free lunch to students in public schools and paying for the terminal examination that students are required to take. Private schools do not receive these benefits. Catholic schools may be the cheapest option among private schools, but they are still beyond the reach of the very poor.

Catholic sisters account for over 90 percent of Catholic administrators (and thus the

**BOX 28: CHRISTIAN EDUCATION ASSOCIATIONS**

*The Association of Christian Schools International (ACSI)*,<sup>164</sup> a global Christian educational organization headquartered in Colorado Springs, United States, began in 1978 with the merger of three organizations and today represents a large international network. ACSI’s mission is “to enable Christian educators and schools worldwide to effectively prepare students for life.” ACSI supports its 23,000 member schools from more than 100 countries through various services, including teacher and administrator certification, school accreditation, legal/legislative help, and curriculum publishing. It has 27 regional offices in North America and around the globe, reaching 3.9 million students. *ACSI Nigeria*, which formally launched in 2009, has registered 400 schools located in different states.

*The Association of Christian Schools in Nigeria (ACSN)*,<sup>165</sup> a non-profit, apolitical, and non-denominational organization, began as a collaboration between the founders of several Christian schools in Plateau State in order to provide a Christian alternative to the national

education system. Founded in 1997, ACSN aims to complement government efforts to provide standard education. Counting 70 schools among its members, ACSN’s objectives include planning, designing, and developing holistic Christian education curriculum; organizing seminars, workshops, and public lectures/trainings to enhance the competence and quality of proprietors, managers, and teachers of Christian schools; and being a united voice for its member schools. ACSN offers various programs and services to its member schools. At the national level, it advocates on behalf of all its members, promotes sporting activities, and represents all members. Development opportunities include conducting vision-intensifying workshops to sensitize Christian schools on the distinctiveness of Christian education; training counselors, chaplains, and teachers on capacity building and discipleship; and equipping schools for accreditation and recognition by government agencies and international bodies.

religious orders play significant roles). However, there is limited information available on the impact of religious women in Nigeria’s Catholic schools.

Other Christian denominations run significant numbers of schools, but there is limited information about numbers, differing approaches, and issues they face. The large denominations (Catholic and Anglican, among others) maintain structures to provide support and oversight for their schools. There are Christian associations, international and national, that aim to support networks of Christian schools operating in different parts of Nigeria. Box 28 highlights two such organizations.

Ongoing discussions in Nigeria focus on the roles of Christian denominations in education policy. Box 29 highlights the recent deliberate effort of the government of Anambra State to reengage Christian institutions.

*Islamic Education*

Western-style education spread more quickly and widely in southern than in northern Nigeria, in part because Muslim leaders and communities were skeptical about the value of an education provided by Christian missionaries and colonial authorities took a similar stance. Islamic education has long historical roots in the region (traced back at least to the fifteenth century); there were an estimated 25,000 Qur’anic schools

in northern Nigeria in 1914 when British colonial authority was established there. Western-style education continues to meet considerable opposition in the northern states. There is widespread, but largely unregulated, Islamic education, alongside various hybrid forms that combine elements of Islamic and non-religious curricula and pedagogy. Among practical issues, the focus on Arabic in Islamic schools is a disadvantage for gaining employment in many sectors. Proper funding of most Islamic schools is a significant problem.

After Nigerian independence in 1960, the government took over most Christian mission schools, which were predominately located in the South. In the northern region, the premier, Sir Ahmadu Bello, launched plans to reform local Islamic institutions gradually and provide government support to Islamic schools willing to modernize. Plans called for establishing a limited number of state schools to train teachers who would cover the Arabic language and Islamic education components in the curricula of formal schools. After Ahmadu Bello was assassinated in 1966, implementation of these programs slowed and Islamic schools lost support within the bureaucracy. In parallel, starting in 1967, the larger regional administrative structures (that covered all northern Nigeria) were dismantled and replaced by states, which were smaller, semi-autonomous administrative units; many lacked the capacity to pursue intended education reforms and to oversee privately-run schools.

Government involvement in the Islamic education systems has grown over the years. Among important measures to address issues were the Almajiri education law of 2012, whose objective was to ensure that students in Islamic schools have opportunities to access basic education, and the Federal Government National Committee on Implementation of the Almajiri Education Programme. However, states in northern Nigeria were unable to develop a common regional response to the Islamic education challenges. Islamic schools have effectively been sidelined in the government’s development agenda in education, even as their importance has grown.

The Islamic system, meanwhile, has faced challenges related to changing power structures within Muslim communities. Schools were once supervised by Nigeria’s northern emirates, but with that system materially weakened, Islamic schools today are largely unregulated. Ambivalent relationships among communities and with the state contribute to sporadic and ineffectual dialogue and reforms, a general mutual isolation, and neglect. These reflect the absence of clear policy frameworks on education overall and Islamic schools more specifically. Credible points of contact between Islamic schools and the state-driven education agenda do not exist. The upshot is that ulama bodies play the largest roles.

Boko Haram’s disruptive role affects school attendance in northern Nigeria, including, in particular, targeting of education of girls. Attacks on schools send a clear message, reinforcing pronouncements over the years that have given the group the name by which it is known (which means “Western education is forbidden”<sup>168</sup>). Risks associated with

**BOX 29: REVIVING CHRISTIAN EDUCATION IN ANAMBRA STATE**

Anambra State, in southeast Nigeria, was known for high-caliber education, but overall school performance declined sharply under policies enacted from 1970 as state governments took control of primary and secondary schools, most of which had originally been established by Christian denominations. In 2006, Anambra State ranked 26 among Nigeria’s 36 states in the National Common Entrance Examination (NCEE) organized by the National Examination Council.

In 2006, the administration of Anambra Governor Peter Obi reversed the policy; 1,040 expropriated schools were returned to the Catholic and Anglican churches, and 6 billion naira were provided for school management.<sup>166</sup> This was set in the context of the Anambra Integrated Development Strategy and of efforts to achieve the Millennium Development Goals. The arrangement was that the government would pay all the staff salaries, while the churches were responsible for administration and maintaining facilities. An additional 10 billion naira was subsequently invested in rebuilding school infrastructure.

The reported results were dramatic. Anambra State rose for a period to first place among Nigeria’s states in both the NCEE and the West African Examinations Council exams.

Full lessons have yet to be drawn from the experience, but it is clear that key factors were clarifying responsibilities and more adequate funding to revenue-starved schools. The model (termed the Peter Obi model) allowed both international development partners and the Catholic and Anglican churches to take on more active roles in school administration. Notwithstanding the success, the approach has its critics, notably with respect to active Christian church roles in education, rather than the expected norm of non-sectarian public education. The success has not been sustained and in 2017, Anambra State fell to seventh in the NCEE rankings.<sup>167</sup>

school-going are compounded for girls and young women, explaining lower female educational attainment. Box 30 highlights the impact of Boko Haram’s stance on education.

A significant set of concerns center on a group termed *almajiri* children. Parents entrust their children (especially boys) to Islamic schools to learn Islamic values and provide a solid education. In practice, school owners/managers (*mallams*) often have limited training and capacity to provide quality education. Funding is a perpetual challenge. The common practice of sending children to beg in the streets as a way to support the schools is of particular concern because it makes the children vulnerable to abuse, which is quite widespread. One recent report estimated over 10 million *almajiris* on the streets of northern Nigeria. Poor and often illiterate, these boys can be recruited by extremist groups like Boko Haram, and they are prone to drug use and sexual exploitation.

Several variants of Islamic schools operate today in Nigeria. Patterns vary widely among communities, and different typologies reflect both various traditions and specific reform efforts. The major categories used are Islamiyya, madrasa, and traditional Qur’anic schools. Islamiyya schools combine traditional Islamic and national education approaches. Madrasas focus on education in Arabic and on Islamic scholarship. Qur’anic schools follow more traditional approaches and tend to serve Muslim communities that doubt the merit of Western education, seeing it as a threat to their own traditions.

**BOX 30: BOKO HARAM’S IMPACT ON EDUCATION<sup>169</sup>**

Attacking schools serves several purposes for Boko Haram. Schools represent not just the form of education Boko Haram abhors, but also the presence of the state. Destroying schools undermines state authority. Each school attack brings ripple effects – teachers and students flee, other schools close, and authorities are left scrambling to respond with limited resources.

Schools also symbolize privilege: it is noteworthy that Boko Haram’s highest-profile school attacks have been against secondary schools (particularly boarding schools) and, to a lesser extent, universities. Secondary schools are out of reach for many young Nigerians – across the country. UNICEF<sup>170</sup> estimates attendance at only 54% in secondary schools during the 2008-2012 period. In Yobe, the figures are likely much lower. The Nigerian Bureau of Statistics<sup>171</sup> estimates in its report “Education Statistics 2014-2016” that there is a steep drop-off between primary school enrollment and secondary school enrollment in

Yobe – in 2014, nearly 700,000 pupils attended public primary school in the state, whereas only 127,000 attended senior secondary school (public and private). In any case, Boko Haram’s violence drove a rapid fall in secondary school attendance in Yobe State. By 2016, only around 43,500 students were enrolled in secondary school in Yobe, whereas public primary school enrollment only decreased slightly.

The students Boko Haram often targets are those who come from relatively more privileged backgrounds, and in contrast to its effort to entice and coerce young men into joining in other settings, it is striking that Boko Haram often chooses to simply slaughter the young men it finds in boarding schools. If Boko Haram’s treatment of the Chibok girls is any indication, the group relishes having power not just over girls in general, but particularly over girls from families with means and mobility that are poised to go on to university or to independent careers.

Integrated Qur’anic Schools (IQS) represent efforts to address issues affecting the large group of traditional Qur’anic schools.

Data on numbers of schools, attendance, and outcomes are limited, and estimates used are largely indicative. A survey of 1,998 pastoral Fulani reported that about half had a Qur’anic education, 40 percent had no education, and only 7 percent had either formal or both mainstream and Qur’anic education. In a 1993 nationwide survey, NISER recorded widespread Qur’anic education among ethnic groups in northern Nigeria generally, and notably among Hausa, Fulani, and Kanuri, with 23.5 percent of children between ages 5 and 24 from these ethnic groups attending Qur’anic schools.

Schools that are categorized as Islamiyya reflect efforts to respect Islamic traditions and values while offering students the benefits of national education (which include access to many jobs). Some such schools date back to the colonial period and they come in many forms. Many operate modified national curricula and aim to facilitate integration of students in national educational and career opportunities without abandoning their pursuit of Islamic education. They offer broad coverage of subjects prescribed for secondary schools in the National Policy on Education, use English as the medium for teaching these secular subjects, and put students forward for common national examination and certification processes.<sup>172</sup> They include elements of the traditional curriculum together with educational models inspired by Western and Arab models, thus representing interactions between local and global, new and old. Many Islamiyya schools have a co-ed student population (Islamiyya schools have been a vehicle for efforts to expand girls’ education in the North). Islamiyya schools have attracted international attention, much of it positive, and support.

The government has devoted significant funds and efforts to schools that address the specific needs of the *almajiri* students. Some 100 schools in this program offer a traditional Qur’anic education alongside Western-style classes in reading, math, and science, plus vocational training. Bringing *almajiri* children into the formal education system has, however, been difficult, and few teachers are capable of blending Western and Qur’anic curriculums.

Schools categorized as madrasas generally focus on teaching in Arabic. Some offer a modified national public school curriculum. School administrators actively foster Islamic identity and awareness among students and teachers through prayers, images of the Islamic world, and Islamic dress for females. The curricular emphasis on Islamic studies shapes their Islamic character and orientation and differentiates them from both the old Islamic educational institutions and Nigeria’s public schools. Madrasas can provide students access to higher education in certain areas, largely Islamic law and Arabic studies.

Qur’anic schools, known in Hausa as *Makarantar Allo*, are the first of the two phases of a typical Islamic education; the other is *Makarantar Ilmi* or “school for advanced learning.”

Qur’anic schools provide the equivalent of modern pre-primary and primary education. These schools have not witnessed significant degrees of modernization and reform. Qur’anic school proprietors/teachers (*malammai* in Hausa) prefer to preserve what they perceive as the pristine purity of Islam from contamination by the forces of modernity symbolized by the state. Data are poor, but they enroll a majority of poor and rural children in the North. They have long histories of aversion to outside influence.<sup>173</sup>

### *External Assistance to Education*

Several external institutions support Nigeria’s national education objectives through various programs. Sectoral approaches focus on improving coordination and links to SDG objectives. Religious actors do not appear to be directly involved in the design of these national approaches, with the exception of those that focus on reforms of Muslim education.

Bilateral aid dominates ODA to education, nearly all of it from countries on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC); thus the data does not include support from most Gulf countries. DAC contributions averaged 69 percent of total education ODA from 2002 to 2013; non-DAC contributions were less than 1 percent. The United Arab Emirates was the only non-DAC contributor (although Kuwait recently donated US\$80 million to the UN-launched Safe Schools Initiative Fund). The United Kingdom provides the largest financial support (average annual contribution US\$24.60 million), followed by the United States (US\$7.66 million), Germany (US\$5.37 million), France (US\$3.17 million), and Japan (US\$2.77 million). Others are mostly small contributors. Each organization designs their own programs, consulting each other and the government in the process. They implement programs directly through non-government channels; bilateral funds are rarely channeled through local financial and procurement processes due to concerns about possible misuse and the domestic policies of the donor countries.

Multilateral assistance accounted for 31 percent of ODA between 2002 to 2013. World Bank Group IDA credits dominated in both multilateral and all education ODA, averaging US\$44.85 million annually. Other multilateral donors are UNICEF (US\$1.97 million), African Development Fund (US\$1.81 million), UNDP (US\$0.34 million), and EU institutions (US\$0.02 million). IDA and AFDF funds are disbursed through parallel project accounts separately created for the purpose, with specially designed accounting and procurement procedures. Projects/programs are designed in consultation with the government. Some are infrastructure related at the non-basic education level. Other multilateral organizations implement programs directly.

Coordination among international development partners in education (and overall) is considered to be less effective than it should be but has increased with monthly donor coordination meetings (chaired by DFID and UNICEF). Another platform, the Local Education Group, is chaired by the Federal Ministry of Education. The World Bank

Group (WBG) and DFID have cooperated since 2004 around a common agenda, including joint financing of projects. The EU and the World Bank also support a common State and Local Governance Program.

The Nigeria Northern Education Initiative,<sup>174</sup> a four-year USAID-funded basic education project, involved a partnership with the federal government of Nigeria. Implemented by Creative Associates International in collaboration with four U.S.- and two Nigeria-based partners, state governments, and several local NGOs, the initiative covered two northern states—Bauchi and Sokoto—and aimed at strengthening states’ and local governments’ capacity to deliver quality basic education and increase access to education (and related services) for orphans and vulnerable children.

Five organizations cooperate through two particularly pertinent programs: Safe Schools Initiative and the Global Partnership for Education. Both focus on the northern states affected by insurgency and aim to address specific needs of Islamic as well as public schools.

The Safe Schools Initiative (SSI) is a joint response to the children and schools affected by insurgency in Nigeria’s northeastern states.<sup>175</sup> All schools in Borno State closed because of the insurgency from March 14, 2014, keeping roughly 253,000 children out of school in [the] 2013-14 School Year. Adamawa, Yobe, and Borno states reported 338 schools destroyed, at least 196 teachers and over 314 learners killed, and more than 276 learners abducted by the end of 2014. The national Safe Schools Fund is to accommodate capitalization from the Federal Government, Private Sector, and grants from donors.<sup>176</sup> SSI, launched in May 2014, includes the Nigerian government, the Office of the UN Special Envoy for Global Education (Gordon Brown), the Nigerian Global Business Coalition for Education, and private sector leaders. The Nigeria Safe Schools Initiative Multi-Donor Trust Fund allows matching co-financing and implementation of activities. SSI is piloting in Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe states with three objectives: transfer of secondary students to other states, support to education in IDP camps, and piloting of safe schools models, including community mobilization. UNICEF (supported with funds from Norway), DFID, and GIZ have respectively selected and are implementing one each of the three SSI objectives. Coordination is through a high-level steering committee of government and donors (headed by the federal minister of finance) and a technical committee also headed by government (National Emergency Management Agency). Members of the coordination bodies are the World Bank Group, ADB, DFID, GIZ, UNICEF, and USAID.

The Global Partnership for Education (GPE) involves a three-year (2015-2018) IDA grant of US\$100 million to improve access and quality of basic education in northern states, with particular attention to girls’ participation. The grant directly benefits pupils attending government-funded basic education and integrated Islamiyya schools and teachers working in government schools who receive training and support. Indirectly it benefits public officers at all levels of government active in delivering education and

School-Based Management Committees (SBMCs) and their communities. Partners support and supervise GPE-funded activities in localities where they operate; DFID provides technical assistance in Jigawa, Kaduna, and Kano; UNICEF in Katsina; and USAID in Sokoto.<sup>177</sup>

The DFID Girls' Education Project phase 3 (GEP3), an 8-year, £88.3 million project, aims to improve access, retention, and quality of learning for girls in five northern Nigerian states (Bauchi, Katsina, Niger, Sokoto, and Zamfara). It is implemented by UNICEF through partnerships with federal and state ministries of education, the Universal Basic Education Commission and State Universal Basic Education Boards, Local Government Areas, colleges of education, FHI360, civil society organizations, SBMCs, and mothers' associations. By 2020, the project aims to get approximately one million additional girls into school (primary and Qur'anic). Other expected results by 2019-2020 include:

- Improved girls' survival rate to Grade 5 to 80 percent by 2019/2020;
- 1.3 million girls reached by improved teaching and girl-friendly learning environments;
- 42,000 primary and IQS teachers trained and mentored in child-centred pedagogy;
- 15,000 head teachers trained in school effectiveness, efficiency, and curriculum management;
- 21,400 families benefiting from cash transfers, to encourage them to send their daughters to school and support their transition to junior secondary school;
- Reliable and validated Annual School Censuses in each state, which are used for targeting resources towards girls' basic education.

An estimated 1.5 million boys could also benefit from GEP3's investments through improvements to teacher quality and school governance.

Several programs have features similar to GEP3 (enrolment drives, cash transfers, school grants, monitoring, literacy initiatives, etc.). A DFID report comments that "crowding is good if it promotes replication, but can be a challenge if it duplicates efforts."<sup>178</sup> "GEP3 needs to keep sight of, and engage with, other partners in the states to deepen an understanding of its approach and minimise duplication of efforts; maintain the integrity of its interventions in the states."<sup>179</sup> UNICEF field office staff support coordination, but GEP3 state team leads need to attend coordination meetings to ensure that the GEP3 state teams are able to work proactively with others.

Box 31 highlights issues emerging in implementing a program designed to support reformed Qur'anic schools.

*Education Programs of Faith-inspired Organizations or with Explicit Religious Objectives or Links*

The following are illustrative of wide-ranging, largely discrete private FIO efforts to support education in Nigeria.

*YWCA-Nigeria*<sup>181</sup> carries out various advocacy initiatives focused on girl-child education and provides space for learning through YWCA-Nigeria's primary/secondary schools and crèche/nursery schools to cater for the needs of career and full-time working mothers. Adult and computer literacy programs provide opportunities for women and young women who are unable to access conventional spaces of formal education and also for women and girls who seek to compete in this era of information and communication technology.

**BOX 31: INTEGRATED QUR'ANIC SCHOOLS: COMMENTS FROM A DFID EVALUATION REPORT<sup>180</sup>**

UNICEF adapted the teacher's guide to the Integrated Qur'anic school (IQS) context, incorporating gender sensitive pedagogy and translating it into Hausa. This was piloted, then used in IQS facilitator training and follow up mentoring in Niger, Bauchi, and Sokoto. Local government officials and SAME staff have been involved in supervision of training to institutionalize on-going support.

The landscape of IQS is complex with varying school structures and levels of support with state governments, and different curriculums being used in schools. UNICEF conducted an IQS institutional capacity assessment in May 2015, and have been following up with UBEC, NMEC, SUBEB and SAMEs. This work has provided a foundation for policy dialogue on issues relating to coordination, funding and capacity development needs. Addressing these issues will be essential to develop a more robust and effective system for management, financing and monitoring of IQS.

The baseline survey revealed varying degrees of integration in GEP3 focus IQSs; only 12 percent provide all the core subjects on the integrated curriculum- most schools teach English,

mathematics and Hausa but not sciences or social sciences. This may be linked to fewer numbers of teaching hours – most schools reporting 3 hours per week on the integrated curriculum below the 8 hours recommended. The baseline also revealed low teacher and facilitator competency levels. Teachers generally performed best on knowledge of Hausa, upholding GEP3's approach of using Hausa in teaching materials. However, literacy levels are still incredibly low – 60 percent of facilitators were not competent in Hausa - suggesting that literacy skills may be limiting performance across other areas that teachers need to improve learning. Subject knowledge was also low. GEP3 should review materials to ensure that they are appropriate to facilitators' baseline skills. Overall facilitator's attitudes towards girls' education seemed to be positive and facilitators display gender-sensitive techniques, but baseline interviews and lesson observations revealed that gender-sensitive classroom practice can sometimes be tokenistic and mask deeply ingrained gender biases on the value of educating girls and their ability to learn. Tackling these issues should be a focus of the cluster meetings.

*The Federation of Muslim Women's Associations in Nigeria* (FOMWAN),<sup>182</sup> an umbrella organization that links Islamic women's groups in Nigeria, promotes Muslim women's viewpoints on the national stage. It has worked since 1985 to spread Islam through *dawah* and to advocate for Muslim girls' education—and thus, to improve the status of Muslim women and children, to advance Nigerian development projects, and to promote the “positive social behavior of Muslim girls.” Embracing girls' education as a means to eradicate poverty, it engages in programs to increase the retention rate of girls in school, continue education for married women, and integrate literacy and vocational training into established Qur'anic schools. It has members from 36 Nigerian states and is affiliated with over 500 organizations.

## CHAPTER 7: WORKING FOR PEACE IN NIGERIA: FAITH-INSPIRED ORGANIZATIONS, RELIGIOUS BODIES, AND COMMUNITIES

The press coverage of violence and conflict in Nigeria tends to focus on the Boko Haram uprising and its impact on the states of northern and especially northeast Nigeria; the Islamist discourse around Boko Haram contributes to narratives wherein Muslim-Christian tensions account for most contemporary conflicts. The reality is far more complex. The Boko Haram phenomenon is only one of several sources of extremist movements and patterns of violence. Farmer-pastoralist conflicts (that have religious and ethnic elements) in the Middle Belt contribute to more deaths, violent incidents, and displacements of people. The long-standing tensions and violence in the Delta region have deep roots and extensive impact, albeit with less clear links to religious differences. Organized crime and domestic violence are significant and widespread problems affecting Nigeria overall. Across all these topics, there is a common and plausible narrative that “religion is not the problem,” even as religious elements are clearly involved in many ways, directly (for example, through individual roles of religious actors) or indirectly (affecting community attitudes). A robust analysis of the complex links between religious identities and conflict is an essential prerequisite to engaging religious actors more effectively in conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and building peace.

Nigeria's complex patterns of conflict and violence need to be understood at many levels: international, national, state, community, and family. They involve politics, history, economics, anthropology, psychology, environmental science, and theology, to cite a few perspectives. Religious links to underlying causes of violence are in all cases part of broader phenomena. Most, if not all, of the links are widely disputed. The same applies to religious roles in peacemaking and peacebuilding, and among the multiple



*This woman has lived in an IDP camp near Abuja for four years after fleeing her home when Boko Haram attacked.*

*Photo Credit: Fati Abubakar*

initiatives linked to conflict resolution and peacebuilding, many are led by or involve religious actors.

This chapter introduces these topics with a brief review of analyses of the central conflicts and of religiously linked peacebuilding efforts. It offers a schematic presentation of conflict issues, then reviews specific efforts and institutions focused on religious actors. The overall picture is one of a multitude of worthy but often poorly coordinated efforts that approach the complex problems from different if overlapping perspectives.

## CONFLICT AND RELIGION IN NIGERIA: OVERVIEW

Religious roles in conflict and strategies to resolve them and build peace involve several different levels and perspectives. It is useful to highlight this large span as the complex narratives about religion and conflict tend to conflate the differing perspectives. While it is obvious that conflicts have local roots and therefore solutions, the rising impact of global factors colors even very local conflicts—for example, the violence around nomadic herders and settled farmers—as do social media and the global politics around violent extremism and understandings of Christian-Muslim relationships. Nigeria is central to many of these global issues even as very local dynamics play out in intergroup relationships and attitudes.

*"Nigeria is the world's largest country that is so evenly split between Islam and Christianity, in which extremist, minority groups, even though they are a tiny minority of the population, cause a stalemate that prevents productive dialogue for peacebuilding and reconciliation." Ibrahim Yahya, director of the Da'Wah Institute of Nigeria, said, "Religion is used to manipulate and divide the society for personal gain and media attention, while on the grassroots level, the amount of interaction and interreligious understanding is incredible."*

- Matthias Eder, KAICIID program manager for Nigeria<sup>183</sup>

Both symbolic and practical responses to conflict are led at the state level. State roles in education and financial realities are significant factors shaping religious relationships. Many issues in practice play out at the *local* level. These include settlement patterns,

At the most *global* level is the significant international role that Nigeria plays. Nigeria is a central player in the politics around the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, Catholic Church, and global Pentecostal movements. These color perspectives on religious roles and conflicts from outside Nigeria and within the nation. Nigeria's *regional* roles are also important, with heightened concerns about the growing prominence and impact of conflicts affecting the Lake Chad Basin and the Sahel. *National* perspectives are important in understanding religious roles and tensions. The underlying issues are well illustrated in constitutional provisions touching on religion and in the essential features of Nigeria's federal structure, legal systems, approaches to migration, financial matters, and the perceptions and realities of corruption. Many debates and tensions play out at the *state* level. The roles of gubernatorial leadership and interactions of state governments with religious leadership vary by state.

local “pacts,” and the involvement of leaders and community organizations. Finally, attitudes towards “others,” about religious and gender roles, and approaches to violence are shaped within each *family*.

Box 32 explores the question of how Nigerians view religious roles in conflicts, in comparison with other countries. A Pew Forum survey underscores that despite the complex factors that underlie various conflicts, many Nigerians view religious factors as a significant cause of conflict.

The following paragraphs explore various religious dimensions of conflicts, followed by a suggested framework to help in analyzing specific conflicts, conflict resolution efforts, and work for reconciliation and peacebuilding.


### Political Dimensions Global Perspectives

Nigeria's size and influence give particular importance to international religious links that affect conflicts and peacebuilding approaches. Positively, Nigerian religious leaders are prominent in global and regional Muslim and Christian peacebuilding efforts. Less positively, conflicts in Nigeria have extensive regional repercussions and spillover.

- As a member of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, Nigeria is an influential leader on global political issues. However, since Nigeria became an observer in 1976 and joined in 1986, there has been a continuing controversy within Nigeria surrounding its membership. For example, in November 2017, the Christian Association of Nigeria reiterated a call for withdrawal, arguing that the OIC's identity is religious, while Nigeria is defined as a secular state.
- Intellectual, political, and financial links

### BOX 32: PEW STUDY OF ATTITUDES TOWARDS RELIGION AND CONFLICT IN NIGERIA<sup>184</sup>

Notwithstanding commentary suggesting that religious dimensions are peripheral to Nigeria's conflicts, public opinion surveys suggest that Nigerians overall tend to perceive religious factors as quite central:



to the Gulf and to other regions (including Europe and the United States) influence conflicts in Nigeria.

- International training and education shape both Muslim and Christian leaders and institutions.
- Links to transnational extremist groups like ISIS and Al-Qaeda are directly involved in conflicts in Nigeria.
- Religious dimensions of international migration, including roles of diaspora communities, have implications for various conflicts.
- Nigerian religious leaders are prominent participants in global interfaith work and many international religious encounters, including for example Religions for Peace, G20 Interfaith Forum and Think Tank 20 events, KAICIID assemblies, academic meetings, and the Community of Sant'Egidio.
- Nigerian religious movements (Christian and Muslim) have extensive influence across Africa and elsewhere.

### *National Perspectives*

National religious dimensions of the various conflicts that Nigeria experiences are complex and numerous:

- Colonial legacies of differing administrative systems for northern and southern Nigeria contribute to perceived and actual tensions among religious communities.
- Implicit facets of religious concerns are translated into federal structures, including the controversial indigene provisions.
- Constitutional provisions on religious roles in society (e.g. religious freedom, approaches to blasphemy) can give rise to tensions and violence.
- Application and impact of sharia law contributes to controversies.
- The “gentlemen’s agreement” on alternating presidencies between North and South/Christian and Muslim is a fundamental political reality.
- There is murky treatment of data, notably omission of questions about religion in the census.
- Reformulations of state boundaries and numbers, negotiated settlements on census (silence on questions about religion) often reflect religious perspectives and concerns.

### *Socioeconomic Dimensions*

Many tensions and violent conflicts that involve or affect religious communities have roots in socioeconomic factors, including competition and inequalities among different groups. Specific factors include:

- Regional imbalances in prosperity: religious roles are advanced as explanatory factors in gaps in development.
- Religious approaches affect development strategies, including approaches to private sector roles, accumulation of wealth, and taxation.
- Religious approaches to corruption and crime, which are seen as core national challenges, involve questions of values that have religious implications.
- Issues around land tenure and use involve both direct involvement in dispute resolution and perceptions of unfairness.
- Overlap of ethnic and religious dimensions are a factor in various social, economic, and political tensions.
- Approaches to education, both provided by religious institutions and treatment of religion in curriculum, have religious implications.
- Approaches to internal migration and roles of settlers, linked to religious adherence.
- Boko Haram violence: interpretations of root causes and approaches to resolution.
- Specific issues with religious dimensions: education of girls, child marriage, and FGC.
- Religious dimensions of agricultural patterns (pastoral versus cultivation), urban migration patterns, and spatial settlement in cities.
- Business and government practices: “affirmative action” in hiring; deliberate “capacity” efforts.

### *Media Roles*

Many religious institutions are active players in the media world, thus exacerbating or calming tensions. Areas for attention include:

- An active religious media.
- Coverage of religious topics in various media outlets.
- Debates on blasphemy and freedom of expression that can spark religious tensions.
- Role of social media, for example in spreading hate speech or supporting conflict resolution.
- Role of the arts (novels, drama, film) that affect attitudes towards religious communities.

### *Intellectual Roles of Theologians and Religious Training Schools and Programs*

Theological discourse and intellectuals contribute to religious tensions and to the intellectual backdrops for peacebuilding.

- Knowledge of the “other” and efforts to promote better understanding among religious communities and about religious matters in curricula.
- Religious schools and universities.

### *Animosity and Harmony among Religious Communities*

A prevalent narrative in Nigeria emphasizes cultural and religious traditions of tolerance, and social harmony as the national “norm” and certainly the goal. Harmonious ideals are illustrated by the common practice of intermarriage and general respect among different religious communities. In Nigeria’s mobile society, many see encountering people from other religious communities as a normal event, and both Islam and Christianity are widely if not universally recognized as pivotal elements of national identity. Traditional religious practices are less a focus but nonetheless are prominent facets of Nigerian identity. Even so, Nigeria’s history has revolved around social, regional, and political

#### **BOX 33: BOKO HARAM: THE HISTORY OF AN AFRICAN JIHADIST MOVEMENT BY ALEXANDER THURSTON (2017)**

*Excerpt from a review by Siona Jenkins, Financial Times, January 2018*<sup>185</sup>

Like other jihadi groups — such as Isis in Iraq or al-Shabaab in Somalia — Boko Haram grew out of local grievances; also like others, its principal victims have been the people it purports to represent. But there are important differences. As Alexander Thurston writes in *Boko Haram: The History of an African Jihadist Movement*: “Almost uniquely among contemporary jihadist movements, it began as a mass religious movement before transitioning to an armed struggle. And to an unusual degree among peer movements, it stresses western-style education as an enemy.”

To fill what he calls “significant gaps” in what is known about the group, Thurston, African studies professor at Georgetown University, takes readers back to northern Nigeria in the 1970s and 1980s, when the group’s founder, Mohamed Yusuf, and its current leader, Abubakar Shekau, were children. A disastrous civil war was followed by political turmoil, with military dictatorships punctuated by corrupt civilian governments. In majority Muslim northern Nigeria, the uncertainty fuelled religious activism, with competing groups challenging the authority of traditional leaders in the search for a new Muslim identity. The area’s poverty was exacerbated by the government’s failure to provide basic education. Literacy was, and remains, shockingly low. Added to this was ambivalence among the area’s Muslim population to western-style schools, which they associated with colonisation and attempts to destroy their traditions. Later, this suspicion became intertwined with resentment as Nigerian politicians and technocrats presided over a corrupt

system. “Boko Haram’s rejection of western-style education did not come out of thin air,” writes Thurston. By the early 2000s, Yusuf and Shekau were based in the city of Maiduguri, a centre for competing Salafi groups, ultra-conservative Sunni Muslims who wanted to establish Islamic law. It was here that Yusuf established himself as a preacher, advocating opposition to democracy and the Nigerian state. In 2009 he launched an uprising against the authorities that ended with his killing by the security forces. Under his successor, Shekau, Boko Haram transformed into a hardened jihadi organisation, widening its campaign of violence and seeking to forge links with transnational groups. As the Nigerian security forces became more violent in their attempt to contain the group, the two became locked in what Thurston describes as a cycle of “repression and terrorism [that] helped preclude any peaceful solution to the conflict”.

Thurston’s account of Boko Haram’s rise and how it “interacted dynamically with the political dysfunction and economic malaise that surround it” is key to understanding its survival. Boko Haram “represents an ugly paradox: its ideas have limited appeal but significant staying power. The group can be crushed militarily, yet state violence fuels its narrative of victimhood.” The release of some Chibok girls in prisoner exchanges shows that the two sides can manage dialogue. But with the conditions that led to Boko Haram’s creation still prevailing, it is not clear whether it will ever be defeated without a profound rethink in tactics. Thurston concludes, “business as usual... would set the stage for future violence”.

*Excerpt from a review by Sarah Eltantawi. Times Higher Education Review, December 7, 2017*<sup>186</sup>

Alexander Thurston has written a clear, richly sourced, matter-of-fact history of Boko Haram, West Africa’s most notorious terrorist organisation. The book’s strength is in its careful attention to the interplay between political events, personal networks and Boko Haram’s strategy and behaviour. The reader is guided, in grim detail, through the battles, declarations, terrorist operations and scorched-earth government reprisals that make up Northern Nigeria’s chief contemporary nightmare.

This book offers several micro-histories of Boko Haram and its context – a welcome rarity in the reams of jihadist studies that are preoccupied with establishing familial links and too-linear cause and effect relationships between religious doctrine and terrorism. One of the most useful is in its focus on the local context of the city of Maiduguri. Here Thurston unravels with marvellous skill the patronage networks, dynamics of political competition and unaccountable politicians that fermented some of the bitter seed that would later become Boko Haram. His detailed biography of Mohammad Yusuf, Boko Haram’s founder, is well conceived, and helps us comprehend not only the why but the “how” of his popularity in Maiduguri through an understanding of who he sought to influence (mainly the poor, but also, importantly, the very corrupt politicians who in large part perpetuated that poverty). These details of how Boko Haram drew from a wide socio-economic spectrum, while making an explicit pitch to the poor, all against the backdrop of Yusuf’s personal charisma, helps demystify the movement in a crucial way.

The book’s theoretical hypothesis – “Boko Haram represents the outcome of dynamic locally grounded interactions between religion and politics” – is one that anyone would be hard pressed to argue with, and as such it is not particularly generative. While the “politics” section of this formulation is very well conceived, the “religion” part is rather more wooden. One gets the sense that “Islam” is surely a much more weighty signifier for the members of Boko Haram than this book describes. An example of this two-dimensional treatment of religion is Thurston’s discussion of colonialism. While he does an impressive job of illustrating the micro-effects of colonialism in the city of Maiduguri, especially with respect to economics and labour, the effects in the region more generally are minimised and there is little to no discussion of the impact of colonialism on Islamic law and Islamic authority, which is surely a trauma worth exploring in more detail.

The book in general takes a top-down approach to describing Boko Haram and, for example, documents various scepticisms among salafi elites about the political and religious efficacy of the post-1999 sharia experiment. At bottom, though, Boko Haram’s revolution for sharia is a grass-roots phenomenon, and one longs for more representation of that voice. All projects have their boundaries, and this one seems to stop at the perspective of the rank and file. Despite this, Thurston’s book provides an excellent micropolitics of the career of Boko Haram which will satisfy the reader with a craving for the details of the events and networks that make a movement.

conflicts, many of them with explicitly religious dimensions. Explanations put forward for discord include various disruptions (often seen as alien to the core culture and beliefs of religious communities), for example the history of Christian missionary behavior, the dominance of Christians in colonial and post-colonial elites, the influence and evolution of specific political leaders, and outside influences seen to explain transformations of traditional Nigerian Islam. The history of introducing sharia law in northern states is a factor, as is the radicalization of various Muslim communities. The remarkable energy and influence of charismatic Christian churches and their rapid spread account for some communal tensions. Box 33 highlights analyses of the context within which Boko Haram emerged as a significant force.

Separating broad narratives from specific incidents and debates underscores the obvious fact that context matters, as do governance and leadership. Each conflict that Nigeria has confronted has, in this society deeply imbued with religious institutions and influences, involved religious dimensions. That includes colonial approaches and strategies for keeping control and keeping peace, constitutional arrangements, the Biafra conflict, introduction of sharia law, disputes around beauty contests, approaches to pornography, treatment of LGBTQ citizens, family law, and roles of women. It applies to contemporary violent conflicts which include the long-standing upheavals in northern states linked above all to Islamic militancy, the Middle Belt conflicts involving above all herder and farming communities, and strife in the Niger delta. Memories of past conflicts and injustices play roles. Areas of tension that can spill over into or exacerbate violence include such perceptions as that Christians are more corrupt, that public education is Christian/Western-biased, that “Western” medicine has insidious effects, that Muslim leaders encourage violence, and that both high Muslim birth rates and active proselytism (Christian and Muslim alike) undermine the national balance of power seen as finely balanced between the largest religious communities.

The need to separate perception from reality and to pursue solutions to conflicts are reflected in numerous analyses of conflicts. These in turn reflect varying theories of change. Numerous and sometimes discordant conflict resolution and peacebuilding strategies are a result. Notwithstanding fairly widespread ambivalence about religious roles in conflict and in peacebuilding, religious actors are seen to carry particular responsibilities for addressing violence and conflicts, including crime and domestic violence. Often cited in calling for active religious roles are surveys that show higher trust levels in religious leaders and communities as well as their ubiquitous presence.

One result of expectations that religious actors will be actively involved in peacebuilding is a long history of commissions involving religious and traditional actors. These are centered at national, state, and local levels. Individual religious leader roles in peace processes are also noteworthy and significant: the work of the Emir of Kano, the Sultan of Sokoto, and of Catholic Cardinal John Onaiyakan and Archbishop Matthew Kukah are important examples. Internationally, the personal engagement of Archbishop of

Canterbury Justin Welby in working for peace in Nigeria is an example of efforts to bring religious authority and knowledge directly to the task of building peace. Specific interventions by individual leaders in negotiations and peacemaking efforts are formal and informal and include, for example, mediation in community disputes and negotiations to secure the release of the kidnapped Chibok girls. The mobilization of local religious communities, particularly involving women, is a striking and hopeful development.<sup>187</sup> These include women formally linked to religious communities, like Catholic sisters, as well as women within communities who are part of local religious groups and band together to work for peace.

Longer term efforts focus, inter alia, on the challenges of addressing religious perceptions and perspectives, at all levels. Inter- and intrareligious initiatives abound, with many locally or nationally inspired and organized, while others have external support. These run the gamut from specific efforts to defuse tensions—for example around a holy site, in the face of calls for vengeance following violent incidents, or around elections—to efforts to work together towards common objectives, for community development or to address specific challenges like care of orphans or the need for shelter. Religious leaders working together model active cooperation that can inspire communication among estranged communities. A striking example is the interfaith effort, working with government bodies and international agencies, to combat malaria, and the emerging effort to address corruption. Likewise dialogue efforts focus on structured processes to address causes of mistrust and grievances and work towards more positive solutions. Others focus on theological “deep dialogue” approaches. Leadership development within religious communities is another significant approach.

Debates in Nigeria focus on security dimensions—and the respective roles of robust military and police responses to violence and threats—versus broader efforts to identify and respond to grievances and building trust among and within communities. This mirrors global discussions around countering violent extremism, sometimes contrasted with preventing violent extremism. Excessive violence by the Nigerian military is put forward as one explanation for the persistence of extremist efforts.

### ***Institutions and Programs Directed at Peacebuilding/Conflict Resolution***

The following brief descriptions highlight different initiatives linked to conflict resolution and peacebuilding that address religious dimensions, directly or indirectly. They are grouped notionally in different categories and represent a first overall inventory of such efforts.

#### ***Dialogue Platforms***

*Inter-Faith Mediation Centre (IMC).*<sup>188</sup> Established in 1995 by Imam Muhammad Ashafa and Pastor James Wuye, the Center now has over 20,000 community members



*A political cartoon illustrates the increased tensions between Muslims and Christians caused by Boko Haram.*  
Source: <http://terrorism-in-africa.com/nigerian-christians-respond-to-boko-haram-attacks/>

and 26 listed staff members. A non-profit, non-governmental, faith-based organization, it envisions “an inclusive society free from violent ethno-religious conflicts.” The focus is on Muslim-Christian dialogue and mediation. Based in Kaduna, IMC works across Nigeria and neighboring countries. It has received various awards and been popularized through films, notably *The Imam and the Pastor*. IMC has received wide support, with funding from a diverse institutions including UNDP, Christian Aid, and the Nigerian government. Among its achievements is the Kaduna Peace Declaration of Religious Leaders, said to have brought nearly a decade of peace in Kaduna State. IMC has trained staff for Nigeria’s Inter-Religious Council on peaceful coexistence, tribal and religious leaders in Adamawa State on conflict mitigation, and Kano State’s religious security group on managing conflict situations.

Partners are something of a “who’s who” of Nigerian peacebuilders: Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs, Christian Association of Nigeria, Jama’atu Nasril Islam, Nigeria Inter Religious Council, Conflict Management Stakeholders Network, West African Civil Society Forum, National Democratic Institute (Abuja, Nigeria), Strategic Empowerment and Mediation Agency (Abuja, Nigeria), Academic Associate Peace Work (Abuja, Nigeria), Human Right Monitor (Kaduna, Nigeria), Civil Liberties Organization (Kaduna, Nigeria), Kaduna Peace Committee (Kaduna, Nigeria),<sup>189</sup> KAICIID, UNDP, Search for Common Ground, Institute for Democracy in South Africa – Nigeria Office, Pact, tribal and religious leaders in Adamawa State, Kano State’s Bureau of Religious Affairs, British Council, International Centre for Reconciliation (United Kingdom), Initiatives of Change (Switzerland), Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (Netherlands), Open Society Initiative of West Africa (Senegal), FTL Films (United Kingdom), Library of Congress Nigerian People Forum (United States), Nigerian Reconciliation Group (United Kingdom), German Technical Co-operation (Nigeria), Responding to Conflict (United Kingdom), Conflict Management Initiatives (United States), International Alert (United Kingdom), Tanenbaum Center for Interreligious Understanding (United States), Ashoka (Nigeria), Diversity Matters Forum, and Australia Results.<sup>190</sup>

*Interfaith Activity and Partnership for Peace (IFAPP)*: “IFAPP works at both national and sub-national levels for the peaceful coexistence of religious groups in Nigeria through an integrated set of educational and advocacy programmes, projects and initiatives that will enlighten adherents of both faiths, diffuse tension, and promote peace.”<sup>191</sup> Their initiatives include: creating cartoons that cater to low-literacy environments to empower positive action in response to challenges; hosting conferences to share perspectives from various faith backgrounds on strategies for peacebuilding among community and faith leaders from regions affected by conflict, especially regions affected by Boko Haram’s activities; and creating databases and networks of religious and political leaders to invite them to conferences and otherwise improve religious tolerance.

*Dialogue, Reconciliation, and Peace Center (DREP)*:<sup>192</sup> The Dialogue, Reconciliation and

Peace Centre (DREP) is a Nigeria-based NGO with headquarters in Jos, Plateau State. It was founded in 2011 by Most Rev. Dr. Ignatius A. Kaigama, the Catholic archbishop of Jos. The center works to “break the barriers existing between people of different ethnic, religious, and cultural affiliations by encouraging them to talk openly, honestly and with respect for one another, thereby diffusing the hurt and anger they feel towards one another.” It works with USAID to reintegrate former Boko Haram members into society. Recent events include quarterly dialogue and consultative meetings in Jos (recently in June 2017) to call on Christian and Muslim leaders, as well as community leaders, to relieve the rising tensions across the country and silence calls for violence and extremist sentiments.

#### ***Broad Peacebuilding Programs***

*Kukah Centre (TKC)*:<sup>193</sup> The Kukah Centre is a Nigeria-based policy research institute founded by Reverend Matthew Hassan Kukah, archbishop of the Catholic Diocese of Sokoto. The Kukah Centre has partnered with the Women’s Interfaith Council and KAICIID. The center focuses on interfaith dialogue and promotes discussion among faith communities, faith leaders, and policy leaders.

*Cardinal Onaiyekan Foundation for Peace*:<sup>194</sup> The foundation supports the work of Cardinal John Onaiyekan and focuses on interfaith dialogue, outreach to women, and working with youth, mainly through sports. Much work is focused in IDP camps.

#### ***Analytic Efforts***

*Building Consensus on Protection of Holy Sites in Northern Nigeria*: A year-long ongoing project funded by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs,<sup>195</sup> supports religious leaders to build consensus to protect holy sites. Search for Common Ground is a leader in this effort.

*Building Resilience & Supporting Youth Network in Countering Violent Extremism*: This project builds on empowering youth to be the true agents of conflict transformation within their communities. This project is funded by the North East Regional Initiative.<sup>196</sup>

*Developing Early Warning Prevention & Response in North East*: A 24-month project funded by the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, seeks to give communities the ability to identify and develop concrete responses to prevent Boko Haram’s attacks.

*Interreligious Peacebuilding in Northern Nigeria program (IPNN)*: A three-year DFID and private foundation-supported program, focused on measuring the impact of economic development interventions on reducing religious violence between farmers and pastoralists in Plateau State; Mercy Corps co-led development of all research tools. The central research question has been to determine to what extent religious identities can be seen as an underlying driver of conflict. How far can violent incidents be reduced and economic activity increased by leveraging the roles of religious leaders to create interfaith

cooperation in a region where ethnicity and religion are closely interlinked? As part of this effort, the IPNN qualitative research study (by Mercy Corps) evaluated the impact of religious leaders and interfaith initiatives on peacebuilding outcomes.

The assessment concluded that most participants did not identify religion as a direct trigger of conflict, with land disputes seen as the primary cause for conflict. Differences between religions do “create an environment more conducive to conflict.”<sup>197</sup> In cases of conflict, religious leaders were seen as potential agents of peace; because of their high respectability, authority, and status within each community, they can help shape attitudes and behaviors of community members. Women and youth leaders were identified as potential key actors in changing perceptions. Because most conflicts happen over land rights, where religious leaders’ authority is quite limited, traditional leaders tend to be involved instead. Possibly as a result of peacebuilding meetings facilitated by IPNN, an observable trend towards involving religious leaders at the earliest stages of the conflicts was noted.

Mercy Corps recommends that the relevant actors in farmer-pastoralist conflicts consult and include religious leaders to draw on their knowledge of the communities and the existing infrastructures. NGOs, the Plateau State government, and external donors are urged to work with religious, women, and youth leaders to strengthen their ability for peacebuilding activity from early stages, support greater cooperation with the traditional leaders of each community, and organize regular peacebuilding meetings between the conflicting communities to discuss the issues they face. By increasing their ability for involvement in the earlier stages of conflicts over issues that traditional leaders typically resolve, the positive impacts found in this research can be replicated in other communities facing similar conflicts.<sup>198</sup>

### ***Community-level Interventions***

*Community-Based Conflict Management and Cooperative Use of Resources (CONCUR):* The four-year program, launched in December 2012 and funded by DFID, aimed to reduce conflict between pastoralists and farmer community groups. It was based on 1,806 baseline and 1,276 endline household surveys in 10 CONCUR sites and six comparison sites. Reported results: tensions reduced by 86 percent (56 percent in comparison sites); freedom of movement increased in both types of sites, but CONCUR sites were 44 percentage points higher; increased trust by 49 percentage points compared to comparison sites; reduced number of households that experienced negative economic impact by 47 percentage points more than the comparison sites.<sup>199</sup>

*Inter-faith Partners for Peace and Development (IPPD):*<sup>200</sup> The non-profit faith-based NGO works with divergent communities to promote peaceful coexistence in northern Nigeria, especially in Kano State. IPPD activities include: a live radio program each week involving all the religious leaders in Kano; roundtables with discussants from all faiths to better understand one another; explaining religious teachings from all faiths through workshops, symposiums, and public lectures; encouraging religious leaders

to deliver peaceful sermons in Friday and Sunday services; publication of pamphlets utilizing quotations from the Bible and Qur’an to promote peaceful coexistence; mounting billboards on all major roads throughout the state with verses from the Qur’an and Bible on peace, unity, tolerance, and better understanding of one another.

*Interfaith Peace Foundation:*<sup>201</sup> The Interfaith Peace Foundation was established in 2006 in Kano State to promote and enhance peace, healthy living, and improve the standard of living of people in Nigeria. The foundation works through enlightenment campaigns, seminars, workshops, and skills acquisition training. Projects include: “Improving the Lives of Vulnerable Children and Families” Project, funded by USAID; a skills acquisitions project, funded by the French embassy; and monitoring and evaluation of MDG projects and programs in Jigawa State.

*Investing in the Safety and Integrity of Nigerian Girls (I-SING):* I-SING aims to coordinate with other projects funded by ECHO, FFP, and OFDA in Adamawa and Gombe States, in order to provide economic assistance to an estimated 12,000 adolescent girls and 5,000 adolescent boys.

*Interfaith Peacebuilding in Northern Nigeria (IPNN):* IPNN (supported by the GHR Foundation) aims to reduce violence through religious leaders, and to develop and enhance interfaith cooperation in a region where ethnicity and religion are closely interlinked. Each IPNN site is home to one pastoralist and one farmer community in conflict with each other. The research aimed to “establish whether and to what extent religious leaders have a role to play in peacebuilding and under what conditions they are most effective.”<sup>202</sup>

### ***International Programs Working in Nigeria***

*King Abdallah bin Abdulaziz Center for Interreligious and Intercultural Dialogue:*<sup>203</sup> An intergovernmental organization based in Vienna, Austria, has concentrated its strategic peacebuilding approach on Nigeria, with an office in Abuja. Focusing on the diverse conflicts in Nigeria, KAICIID convenes religious leaders, policymakers, regional stakeholders, and experts in a series of intra- and interreligious meetings. Two “Coordinate to Achieve” conferences were held in September 2016 and January 2017, attended by over 100 religious leaders—including the sultan of Sokoto, the cardinal of Abuja, and the president of CAN—in order to agree on an action plan to promote interfaith dialogue throughout the country. A joint action plan was adopted in October 2016 for interreligious dialogue and peacebuilding, as well as interfaith action plans. The Interfaith Dialogue Forum for Peace was established in January 2017 to use the process of interreligious dialogue as a tool for peace in Nigeria. The forum drafted a resolution to increase both intra- and interfaith activities to help reduce religious tensions. KAICIID supports advocacy efforts against hate speech including through a draft bill, written in collaboration with the IMC and others, and technical support to conduct and coordinate interreligious efforts and initiatives throughout the country.



**ABOVE**  
*Lekki Market in  
 Lagos, Nigeria;*  
*Photo Credit: Flickr*  
*user Shawnleishman*

The core objective is to address the “urgent need for dialogue platforms in Nigeria which leaders from different religious traditions can use to work together to combat growing intolerance and mistrust”<sup>204</sup> by supporting current interreligious dialogue initiatives through coordination between the parties and those conducting dialogues. KAICIID sees poor coordination among numerous ongoing interreligious activities as an issue. They aim to support coordination of efforts and increase visibility of initiatives through documentation and mapping of their work. Programs aim to stabilize the social fabric among and between Muslims and Christians. It works to enhance local capacities of religious communities to contribute actively and effectively to conflict resolution and reconciliation through interreligious peacebuilding. KAICIID cooperates with the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, TKC, Interfaith Mediation Centre, and the Women of Faith Peacebuilding Network. IPCR also hosted a joint delegation of OIC and KAICIID representatives in August 2015.

*Search for Common Ground:*<sup>205</sup> Present in Nigeria since 2004, works with Community Action for Popular Participation, Jos Repertory Theatre, the Special Task Force in the Office of National Human Rights Commission, the Office of the Special Advisor on Peacebuilding within the state government, and the Plateau Peace Practitioners Network on an 18-month program, Plateau Will Arise! The goal is to train key local actors to transform conflicts and de-escalate violence.

*The Community of Sant’Egidio:*<sup>206</sup> Active in Nigeria in the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, Lagos, Niger, Nassarawa, Kaduna, and Plateau, it supports various activities including “Paths of Peace,” an interreligious meeting in Jos organized in collaboration with DREP in September 2017. Examples of local activities include bringing mattresses to a female prison in Suleja, near Abuja, and an event in Jos with young prisoners to create opportunities to rebuild networks of friendship and solidarity to help prepare them for reintegration into society. In Minna, the Community visits the leprosarium of Kampani village every week to spend time and help the inhabitants, culminating in an annual Christmas Lunch.

*The Network for Religious and Traditional Peacemakers:*<sup>207</sup> Founded in 2013 with funding from Finland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Finn Church Aid; in Nigeria it works with the Christian Reformed Church, Tony Blair Faith Foundation, and URI. The network has supported analytic work to better understand motivations for joining extremist groups, among other projects.

*Tony Blair Faith Foundation:*<sup>208</sup> Founded in May 2008 by former prime minister Tony Blair (and now integrated with the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change), the foundation has focused sharply on Nigerian peacebuilding. The approach they use is a “training the trainer” model that involves intensive work with mid-level religious leaders.

*International Center for Ethno-Religious Mediation (ICERM):*<sup>209</sup> A New York-based non-profit organization, was founded by Basil Ugorji in 2012. Projects and campaigns

relevant to Nigeria include Run to Nigeria with an Olive Branch: a symbolic and strategic run for peace, security, and sustainable development, and Role of Interfaith Dialogue in Fostering Sustainable Reconciliation and Peaceful Coexistence in Nigeria.

*Global Peace Foundation:*<sup>210</sup> Founded in 2009 by Hyun Jin Moon, it launched the One Family Under God campaign in 2013 at the Global Peace Leadership Conference in Abuja. They follow a values-based approach to peacebuilding and community development that taps the moral authority of religious leaders and traditional rulers. Global Peace Foundation/Nigeria and partners work to educate faith leaders and encourage substantial cooperation between faith communities through retreats, get-togethers, summits, and substantial projects. Activities include brokering a peace deal in the Kaninkon Chieftdom of Southern Kaduna in June 2017, bringing together leaders from the seven native districts and a Fulani leader. It brought together members from the Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders’ Association of Nigeria, Southern Kaduna Peoples’ Union, CAN, Jama’atu Nasril Islam, district heads of Fulani communities, and the paramount ruler and the eight district heads of Kaninkon chieftdom.

A series of Peace Festivals in May 2017 with the theme “Unity in Diversity” in Mando and Maraban Rido in Kaduna State brought over 8,000 Christian and Muslim participants together. The Mando Peace Festival included attendance by members of Jama’atu Nasril Islam. The foundation works with CAN, Jama’atu Nasril Islam, and the “Kaduna Twins” Reverend John Joseph Hayab and Sheikh Halliru Maraya.

*United Religions Initiative (URI):*<sup>211</sup> Founded in 2000 in the United States by Bishop William Swring, “URI works to promote enduring, daily interfaith cooperation, to end religiously motivated violence, and to create cultures of peace, justice, and healing for the Earth and all living beings.” Its activities in Nigeria center around “cooperation circles” (CC) that engage in the local community to promote peacebuilding, conflict resolution, and interfaith understanding and tolerance. URI is a loose network of self-sufficient local organizations that share the overall goal of interfaith tolerance and peace, so the work of specific CCs is more significant than URI as a whole. Nigerian CCs include: the Center for Applied Spiritual Science in Jos; Christian Muslim Unity Foundation based in Abuja; Dialogue, Reconciliation, and Peace Center; Interfaith Forum of Muslim and Christian Women’s Association; Interfaith Mediation Centre; Kazatsi Reconciliation Centre and Human Development; Nigeria United Religions Cooperation Circle; Society for Life and Human Development Initiative; and Universal Church/Healing Center Cooperation Circle.

### ***Training and Capacity Building***

*Christian Muslim Unity Foundation:*<sup>212</sup> The non-profit organization is based in Abuja; its core interest is promoting peaceful coexistence amongst Christians and Muslims in Nigeria. It was founded in the aftermath of the bombings in Niger State on December 25, 2011. Staff visit the Karmajiji Disability Colony to encourage the caretakers and children of the community. They have plans to work in the education sector to spread their message among the youth.

*Interfaith Forum of Muslim and Christian Women's Association (Women's Interfaith Council).*<sup>213</sup> Founded by Rev. Sr. Kathleen McGarvey in 2010, the forum works in partnership with the Catholic Women's Organization, FOMWAN, Zumuntar Matan Katolika, Baptist Women's Missionary Union, Muslim Sisters Organization, Evangelical Church Winning All Women's Fellowship, Women in Da'Wah, TEKAN Women's Fellowship, Muslim Students Society, Women Pentecostal Fellowship of Nigeria, Movement for Islamic Cultural Awareness, Women's Wing of CAN (WOWICAN), Women's Wing of Nasrul-Lahi-il Fathi (NASFAT), Mother's Union, and Ansar ud Deen. Recent events include a four-day Training of Trainers event and a *Matan Arewa, Me Kuke So* seminar in collaboration with TKC in Kaduna, which focused on efforts to make policymaking a bottom-up process to encourage grassroots efforts.

*Forward Action for Conservation of Indigenous Species (FACIS).*<sup>214</sup> FACIS, active in Bauchi State, was founded in 2008 by Usman Mohammed Inuwa and supports dialogue for peace and interfaith communication. FACIS has introduced a bio-intensive agriculture project that serves as a catalyst for building relationships between people of different religions, particularly Muslim and Christian youth. FACIS has worked in collaboration with the 250 Network, Climate and Sustainability Network of Nigeria, and CAN. Major achievements include successfully engaging Muslim and Christian youth in interfaith dialogue leading to the creation of a dialogue group in one of the communities in Bauchi; teaching over 30 young women and men listening and negotiation skills; supporting over 20 youth in effective interfaith dialogue and communication skills for better relationships; organizing interfaith dialogues between Christian and Muslim youth in seven communities in Bauchi State; mediating and resolving misunderstandings and conflicts between two communities (Birim and Gigyera) in the Alkalari Local Government Area; facilitating the formation of 10 Muslim and Christian youth groups in 10 communities that experienced violent conflict; and establishing Environmental Peace Clubs in two secondary schools.

*Justice, Development, and Peace/Caritas Advocates.*<sup>215</sup> Working in Nigeria for peacebuilding since 2000, they have worked with FOMWAN and Jama'atu Nasril Islam to establish the Community Partnership Peace Building Group in the Kumbotso Local Council in Kano State. Activities include peacebuilding and community development in Kano and Jigawa States; establishing the Emergency Preparedness Response Team/ Peacebuilding; monitoring democracy and election programs in Kano and Jigawa States; and women's empowerment and development initiatives.

*Kazatsi Reconciliation Centre and Human Development.*<sup>216</sup> Located in Jos, the center was born of the religiously-motivated crisis in Jos that previously engulfed the region.<sup>217</sup> It works to promote social interaction among people of different beliefs. The group is committed to reconciliation, post-traumatic healing and counseling, and provides skills acquisition training and civic education to the public. The center was founded by Pastor Daniel Ajang Awari, who was a signatory to the 2015 Call for Zone of Protection to Save Yezidis and Assyrians from genocide.

*TOLERANCE (Training of Leaders on Religious and National Coexistence) Project.* This 5-year project (October 2012 to February 2018) was funded by USAID to build political stability and development in northeast, northwest, and north-central Nigeria by building interfaith peaceful coexistence, mitigating extremism through interventions, and increasing capacities of government structures to defend religious freedom. It operates in Bauchi, Borno, Kaduna, Kano, Plateau, Imo, and Sokoto States. Results include: 108 percent progress towards annual goal for having 116 local women participating in a substantive role in peacebuilding; 44 percent progress towards annual goal of having 1,420 people participate in events, trainings, or activities designed to build mass support for peace and reconciliation; 48 percent progress towards annual goal of having 25 youth groups engaged in civic activities to promote peace; 66 percent progress towards annual goal of having 12 events, trainings, and activities designed to build support for peace or reconciliation among key actors to conflict; and 148 percent progress towards annual goal of reaching 1.5 million host national inhabitants through public information campaigns to support peaceful resolutions to conflict.

***Faith Institutions and Initiatives with Broad Mandates That Include Peacebuilding***  
*Caritas Nigeria.*<sup>218</sup> Caritas Nigeria, established in September 2010, has a mandate for overall coordination of development programs of the Catholic Church in Nigeria. Interventions include addressing poverty, diseases, promoting good governance and accountability, support to orphans and vulnerable children, agriculture and livelihoods, support to vulnerable households, and responding to emergencies. They work with UNDP and CRS and with local JDPC groups. Pertinent projects include VOCAL, a UNDP-funded intervention aimed at increasing accountability in public institutions; SUSTAIN, a 5-year program (2012-2017) funded by CDC to treat intervention strategies for reducing HIV-related mortality rates; Social Transfer for Emergency Response in Insurgency States, a program to distribute food rations in states affected by Boko Haram and other insurgency attacks in the northeast; iSTAR, an ongoing study funded by the National Institute of Health aimed at demonstrating the effectiveness of the intervention in achieving the UNAIDS 90-90-90 treatment goal; and AIDSRelief, a CRS-led project with its two sub-partners Institute of Human Virology and Futures Group, which was later transitioned to Caritas Nigeria.

*Catholic Relief Services (CRS) in Nigeria.*<sup>219</sup> CRS has worked in Nigeria since 1967, with three priority sectors: agriculture and livelihoods, health, and emergency response and recovery. CRS and partners work in 32 of the country's 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory, with an extensive grassroots network and tremendous capacity to reach the rural poor. An impact-investing initiative aims to strengthen social enterprises and bolster sustainable, responsible economic growth in the country. The strategy is to identify investments and support the impact-investing ecosystem in Nigeria. In response to the northeast emergency, CRS provides access to life-saving food; shelter; water, sanitation, and hygiene resources; and services for IDPs and conflict-affected host communities. CRS has partnered with the Center for Women, Youth, and Community

Action in Nigeria, Universal Catholic Church, Feed the Future Nigeria Livelihoods Project, Catholic Secretariat of Nigeria, and Picture Impact. It has acted as the prime grantee for the AIDSRelief program and coordinated overall efforts.

*Christian Reformed Church in North America (CRCNA).*<sup>220</sup> The CRCNA is a North American denomination in fellowship with the Christian Reformed Church in Nigeria (CRCN) through Resonate Global Mission (formerly Christian Reformed World Missions, CRWM). Resonate/CRWM has been active in Nigeria since the 1940s. The CRCNA organized the Wukari Peace Process, a four-day meeting of local and religious leaders from both Christian and Muslim communities, in conjunction with the CRCN.

*The Interfaith Peacebuilding Academy:* The academy was created in partnership with URI to develop interfaith youth intellectual capacity to analyze challenges the community faces, work out appropriate strategies, initiate grassroots interfaith perspective, and formulate a moral authority for the common good of the community. *DIALOGUE IN NIGERIA: Muslims and Christians Creating Their Future*, a 2012 award-winning how-to film, has been disseminated globally with over 6,000 DVDs in 70 different countries.

*Justice, Peace, and Development Commission of the Catholic Diocese.*<sup>221</sup> Founded in 1990, this commission works with UNHCR, Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace, Misereor, Kinder Missionswerk, PACT, USAID ADVANCE, Oxfam, and EU-INSIDE. The commission is headquartered and operates in Ogun State. Areas of activity include agricultural development for food sovereignty; good governance and democracy, elections monitoring (Peoples' Parley); research and policy advocacy; conflict resolution/alternative dispute resolution; gender and women's empowerment; legal assistance and counseling; relief, disaster, and emergency aid rehabilitation; and training and education for development.

*New Era Educational and Charitable Support Foundation (NEEDSCI).*<sup>222</sup> It is not explicitly a FIO, but NEEDSCI engages in peacebuilding and interfaith dialogue between communities. Founded in 2007 in Abuja, it works with UNAOC, Global Center on Cooperative Security, Taiwan Foundation for Democracy, Project Happiness, Peace Direct, the Dalai Lama Foundation, Mindfulness Without Borders, the Public Peace Process, Creative Minds International Academy, URI, World Faith, United Purpose, Apurimac, and the International Centre for Leadership Development Nigeria. One project, Youth Capacity Building Project, trained 20 Muslim and Christian teachers from 10 secondary schools in Jos, 20 youth and community leaders, and 10 peer educators on peace education, conflict transformation, and advocacy, and formed Peace Education Clubs in 10 high schools in Plateau State. Another program developed community partnerships with government officials and community leaders, produced and distributed 700 advocacy packages, conducted dialogue circles for 50 religiously diverse youth leaders, aired 20 peace and public education messages on Plateau Radio

and Television, and signed a memorandum of understanding with the Nigerian Police Force.

*Nigerian Inter-Religious Council (NIREC).*<sup>223</sup> An independent union voluntarily formed by Christian and Muslim leaders, NIREC is composed of 50 members, half Christian and half Muslim, and co-chaired by the Sultan of Sokoto and the president of the Christian Association of Nigeria. It organizes seminars on conflict management and resolution, international relations, and terrorism, and offers advice to the government on ways of governing that positively impact the lives of people.



## CHAPTER 8: LOOKING FORWARD

Fundamental questions about the significance of religious beliefs and institutions for Nigeria are debated widely, actively, and explicitly. Nigeria's marked religious pluralism is itself tightly linked to national identity. With religious actors deeply intertwined in Nigeria's society and political system, it would be difficult to point to any topic or issue of concern today where there is no significant religious dimension. Even so, the parameters of debate and action on how to address religious institutions and how to assure peace among communities are far from settled.

There is no clear consensus on approaches to engaging religious actors in development or peacebuilding within a coherent and systematic framework. Indeed, deliberate efforts to deny the importance of religious factors are quite common, and it is rare to see religious actors deliberately included as central partners in development debates. This stems from history, still live in the present, with religious topics the subject of tensions and controversy. It also reflects very different diagnoses of the roles that religious beliefs, leaders, and institutions do and should play. It is striking that religious dimensions of various topics affecting Nigeria are both over-emphasized and over-simplified in some settings, while in others they are overlooked or deliberately ignored.

What emerges clearly from this exploration of religious involvement across development issues is that **a robust appreciation for religious dimensions as they affect development policies and programs should be a central analytic element for both Nigerian development actors and their partners.** There are cases where this is well understood and examples of best practice exist, notably in some sensitive and thoughtful approaches to peacebuilding and in the example of interfaith action on malaria and some other health issues. However, in many instances religious topics are either deliberately or inadvertently ignored or omitted from the dialogue and action.

A feature of Nigeria's experience with religious engagement on development matters is a **deliberate focus on interfaith**

**approaches and mechanisms.** This stems largely from the underlying concerns about tensions between the two largest faith traditions—Islam and Christianity—and a desire by the government and its various partners to ensure that actions and programs do not favor one group over another. There are also hopes that interfaith approaches, especially those that center on pragmatic programs (for example in health) and shared interests, will go some way in encouraging interaction among leaders and communities, and thus help to alleviate or temper misunderstandings and tensions. The experience with interfaith work is decidedly mixed, and the interfaith landscape is in flux. There are robust and effective approaches and institutions, especially at the local level. These include women's and youth organizations, as well as some initiatives that involve the most senior leadership. Other efforts, however, are mired in the very real underlying tensions within and among religious communities as well as a failure to avoid Nigeria's notorious governance traps.

The especially sensitive nature of religious engagement in Nigeria owes much to the country's sheer complexity with a religious landscape peppered by historical legacies and the remarkably dynamic political environment where every issue is politicized. Sensitivities around religious topics are often linked in discourse to the perceived and actual tensions at the root of Nigeria's constitutional and governance regimes. These have long involved the balancing of Christian and Muslim roles and influence and respective ways in which the communities benefit from government interventions. However, the political and financial power of religious actors—and their social and economic influence more broadly—gives rise to ambivalence, for example, on the roles of mega-pastors and the messages surrounding the prosperity gospel. Religious dimensions of the Boko Haram threats, including its core message highlighting opposition to Western education, figure centrally in debates and discussions about why and how religious affiliations matter, enhancing the sensitivities and regrettably reinforcing negative stereotypes.

From a development perspective, **a strong case can be made that a deeper understanding of religious roles on several relevant topics would benefit efforts to support Nigeria's development.** At a broad level, this requires, even imperatively demands, a sober appreciation of the risks and sensitivities involved (thus an admonition to proceed with caution). Any effort will benefit from a robust analysis of institutions and action. An approach that targets specific topics (like education) and involves thoughtful approaches to who is, or is not, at the table, could represent a good start. Learning from the lessons of current efforts in the health sector and in addressing religious roles in fighting corruption could be helpful in looking towards broader approaches to religious engagement. Clearly religious actors are often part of discussions, whether independently or as part of a broader civil society approach, but **the picture that emerges is of a less than fully strategic or systematic approach. The weakness of interfaith organizations and the heavy politicization of religious topics are clear impediments and issues to be taken into account.**

Three topics explored in this report in some depth highlight both complexities and opportunities of active engagement. Following up on these topics offers a real promise of enhancing the quality of development approaches and programs.

Education, fighting corruption, and addressing roots of conflict and strengthening conflict resolution are unquestionably very high on Nigeria’s national development agendas, as well as those of key development partners. In all three cases, there is historic and contemporary religious engagement, which has resulted both in quite rich, if dispersed, research and direct engagement at a programmatic level. There is knowledge and experience to build on. There are also clear gaps in knowledge and thus areas where research and robust consultations are desirable.

**A strong case can be made for purposeful efforts, at national, state, and local levels, to clarify the actual and potential roles that religious institutions play in delivery of education, both public and private.** A priority could be the social cohesion challenges that are so critical to the education mission; another is to address the practical problems related to financing and modernizing Islamic schools.

Likewise, **promising initiatives to engage religious institutions in fighting corruption, most recently in collaboration with BudgIT, offer considerable promise,** as well as a potential for foundering in the shoals of political infighting.

**The conflict resolution landscape is bewildering in its complexity and there appears to be ample room for stronger information sharing and collaboration.** Given the depth of social tensions, there is scope for a wide variety of approaches, but a general stocktaking that focuses on how religious actors could work together towards common goals would be desirable. This would need to go beyond a simple inventory of efforts and institutions to a forthright assessment of successes and shortfalls and a “theory of change” mapping of differing diagnoses of root causes and notions of solutions. Conflict resolution and peacebuilding approaches could for example be integrated more deliberately in broader development programs.

Looking beyond these three issues and the field of public health (where effective efforts have demonstrated the merits of engagement), other development priorities are worth exploring. The current focus on early childhood education lends itself especially well to working with religious networks, as does nutrition. Nigeria’s gender disparities have complex but significant links to religious practices and beliefs, even as there are promising examples of leadership. In the human rights area, the challenges of advancing dialogue on both societal and legal approaches to LGBTQ issues loom large and deserve thoughtful consideration.

Some deeply engrained issues need to be appreciated, notably the fact that data is notoriously and comparatively very poor and unreliable. In many cases, national approaches are unlikely to be feasible and state-by-state dialogue and action is more likely to yield practical results.

This review was not designed to present specific recommendations for an action program. The central objectives are to gather available knowledge and present it in ways that are useful to practitioners. It also seeks to highlight and illustrate priority topics that could underpin policy discussions and research plans. Feedback on the report is welcome and a consultative meeting to discuss the findings of the mapping exercise and possible actions would be helpful. Discussions in Nigeria with pertinent leaders would clearly be appropriate. They would need to be handled with some caution given the sensitivities involved but could point to important actions. With wisdom, knowledge, and an inclusive approach, reflecting on religious dimensions of development challenges could open new windows to cooperation and address unspoken issues and thus could yield important results.

APPENDIX 1: LIST OF INTERVIEWS ONLINE

Interviewee(s)	Organization
Robert Abuul and Ajayi Ayobamidele	Catholic Relief Services
Dr. Joan Agunloye	Christian Care for Widows, Aged and Orphans
Father George Olusegun Ajana	Pontifical Mission Societies, Nigeria
Olasupo Muiz Ajibola	Muslim Student Society of Nigeria
Aisha Akanbi and Maryam Othman	Federation of Muslim Women's Associations of Nigeria (FOMWAN)
Akinsola Akinwale	Christian Mission for the Deaf
Aminat Kikelomo Ale	He Careth Mission
Francis Alimigbe	Justice, Development, and Peace/Caritas, Abuja
Talatu Aliyu	Interfaith Mediation Centre
Yusuf Arrigasiyyu	Muslim League for Accountability
Imam Muhammad Ashafa and Pastor James Wuye	Interfaith Mediation Center of the Muslim-Christian Dialogue
Rev. Sister Agatha Chikelue	Catholic Archdiocese of Abuja/ Women of Faith Peacebuilding Networks
Bishop Josiah Fearon	Bishop of Kaduna
Father Anthony Fom	Justice, Development, and Peace/Caritas Coordinator, Archdiocese of Jos
Banjo Adedeji Gabriel	Hand of Love Ministry
Pastor John Joseph Hayab	Christian Association of Nigeria
Andreas Hipple	GHR Foundation
Nathan Hosler	Church of the Brethren
Dr. Marinus Iwuchukwu	Duquesne University
Rev. Jide Macaulay	House of Rainbow
Temiloluwa Moronkeji	Abundance Ministries
Olusegun Obasanjo	Former Nigerian President
Simiat Bayonle Ogundiran	Federation of Muslim Women's Associations of Nigeria (FOMWAN)- Ibadan
Cardinal John Onaiyekan	Archbishop of Abuja
Rev. Taiwo Opeyemi	Heart Clinic Global Mission
SLS Salifu	Christian Association of Nigeria
Mrs. Omobola Thompson	Tabitha Care Mission
Rev. Marcus Williams	La Vie Mot/Living Word Mission
Bilkisu Yusuf	Journalist, FOMWAN

APPENDIX 2: SUGGESTED REFERENCE MATERIALS

Abdulmalik, J., Omigbodun, O., Beida, O., & Adedokun, B., “Psychoactive substance use among children in informal religious schools (Almajiris) in northern Nigeria,” *Mental Health, Religion & Culture* 12, (2009): 527-542.

Adeosun, I. I., Adegbohun, A. A., Adewumi, T. A., & Jeje, O. O., “The pathways to the first contact with mental health services among patients with schizophrenia in Lagos, Nigeria,” *Schizophrenia Research and Treatment* 2013, (2013): 1-8.

Adeyemi, T.O., “Financing of education in Nigeria: An analytical review,” *American Journal of Social And Management Sciences* 2, (2011): 295-303.

Ajaegbu, O. O., “Religion and National Development in Nigeria,” *American Academic & Scholarly Research Journal* 4, (2012): 57-64.

Baba, N. M., “Islamic Schools, the Ulama, and the State in the Educational Development of Northern Nigeria,” *Bulletin de l’APAD* 33, (2011).

Bratton, M., & Gyimah-Boadi, E., (2016) “Do trustworthy institutions matter for development? Corruption, trust, and government performance in Africa,” *Afrobarometer*, [http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Dispatches/ab\\_r6\\_dispatchno112\\_trustworthy\\_institutions\\_and\\_development\\_in\\_africa.pdf](http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Dispatches/ab_r6_dispatchno112_trustworthy_institutions_and_development_in_africa.pdf).

Busuttil, J. J., & Ter Haar, G., *The Freedom to do God’s Will: Religious Fundamentalism and Social Change* (London: Routledge, 2003).

Campbell, J., *Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink (updated version)* (Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2013).

Ebhomienlen, T. O., & Ukpebor, E. I., “Religion and Politics in Nigeria: A Comparative Study of the Nigeria Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs and the Christian Association of Nigeria,” *International Journal of Science and Research* 2, (2013): 166-170.

Ekeke, E. C., “Religion and Democracy in Nigeria,” *International Journal of Arts & Sciences* 6, (2013): 321-328.

Ellis, S., *This Present Darkness: A History of Nigerian Organised Crime* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).

Ikechi-Ekpendu, C., Audu, S. D., & Ekpendu, I. C., “An Evaluation of the Role of Religion in the Development of Nigeria,” *Developing Country Studies* 6, (2017): 82-87.

Ilechukwu, S. T., “Ogbanje/abikuand and cultural conceptualizations of psychopathology in Nigeria,” *Mental Health, Religion & Culture* 10, (2007): 239-255.

Kaplan, S., “Nigeria’s Potential for Sectarian Conflict,” Fragile States Resource Center (January 29, 2012), <http://www.fragilestates.org/2012/01/29/nigerias-potential-for-sectarian-conflict/>.

Kew, D., *Civil Society, Conflict Resolution, and Democracy in Nigeria* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2016).

Marshall, R. *Political Spiritualities: The Pentecostal Revolution in Nigeria* (Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 2009).

Mercy Corps, “Motivations and empty promises: Voices of former Boko Haram combatants and Nigerian youth,” (2016), [https://www.mercycorps.org/sites/default/files/Motivations%20and%20Empty%20Promises%20Mercy%20Corps\\_Full%20Report.pdf](https://www.mercycorps.org/sites/default/files/Motivations%20and%20Empty%20Promises%20Mercy%20Corps_Full%20Report.pdf).

Odumosu, O., Olaniyi, R., & Alonge, S., “Mapping the activities of faith-based organizations in development in Nigeria,” (2009), <http://www.birmingham.ac.uk/Documents/college-social-sciences/government-society/research/rad/working-papers/wp-38.pdf>.

Oladosu, A. G., “Arabic and Islamic Education in Nigeria: The Case of Al-Majiri Schools,” *World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology International Journal of Educational and Pedagogical Sciences* 6, (2012): 3265–3269.

Olarinmoye, O. O., “Faith-Based Organizations and Development: Prospects and Constraints,” *Transformation: An International Journal of Holistic Mission Studies* 29, (2012): 1–14.

Okonjo-Iweala, Ngozi. *Fighting Corruption is Dangerous: The Story Behind the Headlines* (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2018).

Onapajo, H., “Politics for God: Religion, Politics and Conflict in Democratic Nigeria,” *The Journal of Pan African Studies* 4, (2012): 42–66.

Paden, J., *Faith and Politics in Nigeria: Nigeria as a Pivotal State in the Muslim World* (USIP, 2008).

Paden, J., *Muhammadu Buhari: the Challenges of Leadership in Nigeria* (California: Roaring Forties Press, 2016).

Paden, J., *Postelection Conflict Management in Nigeria: the Challenges of National Unity*, (George Mason University School of Conflict Analysis and Resolution, 2012).

Pew Research Center, *Tolerance and tension: Islam and Christianity in Sub-Saharan Africa*, 2010, <http://www.pewforum.org/files/2010/04/sub-saharan-africa-full-report.pdf>.

Pew Research Center, *The World’s Muslims: Unity and Diversity*, 2012, <http://www.pewforum.org/Muslim/the-worlds-muslims-unity-and-diversity.aspx>.

Pew Research Center, *Spirit and power: A 10-country survey of Pentecostals*, 2015, <http://www.pewforum.org/files/2010/04/sub-saharan-africa-full-report.pdf>.

Rakodi, C., *Religion, Religious Organisations and Development: Scrutinising Religious Perceptions and Organisations* (London: Routledge, 2014).

Roberts, F. O., Nabofa, M. Y., Odumosu, O., *Religions and Development in Nigeria: A Preliminary Literature Review* (University of Birmingham, Religions and Development Program, 2009).

Salih, M. A., & University of Copenhagen, *Islamic NGOs in Africa: The promise and peril of Islamic voluntarism* (Copenhagen: Centre of African Studies, 2001).

Ter Haar, G., *How God became African: African spirituality and Western secular thought* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009).

Thurston, A., *Boko Haram: The History of an African Jihadist Movement* (Princeton University Press, 2017).

U.S. State Department, “International Religious Freedom Report for 2015,” (2015), <http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm?year=2015&dliid=256057>.

Vaughan, O., *Religion and the Making of Nigeria* (Duke University Press, 2016).

Wariboko, N., *Nigerian Pentecostalism* (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2014).

## Endnotes

- 1 “Human Development Report 2016: Human Development for Everyone,” UNDP, 2016, [http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2016\\_human\\_development\\_report.pdf](http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2016_human_development_report.pdf).
- 2 Development is understood broadly to signify both deliberate policies and programs that aim at bettering the lives of Nigeria’s citizens and a trajectory of progress towards, more specifically, the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
- 3 Nyemutu Robert, F.O., Odumosu, Olakunle, and Nabofa, Michael, *Religions and Development in Nigeria: A Preliminary Literature Review* (University of Birmingham, Religions and Development Program, 2009).
- 4 “Nigeria,” Harvard Divinity School Religious Literacy Project, accessed December 15, 2017, <https://rlp.hds.harvard.edu/nigeria-overview>.
- 5 Religious Literacy Project, *Country Profile: Nigeria* (Harvard Divinity School, 2016), available at [https://rlp.hds.harvard.edu/files/hds-rlp/files/nigeria\\_country\\_profile\\_1.pdf](https://rlp.hds.harvard.edu/files/hds-rlp/files/nigeria_country_profile_1.pdf).
- 6 British Council, “Gender in Nigeria Report 2012,” British Council (2012); Canagarajah, Sudharshan and Thomas, Saji, “Poverty in a Wealthy Economy: the Case of Nigeria,” *Journal of African Economics*, Vol. 10, No. 2 (2001), pp. 143–173.
- 7 The Middle Belt region of Nigeria is generally considered to include the following states: Kwara, Kogi, Benue, Taraba, Plateau, Nasarawa, Niger, Adamawa, Abuja (the federal capital), and southern Kaduna, Kebbi, Bauchi, Gombe, Yobe, and Borno.
- 8 “Relationships between religious values and development concepts and practices,” Religions and Development, University of Birmingham, accessed April 23, 2018, <https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/schools/government-society/departments/international-development/rad/research-components/values.aspx>.
- 9 Ibid.
- 10 “Religions, governance and development,” Religions and Development, University of Birmingham, accessed April 23, 2018, <https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/schools/government-society/departments/international-development/rad/research-components/governance.aspx>.
- 11 Ibid.
- 12 Ibid.
- 13 “Religious identity, faith-based organisations and development activities,” Religions and Development, University of Birmingham, accessed April 23, 2018, <https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/schools/government-society/departments/international-development/rad/research-components/organisations.aspx>.
- 14 Ibid.
- 15 Ibid.
- 16 Ibid.
- 17 Nyemutu, Olakunle, and Nabofa, *Religions and Development in Nigeria: A Preliminary Literature Review*, pp.67.
- 18 “Total population: Nigeria,” United Nations Population Division, accessed April 6, 2018, <https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/DataQuery/>.
- 19 “Land Area (sq.km),” World Bank, accessed May 15, 2018, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/AG.LND.TOTL.K2?locations=NG>.
- 20 “Population growth (annual %),” World Bank, accessed May 15, 2018, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW?locations=NG>.
- 21 “Urban Population,” World Bank, accessed May 15, 2018, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL?locations=NG>.
- 22 “Population ages, 0-14 (% of total),” World Bank, accessed May 15, 2018, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.0014.TO.ZS?locations=NG>.
- 23 “GDP (current US\$),” World Bank, accessed May 15, 2018, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=NG>.
- 24 “GDP per capita (current US\$),” World Bank, accessed May 15, 2018, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=NG>.
- 25 “Human Development Index,” United Nations Development Programme, last modified 2016. <http://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/HDI>.
- 26 “Corruption Perceptions Index 2017,” Transparency International, last modified 2017, [https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption\\_perceptions\\_index\\_2017#table](https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2017#table).
- 27 “CPIA Africa: Nigeria,” World Bank, accessed May 15, 2018, <http://datatopics.worldbank.org/cpia/country/nigeria>.
- 28 “Ease of Doing Business,” World Bank, accessed May 15, 2018, <http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings>.
- 29 “Ease of Doing Business,” The World Bank, accessed May 15, 2018, <http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings>.
- 30 “2017 Social Progress Index, Nigeria,” Social Progress Imperative, accessed May 15, 2018, <https://www.socialprogressindex.com/?code=NGA>.
- 31 “Nigeria,” Ibrahim Index of African Governance, accessed May 15, 2018, <http://iiag.online/>.
- 32 “Nigeria,” Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform, accessed April 13, 2018, <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/memberstates/nigeria>.
- 33 Ibid.
- 34 Olawale, S., “Top Ten List of Social Problems in Nigeria and Solutions,” *NaijaQuest*, last modified February 3, 2018, <https://naijaquest.com/list-of-social-problems-in-nigeria-and-solutions/>.
- 35 This box takes text from the government Q and A and highlights both content and tone; “Economic Recovery and Growth Plan, Frequently Asked Questions,” The State House, Nigeria, accessed February 22, 2018, <https://statehouse.gov.ng/economic-recovery-and-growth-plan/>.
- 36 “Nigeria OECD-DAC data,” Tableau, accessed February 24, 2018, [https://public.tableau.com/views/OECDDACaidataglacebyrecipient\\_new/Recipients?:embed=y&:display\\_count=yes&:showTabs=y&:toolbar=no&:showVizHome=no](https://public.tableau.com/views/OECDDACaidataglacebyrecipient_new/Recipients?:embed=y&:display_count=yes&:showTabs=y&:toolbar=no&:showVizHome=no).
- 37 Ibid.
- 38 Abimbola Akosile, “Nigeria - Time to Cure the Addictive Aid Fix,” *This Day*, July 27, 2017, <https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2017/07/27/nigeria-time-to-cure-the-addictive-aid-fix/>.
- 39 “New Country Partnership Strategy in Nigeria Set to Spur Growth, Less Poverty,” World Bank, May 1, 2014, <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/nigeria/publication/new-country-partnership-strategy-in-nigeria-set-to-spur-growth-less-poverty>.
- 40 “IMF Staff Completes 2018 Article IV Mission to Nigeria,” IMF, December 22, 2017, <https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2017/12/22/pr17521-imf-staff-completes-2018-article-iv-mission-to-nigeria>; “Nigeria: 2018 Article IV Consultation-Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive Director for Nigeria,” IMF, March 2018, <http://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2018/03/07/Nigeria-2018-Article-IV-Consultation-Press-Release-Staff-Report-and-Statement-by-the-45699>.
- 41 “Federal Republic of Nigeria: Country Strategy Paper 2013-2017,” African Development Bank Group, January 2013, <https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-Operations/Nigeria%20-%202013-2017%20-%20Country%20Strategy%20Paper.pdf>.
- 42 “DFID Nigeria,” DFID, accessed March 18, 2018, [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/630915/Nigeria.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/630915/Nigeria.pdf).
- 43 “GIZ in Nigeria,” GIZ, accessed February 20, 2018, [https://www.giz.de/de/downloads/01\\_201709\\_%20Fact%20sheet\\_GIZ%20in%20Nigeria\\_EN.pdf](https://www.giz.de/de/downloads/01_201709_%20Fact%20sheet_GIZ%20in%20Nigeria_EN.pdf).
- 44 Ibid.
- 45 “Nigeria,” GIZ, accessed February 21, 2018, <https://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/1902.html>.
- 46 “USAID/Nigeria: Country Development Cooperation Strategy, 2015-2020,” USAID, accessed March 1, 2018, [https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1860/Nigeria\\_CDCS\\_2015-2020.pdf](https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1860/Nigeria_CDCS_2015-2020.pdf).
- 47 “Islamic Development Bank opens Nigeria office,” *Premium Times*, August, 22, 2016, <https://www.premiumtimesng.com/business/business-news/209046-islamic-development-bank-opens-nigeria-office.html>.
- 48 “Nigeria,” Global Fund, accessed March 2, 2018, <https://www.theglobalfund.org/en/portfolio/country/?loc=NGA&k=430b8acd-ef36-4ef1-8231-0e730499d19a>.
- 49 Ibid.
- 50 For a rich analysis of the history and complexities of these relationships see Stephen Ellis, *This Present Darkness: A History of Nigerian Organized Crime* (Oxford University Press, 2006).
- 51 “Arresting The Storm Within NIREC,” *Vanguard*, July 20, 2015, <https://www.vanguardngr.com/2015/07/arresting-the-storm-within-nirec/>.
- 52 “Constitution of Nigeria, Article 38: Freedom of Religion,” Berkley Center for Religion, Peace and World Affairs, accessed March 2, 2018, <https://berkeleycenter.georgetown.edu/quotes/constitution-of-nigeria-article-38-freedom-of-religion>.
- 53 Oba, Abdulummini A., “Religious and Customary Laws in Nigeria,” *Emory International Law Review* 25:2, <http://law.emory.edu/eilr/content/volume-25/issue-2/religious-nigeria/religious-customary-laws-nigeria.html>.
- 54 “Nigeria, 2016 Report on International Religious Freedom,” U.S. Department of State, August 15, 2017, <https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2016/af/268682.htm>.
- 55 “US Commission on International Religious Freedom, 2017 Annual Report: Nigeria,” United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, <http://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/Nigeria.2017.pdf>.
- 56 This draws on Human Rights Watch, “*They do not own this place: Government Discrimination against “Non-indigenes” in Nigeria*, April 25, 2006, <https://www.hrw.org/report/2006/04/25/they-do-not-own-place/government-discrimination-against-non-indigenes-nigeria>; and Sayne, Aaron, *Rethinking Nigeria’s Indigene-Settler Conflicts* (USIP, July 2012).
- 57 Religious Literacy Project, “Country Profile: Nigeria 2016,” Harvard Divinity school, [https://rlp.hds.harvard.edu/files/hds-rlp/files/nigeria\\_country\\_profile\\_1.pdf](https://rlp.hds.harvard.edu/files/hds-rlp/files/nigeria_country_profile_1.pdf).
- 58 Excerpted from Alkali, Muhammad Nur, Monguno, Abubakar Kawu, and Mustafa, Ballama Shettima, “Overview Of Islamic Actors In Northeastern Nigeria,” accessed March 2018, [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/268435905\\_Overview\\_Of\\_Islamic\\_Actors\\_In\\_Northeastern\\_Nigeria](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/268435905_Overview_Of_Islamic_Actors_In_Northeastern_Nigeria).
- 59 Recommended reading: Alexander Thurston, *Boko Haram: The History of an African Jihadist Movement* (Princeton University Press: 2017).
- 60 Sergie, Mohammed Aly and Johnson, Toni, “Boko Haram,” Council on Foreign Relations, last updated March 5, 2015, <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/boko-haram>.
- 61 Estimates from a Christian organization, Operation World: <http://www.operationworld.org/country/nigr/owtext.html>.
- 62 “Member Churches,” Tekan Peace Desk, accessed March 2018, <http://www.tekanpeace.org/node/2>. *Tarayyar Ekkliyyar Kristi a Nigeria* is Hausa for the Fellowship of Churches of Christ in Nigeria. TEKAN is the largest Christian ecumenical body in Nigeria with over 12 million adherents, comprising 13 member churches.
- 63 “Church of the Brethren in Nigeria (EYN),” World Council of Churches, accessed March 23, 2018, <https://www.oikoumene.org/en/member-churches/church-of-the-brethren-in-nigeria-cyn>.
- 64 “Nigeria,” Church of the Brethren, accessed March 23, 2018, <http://www.brethren.org/global/nigeria/>; see also interview with Nathan Hosler: “A Discission with Nathan Hosler, Director of the Office of Public Witness, Church of the Brethren,” January 10, 2018, <https://berkeleycenter.georgetown.edu/interviews/a-discussion-with-nathan-hosler-director-of-the-office-of-public-witness-church-of-the-brethren>.
- 65 Sieff, Kevin, “Relic or Reformer?” *Washington Post*, March 16, 2018, [https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/world/nigerian-emir-beholds-the-future/?utm\\_term=.995f0adb377d](https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/world/nigerian-emir-beholds-the-future/?utm_term=.995f0adb377d).

- 66 “About CAN,” Christian Association of Nigeria, accessed March 25, 2018, <http://canng.org/about-can>.
- 67 This summarizes Elisha P. Renne’s review of Ruth Marshall, “Political spiritualities: the Pentecostal revolution in Nigeria,” *Reviews* 497, *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 18, (2012) pp. 466-510.
- 68 Peel, J.D.Y., “Olaju: A Yoruba Concept of Development,” *The Journal of Development Studies* 14 (1978), 139-165.
- 69 Extracts (with permission) from Rosalind Hackett, “Charismatic/Pentecostal Appropriation of Media Technologies in Nigeria and Ghana,” *Journal of Religion in Africa* 28:3, (1998), pp. 258-277
- 70 WFDD uses FIOs rather than faith-based organizations (FBOs) to describe the many varied organizations that define themselves or are defined as having religious links, because FIO covers a wider range of organizations and is accepted by some that hesitate at the FBO label as implying a direct link to a religious denomination.
- 71 “Aramide, Oyindamola, “NGO Self-Regulation,” NNNGO, April 26, 2017, <http://nnngo.org/portfolios/biills-at-the-national-assembly/>.
- 72 “Nigeria NGO which way forward: Self-regulation or Government Regulation?” Partners West Africa Nigeria, October 17, 2016, <http://partnersnigeria.org/nigeria-ngo-which-way-forward-self-regulation-or-government-regulation/>.
- 73 “Non-Governmental Organizations Regulation and Co-ordination Bill, 2010,” Nation Assembly: Nigeria, accessed April 10, 2018, <http://nass.gov.ng/document/download/1321>.
- 74 Akiri, Chris, “The NGO regulatory bill,” *Guardian*, September 11, 2017, <https://guardian.ng/opinion/the-ngo-regulatory-bill/>.
- 75 Carsten, Paul, “Nigeria NGOs slaw civil society bill as grave threat to freedoms,” *Reuters*, December 13, 2017, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-rights/nigeria-ngos-slam-civil-society-bill-as-grave-threat-to-freedoms-idUSKBN1E72CO>.
- 76 Ibid.
- 77 Lopez-Thismon, Natalia, “Support for Victims of Boko Haram Insurgency,” ADRA, April 14, 2015, <https://adra.org/support-for-victims-of-boko-haram-insurgency/>.
- 78 Christian Aid studies: *Religion and the Adolescent Girl: A formative study in Kaduna state*, January 2017; *Masculinity and Religion in Nigeria: Findings from qualitative research* - Part of the Landmark Research Report, November 2015; *Faith Leaders and Family Planning: A Research Report*, Charlotte Walker; *Role of Faith leaders in advancing the cause of marriage age of adolescent girls in Kaduna State, Nigeria*, January 2018. Research Rep
- 79 Courtesy of Usie Charles Emmamuzou, Country Director, Christian Aid UK, Nigeria Country Office.
- 80 “Nigeria. Report, Briefing Note for Countries on the 2016 Human Development Report, Human Development for Everyone,” UNDP, last modified 2016, Accessed April 8, 2018, [http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr\\_theme/country-notes/NGA.pdf](http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/NGA.pdf).
- 81 “WHO Country Health Profile: Nigeria,” WHO, accessed April 8, 2018, <http://www.who.int/countries/nga/en/>; “Nigeria: WHO statistical profile,” WHO, accessed April 8, 2018, <http://www.who.int/gho/countries/nga.pdf?ua=1>; see also “Nigerian Health Sector: Market Study Report,” PharmAccess Foundation, March 2015, [https://www.rvo.nl/sites/default/files/Market\\_Study\\_Health\\_Nigeria.pdf](https://www.rvo.nl/sites/default/files/Market_Study_Health_Nigeria.pdf).
- 82 Eriki, Peter, Oyo-Ita, Angela, Odedo, Robert, Udoh, Anthony, Omaswa, Francis, and Kadama, Patrick, “Surgical Workforce in Nigeria,” African Centre for Global Health and Social Transformation, December 2015, <http://www.who.int/workforcealliance/031616NigeriaCaseStudyweb.pdf>.
- 83 “Nigerian Interfaith Action Association,” NIFAA | Nigerian Interfaith Action Association, accessed March 11, 2018, <https://www.nigerianinterfaith.org/>; “A Discussion with Andreas Hipple, GHR Foundation,” Interview. last modified September 29, 2017, accessed April 8, 2018, <https://berkeleycenter.georgetown.edu/interviews/a-discussion-with-andreas-hipple-ghr-foundation>; Berkley Center/WFDD, “Malaria: Scoping New Partnerships,” last modified January 9, 2009, accessed March 22, 2018, <https://s3.amazonaws.com/berkeley-center/090109MalariaScopingNewPartnerships.pdf>; “Malaria,” World Bank, last modified April 24, 2015, accessed April 11, 2018, <http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/health/brief/malaria>. Jean Duff provided helpful comments on the box and Tom Woods provided useful insights.
- 84 Hipple, J. Andreas, *Evaluation Report: Faiths United for Health-Interfaith Action Against Malaria in Nigeria*, Report, Joint Learning Initiative on Faith and Local Communities, Center for Interfaith Action in Global Poverty, 33, last modified March 30, 2011, accessed April 14, 2018, <https://jilfic.com/resources/evaluation-report-faiths-united-health-interfaith-action-malaria-nigeria/>.
- 85 Dr. Muhammad Ali Pate provided helpful comments on the draft box.
- 86 Agyepong, Irene Akua, “Longer and Healthier Lives for All Africans by 2030: Perspectives and Action of WHO AFRO,” *The Lancet* 390, no. 10114 (September 13, 2017): 2803-859, accessed April 8, 2018, doi:10.1016/s0140-6736(17)32128-1.; Berkley, Seth, and Muhammad Pate, “Polio’s Last Stand,” Project Syndicate, last modified July 31, 2015, accessed March 28, 2018, <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/nigeria-polio-eradication-gavi-alliance-by-seth-berkley-and-muhammad-pate-2015-07>; Ghinai, Isaac, Chris Willott, Ibrahim Dadari, and Heidi J. Larson, “Listening to the Rumours: What the Northern Nigeria Polio Vaccine Boycott Can Tell Us Ten Years on,” *Global Public Health: An International Journal for Research, Policy, and Practice* 8, no. 10 (December 3, 2013): 1138-150, accessed April 15, 2018, doi:10.1080/17441692.2013.859720.; Jegede, Ayodele Samuel, “What Led to the Nigerian Boycott of the Polio Vaccination Campaign?” *PLoS Medicine* 4, no. 3 (March 20, 2007), accessed March 29, 2018, doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0040073.
- 87 “Faith and Tuberculosis: Experience and Opportunities,” Policy Brief no. 15, Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs, Georgetown University, last modified September 2015, accessed April 18, 2018, <https://s3.amazonaws.com/berkeley-center/150901BCWFDDPolicyBriefFaithTuberculosisExperienceOpportunity.pdf>
- 88 “Nigeria Tuberculosis Fact Sheet,” U.S. Embassy in Nigeria, last modified January 2012, accessed June 8, 2018, <https://photos.state.gov/libraries/nigeria/487468/pdfs/JanuaryTuberculosisFactSheet.pdf>.
- 89 “World Population Prospects 2017,” last modified 2017, accessed April 10, 2018, <https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/DataQuery/>.
- 90 Ibid.
- 91 Fick, Maggie, “Dividend or Disaster? Nigeria Grapples with Demographic Conundrum,” *Financial Times*, last modified October 13, 2016, accessed April 6, 2018, <https://www.ft.com/content/14962a72-8ebf-11e6-8df8-d3778b55a923>.
- 92 *Nigeria Demographic and Health Survey*, National Population Commission, Federal Republic of Nigeria, last modified June 2014, <https://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/FR293/FR293.pdf>.
- 93 “Total population: Nigeria,” United Nations Population Division, accessed April 6, 2018, <https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/DataQuery/>.
- 94 Ibid.
- 95 “Population Growth (annual %),” World Bank., accessed April 4, 2018, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW>.<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.CBRT.IN>
- 96 “Birth Rate, crude (per 1,000 people),” World Bank, accessed April 4, 2018, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.CBRT.IN>
- 97 “Fertility Rate, Total (births per woman),” World Bank, accessed April 4, 2018, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN>.
- 98 “Population ages 0-14 (% of total),” World Bank, accessed April 4, 2018, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.0014.TO.ZS>.
- 99 “Maternal mortality ratio (modeled estimate per 100,000 live births),” World Bank, accessed April 4, 2018, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.STA.MMRT>.
- 100 “Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births),” World Bank, accessed April 4, 2018, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.IMRT.IN?view=chart>.
- 101 *Nigeria Demographic and Health Survey*, Report, National Population Commission, Federal Republic of Nigeria, last modified June 2014, <https://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/FR293/FR293.pdf>.
- 102 Ibid.
- 103 Ibid.
- 104 Ibid.
- 105 Obono, Oka, “Cultural Diversity and Population Policy in Nigeria,” *Population and Development Review* 29, no. 1 (2003): 103-11, accessed March 30, 2018, doi:10.1111/j.1728-4457.2003.00103.x.
- 106 Mazrui, Ali A, “Islamic Doctrine and the Politics of Induced Fertility Change: An African Perspective,” *Population and Development Review* 20 (1994): 121-34, accessed March 23, 2018, doi:10.2307/2807943.
- 107 *Implementation and Assessment Report*, Report, NIGERIA’S 2004 NATIONAL POLICY ON POPULATION FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, National Population Commission of Nigeria, last modified September 2015, accessed April 18, 2018, [https://www.healthpolicyproject.com/pubs/821\\_FINALNPPReport.pdf](https://www.healthpolicyproject.com/pubs/821_FINALNPPReport.pdf).
- 108 *Nigeria Family Planning Blueprint (Scale-Up Plan)*, Report, Federal Ministry of Health, Federal Government of Nigeria, last modified October 2014, accessed April 8, 2018. [http://www.health.gov.ng/doc/Nigeria\\_FP\\_B\\_print.pdf](http://www.health.gov.ng/doc/Nigeria_FP_B_print.pdf).
- 109 *Implementation and Assessment Report*, Report, NIGERIA’S 2004 NATIONAL POLICY ON POPULATION FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, National Population Commission of Nigeria, last modified September 2015, accessed April 18, 2018, [https://www.healthpolicyproject.com/pubs/821\\_FINALNPPReport.pdf](https://www.healthpolicyproject.com/pubs/821_FINALNPPReport.pdf).
- 110 *Reproductive Health Issues in Nigeria: The Islamic Perspective*. Report. Policy Project and Islamic Scholars, Pathfinder International, last modified May 2004, accessed March 8, 2018, [http://www.nurhitookit.org/sites/default/files/tracked\\_files/Reproductive%20Health%20In%20Nigeria%20-%20Islamic%20Perspective.pdf](http://www.nurhitookit.org/sites/default/files/tracked_files/Reproductive%20Health%20In%20Nigeria%20-%20Islamic%20Perspective.pdf)
- 111 Burket, Mary K, *Advancing Reproductive Health and Family Planning through Religious Leaders and Faith-Based Organizations*, Pathfinder International, last modified August 2006, accessed June 8, 2018. [http://www2.pathfinder.org/site/DocServer/FBO\\_final\\_reference.pdf?docID=6901](http://www2.pathfinder.org/site/DocServer/FBO_final_reference.pdf?docID=6901).
- 112 Walker, Charlotte, *Faith Leaders and Family Planning*, Christian Aid, accessed June 8, 2018. <https://www.christianaid.org.uk/sites/default/files/2017-11/Faith-leaders-family-planning-health-april2017.pdf>
- 113 Adegun, Aanu, “Forcing a Muslim to Do Family Planning Is Forcing Him to Violate His Religion - Nigerian Lawmaker,” *Naija.ng - Nigeria News*, last modified April 12, 2018., accessed April 08, 2018, <https://www.naija.ng/1130371-forcing-a-muslim-family-planning-forcing-violate-religion-kazaure.html#1130371>.
- 114 Irekamba, Chris, and Kenechukwu Ezeonyejiaku, “Family Planning And Religion: How Clerics See It,” *Guardian*, last modified May 17, 2015, accessed March 17, 2018, <http://guardian.ng/features/family-planning-and-religion-how-clerics-see-it/>.
- 115 Ibid.
- 116 Ibid.
- 117 Ibid.
- 118 Ibid.
- 119 “Traditional, Religious Leaders Parley on Need to Strengthen Family Planning,” *Premium Times Nigeria*, last modified September 11, 2017, accessed April 08, 2018, <https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/more-news/242975-traditional-religious-leaders-parley-need-strengthen-family-planning.html>.

- 120 Ibid.
- 121 Ibid.
- 122 “Prevalence of HIV, total (% of population 15-49),” World Bank, accessed April 4, 2018, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.DYN.AIDS.ZS>.
- 123 “Incidence of HIV (% of uninfected population ages 15-49),” World Bank, accessed April 4, 2018, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.HIV.INCD.ZS>.
- 124 “Nigeria.” UNAIDS, accessed April 08, 2018. <http://www.unaids.org/en/regionscountries/countries/nigeria>.
- 125 Ibid.
- 126 Ibid.
- 127 Aguwa, Jude, “Religion and HIV/AIDS Prevention in Nigeria,” *CrossCurrents*60, no. 2 (May 26, 2010): 208-23., accessed April 25, 2018, doi:10.1111/j.1939-3881.2010.00120.x.; Smith, Daniel Jordan, “Youth, Sin and Sex in Nigeria: Christianity and HIV/AIDS-related Beliefs and Behaviour among Rural-urban Migrants,” *Culture, Health & Sexuality: An International Journal for Research, Intervention and Care* 6, no. 5 (May 19, 2010): 425-37, accessed March 10, 2018, doi:10.1080/13691050410001680528.
- 128 “Statement on HIV testing and counseling: WHO, UNAIDS re-affirm opposition to mandatory HIV testing,” WHO, November 28, 2012, [http://www.who.int/hiv/events/2012/world\\_aids\\_day/hiv\\_testing\\_counselling/en/](http://www.who.int/hiv/events/2012/world_aids_day/hiv_testing_counselling/en/).
- 129 *National HIV/AIDS Reduction Strategy*, Report, Stigma and Discrimination Reduction in the National HIV/AIDS Response, National Agency for the Control of AIDS, 2016, last modified 2016, accessed March 5, 2018, <https://www.christianaid.org.uk/sites/default/files/2017-09/Nigeria-HIV-stigma-reduction-strategy-implementation-guide-ninrela-May2017.pdf>.
- 130 Ibid.
- 131 *Transforming Approaches to HIV Prevention in Nigeria: A Case Study*, TearFund, last modified July 2008, accessed March 17, 2018, [http://www.tearfund.org/~media/files/tilz/hiv/hiv\\_prevention\\_nigeria\\_final.pdf](http://www.tearfund.org/~media/files/tilz/hiv/hiv_prevention_nigeria_final.pdf).
- 132 “Program Areas,” Ninerela, accessed April 18, 2018. <http://ninerela.org.ng/Home/ProgrammeAreas>.
- 133 For more information, see *SAVE Toolkit*, accessed April 17, 2018, <http://inerela.org/wp-content/uploads/SAVE-TOOLKIT-2ND-EDITIONfor-web.pdf>.
- 134 “Program Areas,” Ninerela, accessed April 18, 2018. <http://ninerela.org.ng/Home/ProgrammeAreas>.
- 135 “World Economic Forum: Nigeria,” World Economic Forum, last modified 2016, accessed April 18, 2018, <http://reports.weforum.org/feature-demonstration/files/2016/10/NGA.pdf>.
- 136 “Religion, Women’s Movements and Legal Reform in Nigeria,” Policy Brief no. 15, University of Birmingham, 2011, accessed March 19, 2018, <https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/Documents/college-social-sciences/government-society/research/rad/policy-briefs/pb-15.pdf>.
- 137 UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
- 138 “Nigeria,” 28Toomany, accessed April 1, 2018, <https://www.28toomany.org/country/nigeria/>.
- 139 Olubunmi Akinsanya Alo and Babaunde Gbadebo, “Intergenerational Attitude Changes Regarding Female Genital Cutting in Nigeria,” *Journal of Women’s Health*, Vol. 20, 11, November 2011, <https://www.liebertpub.com/doi/full/10.1089/jwh.2010.2610>.
- 140 “Nigeria,” *Global Slavery Index 2016*, accessed April 18, 2018, <https://www.globalslaveryindex.org/country/nigeria/>.
- 141 See for example Taub, Ben, “A Reporter’s Path to Uncovering Human Trafficking”, *New Yorker*, April 2017; Taub, Ben, “The Desperate Journey of a Trafficked Girl,” *New Yorker*, April 2017; Neil, Maggie, “Witchcraft can be the toughest chain to break for Nigerian women looking to escape slavery,” PRI, May 2017, <https://www.pri.org/stories/2017-05-22/witchcraft-can-be-toughest-chain-break-nigerian-women-looking-escape-slavery>.
- 142 “Europe,” *Global Slavery Index 2016*, <https://www.globalslaveryindex.org/region/europe/>, with additional analysis by the Globalist Research Center. “9 Facts on Modern Slavery in Nigeria,” *Globalist*, February 19, 2015, accessed March 8, 2018, <https://www.theglobalist.com/9-facts-on-modern-slavery-in-nigeria-2/>.
- 143 Peter Ajayi Dada, “Bishops condemn selling of Nigerians into slavery in Libya”, *National Catholic Reporter*, May 2017, <https://www.ncronline.org/news/world/bishops-condemn-selling-nigerians-slavery-libya>.
- 144 Tondo, Lorenzo, and Annie Kelly, “The Juju Curse That Binds Trafficked Nigerian Women into Sex Slavery,” *Guardian*, last modified September 02, 2017, accessed March 08, 2018. <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2017/sep/02/juju-curse-binds-trafficked-nigerian-women-sex-slavery>; Politi, James, and Maggie Fick, “The Long and Dangerous Road to Slavery,” *Financial Times*, last modified December 03, 2015, accessed April 08, 2018, <https://www.ft.com/content/26f1a120-990f-11e5-95c7-d47aa298f769>; Neil, Maggie, “Witchcraft Can Be the Toughest Chain to Break for Nigerian Women Looking to Escape Slavery,” Public Radio International, last modified May 22, 2017, accessed May 16, 2018, <https://www.pri.org/stories/2017-05-22/witchcraft-can-be-toughest-chain-break-nigerian-women-looking-escape-slavery>.
- 145 “Global Report On Trafficking In Persons: 2014,” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2014, [http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/glotip/GLOTIP\\_2014\\_full\\_report.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/glotip/GLOTIP_2014_full_report.pdf).
- 146 For more information see Effiong, Utibe, “What’s behind Children Being Cast as Witches in Nigeria.” *Huffington Post*, last modified December 06, 2017, accessed April 04, 2018, [https://www.huffingtonpost.com/the-conversation-africa/whats-behind-children-bei\\_b\\_9698680.html](https://www.huffingtonpost.com/the-conversation-africa/whats-behind-children-bei_b_9698680.html); Essia, Uwem, “The Social Economy of Child Witch Labeling in Nigeria,” *Science Journal of Psychology* 2012 (2015): 01-07, last modified June 29, 2012, accessed March 12, 2018, doi:10.7237/sjpsych/289; Foxcroft, Gary, *Report on Accusations of Witchcraft Against Children in Akwa Ibom State, Nigeria*, Report, accessed April 8, 2018. <https://www.experts.com/Articles/Accusations-of-Witchcraft-Against-Children-By-Gary-Foxcroft>; Marshall, Katherine, “Bewitched Children? A Problem Churches Should Tackle,” *Huffington Post*, June 15, 2013, accessed April 08, 2018, [https://www.huffingtonpost.com/katherine-marshall/bewitched-children-a-problem-churches-should-tackle\\_b\\_3398805.html](https://www.huffingtonpost.com/katherine-marshall/bewitched-children-a-problem-churches-should-tackle_b_3398805.html); Secker, Emilie, “Witchcraft Stigmatization in Nigeria: Challenges and Successes in the Implementation of Child Rights,” *International Social Work*56, no. 1 (December 12, 2012): 22-36, accessed March 8, 2018, doi:10.1177/0020872812459065. <http://www.whrin.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Witchcraft-stigmatization-in-Nigeria.pdf>.
- 147 “About AfCAA.” AfCAA. Accessed March 08, 2018. <http://afcaa.org/about-us/>. Valentine Gitoho provided helpful comments on a draft of this text.
- 148 “A Discussion with Valentine Gitoho, Financial Management Consultant and Entrepreneur in Kenya,” Interview by Valentine Gitoho, last modified July 31, 2015, accessed April 6, 2018, <https://berkeleycenter.georgetown.edu/interviews/a-discussion-with-valentine-gitoho-financial-managament-consultant-and-entrepreneur-in-kenya>.
- 149 “Workshop For Our Lady of Fatima, Cathedral Church Congregation on Budget & Anti-Corruption,” BudgIT, last modified October 27, 2017, accessed April 08, 2018, <http://yourbudgit.com/workshop-for-our-lady-of-fatima-cathedral-church-congregation-on-budget-anti-corruption/>.
- 150 Girls Not Brides, “Nigeria - Child Marriage Around The World. Girls Not Brides,” Girls Not Brides, accessed April 09, 2018, <https://www.girlsnotbrides.org/child-marriage/nigeria/>.
- 151 Ibid.
- 152 Male, Chata, and Quentin Wodon, *Basic Profile of Child Marriage in Nigeria*, Health, Nutrition and Population Global Practice, Knowledge Brief, last modified March 2016, accessed March 8, 2018, <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/24547/Basic0profile000marriage0in0Nigeria.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>.
- 153 “Nutrition,” UNICEF Nigeria, accessed April 15, 2018, <https://www.unicef.org/nigeria/nutrition.html>.
- 154 Among the many sources of basic information about Nigeria’s education system are “2015 Nigeria National Education Data Survey (NEDS),” National Population Commission, December 2015, <https://shared.rti.org/content/2015-nigeria-national-education-data-survey-neds>; and “Education in Nigeria,” World Education News and Reviews, March 7, 2017, <https://wenr.wes.org/2017/03/education-in-nigeria>.
- 155 Nigeria’s Universal Basic Education (UBE) program was launched in 1999 to provide “free, universal and compulsory basic education for every Nigerian child aged 6-15 years.” The UBE program took off effectively with the signing of the UBE Act in April 2004.
- 156 “2015 Nigeria National Education Data Survey (NEDS),” National Population Commission, December 2015, <https://shared.rti.org/content/2015-nigeria-national-education-data-survey-neds>.
- 157 “Federal Universities.” National Universities Commission, accessed March 12, 2018. <http://nuc.edu.ng/nigerian-universities/federal-univeristies/>.
- 158 Havergal, Chris. “Africa’s ‘Teaching Shops’: The Rise of Private Universities.” *Times Higher Education*, last modified October 22, 2015, accessed April 12, 2018. <https://www.timeshighereducation.com/features/africas-teaching-shops-the-rise-of-private-universities>.
- 159 Ajah, Miracle, “Religious education and nation-building in Nigeria”, *Stellenbosch Theological Journal*, Vol. 2, No. 2 2015, [http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci\\_arttext&pid=S2413-94672015000200014](http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S2413-94672015000200014).
- 160 Governments all over the British Commonwealth nationalized non-government schools in the 1960s and 1970s. Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland were an exception; there, like most OECD countries, public schooling is delivered through both state and faith-based school systems.
- 161 See notably Baba, Nasir Mohammed, “Islamic Schools, the Ulama, and the State in the Educational Development of Northern Nigeria,” *Bulletin De L’APAD*, last modified March 22, 2012, accessed April 13, 2018, <http://apad.revues.org/4092>.
- 162 Omolade, Richard. “Challenges for Catholic Schools in Nigeria.” *International Studies in Catholic Education* 1:1, (February 03, 2009): 30-41, accessed March 22, 2018, doi: 10.1080/19422530802605457.
- 163 Catholic schools are defined according to the Code of Canon Law (1983) and the SCCE; this includes expectations to commit to the formation of the individual guided by a Christian vision and obedience to the solicitude of the Church.
- 164 “Welcome to ACSI.” ACSI Info, accessed March 19, 2018. <http://acsinigeria.org/>.
- 165 “Frequently Asked Questions.” Association of Christian Schools in Nigeria, accessed April 22, 2018. <https://acsn.ng/who-we-are/>.

- 166 Udeh, Chiagozie, Izuchukwu J. Okoye, and Oseloka H. Obaze, "Anambra State Education Rebirth-The Peter Obi Model," *Oracle*, accessed April 23, 2018, <http://oraclenews.ng/anambra-state-education-rebirth-peter-obi-model/>.
- 167 Ajayi, Omeiza. "WAEC/NECO: Obaze Blasts Obiano for Loss of No. 1 Position." *Vanguard News*, last modified October 12, 2017, accessed April 1, 2018, <https://www.vanguardngr.com/2017/10/waecneco-obaze-blasts-obiano-loss-no-1-position/>.
- 168 Even though the group itself does not claim that name.
- 169 Extract from blogpost by Alexander Thurston: Thurston, Alex J. "Daphi and Boko Haram's Continued Assault on Education." *Resolve Network*, last modified March 06, 2018, accessed March 30, 2018, <https://resolvenet.org/news/dapchi-and-boko-harams-continued-assault-education>.
- 170 "Statistics At a Glance: Nigeria," last modified December 27, 2013, accessed March 21, 2018, [https://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/nigeria\\_statistics.html](https://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/nigeria_statistics.html).
- 171 "NBS E-Library." National Bureau of Statistics, accessed April 2, 2018, [http://nigerianstat.gov.ng/elibrary?queries\[search\]=education](http://nigerianstat.gov.ng/elibrary?queries[search]=education).
- 172 Baba, Nasir Mohammed. "Islamic Schools, the Ulama, and the State in the Educational Development of Northern Nigeria." *Bulletin De L'APAD*, last modified March 22, 2012, accessed April 13, 2018, <http://apad.revues.org/4092>.
- 173 Ibid.
- 174 Northern Education Initiative: "Integrated Qur'anic Education: Nigeria Case Study." Creative Associates International, last modified March 2015, accessed April 16, 2018, [http://www.creativeassociatesinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Integrated\\_Ed\\_Nigeria.pdf](http://www.creativeassociatesinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Integrated_Ed_Nigeria.pdf).
- 175 "Nigeria Safe Schools Initiative Multi-Donor Trust Fund," UNDP, accessed April 16, 2018, <http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/fund/NGA00>.
- 176 Ibid
- 177 "Nigeria Partnership for Education Project," World Bank, December 30, 2017, <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/845391514675764796/pdf/Disclosable-Version-of-the-ISR-Nigeria-Partnership-for-Education-Project-P143842-Sequence-No-05.pdf>; Nwoko, Chinedum, "Financing Education in Nigeria: Opportunities For Action. Country Case Study for the Oslo Summit on Education for Development," July 7, 2015, <http://cap.africa-platform.org/sites/default/files/NigeriaOsloSummitpaper.pdf>.
- 178 "Evaluation of Independent Monitoring and Evaluation Project for the DFID Nigeria State Level Programmes (IMEP)" DFID, February 2, 2018, <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/evaluation-of-independent-monitoring-and-evaluation-project-for-the-dfid-nigeria-state-level-programmes-imep>.
- 179 "Girls Education Project: Phase 3," DFID, accessed April 16, 2018, <https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-202643>.
- 180 "Introducing Modern Education into Islamic Schools in Northern Nigeria: A Report on ESSPIN's 1st Phase Experience 2008-2014," ESSPIN.
- 181 "Education," Young Women's Christian Association of Nigeria, accessed March 12, 2018, <http://ywcanigeria.org/education/>.
- 182 "Home." FOMWAN, accessed March 12, 2018, <http://fomwan.org.ng/>.
- 183 "Project Update: Nigeria Fact-Finding Mission Establishes KAICIID Role in Nigeria," KAICIID, May 30, 2016, <https://www.kaiciid.org/news-events/news/project-update-nigeria-fact-finding-mission-establishes-kaiciid-role-nigeria>.
- 184 Pew Research Center, *Tolerance and Tension: Islam and Christianity in Sub-Saharan Africa*, April 2010, <http://www.pewforum.org/2010/04/15/executive-summary-islam-and-christianity-in-sub-saharan-africa/>.
- 185 Jenkins, Siona, "Review, Non-fiction: Boko Haram, by Alex Thurston," January 15, 2018, <https://www.ft.com/content/7f3d8240-f619-11e7-88f7-5465a6ce1a00>.
- 186 Eltantawi, Sarah, "Boko Haram: The History of an African Jihadist Movement, by Alexander Thurston," *Times Higher Education Review*, December 7, 2017, <https://www.timeshighereducation.com/books/review-boko-haram-alexander-thurston-princeton-university-press>.
- 187 See for example Bilkusu Yusuf and Sr. Kathleen McGarvey, "Women, Religion, and Peacebuilding in Kaduna State," in Susan Hayward and Katherine Marshall (eds.), *Women, Religion, and Peace: Illuminating the Unseen* (USIP: 2015). See also UN Women, "Tired of communal conflicts in northern Nigeria, women-led peace networks take action," September 2017, <https://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/tired-communal-conflicts-northern-nigeria-women-led-peace-networks-take-action>.
- 188 "Home," Interfaith Mediation Centre, accessed April 07, 2018, <http://www.imc-nigeria.org/>; "Interfaith Mediation Centre of Muslim Christian Dialogue Forum (IMC-MCDF)," How to Entrepreneur Peace, accessed April 10, 2018, <https://www.changemakers.com/competition/entrepreneurship-peace/entries/interfaith-mediation-centre-muslim-christian-dialogue-f>.
- 189 "IFAPP ISSUES: Press Release." InterFaith Activity and Partnership for Peace, last modified November 21, 2014, <http://www.interfaithnigeria.org/index.html>.
- 190 "Awards and Affiliations," Interfaith Mediation Centre, accessed April 07, 2018, <http://www.imc-nigeria.org/new-page/>.
- 191 *Report of an Inaugural Meeting*, Report, last modified April 17, 2012, <http://interfaithnigeria.org/inaugural> meeting.html.
- 192 "Archbishop Kaigama Inaugurates RECOWA Peace Committee," *DREP Centre*(blog), last modified April 13, 2018, <http://drepcentre.blogspot.com/>.
- 193 "ABOUT US," Kukah Centre, accessed March 07, 2018, <http://thekukahcentre.org/about-us/>.
- 194 Marshall, Katherine, "Sister Agatha: A Nigerian Peacemaker at Work," Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs, Georgetown University, last modified October 28, 2017, <https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/posts/sister-agatha-a-nigerian-peacemaker-at-work>.
- 195 "Building Consensus on Protection of Holy Sites in Northern Nigeria," Search for Common Ground, last modified March 16, 2017, <https://www.sfcg.org/building-consensus-protection-holy-sites-northern-nigeria/>.
- 196 "Building Resilience & Supporting Youth Network in Countering Violent Extremism," Search for Common Ground, last modified August 10, 2017, <https://www.sfcg.org/building-resilience-supporting-youth-network-countering-violent-extremism/>.
- 197 *An Inter-Religious Peacebuilding in Northern Nigeria (IPNN) Qualitative Research Report*, <https://www.mercycorps.org/research-resources/role-religion-and-religious-leaders-farmer-pastoralist-conflict-plateau-state>.
- 198 "Nigeria," Mercy Corps, accessed April 07, 2018, <https://www.mercycorps.org/countries/nigeria>; "Concur Impact Evaluation," 2017, accessed June 7, 2018, <https://www.mercycorps.org/sites/default/files/Conflict-Mitigation-Economic-Growth-Nigeria-2017.pdf>.
- 199 *Role of Religion and Religious Leaders in Farmer-Pastoralist Conflict in Plateau State, An Inter-Religious Peacebuilding in Northern Nigeria (IPNN) Qualitative Research Report*, last modified October 2016, [https://www.mercycorps.org/sites/default/files/IPNN\\_Research\\_Report\\_final.pdf](https://www.mercycorps.org/sites/default/files/IPNN_Research_Report_final.pdf).
- 200 "Inter Faith Partners for Peace & Development (IPPD)," Peace Insight, last modified November 2017, <https://www.peaceinsight.org/conflicts/nigeria/peacebuilding-organisations/ippd/>.
- 201 "Interfaith Peace Foundation (IPF)." last modified November 2017, <https://www.peaceinsight.org/conflicts/nigeria/peacebuilding-organisations/ipf/>.
- 202 "Inter-religious Peacebuilding in Northern Nigeria (IPPN) Research Fellow at Mercy Corps," *Myjobmag*, accessed April 17, 2018, <https://www.myjobmag.com/job/17532/inter-religious-peacebuilding-in-northern-nigeria-ipnn-research-fellow-mercy-corps>.
- 203 "What We Do," KAICIID, accessed April 09, 2018, <https://www.kaiciid.org/what-we-do/peace-and-reconciliation-through-interreligious-dialogue-nigeria-0>; "Austria mulls quitting Saudi-backed religious center in Vienna," Reuters, January 17, 2015, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-austria-saudi-centre/austria-mulls-quitting-saudi-backed-religious-center-in-vienna-idUSKBN0KQ0KA20150117>.
- 204 Ibid.
- 205 Sjolander, Jessica, *Plateau Will Arise (PWA)! Phase II: Consolidating an Architecture for Peace, Tolerance and Reconciliation in Plateau and Kaduna State*, last modified October 2016, [https://www.sfcg.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/NGR505\\_Mid-term-Evaluation\\_2016\\_Final.pdf](https://www.sfcg.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/NGR505_Mid-term-Evaluation_2016_Final.pdf).
- 206 "DOSSIER | Community of Sant'Egidio," last modified September 25, 2017, accessed April 08, 2018, [http://www.santegidio.org/pageID/5433/langID/en/geoRef/CY=Nigeria/DOSSIER\\_NIGERIA.html](http://www.santegidio.org/pageID/5433/langID/en/geoRef/CY=Nigeria/DOSSIER_NIGERIA.html); "MINNA (NIGERIA) – The Elderly in the Leprosarium Find New Hope Thanks to the Visit of Their Sant'Egidio Friends. A Report | NEWS | Community of Sant'Egidio." Sant'Egidio, last modified March 06, 2010, <http://www.santegidio.org/pageID/3/langID/en/itemID/3366/MINNA-NIGERIA--The-elderly-in-the-leprosarium-find-new-hope-thanks-to-the-visit-of-their-SantEgidio-friends-A-report.html>.
- 207 "About," Network for Religious and Traditional Peacemakers, accessed April 07, 2018, <https://www.peacemakersnetwork.org/about-us/>.
- 208 "Supporting Leaders," Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, accessed April 07, 2018, <http://institute.global/co-existence/supporting-leaders>; Mendick, Robert, and Edward Malnick, "Revealed: Tony Blair and the Oligarch Bankrolling His Charity." *Telegraph*, last modified February 10, 2013, accessed April 7, 2018, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/tony-blair/9859780/Revealed-Tony-Blair-and-the-oligarch-bankrolling-his-charity.html>.
- 209 "What We Do," International Center for Ethno-Religious Meditation, last modified December 28, 2015, <https://www.icermediation.org/what-we-do/>.
- 210 "One Family Under God Campaign," accessed March 07, 2018, <https://www.globalpeace.org/project/one-family-under-god-campaign>.
- 211 "Who We Are," United Religions Initiative, accessed April 09, 2018, [http://uri.org/about\\_uri](http://uri.org/about_uri).
- 212 "Christian Muslim Unity Foundation," accessed March 13, 2018, <http://www.christianmuslimunity.org/>.
- 213 "Women's Interfaith Council," accessed March 27, 2018, <http://womeninterfaithcouncil.org/>; Omolekun, Ebenezer, "Interfaith Forum of Muslim and Christian Women's Association, Aka, Women's Interfaith Council (WIC)." *Namati.org*, last modified June 24, 2016, <https://namati.org/network/organization/interfaith-forum-of-muslim-and-christian-womens-association-aka-womens-interfaith-council-wic/>.
- 214 "Forward Action for Conservation of Indigenous Species (FACIS)," Peace Insight, last modified December 2017, accessed March 20, 2018, <https://www.peaceinsight.org/conflicts/nigeria/peacebuilding-organisations/facis/>; "URI Stories," United Religious Initiative, accessed March 07, 2018, [http://www.uri.org/the\\_latest/2014/04/facis\\_joined\\_other\\_ccs\\_in\\_comomerating\\_the\\_world\\_golden\\_rule\\_day\\_in\\_bauchi\\_state\\_northern\\_nigeria](http://www.uri.org/the_latest/2014/04/facis_joined_other_ccs_in_comomerating_the_world_golden_rule_day_in_bauchi_state_northern_nigeria).
- 215 "Justice, Development and Peace/Caritas Advocates (JDPCA)," Peace Insight, last modified November 2017, accessed June 07, 2018, <https://www.peaceinsight.org/conflicts/nigeria/peacebuilding-organisations/jdpc/>; Adamu, Abuh, "Thumbs Up for Kano Peace Builders," *Guardian: Nigeria*, last modified July 13, 2017, accessed March 12, 2018, <https://guardian.ng/news/thumbs-up-for-kano-peace-builders/>.

- 216 “Kazatsi Reconciliation Centre & Human Development,” United Religious Initiative, accessed March 15, 2018, [http://www.uri.org/cooperation\\_circles/detail/karcenahd](http://www.uri.org/cooperation_circles/detail/karcenahd).
- 217 A protracted political crisis over ‘indigene’ rights and political representation in Jos, capital of Plateau State, fueled a communal conflict affecting most parts of the state. At least 4,000 and possibly as many as 7,000 people have been killed since late 2001, when the first major riot in more than three decades broke out in Jos. See “A Deadly Cycle: Ethno-Religious Conflict in Jos, Plateau State, Nigeria,” November 8, 2011, <https://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/deadly-cycle-ethno-religious-conflict-jos-plateau-state-nigeria>.
- 218 “CARITAS Nigeria,” accessed March 7, 2018, <https://www.caritasnigeria.org/en/>.
- 219 “CRS in Nigeria.” Catholic Relief Services, accessed March 12, 2018, <https://www.crs.org/our-work-overseas/where-we-work/nigeria>; Piraino, Nathalie, “CRS OVC Programming: Making an Impact in Nigeria,” last modified 2010, accessed June 7, 2018, <http://static1.1.sqspcdn.com/static/f/752898/12390061/1306352902730/Nigeria-ovc-brochure-final.pdf?token=0bOZKjA8uKAvV CAuEP/O1uDtVk=>; “Nigeria: Final Report 2004-2012,” Catholic Relief Services, accessed March 7, 2018, [https://www.crs.org/sites/default/files/tools-research/aidsrelief\\_nigeria\\_final.pdf](https://www.crs.org/sites/default/files/tools-research/aidsrelief_nigeria_final.pdf).
- 220 Vernon, Alissa, “CRC Agencies Support Peace Building in Nigeria,” *Banner*, last modified March 31, 2017, accessed March 17, 2018, <https://thebanner.org/news/2017/03/crc-agencies-support-peace-building-in-nigeria>; “West Africa,” accessed March 07, 2018, <https://www.resonateglobalmission.org/west-africa>.
- 221 “WELCOME TO JDPC IJEBU-ODE,” JDPC Ijebu-Ode, accessed June 07, 2018. <http://www.jdpcijebuode.org/>; Ibhawoh, Bonny, and Adebisi Alade, “Democracy and Election Monitoring (Good Governance) Project of the Justice, Development and Peace Commission (Ijebu-Ode Chapter), Ogun State, Nigeria,” Participedia, last modified December 19, 2016, accessed March 11, 2018, <http://participedia.net/de/node/4624>.
- 222 “New Era Educational and Charitable Support Foundation (NEEDCSI),” Peace Insight, last modified November 2017, accessed March 22, 2018, <https://www.peaceinsight.org/conflicts/nigeria/peacebuilding-organisations/needcsi/>; “Awards, Recognitions, and Partnerships,” New Era Support Foundation, accessed March 03, 2018, <https://www.newerasupportfoundation.org/awards>.
- 223 Siddeeq, Ustaz Abubakr, “The Nigerian Inter-Religious Council (NIREC) Meeting in Maiduguri,” *Focus on Faith*, accessed May 10, 2018, <http://www.abubakrsiddeeq.com/2010/12/nigerian-inter-religious-council-nirec.html>.



WORLD FAITHS  
DEVELOPMENT  
DIALOGUE

**PaRD**

International Partnership on  
Religion and Sustainable Development

**wfdd.us**

3307 M Street NW, Suite 200 | Washington, D.C. 20007 | @worldfaiths | 202-687-6444