Department of Social & Policy Sciences

Affirming and Legitimating Partnership Models of Development: A Case Study of Tearfund's Church and Community Mobilization Programme

This dissertation is submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of Master of Research in Global Political Economy

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ABSTRACT

This paper considers the complex ontological and epistemological positionalities that underpin how individuals and organizations in the aid industry define development and legitimate their role in its actualization. This will include a description of the dominant industry power dynamics that influence the formation and adoption of specific models of development, and an examination of how power can be exerted through knowledge creation, legitimating specific development ideologies.

Building on this theoretical foundation, the paper then considers the applicability and legitimacy of a partnership model of development through a case study investigation of Tearfund's Church and Community Mobilization Programme. Within this case study, the influence of stakeholder power and development ideologies over the theoretical and practical aspects of the programme will be reviewed, along with a consideration of how a partnership model of development can be legitimated through the creation of appropriate accounts of performance.

CONTENTS

ABBREVIATIONS & TERMINOLOGY

The discourse of international development is interpretive and often contested in literature. However, to allow this paper to flow and not become tangled up in the complexity of language use, it is necessary to set down some definitions in order for the reader to understand the thoughts of the author. As such, below are some terms, commonly used in this paper, with a brief description of the meaning that has been attributed to them.

Northern and Western	Used to describe typically more economically developed countries such as those located in Western Europe, Canada, United States, developed parts of Asia, Australia and New Zealand.
Southern	Used to describe typically less economically developed countries such as those located in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and developing Asia.
NGO	Non-governmental organisation. Private, non-profit bodies, engaged in development work.
NNGO	Northern non-governmental organisation
SNGO	Southern non-governmental organisation
INGO	International non-governmental organization
Partner	Used throughout to describe in-country local agencies that NNGOs delegate their work to.
Aid	"A voluntary transfer of resources (e.g. funds, assets, skills) from the people of one country to another, with the objective of benefiting the recipient country." (IDM, n.d.)
Conditionality	"The nature of the conditions contained in a loan, grant or other agreement between a development partner and recipient. If any of these conditions are not fulfilled, the agreement has been broken and aid may be suspended." (IDM, n.d.)
NGO, NNGO, SNGO and Partner	It is recognized that organizations are made up of their constituent members. As such, when discussing the values, beliefs and practices of these bodies, I refer to a collective group of people rather than seeing an organization as a 'being' in its own right. See Mowles (2008a) for further discussion.
Development	Used as a general term to denote an improvement in some aspect of an individual's life. Development is understood and measured in diverse ways in literature. For example: GDP growth, happiness, social capital enlargement, political empowerment. See Copestake (2008, 2010) for further discussion.

LIST OF TABLES, FIGURES & DIAGRAMS

1. RESEARCH FOCUS

The international aid industry has grown rapidly over the past thirty years (Huggett, 2012), with international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) affecting the lives of millions of people globally through their intervention in social, economic, political and spiritual spaces. The breadth and depth of their impact, and the vast sums of donor money they deploy, has led to, what some describe as, a crisis of legitimacy (van de Walle, 1999) - exigency for concrete evidence to legitimate the non-profit's unelected place in, "the emergent public spheres of globalization" (Thrandardottir, 2015, p107). "Governments, intergovernmental bureaucrats, and global corporations are all well aware of the impact NGOs can have on their affairs" (ibid); and this, coupled with growing technological sophistication in information management and a general move toward a results-based managerialism within the aid sector (Elbers et al., 2014), has fuelled the desire for increasingly innovative impact measurement tools.

The ability for INGOs to legitimate their global role through performance measurement is, however, problematic. The definitions of human wellbeing and positive development are contested and evolving (Copestake, 2008, Fischer, 2014), constructed and interpreted in divergent ways; and this has led to a lack of clarity surrounding both INGO objectives and metrics of success (Copestake and Camfield, 2010, Volk, 2014). This inability to neatly define development performance, coupled with uneven power relationships within the aid regime[1] (Aerni, 2006, Murtaza, 2012), and the necessity to ensure a continual flow of

[1] Processes and collections of rules.

donor investment, has often led to the prioritization of programming that is easily measureable and aligns with donor's vision of success; focusing on the "'middle poor more than […] the chronically poor' to create market-orientated solutions to poverty…where NGOs' representation of poor people is depoliticized to avoid difficult 'questions of inequality, redistribution, and social organisation'" (Bebbington, 2005, p940-946 in Thrandardottir, 2015, p115).

Despite the popular Northern NGO (NNGO) discourse of beneficiary accountability, and grassroots partnership, this prioritization is reflected in the prevalence of top-down formalized accountability relationships with Southern NGO partners (SNGOs) seen as a means to an end, implementing contractually-specified, largely practical activities (Elbers et al., 2014, p4, Hart and Paludan, 2016, James, 2012). It has also encouraged NGOs to emphasize apolitical functionality – their ability to delivery welfare services and policy – when seeking legitimacy for their work (Thrandardottir, 2015).

As such, there is exigency for NGOs and their stakeholders to understand:

- the complex ontological and epistemological positions that underpin how individuals and organizations define development and legitimate their role in its actualization;
- the power dynamics within the aid industry that influence these development ideologies and, thus, how performance is understood and legitimated;

- how power can be exerted through selective knowledge creation, legitimating specific development ideologies.

This knowledge will allow a more in-depth self-interrogation surrounding organizational ideology and representations of power, facilitating discussion and a more purposeful, informed selection of development model.

Given these requirements, and to add to the limited literature available on the above themes, this paper utilizes a case study example to empirically explore the complex interactions between one NNGO and it's Southern partner agencies and beneficiaries as they attempt to operationalize and legitimize a partnership model of development. It analyses how stakeholder relationships are shaped by development ideologies[2] and power, and legitimized through accounts of performance. My findings, though case-based, will be useful in a broader sense to raise questions about how power imbalances and theories of development can affect the value a NNGO places on their relationship with different stakeholders; and how this, in turn, affects the legitimation of certain models of development. Given the industry interest in bottom-up, partnership models of development at the present time, it will also serve to illustrate both some positive industry experience of development partnership and the dilemmas that NNGOs face when attempting to pursue this model.

[2] 'Development' is understood and measured in diverse ways. For example: GDP growth, happiness, social capital enlargement, political empowerment. See Copestake (2008, 2010) for further discussion.

The paper commences with a review of literature pertaining to three key areas: NGO legitimacy and accountability; power asymmetries within stakeholder relationships; and development ideologies and resultant modes of stakeholder engagement. I then go on to offer a description of the research paradigm and methodology employed; followed by a detailed discussion of my research findings in relation to theories previously elucidated. Finally, I will conclude with a number of key findings and recommendations for future action.

Due to the constraints of this research paper, I have chosen not to talk more generally about the history of development and differing develop styles in relation to power asymmetries. Nor will I describe or discuss in detail the myriad types of planning and evaluation tools available to development professions and their relative merit in legitimacy and accountability. To do this, would result in insufficient space to concentrate on the core research imperatives set out above.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Purpose and Scope

The purpose of this review is to examine current theories, paradoxes and dilemmas within literature pertaining to my research theme, with the intention of unearthing interesting and contradictory accounts to inform a critique of my primary case study research[3].

I will commence with a brief introduction to how accountability and legitimacy are defined, utilizing the work of Thrandardottir's (2015) to explain how epistemological beliefs surrounding development influence NNGO's modes of legitimation. This will not be an exhaustive inquiry, but will reflect how I intend to use the terms within the paper. I will then move on to discuss accountability structures and the power asymmetries that influence an NNGOs stakeholder relationships, drawing on the theories of 'Principal-Agent' (Aerni, 2006). This will be followed by a look at the impact of development ideology on how NNGO interventions are conceived, operationalized and measured, utilizing literature on institutional logic (Elbers et al., 2014) and the potential for partnership models of development (Hart and Paludan, 2016). Finally, I will turn to the substance of accountability - the accounts of INGO performance – and how power can be exerted through knowledge construction to legitimate certain accounts of development over others (Hilhorst, 2003, Hayman et al., 2016).

[3] Literature review methodology in Appendix 1.

2.2 Defining Accountability and Legitimacy in NNGOs

The terms *accountability* and *legitimacy* are frequently used in literature pertaining to the aid industry. However, the meaning infused into their use is both constructed and interpreted diversely.

A purposive literature review finds accountability most often used to discuss the conduct and performance of an organization, individual or group and how it is assessed (Day and Klein, 1987, Jenkins and Goertz, 1999, Mulgan, 2003, Kilby, 2006). As such, it is concerned with power, authority and ownership (Conger and Kanungo, 1988, Day and Klein, 1987, Gray et al., 1997, Mulgan, 2003), and "defines the relationship between actors through identifying who can call whom to account, and who owes a duty of explanation and rectification" (Kilby, 2006, p953). It is conceptualized as directional: an externally-driven process "by which individuals and organizations report to a recognized authority (or authorities) and are held responsible for their actions" (Edwards and Hulme, 1996, p967); and internally driven: the process of holding oneself responsible for alignment with a personal or organizational mission or set of values (Mowles, 2008a), a 'higher purpose', worldview or belief system (Kilby, 2006). Authors also pay particular attention to the epistemological foundations of accountability, with some propounding a rational, transparent view of performance measurement (Power, 1994); a view contested by those who see accountability as covert and morally-enforced (Durkheim in, Hilhorst, 2003, p127). These arguments are expanded in Appendix 2.

Legitimacy, on the other hand, is concerned with a more "generalised perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially construction system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions" (Suchman, 1995, p574), and in the case of NGOs, where "performance conforms to stakeholders' expectations" (Bansal and Clelland, 2004, in Alrazi et al., 2015, p45). These expectations may "be explicit (formal, and in the form of laws and regulations) or implicit (informal, hypothetical and based on moral justifications)" (Alrazi et al., 2015, p46). Therefore, legitimacy is both "temporally and culturally defined" (ibid, p45).

Thrandardottir's (2015) classification of NGO legitimacy defines four distinct ways that organisations conceptualize and operationalize legitimacy (Table 1). Firstly, the *market model* situates NGOs within a philanthro-capitalist marketplace. The role of the organisation is largely apolitical and functional and legitimacy is gained exogenously, through proving efficiency via donor-focused accountability tools. The *social change model* links legitimacy with democracy. NGOs are constitutive, semi-political entities in society, representing[4] a body of people or a particular belief and providing the "space for socialisation and civil politics" (ibid, p111). As such, legitimacy relies on normative reasoning and is found endogenously. Legitimacy in the *new institutional model* is also normative. However, rather than focusing on NGO autonomy and democracy, it considers NGOs as legitimate actors in global structures either as "rightful participants [or as] proxy publics[5] to institutions (legitimacy gap fillers)" (ibid, p113), exerting 'soft power' on the world stage to challenge the sovereignty of

[4] Competing views lead to questions about *whom* and *what* NGOs represent. How democratic and representative are their actions?
[5] Some suggest they are replacing civic participation.

state and non-state power (Bexell, 2014, Pattberg, 2005). In this model, legitimacy is conferred and is therefore exogenous in nature.

Table 1: NGO legitimacy characteristics/defining features of the models *(Thrandardottir, 2015, p116-117)*

	Market model	Social Change Model	New institutional model	Critical Model
Research	Weisbrod (1998) Frumkin (2002) Brown (2008)	Salamon and Anheier (1997), Kendall and Knapp (1996), Hilton et al (2010)	Powell and DiMaggio (1991), Reimann (2006), Macdonald (2008)	Edwards and Hulme (1996), Bebbington (2005), Lister (2003)
Theoretical Premises	Neoliberal/utilitarian	Social capital/change theories	Organisational theories/New institutional theories	Marxist/critical theories
Keywords	Demand and supply	Freedom of association	Norms	Empowerment
Vocabulary	Nonprofits, Voluntary orgz., Charities, Philanthropy	Civil society orgz. Associations	NGOs, (global) Civil society	NGOs, Southern NGOs, Northern NGOs
Level of Organisation	Domestic (international)	Domestic (cross-country)	International (country of registration)	International (host country)
Context	Market economies	Democracy (individuals, society)	Institutions (networks, systems)	Relationships of power
Analysis	Comparative advantage, complimentary functions to state	Constitutive democracy, internal factors, socialisation, 'bottom-up' analysis, social entrepreneurs	Organisational environment, promotion of norms in institutions, global governance, norm entrepreneurs	Power relations, donors and beneficiaries, aid chains
Legitimacy Criteria	Performance, Supply-demand, Accountability	Representativeness, Accountability, Global public opinion	Institutional processes, NGOs as legitimacy gap fillers in IGOs, Norms	Political legitimacy, Representation, Empowerment
Legitimacy Justifications	NGOs provide alternative or complimentary welfare services	NGOs are intrinsically good for democracy	NGOs are institutionally embedded in structures	NGOs are self-serving organisationally and enmeshed in donors' agendas
Legitimacy Claims	Claims are rooted in contractual credibility (financial, peers)	Claims are socially driven rather than market driven	Claims are norms driven and embedded in structures	Claims have a political dimension, need political analysis.
Regulation	Self-regulation	Self-regulation (or no regulation)	Derived or embedded regulation	Pro-regulation, Democratic regulation
Legitimate Role	Functional-Apolitical	Democratic-Semi-political	Complimentary – Semi-political	Political - Political

Finally, the *critical model* defines an NGO's role as political, and their legitimacy is understood through their ability "'to put effective limits on power' in world politics" (Collingwood, 2006, p1, in Thrandardottir, 2015); thus, representing and empowering those who are disadvantaged and excluded in decision-making processes. NGOs are conceived as an antidote to the neoliberal agenda. However, given the industry reliance on institutional funding, some suggest their "ability to act independently in pursuing their goals" may be limited (Edwards and Hulme, 1996, p962). As with the social change model, legitimacy is generated endogenously and based on normative reasoning.

2.3 The Influence of the Dual Principal-Agent Relationship on Legitimacy and Accountability

"One of the most basic differences between non-profit organizations and business is that a typical non-profit has so many more relationships (and hence classes of stakeholder) that are vitally important" (Drucker, 1990, p157)

INGOs function within a complex stakeholder web. Interested parties span continents, cultures and languages, have conflicting interests and objectives and view legitimacy and accountability divergently. As such, the question of how INGOs legitimate their work, and to whom, why and how they should be accountable, is problematic and a source of continual deliberation both internally and externally. (Diagram 1 offers an example of stakeholders typically involved in a INGO's activities.)

Diagram 1: INGO Stakeholder Relationships (James, 2012)



The exact nature of a INGOs sphere of influence, and their principal legitimators and stakeholders for accountability purposes, will vary dependent on the type of development mechanism involved. However, for the purposes of this paper, and in alignment with my chosen case study's modus operandi, I have chosen to concentrate on the principal-agent-beneficiary relationship associated with project aid[6]. Bilateral, multilateral, tied and military aid[7] all bring with them

[6] Financing of pre-planned projects.
[7] See Agarwal, 2016 for description of aid modalities.

nuanced stakeholder systems, politics, values and power dynamics, but it is beyond the scope of this paper to describe these adequately.

Aerni (2006) utilizes resource dependency literature to highlight the interdependency between NNGOs, their donors and their partners, and to suggest why downward accountability to aid recipients remains weak (see Ebrahim, 2003, and Appendix 3 for further discussion), through a description of principal-agent theory.

Principal-agent theory is based on the assumption that economic agents (stakeholders), “pursue, at least to some extent, their own private interests” (Laffont and Martimort, 2002, p2), and that the “rules and norms governing economic arrangements evolve to reduce the difficulties organizations face in obtaining and analyzing all the information relevant to their decision-making” (Copestake et al., 2016b, p158). Though the primary desire of donors and development workers may be to improve the lives of the poor, Aerni suggests that the industry also represents, “a market in which participants have strategic interests and respond to economic and political incentives” (Aerni, 2006, p28) in consideration of personal or institutional gain.

NNGOs are predominantly involved in a two-stage delegation process to fulfill their mission and objectives, which may “cause high transaction costs and unintended outcomes in development projects” (ibid, p27). Conceptualized within a project aid context, the first delegation occurs when a donor (the principal) employs an NNGO (the agent) because of their specialist knowledge

and social connections to carry out a piece of work (the project). The second delegation comes through the NNGO, now in the role of principal, employing a local partner, the new agent, to carry out project work on their behalf. This theory aligns with a market-based model of legitimacy, based on functional supply and demand, where the principal legitimates the agent's work as complimentary to their own objectives, and performance and formal accountability mechanisms are defined as legitimacy criteria.

A problem arises in this scenario, as in both principal-agent delegation cases, the principal will never fully be able to check the performance of the agent (Arrow, 1963), allowing the agent to alter their actions without sanction (moral hazard) and conceal exact project costs (adverse selection) (Laffont and Martimort, 2002). This leads to what is known as the Principal-Agent Problem (PAP).

The PAP between Donor and NNGO

The majority of large NNGOs are found in affluent nations, and in order for them to fulfill their mission they need to maximize their income. To do this, they must gain public legitimation by appealing to the donor population's sense of compassion and solidarity with those in need and portraying their work as a legitimate answer. They must also consider the wider, prevailing concerns of their donors, such as global warming or immigration, and either attempt to change these donor priorities to match their own, or align their own projects with them to gain maximum support. As such, the *demand* for aid, and its legitimation, is shown to come from donors who want to give to the poor, and

not from the poor themselves. The *supply* comes from the NNGOs through the creation of development projects that fit donor priorities. So then, Aerni argues, "the purpose of such a market is not primarily to eliminate hunger and poverty … but to address the concerns of the donors in affluent countries who want to be reassured that they did something against world hunger and poverty" (Aerni, 2006, p28). As such, there is pressure to 'construct' accounts of performance that legitimize an NNGO's work, and thus maximize the continued flow of income.

The PAP between NNGO and In-country Partner

NNGOs often delegate their project activities to in-country partners (SNGOs), as they possess superior contextual knowledge and skills, such as cultural awareness and native language. This delegation is usually accompanied by funding conditionalities and accountability requirements. In order for the SNGO to gain legitimacy as a credible compliment to the NNGO's work they must demonstrate their suitability and alignment with the NNGO's objectives. As such, SNGOs have been shown to employ strategic behaviour, "manipulating the perception of donors resulting in the creation of a paper reality" (Elbers and Arts, 2011, p713). This is achieved through 'adverse selection' - restricting the information given to the NNGO to that which sheds a positive light on their work. Given the resource dependency of the partner it is also likely that they will embrace, or at least profess to, the same worldview and poverty alleviation logic as the NNGO, rather than that of their local community. It may also lead to the adoption of performance measurement criteria that perpetuate a Western

conceptualization of wellbeing and development, rather than the acceptance and articulation of contextualized indicators of impact (Copestake, 2010) .

The Persistence of the PAP in NNGOs

Evidence suggests that the PAP "leads to wrong market signals, the misallocation of scarce resources and, ultimately, an unsustainable form of long-term poverty alleviation" (Aerni, 2006, p29). However, despite the considerable attention given to the PAP as a source of institutional inefficiency in private and public institutions over the last 30 years, little has been done to counteract the problem in the development industry (ibid, p32). Easterly (2002, 2007) and Mowles (2010a, 2010b) suggest NNGOs have managed to avoid taking action by focusing on internal change, through the appropriation of traditionally for-profit managerial and strategic models of organization; a method that may lead to exogenous legitimation by those with a market-orientated view of performance. With the recent, popular adoption of a rights-based approach to development and accountability [8] (Hughes et al., 2005, Murtaza, 2012), NNGOs may contest this view, pointing to their participatory, capacity-building work. However, Aerni would argue that the PAP remains strongly evident, even in participatory grassroots development, witnessed through the continued replication of Western concerns and ideologies in the capacity-building process and resultant community projects.

[8] All humans have fundamental human rights, such as education and nutrition. NGOs attempt to redress unjust distributions of power and discriminatory practices that impede the actualisation of these rights.

2.4 The Influence of Institutional Logic on Legitimacy and Accountability

The current conflict between NNGO's desire to promote bottom-up, beneficiary-led development through partnership with SNGOs, and their use of strategic, logical planning and hierarchical accountability models to elicit market-based, functional legitimacy can be traced back to a period of changing ideologies and practice in the aid industry that has taken place over the past forty years.

In the 1980's, development discourse within NNGO's converged around a shared vision and set of values that espoused bottom-up approaches, empowerment, participation and equality, based on the belief that "the root causes of poverty were attributed to unequal power relations" (Elbers et al., 2014, p1, see also Tvedt, 2002, p369, and Thrandardottir's Critical Model, 2015, p115). Development was understood as a "social and political transformation through empowerment at the individual, household and societal levels" (Elber et al, 2013, p1, see also Korten, 1990, Mitlin, 2007, Lewis and Kanji, 2009). SNGOs were deemed the key drivers of change through their use of democratic empowerment strategies; while NNGOs acted as catalysts, providing the funds and facilitating the SNGO's work through a relationship built on respect, equity and trust (Biekart, 1999, Fowler, 2000b, Fowler, 2000a, Lister, 1999, Johnson, 2006).

This began to change in the 1990's with an influx of business graduates joining the NNGO ranks, the rise of institutional donors providing larger multi-dimensional grants (Lewis, 2008, p46-48) with increased conditionality (Hood, 1991, p49, Osborne, 1993, Lewis, 2008), and the resultant scaling up of NNGO

operations and ambition. This phenomenon set in motion a period of 'development managerialism'; a move to the belief that predictable and linear change is possible through the adoption of "scientific principles, technical problem-solving and the application of rational tools for planning and measurement" (Elbers et al., 2014, p1, see also Lewis, 2008 p46). With the adoption of business modeling in the development sector, came a commitment to, and prioritization of, efficiency, transparency and effectiveness, operationalized through the increased utilization of logical framework analysis, independent financial monitoring and quantitative evaluation and strategic planning (Wallace, 2006, Roberts et al., 2005, Mawdsley et al., 2002).

Elbers et al uses a two-fold NNGO classification system (see Table 2 below), based on the notion of *institutional logic* - "sets of widely shared values, beliefs and practices" (2014, p2) to analyze NNGO's development ideology. The predominant logic during the 1980's saw development as a process of *social transformation*, a political exercise, focused on the equalizing of power through a local, autonomous civil society, and authentic partnership between principal and locally-rooted agent as a means and an end in itself. This view aligns most closely with the critical model of legitimacy, with NNGO's validity based on their ability to facilitate empowerment through grassroots enlightenment. Conversely, the 1990's logic was *managerial,* with change viewed as projectable and rational, civil society participation as a means to an end, partner relationships contractual, results quantifiable, and legitimacy and accountability hierarchical, market-based and formalized.

Table 2 – Comparison of Institutional Logic (Elbers et al., 2014, p4)

		Social Transformation	Managerial
Beliefs	**Development**	Development is a political process to change unequal power relations.	Development can be planned and measured.
		Development requires local ownership by marginalized groups	Development requires the 'right' set of management tools.
	Civil Society	Civil society needs to be autonomous to contribute to development.	Civil society is complementary to the state and donors in achieving development.
		Civil society's value is expressed in terms of its ability to act against vested interests.	Civil society's value is expressed in terms of value for money.
	Relationships	Relations with local organizations are both a means and an end.	Relations with local organizations are a means to an end.
		Value-based relations ensure local organizational autonomy.	Formalized relations prevent misuse of funds and ensure compliance with agreed-upon results.
Practices	**Roles**	NNGOs provide financial, institutional and moral support.	NNGOs ensure value for money.
		Local organizations take the lead in development work.	Local organizations implement contractually specified activities and comply with accountability requirements.
	Selection	Local organizations have to be locally rooted to qualify for a relationship.	Local organizations have to be strong and professional to qualify for funding.
	Governance	NNGOs refrain from interfering in development interventions and internal affairs.	NNGOs control how funds are spent and what accountability requirements are met.

Today, NNGOs are again embracing the belief that development is most appropriate, empowering and sustainable if planned, actioned and monitored by aid recipients themselves (Elbers et al., 2014, p7), resulting in a renewed commitment to community-based initiatives (Tearfund, 2015b, Tearfund, 2013a). However, research shows that despite an ideological return to their original social transformation-based mission and values, modern NNGOs retain many of their managerial practices; funding conditionalities and accountability mechanisms are becoming ever more sophisticated and onerous (Elbers et al.,

2014, p7-9); and legitimation continues to be sought through the demonstration of quantifiable results as a guide to success.

“The contradiction between both logics will increasingly challenge and even force NNGOs to make choices about their future direction” (Elbers et al., 2014, p11), as the inherent tensions that accompany the attempt to merge two conflicting logics intensify (ibid, p9-10). Faced with this growing organizational contradiction, NNGOs will need either to embrace the managerialist modus operandi, thus securing their institutional funding stream at the potential lose of authentic stakeholder relationships, or return to a civic-led, politicized vision of development, with partnership and organizational autonomy prioritized at the expense of security. This second option, though counter-cultural in Western society, offers the opportunity for organizational distinctiveness, freedom from the intensifying principal-agent conditionalities “and (added) value that goes beyond effectiveness and efficiency” (ibid, p11). However, in order to minimize it’s potential effect on income, NNGOs and their stakeholders will need to interrogate and realign their conception of legitimacy to embrace a broader and deeper view of the political and representative role of NNGOs both domestically and globally.

2.5 The Potential for Partnership

Hart and Paludan (2016) propound a similar argument to Elbers et al, pointing to the persistence of PAP as fundamentally rooted in the development industry’s continued use of an aid delivery mechanism that prioritizes outcomes

over process, despite the prevalent discourse of participation and empowerment. To counter this phenomenon, they propose the need for *authentic partnership* between NNGOs and their stakeholders – where, over and above the minimum partnership requirements of trust, equity, respect, accountability and mutuality, "partnership should also enhance the autonomy of partner institutions and not threaten the core values of each" (Hart and Paludan, 2016, p4). This would require a paradigm shift in mindset, with partnership in itself becoming the main goal of stakeholder relationship or NNGO intervention, rather than simply a tool for achieving a set of predefined tangible outcomes.

In order to consider the legitimacy of authentic partnership[9] as a development intervention in its own right, Hart and Paludan suggest it is necessary to reflect upon our understanding of social change and how it occurs, a sentiment in line with Elbers. However, rather than considering institutional logic, they draw on Reeler's (2007) tripartite typology of change – classifying a person or organization's change mentality as *projectable, emergent* or *transformational* (Table 3).

Reeler's typologies build on Elber's logic classification by not only discussing NNGO's[10] philosophies of change, but also in what situations each philosophy may be applicable. Elber's managerial logic fits comfortably within the *projectable* change typology, with its linear cause and effect and logical development tools. However, utilizing Snowden's Cynefin framework, Reeler suggests that the "simple" and "ordered" conditions required for projectable

[9] From this point on, the term partnership will be used to describe the authentic partnership as described by Hart and Paludan.
[10] Formed of their internal constituents.

change are “generally fleeting” (Snowden, 2010); a concern, given the prevalence of this mindset in NNGO’s current practices.

The social transformation logic appears most closely aligned with *emergent* change, an adaptive process of community-led development with an emphasis on learning, building on what is in-situ without ‘pre-cooked plans’. Reeler indicates this philosophy is applicable where a multi-dimensional, evolving process of change is required through partnership between organizations, communities and individuals.

Reeler’s vision of *transformational* change goes beyond that which is described in Elber’s social transformation logic to not only include autonomous civil society-led development based on mutual partnership and learning, but to explicitly require a period of unlearning, of stepping back and reassessment of individual and collective mindset. It is about freeing those involved in the change process from the previously trodden path, and is applicable where either a crisis or a sense of ‘stuckness’ has occurred. Transformational change is systemic and is concerned with changing norms and behaviours, at the social theory level of society[11] (see Figure 3 in Appendix 4, and Williamson, 2000).

[11] Informal institutions, customs, traditions, norms, religions.

Table 3 – Reeler's Typology of Change
(based on Hart and Paludan, 2016, p14-18, unless otherwise stated)

Typology	Description	Applicable Situation	Development Tool
Projectable	A "linear, cause and effect process, largely mapped out in advance".	Under conditions that are stable, in an "ordered system" where "the relationship between cause and effect…is predictable" (Snowden, 2010) "These conditions are rare and generally fleeting."	Log frame Theory of Change
Emergent	"Day to day unfolding of life, adaptive and uneven processes of unconscious and conscious learning from experience and the change that results from that". "Adjusting to shifting realities, of trying to improve and enhance what they know and do, of building on what is there, step-by-step" (Reeler, p9). Non-linear change. Process of learning.	Individuals, families, communities, organizations. Where a more nuanced, multi-dimensional response is required. Where partnership exists to communicate different vantage points.	Community-initiated projects. No "pre-cooked plan of action". (Cooke and Kothari, 2001).
Transformative	"About unlearning, freeing the social being from those relationships and identities, inner and outer, which underpin the crisis and hold back resolution and further healthy development" (Reeler, 2010, p11-12). "Stepping back from habitual ways of thinking, acting and relating to others".	"In response to a crisis or the experience of 'stuckness'".	Systemic change Changed norms and behaviours

Transforming the Principal-Agent Relationship

In order to pursue societal transformation to alleviate poverty and injustice, NNGOs must first realize that change 'out there' is inseparable from change within the organization and the individuals it is made up of (Hart and Paludan, 2016, p18). This process of transformative change requires a stepping back and self-interrogation of beliefs surrounding how change happens and the NNGO's role in that change. Unless this is done, organizations are likely to create a vision that "may amount to a kind of change strategy for fixing problems which they have not yet seen their part in creating" (Senge et al., 2005, p132). In order for this unlearning to occur, individuals within the NNGO and partner organizations must become aware of the blindspots or learning barriers that perpetuate what is know as downloading – "patterned ways of thinking and acting" (Hart and Paludan, 2016, p 19, also see 'Theory U' in Senge et al 2005, p87-92), which inhibit the ability to view situations afresh or consider fully the perspectives of others. These modes of downloading are commonly experienced as (ibid, p19):

1. Not recognizing what you see (decoupling perception and thought);
2. Not saying what you think (decoupling thinking and talking);
3. Not doing what you say (decoupling talking and 'walking');
4. Not seeing what you do (decoupling perception and action).

Authentic partnership, founded on open and empathetic communication, can be a catalyst for the questioning and realignment of downloaded mindsets, allowing all those involved to view a given situation from "the vantage point of

the whole" (ibid, p20) rather than from self; what Scharmer and Kaufer (2013, p16) describe as the, "journey from ego-system to eco-system awareness".

"The real challenge of development, therefore, is not to deliver goods and services from the rich to the poor through partnership – but to change the most fundamental way of relating to each other as human beings, and to our environment". (Taylor, 2002, p3)

This sentiment aligns with a view of poverty as a breakdown of relationship (Corbett and Fikkert, 2009), and sees the primary intervention required for mutually-beneficial development as a restoration of relationship with self, each other, the environment and, for some, spiritual consciousness. True partnership between stakeholders in development, therefore, legitimates a wider, more systemic perspective of cause and effect, placing "the current objects of concern – such as poverty, inequality, rights and governance etc. – within a global context: dissolving the self/other, giver/recipient, North/South oppositions that underpin the conventional paradigm of aid in the West" (Hart and Paludan, 2016, p25) and accepting the multi-directional power dynamics that constitute our current condition.

For partnership between NNGOs and their stakeholders to be effective in transforming both their own condition and that of wider society a commonality of purpose and values is necessary, allowing all parties to work towards the same goal. This cannot occur in hierarchical relationships, where power and decision-making remain concentrated within the NNGO, but must flow our of continual

dialogue and the “active embrace of differences” (ibid, p26); not merely respecting difference, but engaging with, and utilizing them towards the achievement of the common purpose.

Finally, integrity and honesty are key constituents to effective partnership. Both the NNGO and it partner organizations must be honest about the motivation for their involvement with each other: are they instrumental relationships, focused primarily upon function; or intrinsic, seeking authentic trust-based partnership. Both instances may arise and be legitimate in one organization, but it is important for both parties to be clear what the relationship expectations are, as “hollow” partnerships (Maxwell, 1998, p258), without genuine equity and solidarity may “hide fundamental power asymmetries” and “maintain the status quo” of the traditional Principal-Agent aid modality (Lister, 1999, p235).

2.6 Accounts of Performance: Whose Reality Counts

“With NGOs increasingly pressed to prove their legitimacy and value in the new international development ecosystem…their use of knowledge and evidence to buttress their role is a harder task by the day”.

(Mougeot, L, quoted in Hayman et al., 2016 , piii)

The previous sections have demonstrated how stakeholder power hierarchies, wellbeing and development ideologies, and organisational priorities influence how NNGOs perceive their role in positive global change. In order for a NNGO’s chosen typology of change or institutional logic to gain legitimacy within a community, organization or wider industry a convincing account of it’s

applicability or performance is, however, required. Stakeholders need to be persuaded of the rationality of the proposed philosophy and associated practical action to buy-in to the presented theory. For this reason, I turn briefly to consider the less often addressed issue of the *substance* of the legitimacy and accountability process and the "power dynamics inherent in [the] use of knowledge and evidence" in NNGOs (Hayman et al., 2016, p2).

When NNGOs consider a given development intervention, the project that is to be evaluated is not there on the table, it can only be understood through how it is represented by a given account (Garfinkel, 1967). The malleability of representation has led some to describe the 'multiple lives' of a project: "they acquire additional realities, beyond the locale where they are implemented, as *representations* in areas of accountability" (Hilhorst, 2003, p126). Therefore, beyond legitimation, performance documentation can be seen as a process by which differing actors negotiate to attribute meaning to an NGO and it's activities.

To illustrate, I turn to Hilhorst's analysis of how two different funding NGOs presented an evaluation of the same women's weaving project to their governing consortium. She found that "the way in which accounts regarding the project were constructed had little to do with what happened locally, or with the narratives of the participants involved in the village. What mattered more were the values and priorities of the NGOs and, in the end, discourse[12] and power at

[12] Discourses are "coherent sets of references that frame the way we understand and act upon the world around us. They are an ensemble of ideas, concepts and categories through which meaning is given to phenomena" (Hilhorst, 2003, p8, on Gasper and Apthorpe 1996, p2).

the accountability interface of the NGOs" (ibid, p142). The NGOs were attempting to legitimate their chosen conceptualization of project success through moulding quantitative and qualitative data to align with their chosen story.

Garfinkel suggests that accounts are created by a group, and those with dissident views are informally sanctioned through the hidden power of *discursive disciplining* and *group socializing* (Hilhorst, 2003 on Foucault 1995/1975 p200-209 and Garfinkel, 1967, p1) (For a more detailed discussion on power see Appendix 4). In order to belong to the group, individuals must understand the reasons behind a phenomenon in a collectively acceptable way, and use the prevailing explanatory discourse to describe it. The use of discursive power and group socializing can also be seen in impact assessment tools, shaping organizational relations, by controlling how information is presented and disseminated. The questions asked and analytical tools employed reflect a particular culture, belief system (institutional logic or change philosophy) and a judgment regarding what constitutes relevant knowledge, what project success looks like, who should be privy to the results and in what form.

Miller suggests that the way in which an account is framed "enhances certain ways of perceiving and assessing economic or organizational life" (Miller, 1994, p2-5), resulting in alignment between individual action and the perceived requirements of success embedded in the means of accounting. As such, how

an account is framed, and a project's apparent success, will be mitigated by the prevailing discourses within the NNGO; which will, in turn, be informed by the values and beliefs of those who carry out the impact assessment. Finally, discursive disciplining also affects how any information gleaned from the process is analyzed and understood by readers. The accountability process, therefore, cannot be independent, unbiased, technological or invisible; it is social in nature.

3. Research Design

3.1 Research Paradigm

The broad aims of this research paper were to investigate:

1. the complex ontological and epistemological positions that underpin how individuals and organizations define development and legitimate their role in its actualization;
2. the power dynamics within the aid industry that influence these development ideologies and, thus, how performance is understood and legitimated;
3. how power can be exerted through selective knowledge creation, legitimating specific development ideologies.

These research themes reject the practical positivist assumption that stakeholder relationships can be mapped precisely, power channels described in a linear fashion, and influences on personnel and policy defined neatly. What emerges from the literature is the 'messy' nature of accountability in NGOs (Acknoff, 1979), and the complex and interpretive ways in which it is understood, constructed and utilized.

With reference to aid interventions, the substance of a given project is, first, interpreted by the observer through their own situational lens; second, used by them to construct knowledge - an account of the substance - that is highly contingent on the audience and objectives of the knowledge-sharer, and, third,

interpreted by the reader through their own experiences and prior beliefs on the given subject. As such, a complexity ontology is adopted, accepting that no single person can be all knowing and that knowledge is constructed and interpreted through, “the cosmologies, values, cultural beliefs and webs of relationship that exist” within groups of people (Denzin et al., 2008, pxiv). A research methodology that places a premium on plurality of perspectives and partnership in the creation of knowledge, and views information as “a human tool designed by human beings to make sense of a reality both chaotic and orderly” (Dervin, 2003, p328), will, therefore, be sought.

This approach is founded on a number of assumptions which I adopt during my research (Dyll-Myklebust, 2014, p525):

- the validity of cultural as well as personal relativity;
- discourses of power will always frame attempts to formalise information;
- information is constructed and deconstructed in communication between humans (both individually and collectively);
- information is dynamic and continually re-formed, it is theoretically incomplete;
- individuals are capable of theorising, developing ideas that guide their understanding of their social and historical world, both personally and collectively.

Accepting these assumptions, NNGOs must consider the divergent ontological and epistemological positions on development and accountability of their constituent members and SNGO partners, as it is these same individuals who turn corporate aspiration, beliefs and values into practice and, thus, influence how accountability relations are shaped, and accounts of development constructed and legitimated.

The use of thematic analysis (Braun and Clarke, 2006), incorporating document review, semi-structured interviews, participant observation and personal reflection[13] within a case study setting, as an interpretive research practice was, therefore, appropriate for this study, as it enlarged my capacity to understand how others make sense of a particular situation or phenomenon through themes, story-telling and observation. “Sense-making explicitly enters the research situation in the “in-between spaces between order and chaos, structure and individual, self 1 and self 2” (Dervin, 2003, p332). As such, the utilization of both personal and more formalised research tools addressed the fluidity of ideas and how they were shaped within the pragmatic interaction between researcher and participant, locally grounded in the economies, circumstances and politics of the moment (Denzin and Lincoln, 2008).

3.2 Methodology and Methods

“Theory, if preconceived prior to engagement with the research area, and without the flexibility to be modified when tested and challenged in the field, often becomes irrelevant and ‘forced’ in its attempts to make sense of a

[13] Based on a 5-year period of employment with the organization.

phenomenon" (Dyll-Myklebust, 2014, p526, see also, Denzin and Lincoln, 2008, Tomaselli, 2005, Tomaselli et al., 2013). To address these concern, I chose to adopt a pragmatic mixed methods research methodology (Gelo et al., 2008, Tillman et al., 2011), attempting to use the most practical research methods available to induce theory rather than become subservient to theoretical positioning (Aguinaldo, 2012). This decision was also inspired by literature on the benefits of triangulation through combining seemingly incompatible social research tools to embrace complexity (Copestake, 2014a, Parker and Kozel, 2007, Gorard, 2004).

3.21 The Case Study

Wynsberghe and Khan (2007, p2) define a case study as a, "transparadigmatic and transdisciplinary heuristic that involves the careful delineation of the phenomena for which evidence is being collected". As such, given my desire to collect detailed interpretive data and cross-disciplinary and theoretical boundaries, a case study was chosen as the most effective research approach, given it's hands-on, in-depth and accessible nature.

Leaning on Wynsberghe and Khan's delineation between a 'unit of analysis' and 'a case', I investigated the *case* of Tearfund, a large Christian NNGO based in London, United Kingdom[14], to induce knowledge and theory that may be applicable to NNGOs (*unit of analysis*) in general. For a more detailed critique of case study methodology see James (2015).

[14] www.tearfund.org

My choice of Tearfund as a case study was purposive. While planning my dissertation I became involved in the planning phase of a hybrid impact measurement tool between Bath University and my former employer, Tearfund[15]. Given my previous academic interest in impact measurement and accountability within INGOs and my inside knowledge of Tearfund, I decided this was the ideal opportunity to use a 'real life' exercise to inform my dissertation and to academically interrogate themes that had arisen during my previous employment.

To satisfy my broader research aims within the chosen case study, I generated a number of case-specific questions to bring clarity and definition to my research. To do this, the decision was taken to limit my analysis to one specific development intervention within Tearfund - the Church and Community Mobilisation (CCM) programme, and to consider this intervention theoretically and practically in light of my key literature: principal-agent relationships (Aerni, 2006); institutional logic (Elbers et al., 2014); authentic partnership (Hart and Paludan, 2016, Reeler, 2007) and NNGO legitimacy (Thrandardottir, 2015, Hayman et al., 2016, Hilhorst, 2003). This led to the creation of two key research questions, which informed my thematic analysis:

1. To what extent does CCM align with the social transformation logic and the concept of authentic partnership, theoretically and practically.

[15] Tearfund approached Bath University to request the creation of a hybrid version of their QuIP evaluatory tool (see Appendix 5), incorporating Tearfund's holistic wellbeing methodology 'The Light Wheel' (see Appendix 6). As a former employee of Tearfund and current Bath student I volunteered to take part in the planning phase.

2. How are CCM accounts of performance influenced by institutional logic, and to what extent do they aid in the legitimation of a partnership mode of development.

3.22 Thematic Analysis

The use of thematic analysis was inspired by Braun and Clark's (2006) description of it's theoretical freedom, providing, "a flexible and useful research tool, which can potentially provide a rich and detailed, yet complex account of data" (ibid, p78). Some researchers have suggested that both qualitative research in general (Antaki et al., 2003), and thematic analysis in particular, lack uniformity and rigor in application, making it difficult to replicate (Attride-Stirling, 2001, Boyatzis, 1998). As such, though I was keen to work in an inductive manner, embracing the complexity in my data, I felt it prudent to apply a systematic analysis approach to allow my own methods to be held to account.

Braun and Clarke (2006) offer a six-phase process for analyzing data, summarized in Table 4. This allows data of different formats to be analyzed and themes identified, where, "a theme captures something important about the data in relation to the research question, and represents some level of patterned response or meaning" (ibid, p82). Given the inductive approach adopted, I intended to dig deeper than surface description of the data to search for latent themes and patterns, offering broader meaning and implication from the data (Patton, 1990, Boyatzis, 1998).

Table 4: Phases of Thematic Analysis (Braun and Clarke, 2006, p86)

Phase	Description of the Process
1. Familiarizing yourself with your data:	Transcribing data (if necessary), reading and re-reading the data, noting down initial ideas.
2. Generating initial codes	Coding interesting features of the data in a systematic fashion across the entire data set, collating data relevant to each code.
3. Searching for themes	Collating codes into potential themes, gathering all data relevant to each potential theme.
4. Reviewing themes	Checking if the themes work in relation to the coded extracts (Level 1) and the entire data set (Level 2), generating a thematic 'map' of the analysis.
5. Defining and naming themes	Ongoing analysis to refine the specifics of each theme, and the overall story the analysis tells, generating clear definitions and names for each theme.
6. Producing the report	The final opportunity for analysis. Selection of vivid, compelling extract examples, final analysis of selected extracts, relating back of the analysis to the research question and literature, producing a scholarly report of the analysis.

3.23 Data Collection

To create a rich and in-depth dataset, I analyzed a number of Tearfund corporate documents, including CCM evaluations, accountability documentation and training materials (see Appendix 9 for full list). Using Braun's six-phase process for the generation of themes highlighted above, I systematically read and re-read the documents, highlighting themes that emerged using NVivo 8 qualitative research software.

I conducted a semi-structured interview (Bryman, 2004, p323) with a senior member of international staff (P1) and a group interview with two members of

the impact and effectiveness team (P2 and P3); following up via email with additional questions to a senior impact and effectiveness team member (P4). These were audio-recorded, transcribed, and analyzed in the same way as the corporate documents. I utilised a semi-structured interview approach, as, though I had a fairly clear research focus, I wanted to allow for some flexibility of questioning and for new topics to emerge if applicable. I was also keen to elicit less formalized narrative data to realise the value of the multiple voices and ontologies of individuals as they perceive and make sense of their situation through story-telling (Dyll-Myklebust, 2014). This approach was viable, given my familiarity with Tearfund and some of the interviewees, allowing for a more relaxed conversational interview style.

I started the two separate interviews with identical questions to understand whether the interviewees, from different teams and of different seniority and length of tenure, answered in divergent ways. These were followed up with questions specific to the interviewees' role in the organisation. I chose to conduct the second interview in a group context to allow the participants to converse with each other, with the hope that richer and more detailed accounts would be provoked. Given my prior knowledge of the organisation, I was able to ask more targeted and detailed questions than would normally be possible. However, I was careful not to lead or influence responses by limiting my part in the discussion to clarification and follow-up questions where appropriate.

In addition to the interviews, I conducted participant observation during a two hour planning workshop attended by twelve[16] UK Tearfund staff, two Ugandan partner staff and a Bath University representative[17]. They met to discuss the purpose and design of a new impact tool intended to analyze holistic individual and community change as a result of Tearfund's CCM intervention. I had been involved in writing the tool, but chose to limit my involvement in the discussion so that I was able to sit back and observe proceedings carefully.

Participant research is defined as "the systematic description of events, behaviours, and artefacts in the social setting chosen for study" (Marshall and Rossman, 1989, p79) and allows the observer to "develop a holistic understanding of the phenomena under study" (Dewalt and Dewalt, 2002, p92). By observing the nature of the conversation – key themes, areas of contention or agreement – and any display of authority/submission by participants demonstrated verbally or physically, I was able to add validity and triangulation to the verbal information recorded during the meeting, adding an interesting additional perspective ot my data. As partner staff joined the meeting via Skype I was not able to assess their body language but attempted to pick up on the tone of their voice. A thematic analysis was then conducted on my observation notes.

[16] Head of Impact, Church Development Adviser, Myanmar Country Rep, Uganda Country Rep, US Church Fundraiser, Theology Development Manager, Technical Competence Manager, Senior Environment and Resilience Advisor, Monitoring and Evaluation Team Members x 4, Programme Officer for Innovation in PAG x 2 via Skype, Bath University QuIP Representative

[17] Participant observation was utilised, as it was not possible to interview participants individually, nor gain formal consent for involvement from those who took part.

3.3 Personal Reflexivity

"The problem of bias in qualitative research particularly is still debated in methodology texts and there is a lack of agreement on how much researcher influence is acceptable, whether or not it needs to be "controlled", and how it might be accounted for" (Braun and Clarke, 2006, p82).

In choosing to use a case study that I had been previously employed by I was well aware of the need to address the potential "interpretive crisis" (Denzin, 1994, p501) that close researcher/research site proximity could result in. I chose, however, to embrace my personal reflection as part of the research, and to be open and honest about it.

My in-depth knowledge of, and pre-existing relationships in, Tearfund were beneficial to the research process, affording me access to people and documents that may otherwise not have been shared. I was also able to delve deeper and ask more targeted questions. My five year employment in three different departments gave me a well-rounded view of how the organisation performs and access to Tearfund's discursive space, with a personal understanding of the terminology, values and norms within the organisation that would take considerable time for an outside researcher to develop. Given my interpretive research approach, I did not, however, assume that I knew the answers to my questions prior to data collection; I accepted that knowledge is contextual and individually constructed and experienced. As such, I chose to ask questions that I felt I might already have the answers to, to gauge whether my experiences or 'knowledge' was shared or contested.

My Christian faith is also relevant and requires disclosure. Tearfund is an evangelical Christian organisation that takes seriously its religious foundations and transcendent accountability. My own religious beliefs and biblical knowledge may have been beneficial in critically evaluating the data. However, I acknowledge that my personal alignment with Tearfund's transcendent worldview could cause interpretation bias or reduce my willingness to confront contentious issues that were unearthed. However, based on my experiences of Tearfund's desire to learn, improve and be accountable, I felt able to critically assess organisational behaviour that did not appear to align with their stated values without career-limiting fear; aware of the importance of remaining separate and research-focused to allow the formation of an academically rigorous dissertation.

Given my complexity ontology and acceptance of plurality of views, I felt it was appropriate to treat myself as another research participant. As such, in the discussion section, I have added my own personal experiences where appropriate. I also recognise that my critique and theory-building is interpretive and, as such, must be considered only as a personal representation of the data, analysed through my lens as former employee.

3.4 Ethics Section

Full ethical consent was obtained from the University of Bath prior to research commencement (Appendix 7). A number of specific issues were considered: deception, consent, confidentiality and accuracy.

Deception – My research was built around the planning phase of a new QuIP evaluatory tool designed by Bath University for Tearfund. My voluntary assistance in the design phase afforded me access to Tearfund and an interesting method of analysis to understand Tearfund's CCM legitimation and accountability processes in action. Given my previous employment with Tearfund and the real substance of my work on the QuIP, I disclosed my full research intention from the first contact I had with Tearfund. They were made aware that my involvement was unremunerated and that I would be conducting interviews and participant observation to inform my dissertation during the planning phase. I explained the wider context of my research to my Tearfund contact during our first meeting, and the nature of my involvement was also highlighted in the QuIP contract paperwork.

Consent and Confidentiality - The main research participants were Tearfund staff members, and interviews and meetings were arranged via my main Tearfund contact or direct, if the participant was well known to me. All interviewees were given a consent form (Appendix 8) prior to interview commencement. This briefly described the nature of the research and allowed participants to choose whether their quotes were anonymised. It was also made clear to them that they could withdraw at any stage prior to assessment and

that a interview transcript was available on request, in line with British Sociological Association recommended practice (BSA, 2002, p3). One participant opted to be anonymized, while the other two were happy to be named. However, I decided that as the data would require partial anonymization, and to increase my willingness to confront contentious issues, all participants would be anonymized, with quotes labeled P1-P4 in the discussion.

My participant observation intentions and motivations were made clear to the Tearfund meeting organizer and to the Bath representative several weeks before the meeting and I asked that the meeting organizer inform participants of my intentions prior to their involvement. The participant observation did not include the recording of any names and only general observations were made. As such, permission was not required. However, I attempted to construct my findings in a way that did not reveal the identity of those present.

All corporate documentation analyzed was shared freely and was non-confidential in nature.

Accuracy - Interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed into written records. The recordings were destroyed following the transcription process. No names were included in the transcription. Anonymised notes were taken during the participant observation and subsequently written up. Full Harvard referencing was used throughout the dissertation and a glossary of abbreviations inserted at the beginning of the paper. A copy of my final

dissertation will be given to Tearfund for wider dissemination following University assessment and I will be happy to discuss the findings with any Tearfund staff members on request.

4. Findings and Discussion

4.1 Introduction

Section two examined current theories, paradoxes and dilemmas within academic literature pertaining to how NGOs conceptualize legitimacy and accountability in their work. Firstly, Thrandardottir's (2015) models of legitimacy (2.2), demonstrated that NGOs conceptualize and operationalize legitimacy in divergent ways, dependent on how they view their role in society; from the neo-liberal, functional and apolitical role described in the *market model* to the political power-confronting personification found in the *critical model*. Secondly, Aerni (2006) elucidated the influence that power asymmetries between stakeholders, often as a result of resource dependency, can have on the type of development work that is prioritized and the way in which performance is accounted for: the *principal-agent-problem* (PAP) (2.3).

This was followed by a detailed delve into Elber et al's (2014) work on *institutional logics* (2.4); a theory that classifies NGO development ideology, and it's resultant modes of engagement, legitimacy and accountability, based on, "sets of widely shared values, beliefs and practices" (2014, p2) within organizations. NGOs classified as possessing *managerial* logic see change as projectable and rational, civil society participation as a means to an end, and partner relationships contractual. They believe results can be quantified, and their legitimacy and accountability relationships are hierarchical, market-based and formalized. Conversely, NGOs can envisage development as a process of

social transformation, a political exercise, focused on the equalizing of power through a local, autonomous civil society, and authentic partnership between principal and locally-rooted agent as a means and an end in itself.

Section 2.5 went on to consider the potential for *authentic partnership* as a legitimate development goal in itself (Hart and Paludan, 2016); a relationship of trust, equity, respect, accountability and mutuality that enhanced partner institution autonomy, upholding the core values of each. Leaning on Reeler's typology of change (2007), Hart and Paludan (2016, p18) suggested that *transformational* change is required within NNGOs to catalyze partnership; a process of stepping back and self-interrogation surrounding how change happens, and a realization that change 'out there' is inseparable from change within the organization and the individuals it is made up of. This requires organizations to acknowledge their blindspots, downloaded "patterned ways of thinking and acting" (ibid) that must be brought into the light and confronted.

Finally, Section 2.6 considered the substance of legitimacy and accountability, NNGO *accounts of performance*, and how power manifests in the use of knowledge and evidence to support accounts of development intervention that fit an organization's institutional logic and chosen model of legitimacy (Hayman et al., 2016, p2).

Utilizing this literary foundation to choreograph my research, I performed a thematic analysis of the case study, Tearfund, incorporating document review,

key informant interviews, participant observation and personal reflection. The key questions I sought to answer were:

1. To what extent does CCM align with the social transformation logic and the concept of authentic partnership, theoretically and practically.
2. How are CCM accounts of performance influenced by institutional logic, and to what extent do they aid in the legitimation of a partnership model of development.

To fulfill this brief, the discussion section hereafter is arranged as follows: Section 4.2 provides a brief introduction to my case study; Section 4.3 and 4.4 concern themselves with how institutional logic and authentic partnership are manifest in CCM; followed, finally, in Section 4.5, by a look at how Tearfund's institutional logic is demonstrated in current CCM impact assessment material and the extent to which it is aiding in the legitimation of a partnership model of development.

4.2 The Case Study

4.21 Introduction to Tearfund

Tearfund is a UK faith-based NGO, founded in the 1960's as a result of the Biafra and Vietnamese refugee crisis. Today, Tearfund's income is over £70m per annum (Tearfund, 2016a, p22) and it employs 1,171 staff working in 50 countries (Tearfund, n.d-a). The organization's principal mission is the eradication of poverty, and their core activities are: disaster response,

community development, church mobilization [18] and advocacy. (Tearfund, 2015a, p4)

From incorporation in 1968 to the present day, Tearfund has followed a similar pattern of institutional logic as many NNGOs. Starting life as a humanitarian organization they viewed themselves as complimentary to the State, fulfilling the Christian mandate to care for the whole person by providing top-down charity to starving refugees in crisis. At this time, there was limited consideration to the politically complex foundations of the situation (Sullivan, 2014), and accountability was provided through basic quantitative results. In the 1980-90s, new leadership, schooled in business managerialist techniques, transformed Tearfund into a more systematic organization (Woolnough, 2011). While retaining their humanitarian imperative, Tearfund enlarged their scope to include partner-led, community development work, through a principal-agent modalities, in Africa, Asia, Latin America and Europe (Tearfund, 2013b). They also adopted progressively rigorous quantitative systems of accountability, in line with the general industry trend toward professionalism and managerial development logic.

Over the past fifteen years, Tearfund has embraced an increasingly holistic approach to development, incorporating both political advocacy and the role of local churches worldwide as core development mechanisms. This has seen an emphasis on social transformation, and a growing interest in partnership, empowerment and transcendent values as foundational in development.

[18] Envisioning churches to follow 'integral mission' - caring for the whole person, materially, physically, emotionally, socially, economically and spiritually.

However, despite the organization's move toward a more politically-motivated, social transformation institutional logic, the established belief in the requirement for managerial professionalism and formalized accountability within the organization remains, fuelled by an increasing reliance on external funding with its' inherent conditionalities. This hybridization of institutional logic could be beneficial, particularly if it is an intentional state of being; allowing the most positive attributes of each logic to be held in tension, thus mitigating against potentially extreme views and behavior on either side. On the other hand, there is potential for ideological and practical incompatibility (Elbers et al., 2014, p9), resulting in confusion and disharmony among NGO staff who may be, either intentionally or unintentionally, working toward divergent objectives.

4.22 Church and Community Mobilisation

The dynamic interaction between theological resources, religious spaces and their context can promote social mobilisation by facilitating, "room for manoeuvre, negotiation or engagement", offering "moral authority, social protection or political influence, while remaining relatively insulated from political interference or control – even in undemocratic contexts" (Devine et al., 2015, p24). CCM follows this logic through its use of the local church in mobilising communities.

CCM first seeks to awaken church leaders, and subsequently parishioners, to their God-given mandate for integral mission[18] through bible studies, discussion tools and activities.

"Previously, our Church had seen development as something that diverted people away from faith. In fact it was the physical and other problems of people, the pain and difficulty in their lives, that were affecting the spiritual lives of our people. We realized we had to work with the whole person." (CCM Co-ordinator, Uganda, Lubett, 2013)

This envisioning and equipping process encourages the church, "to act as a facilitator in mobilising the whole community" to identify and respond to their own needs (Tearfund, n.d-b), through a wide collection of tools (religious and non, dependent on context) developed by Tearfund international staff. These tools facilitate community members in working together to understand their own context, capabilities and agency.

4.23 Tearfund's Conceptualization of Accountability

Tearfund is an organization where individual and corporate responsibility and accountability is deemed fundamental in all areas of their work. Corporate documentation, interviews and personal observation form a picture of an NNGO which strives for professionalism, integrity and transparency, respects the requirements of all stakeholders, seeks to be inclusive "irrespective of race, religion, nationality or gender" (Tearfund, n.d-f), and sees beneficiary accountability[19] as "an organizational priority" (Bainbridge et al., 2008, p4), with aid recipients as Tearfund's "main clients" and "primary focus" (ibid, p3). This is coupled with a belief in the agency and capability of individuals, churches and communities, the centrality of restored relationships in alleviating poverty and

[19] It is noted that discourse in itself can be a site of hidden and invisible power (see Appendix 4). In particular, the use of the terms *beneficiary* and *development* in NNGOs suggest a Westernized, them-us, top-down way of thinking.

inequality (Corbett and Fikkert, 2009), and a holistic conceptualization of wellbeing (Tearfund, n.d-e, Tearfund, 2016b, Tearfund, n.d-a).

These complex and potentially conflicting organizational values, priorities and methodological tools, seek to combine "professional excellence" with "spiritual passion" (Tearfund, n.d-a) borne out of the Christian biblical mandate to 'love your neighbour as yourself' (Mark 12 v31, The Bible, 2011), "akin with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which articulates, through international treaties, that all people have duties and responsibilities to respect, protect and promote the rights and entitlements of others" (Bainbridge et al., 2008, p6).

Tearfund's conceptualisation of accountability is both directional and moral. A strong commitment to managerial logic is evidence in the use of formalised directional accountability tools in much of their programming, such as the International Project Management System (IPMS) which monitors alignment of partner organisations against fixed reporting requirements. Tearfund has a Supporters Charter detailing organsational accountability to their individual donors, and they also emphasis internal accountability to staff through a staff council, 360° appraisal[20] and considerable involvement in strategic discussions:

> *"When there is a document going around or a new project being discussed…., it goes very wide and it is normal for people to make comments on it. It seems to be a very strong characteristic that you open things up as much as is possible for people who want to feed into it." (P3)*

[20] Employees appraise their managers and vice versa.

Tearfund uses moral accountability to galvanise, otherwise autonomous, stakeholders' support, founded on religious mandate. Durkheim's view of moral accountability links organizational efficiency with individual's surrendering "to shared norms and values" (Hilhorst, 2003, p127), which are instilled through sanctioning of behaviour. In Tearfund's case this sanctioning occurs to restrict access to membership, as partner organisations and employees are required to profess a Christian faith to join[21]. The majority of individual supporters are also Christians, as Tearfund communicates clearly that, though beneficiaries are given equal consideration irrespective of faith, spiritual passion is central to it's mission. This message is likely to be unappealing to those without faith. However, given that Tearfund is careful not to link evangelism with aid, Tearfund's institutional donors remain largely secular and are untroubled by the NNGO's spiritual emphasis.

Moral acountability can be seen through the use of biblical texts as common discourse to encourage involvement and alignment with Tearfund's core values (Tearfund, n.d-e). References to these pervade internal and external documentation and are disseminated widely, internally and externally.

> *"We encourage a constant, kind of drip feeding of the values, … through staff prayers, … through team prayers, through engagement in the way that we communicate about them. We encourage staff to be embracing them and thinking about how they apply to their work." (P1)*

[21] They must agree to a common understanding of Christianity, a 'Statement of Faith'.

Figure 1 – Supporter Communication July 2016, Tearfund[22]



This moral accountability, through common discourse and shared transcendent values, creates a sense of trust and shared purpose between stakeholders (Power, 1994), encouraging supporters to give, employees and partners to work hard, and beneficiaries to connect any support they receive with spiritual, as well as physical, provision.

Beneficiary accountability is a formal requirement in Tearfund's humanitarian work (Bainbridge et al., 2008) and where partners receive over £100,000 per annum (P1). However, given the size of these interventions, funds have often been received from institutional donors resulting in limited scope for beneficiary involvement in project planning, implementation or evaluation. Though some participation is possible: *"what kind of soap they want…help choosing the cows"* (P1), accountability is, *"boxed. …Institutional donors have a specific thing that they want you to do in a specific area because they've conducted a needs*

[22] Supporter letter received by researcher in July 2016

assessment" (P1), and funds are conditional on responding to their identified need. As such, despite a commitment to beneficiary participation and partnership in both corporate documentation and verbally, the majority of Tearfund's partner and humanitarian programming continues to favour a managerial logic to development[23]. This logic believes "development can be planned and measured" through contractually-specified partner activities, complying with formalized accountability requirements. NNGOs control "how funds are spent" (Elbers et al., 2014, p4) and there is little beneficiary involvement in strategic planning:

> *"I'm not aware that there were any beneficiaries actually in the strategy development process." (P1)*

And limited impact measurement designed specifically for beneficiary dissemination:

> *"I'll be honest, I don't know how much has been looked at in terms of what our beneficiaries are looking for, I don't know how much that's been a voice within, and I think that would be quite a good area to think about" (P1).*

However, employee perception is that CCM is:

> *"A lot more, sitting down and asking people what they want and them coming up with it, so in that respect it's a lot more beneficiary-designed". (P1).*

[23] Partner grants, contractual services and humanitarian aid accounts for approximately 73% of expenditure (Tearfund, 2015a).

This mode of development is more closely aligned with a social transformation logic and partnership model. The appropriateness of this employee perception will be investigated and discussed in the following two sections.

4.3 CCM as Social Transformation

This section will consider the extent to which CCM aligns with the social transformation logic as described by Elber et al (2014). Table 2 has been repeated below as a reminder of the key characteristics of both the managerial and social transformation logic.

Table 2 (repeated) – Comparison of Institutional Logic (Elbers et al., 2014, p4)

		Social Transformation	Managerial
Beliefs	**Development**	Development is a political process to change unequal power relations.	Development can be planned and measured.
		Development requires local ownership by marginalized groups	Development requires the 'right' set of management tools.
	Civil Society	Civil society needs to be autonomous to contribute to development.	Civil society is complementary to the state and donors in achieving development.
		Civil society's value is expressed in terms of its ability to act against vested interests.	Civil society's value is expressed in terms of value for money.
	Relationships	Relations with local organizations are both a means and an end.	Relations with local organizations are a means to an end.
		Value-based relations ensure local organizational autonomy.	Formalized relations prevent misuse of funds and ensure compliance with agreed-upon results.
Practices	**Roles**	NNGOs provide financial, institutional and moral support.	NNGOs ensure value for money.
		Local organizations take the lead in development work.	Local organizations implement contractually specified activities and comply with accountability requirements.
	Selection	Local organizations have to be locally rooted to qualify for a relationship.	Local organizations have to be strong and professional to qualify for funding.
	Governance	NNGOs refrain from interfering in development interventions and internal affairs.	NNGOs control how funds are spent and what accountability requirements are met.

4.31 CCM as a Political Process

NNGO's who display a social transformation logic view development as, "a political process to change unequal power relations" requiring "local ownership by marginalised groups" (Elbers et al., 2014, p4). This is a belief reflected in the pervasive emphasis on enlightenment, empowerment and local ownership found within the CCM training documentation and tools (Njoroge et al., 2009, Tearfund, 2015b).

Power manifests in forms that are both dynamic and inter-relational (Lukes, 2005). "Dominate actors may argue there is space for people to participate but ensure the decisions made are for their own interests (*visible power*) through shaping the way in which people can participate (*hidden power*). This in turn makes the powerless feel the norm is for them to be not included, and accept that as the status quo (*invisible power*)" (Flowers, 2015, p7). CCM seeks to counter visible and hidden power through the use of 'problem-posing' (Freire, 1973). "You are told that your identity is of someone who is poor and there is no opportunity, instead [we ask] what do you have, what can you do…" (Uswege, 2015 in Flowers, 2015, p19).

The use of context-specific activities, such as biblical parables, storytelling and drama, creates, "an enabling environment – where people can look at their own situation and make their own decisions as to what can and should be done to improve individual … and community life" (Scott et al., 2014, p2). This is political in that it acts to break down traditional power dynamics within church and community:

"One of the big challenges in the churches is that we struggle with churches that have a strong leadership, where the pastor doesn't want to hand over control. So one of the strong things about the bible studies is that they are very participative, where people read the same text together, or someone reads it out to them, and everyone can speak. Its not just the man at the top who knows all the answers, and that is majorly transformational". (P3)

CCM also attempts to counter invisible power by bringing together community members to consider different vantage points and challenge oppressive cultural norms and behavior, such as sexism or the exclusion of disabled individuals. In this way, the local church can be seen as a political space for exploring "alternative expressions of power and for individuals and groups to challenge social and cultural boundaries for change" (Flowers, 2015, p28). However, though CCM is intended as a democratic endeavour, it's open nature leads to questions surrounding its efficacy in combatting invisible power within communities. The most influential or confident, or those already involved in the church may be more likely to become involved and, thus, reap the rewards, while the already oppressed or excluded remain marginalised:

"So my fear is that, because it is open for anyone to turn up, so the people who self-select are the ones who are already slightly more confident. ….. For me, that's the question we need to be asking - what about the people on the outskirts, the periphery, the people who are disabled?" (P2)

4.32 Emergent Change through an Autonomous Civil Society

There is no direct top-down Tearfund funding involved in CCM. Instead, communities are encouraged to realize and utilize the resources they already have, or to lobby their local government or NGOs for funding once a decision has been made on what the community requires. As such, the development process cannot be "planned and measured" by Tearfund and does not "require the 'right' set of management tools" for success (Elbers et al., 2014, p4). Rather, it aligns with Reeler's (2007) vision of emergent change: an adaptive process of community-led development with an emphasis on learning, building on what is in-situ without 'pre-cooked plans'. Reeler indicates this philosophy is applicable where a multi-dimensional, evolving process of change is required through partnership between organizations, communities and individuals. This fits Tearfund's view of CCM as "a process not focused on any one change, but on enabling people to decide what changes they want to make" (Scott et al., 2014, p6).

CCM also identifies with social transformation logic in its belief that "civil society needs to be autonomous to contribute to development" (Elbers et al., 2014, p4), and that development should be organic, grassroots-led and not externally-imposed. This view recognizes the need to counter *power over,* through a removal of hierarchical dependency structures, and sees civil society's value expressed in it's constituents - their agency and capabilities (*power to*), relationships and social capital (*power with*), and innate worth, confidence and identity (*power within*) (Gaventa, 2006), rather than through value for money.

4.33 CCM as a Discursive Space for Capability Expansion and Conscientisation

CCM's use of story-telling, games and activities as a discursive space[24] to facilitate community self-diagnosis aligns with a view of development 'as capability [25] expansion' (Sen, 1989), and the realization of 'social competences'[26] (Stewart, 2013). In this vein, CCM appears similar to MaxNeef's concept of Human Scale Development (HSD) (1991) where empowerment comes through a process of reflection and awareness-raising of both the individual and community's fundamental needs, and a democratic contemplation of how those needs can be satisfied through grassroots action. It also aligns with Friere's approach of conscientisation (Freire, 2001), where, "through critical reflection, people understand their social reality and no longer accept oppression as the norm, which leads to action" (Flowers, 2015, p9). This transforms power inequalities through individual enlightenment of the context-specific power dynamics affecting their life. In CCM communities, this process has been *"a real paradigm shift for people"* (P2); a transformational change (Reeler, 2007) encouraging first the church and then the community to step back and view their condition, their 'stuckness' and realize they have agency and capabilities to confront, challenge and change.

> *" I met one lady … she was really excited to tell me that she had been to the district office to demand change and all these things she had done, and she said she would never have gone, even to just a church meeting*

[24] "A dynamic model of social space where what is said or thought is regulated by the relations of power, space and knowledge" (Stanic and Pandzic, 2012).
[25] "A person's ability to do valuable acts or reach valuable states of being" (Sen 1993, p 30).
[26] "What institutions can be or do" (Deneulin and Zampini Davies, 2016, p2).

before, because she said 'I am illiterate, I have nothing to say'. Now she understands that she does have opinions and she is allowed to voice them." (P2 – speaking about a Ugandan participant)

"…that seems to be one of the key drivers for change, when people stop thinking of themselves as victims, as impotent, and realize their value. That's an amazing empowerment for an individual, and, from that position of empowerment, they then recognize that they've got to go and serve the community" (P3)

4.34 CCM as a Dis/Empowerment Paradox

Tearfund attempts to step away from formalized, hierarchical managerial logic by acting as moral supporter and facilitator in CCM, rather than funder and controller; encouraging communities to realize their capabilities and claim their rights to development independently. This is a role akin to Smith's (1996, p17) depiction of religious organizations as 'movement midwifes', helping to spawn movements, "without themselves becoming directly identified" with their offspring, and is achieved through purposive disempowerment. This is in contrast to how power and accountability is documented in Tearfund's humanitarian work, as 'zero-sum' - something to be given and received (Figure 2)[27], a view that may not fully appreciate how people can act within their relationships to enact their own agency (Chambers, 2006).

[27] It is noted that in unstable emergency humanitarian situations beneficiaries may have little opportunity to have immediate agency over their lives. As such, the power differentiation is greater, leading to exigency to find ways to reestablish power in the hands of beneficiaries. This may explain the idea behind Figure 2.

Figure 2: Tearfund Disaster Management Team Good Practice Guidelines – Beneficiary Accountability (Bainbridge et al., 2008, p5)

Accountability is about giving POWER back to beneficiaries.

Though some level of control is unavoidable through the CCM design and training phase, for Tearfund to become voluntarily disempowered, CCM material is free to use and adapt:

> *"We really don't try to keep our fingers and grip on it. We try and make sure the quality is there so that the training is good, and that is why we invest in that and train up the expert trainers and facilitators and try to improve how that is done. But once it is out there, we allow the adaptation. Well we can't stop it really, we don't try to." (P3)*

And, as Tearfund does not routinely fund CCM communities, the hierarchical power dynamics and conditionalities often found between principal, agent and beneficiary are reduced.

However, some view the lack of funding negatively, and changing mindsets among communities who have grown used to charity may be challenging:

> *"I sat down once with one of the ladies who had been through the training. Her husband was really cross because he knew she was working for this organization called Tearfund, who were one of the richest NGOs in the world and she was getting nothing from it. But she bought into it; she got nothing materially out of it. She's doing brilliantly now in what she's done to transform her community and her family." (P3)*

> *"I got a lot of feedback that we need to sensitize more people, we need to get more people involved and they were struggling to do that, and they gave the reason that people don't understand why they don't get handouts, so there is that tension." (P2)*

The decision not to fund CCM communities could also be seen as a perpetuation of historic power hierarchies and value judgments. It is argued that:

> *"It makes it more sustainable if they're not paid…it gives more empowerment. They're not doing it for money, they're doing it because they are inspired and they care, and so they will do it better." (P3)*

However, making a distinction between what should and should not be paid for is complicated.

> *"People shouldn't be paid to do church work because that is what you should be doing as part of your faith." (P2)*

But is the work communities are doing in Uganda, for example, different to that of a Tearfund Head Office employee inspired to service by their Christian faith? Why should a Western consultant or employee be paid to conduct a CCM evaluation while the local information-gatherers receive no remuneration? It was stated that, *"we are not asking them to do Tearfund's work" (P3),* and, in many cases this may be true: where, for example, communities engage in their own development projects. However, where participants are asked to work alongside paid employees to collect Tearfund-requested data, for example, should a comparable remuneration not be paid? Otherwise, this act risks perpetuating a distorted sense of worth and hierarchy, where Northern time and expertise is valued above that of Southern partners and beneficiaries.

In some cases, a small amount of community funding is available for technical support. However, this is limited:

"I think, perhaps, at the moment, that's not being done quite enough, and CCM stops. They get so far, and then there is a need for other inputs." (P2)

And tiny in comparison to the funding given to partner projects, demonstrating a limited commitment to an authentic partnership model of development, whereby Tearfund retains financial control and will only fund projects that it feels compile with it's core strategy, developed with limited beneficiary input.

There is also an argument that, in some cases, external involvement is beneficial:

"They realized they needed water; they dug all these shallow wells..." (P2)

"….and didn't find any water." (P3)

"They needed proper bore holes because it was so deep, so technical advice was needed". (P2)

"I think it's about information. If they don't realize that trees being cut down causes flooding, then they won't realize that that is an issue they can address…. So that's where sometimes the technical information is needed as well as the envisioning". (P2)

4.35 Concluding Remarks

This section has demonstrated how the CCM intervention aligns with a social transformation logic both ideologically and practically. It is a political process of empowerment and relationship expansion, owned by local communities with Tearfund as facilitator, purposively disempowering itself. In CCM, value is understood both as individual agency and capability, and through the realization of social competences within the community. However, there are two characteristics of Elber's social transformation logic that are not clearly evident in CCM and require further examination. Firstly, the NNGO-SNGO-beneficiary relationship should be "both a means and an end" (Elbers et al., 2014, p9), a description that suggests an authentic partnership, where mutual value is gained through relationship, and tangible outcomes are not defined as the main goal of an intervention. Secondly, though CCM communities have autonomy over how they choose to develop, Tearfund still maintains a level of managerial logic in it's attempt to formally measure outcomes and devise a CCM theory of change, suggesting a rational view of cause and effect. These contradictions will be discussed in the following two sections.

4.4 CCM as Authentic Partnership

Hart and Paludan (2016, p4) describe authentic partnership as a mutually beneficial relationship between NNGO and SNGO, evincing, "qualities that include mutuality, respect, accountability, equity and trust", enhancing each institution's autonomy, while not threatening their respective core values.

In the case of CCM, the SNGO manifests as either a partner organization (often the head office of a church denomination) or a direct CCM community. Given the transcendent values that underpin Tearfund's relationship with it's partners, supporters and donors (often churches themselves), there is potential, therefore, to add a wider remit of stakeholders to an authentic CCM partnership - from donor to beneficiary - allowing all to be challenged and changed by their involvement.

4.41 CCM as Transformational Change?

Authentic partnership should offer a discursive space for transformational change (Reeler, 2007) - of mutual learning and unlearning; of stepping back and embracing a wider, more systemic perspective of cause and effect and the multi-directional power dynamics that constitute a given condition. As such, change within a CCM community is inseparable from change within Tearfund - it's staff, supporters and donors - and requires self-interrogation and frank, collective contemplation throughout the partnership chain on how stakeholders believe change happens and their perceived role in that change. This may then result in changed norms and behaviours, at the social theory level of society (Williamson, 2000, p597).

Transformational change is evident in CCM 'in-situ', through it's emphasis on building an honest, open and inclusive relationship between the church and community, and challenging existing power dynamics, both visible, hidden and invisible through community self-interrogation. Building mutual accountability between church and community and among individual community members is

also central to the CCM process and infused through the facilitation guide (Njoroge et al., 2009):

> *"Let your light shine before men. In what ways do you or your church act as light in your community?" (p 50)*

> *Who in the community are our neighbours? What needs do they have? How does Jesus tell us to love our neighbours? (p61)*

However, at the wider stakeholder relationship level, Tearfund's purposive disempowerment – maintained distance and a lack of involvement or funding of CCM projects – could act to perpetuate the them/us power hierarchies of traditional aid regimes and reduce the potential for transformational change at the organization and donor level.

Flint et al (2014, p273) visualizes authentic partnership through the adoption of 'beneficiary-led aid', "a development paradigm shaped and determined by the people affected directly by aid and assistance programs", and where beneficiaries are, "trusted by donors and agencies to make decisions, rather than simply to offer input" (ibid, p274). Tearfund has recently consolidated its programming to promote efficiency and concentrate on core competences. Funding diffuse, beneficiary-designed CCM projects could be seen, therefore, as strategically oppositional. However, given that empowerment and restored equitable relationships feature highly in Tearfund's values (Tearfund, n.d-e), it could be argued that the pursuit of these should come above programming

excellence and efficiency, a transformational change of ideology within staff members and donors.

Flowers (2015, p28) also suggests that CCM communities require, “further skills, knowledge and capacity” to “participate in higher levels of change”. As such, more involvement by Tearfund staff and partners, if carefully managed to minimize dependency and unequal power dynamics, would be empowering, informative and challenging for all stakeholders involved.

4.42 A Requirement for Reciprocity

Written and verbal reports suggest that CCM is catalyzing transformational change in churches and communities globally: promoting positive changes in individual’s identities, values, sense of recognition and belonging, positivity, knowledge-creation and social capital (Flowers, 2015, p19-27). To some extent, Tearfund staff members, supporters and donors are also changing through exposure to the process, as the legitimation of CCM, through positive reports and stories from the field, is internalized, encouraging acceptance of CCM as a rational development model. However, the CCM process still largely appears to happen ‘out there’, without a clearly expressed vision or articulation of dual-directionality - how Tearfund staff and supporters can be challenged to change and hold themselves to account by the intervention, a reciprocity that is essential in authentic partnership.

Without sufficient self-interrogation and mutual learning, NNGOs are in danger of creating a change strategy, “for fixing problems which they have not yet seen

their part in creating" (Senge et al., 2005, p132), and, though evaluatory material suggests that the CCM intervention is an effective political process for tackling unequal power relations in-situ (Flowers, 2015), more is required for the partnership between CCM community, SNGO and their Northern supporters (both NNGO and donors) to be fully authentic, allowing staff and supporters to understand their role and responsibilities in the changes CCM communities desire.

This requires a holistic appraisal and publication of all project outcomes, and, though interviewees felt that Tearfund would respond honestly if questioned, and always reports significant project changes to donors, there did not appear to be a clearly articulated policy on publishing project 'failure'.

> *I think generally we wouldn't, not unless someone actually asked we wouldn't be shouting about it. (P2)*

Evaluation reports also tended to put a positive slant on recorded changes. For example, the increased utilization of pesticides and fertilizers in Tanzania was seen as 'good news' (Scott et al., 2014, p8) but, conversely, could have been reported as an unsustainable Westernization of traditional farming techniques! It would, therefore, be useful to see a more balanced and evidence-based discussion on the pros and cons of the recorded community changes, and discussion about how changes 'out there' may reflect or impact on changes within the NNGO and their stakeholders.

Tearfund has, recently, attempted to increase its supporter awareness-raising work (Tearfund, n.d-d, Tearfund, n.d-c) through initiatives such as ‘See for Yourself’, facilitating closer supporter engagement with where their money goes. However, the associated communication material defines poverty as ‘out there’ and expertise as a Western preserve, paying little attention to how community involvement could challenge and convict Northern supporters, concerning their role in the portrayed poverty and personal need to change.

> *“Just imagine if we could train, equip and enhance the capacity of their [church] leaders with OUR* learning on how to lift communities out of poverty”* (Tearfund, 2015d) (*emphasis within the script)

The continued use of discourse extolling the North’s ability to help the South illustrates a ‘blindspot’, a “patterned way of thinking and acting” (Hart and Paludan, 2016, p18) that perpetuates a sense of superiority and inferiority, maintaining a principal-agent power dynamic that counters authentic partnership.

For authentic partnership to occur these ‘downloaded’ mindsets must be questioned, and a given situation viewed from ”the vantage point of the whole” (Hart and Paludan, 2016, p20). This requires a process of ‘sensing’ – the “development of awareness in an individual or institution about their connection to the system and the ways that they are implicated in its perpetuation”, and presensing – building an “awareness of future possibility and of our part in realizing the new reality” (Sharmer, 2009 in, Hart and Paludan, 2016, p23-24). It

also requires commitment to a high level of scrutiny and accountability between stakeholders, and the creation of an environment that supports mutual questioning and challenge. All these actions appear to be successfully occurring within CCM communities, but more is required to ensure they occur within Tearfund head office and their supporter/donor community.

4.43 Principal-Agent Blind Spots

Given that donor conditionalities on CCM are limited, the level of scrutiny, time and resources given to evaluating the initiative demonstrates considerable commitment to internal learning and best practice. Indeed, fourteen members of staff were present in the meeting I attended during the planning phase of a new CCM evaluation tool, including a theological advisor, several impact personnel, country representatives, partner staff[28] and a technical competence specialist. This confirms the breadth of learning and impact that Tearfund deems CCM to be capable of. The proposed utilization of Bath University's QuIP tool[29] also suggests a desire for legitimacy for the intervention through formal causation.

However, despite a clear commitment to learning and dissemination among the staff members observed, and a desire for autonomy for the CCM communities, my observations of the planning process and interview data indicate a degree of principal-agent power hierarchy remains within Tearfund's stakeholder relationships. An example occurred during the planning meeting I observed. The SNGO partner joined the meeting via Skype, but was not addressed during the discussion and did not contribute to the conversation. There was discussion

[28] Via Skype
[29] A blinded evaluation tool "to assess the impact of multifaceted development activities in complex situations" (Copestake, 2014). See Appendix 5.

among Tearfund staff *about* the partner, but none of the comments were directed *to* the partner himself. This was, perhaps, partly due to limited partner ICT skills (he did not know how to turn his microphone off and so was muted). However, this demonstrates that power is linked to knowledge and capacity, and raises questions surrounding whether "invited spaces[30] should be modified for more effective and inclusive participation of those living in poverty and their representatives, or whether it is participants who must learn the rules, norms and regulations that would make them more effective in these spaces" (Hughes et al., 2005, p70). It also highlights a general need for NNGO's awareness of, and purposive action to combat, both intentional and unintentional hidden power that restricts access to invited spaces.

In the planning meeting, there was considerable discussion and conflicting views surrounding what CCMs core objectives were and, therefore, what constituted a measureable outcome or a driver of change. This will be discussed in more depth in the final discussion section below. However, with reference to an authentic partnership, it is noted that all discussion concerned how Tearfund staff members viewed the CCM process and their evaluation needs. There was no reference to the evaluatory needs of the beneficiaries or SNGO. Where NNGOs govern the nature, scope and discursive language of an account of performance, it demonstrates a limited recognition of the power that is exerted through the control of knowledge, reducing the potential for mutuality, and autonomy for the SNGO and CCM communities involved.

[30] See Appendix 4 for further explanation.

4.5 Legitimating CCM through Account of Performance

For NNGOs, the past three decades have been characterized by a rise in institutional funding and it's inherent conditionalities, a growing crisis of legitimacy (van de Walle, 1999) and a dominant managerial logic within the aid industry (Elbers et al., 2014). This is manifest in NNGO's utilization of a market model approach to legitimacy (Thrandardottir, 2015), building credibility through successful stories of supply and demand. In order to produce these reports, cause and effect have been formalized through a positivist conceptualization of development as top-down, linear and rational, and the adoption of tools such as the 'LogFrame' or a 'Theory of Change' (Stein and Valters, 2012) to formally map and measure development interventions.

On the other hand, there has also been an attempt among some organizations like Tearfund and Action Aid (Magrath, 2014) to embrace the complexity and political nature of development through an emphasis on social transformation, leading to an exploration of beneficiary-led, rights-based initiatives such as CCM. These interventions define performance, outcomes and legitimacy using interpretivist discourse, such as empowerment and capability expansion, in line with Thrandardottir's critical model; and negotiating knowledge is viewed as a participative endeavor; as 'social epistemology' which, "emphasizes the empirical subjects, social interaction, and situations that determine how knowledge is produced" (Hayman et al., 2016, p5). However, even where NNGOs align with this social transformational typology of change, the aid industry's preoccupation with evidence requires an appropriate account of performance for legitimacy to be gained with stakeholders, internal and

external. This account must attempt to elucidate outcomes and attribute impact and is required, both to validate the resources engaged in the initiative, and to create knowledge on best practice.

4.51 Hybridized Institutional Logic and Accounts of Performance

Elber et al (2014) describes the ideological conflict that can arise where a NNGO has a hybridized institutional logic, desiring both to promote development as a social transformation process achieved through partnership, while attempting to formalize the process with rational planning and measurement tools.

This ideological conundrum was evident within Tearfund's CCM intervention. A review of CCM literature, found authors describing the exact objectives of the process divergently, perhaps linked to their own stance on how development occurs. For example, CCM objectives were described as (see Appendix 9 for full analysis):

> *"Achieving 'holistic transformation' … where people 'flourish materially, psychologically and spiritually'" (Tearfund, 2015, in Flowers, 2015, p6);*

> *"Bringing energy and excitement to churches and communities concerning positive changes they can make themselves … encourages the discovery of new skills and expertise within a community." (Njoroge et al., 2009, piii);*

"To empower people to read into their reality, and take charge of it in order to determine their destiny" (Tearfund, 2015b, p1).

Though all of these objectives arguably form part of the CCM process, each evaluator's portrayal of performance was contingent on their development ideology and inherent vision of CCM success. It also reflected the purpose behind the account - learning, legitimation or to fulfill a funding conditionality. This was evident in the planning meeting where those present sought confirmation and legitimation of CCM's performance using discourse that aligned with their academic specialism or supporter audience. For example, the fundraising colleague repeatedly questioned the tools potential to provide quantitative outcome figures, as this was what his institutional donor required. The malleability of performance discourse (Hilhorst, 2003, p126) was also witnessed through the lengthy discussion that occurred concerning what CCM impact should be measured: tangible outcomes, for example health or agricultural advances; or deeper, less palpable drivers of change, such as empowerment or relationship restoration; an ideological conundrum that was also apparent in the evaluation documents reviewed.

Throughout the documentation, and in agreement with Flowers (2015, p29), I found a general "lack of robust evaluation of the process, and assessment of this in light of wider debates on social inequalities, participation and empowerment". The evaluations tended to highlight outcomes without a baseline study, and offered little explanation of the potential drivers for change: a deficit of knowledge that those involved in the planning meeting were keen to

fill. This scarcity of causal data may be because interpretivist, intangible changes, such as identity, values and relationships are difficult to explain or quantify; whereas material improvements offer easily measureable solutions.

Promoting certain outcomes over others may also reflect a principal-agent power dynamic, with writers attempting to align their findings with donor requirements. For example, donors may be more comfortable with supporting a practical project - the building of a well - than giving toward the 'fuzzy' objective (Hayman et al., 2016, p5) of promoting political involvement.

4.52 Legitimation Through Discourse

Within the development community there are expected patterns of development and discourse that, when adopted, bring legitimacy to outcomes. Terms such as, 'empowerment' and 'gender' become buzzwords, whose inclusion are necessary to justify the chosen mode of development (Hayman et al., 2016, p6). These terms are filtered down by NNGOs and eventually internalized as best practice, and required components in performance accounts. However, Laclau (2005, p40) cautions that these buzzwords can become 'empty signifiers', "stripping these terms and associated categories of their diversity" .

The use of discourse to legitimize CCM was seen in the adoption of biblical terminology in evaluation documents to infuse a spiritual element into the initiative's performance. Tearfund's religious foundations motivate a desire for legitimation of the role of the church in community development:

"We want to demonstrate that the local church makes a difference, that it is actually important ..." (P2)

As such, the Tanzania evaluation (Scott et al., 2014) described CCM outcomes as 'good news', in line with the biblical text concerning "good news to the poor" (Luke 4 v18, The Bible, 2011), bringing legitimacy to the role of the church and promoting outcomes as the fulfilment of transcendent objectives. As previously mentioned, the Tanzanian 'good news', (for example, the adoption of Western agricultural techniques) could be viewed both positively and negatively. However, the use of biblical terminology has the potential to make results unquestionable and acts as a reminder of how power is manifest in knowledge creation. It is important, therefore, that when constructing accounts of performance, evaluators interrogate their motivations and realise their own agency in creating, sustaining and reshaping "political and social relationships, ideas about development, and perceptions of their own legitimacy as experts and representatives" (Hayman et al., 2016, p7) to ensure their findings are unbiased and open to question.

4.53 Dissemination as Authentic Partnership

Knowledge creation and dispersion can act as a site of power, where a Northern conceptualization of development and performance is prioritized over that of the subjects involved. Beneficiaries should, therefore, be involved in the design of a performance measurement tool, to ensure their perception of success is included, and the findings owned by the communities through appropriate dissemination.

O'Reilly and Dhanju (2010) suggest that not only is dissemination important for combatting power inequalities and building relationships of mutual respect and understanding, but there is also the possibility for social change to occur *through* the dissemination process itself. As aforementioned, accounts of performance are devices for making sense of an intervention. Going beyond legitimization, they act as a process by which differing actors negotiate to attribute meaning to a given NGO and it's activities. As such, dissemination can highlight "already existing narratives and the tensions they produce … enabling spaces for dialogue lead[ing] to insights for both researcher and researched" (ibid, p285). "The purpose of analytical writing is to produce an authoritative account (usually by a single author…) as a representation of a collective experience. Inevitably [however] the representation will amount to a misrepresentation" (Mosse 2005, in ibid, p286). As such, a lack of dissemination perpetuates an imbalance of power and counters authentic partnership, with the subject of discussion unable to contradict findings they are not privy too.

Interview data suggested that some CCM evaluations were being disseminated with communities. However, there did not appear to be a clear policy or procedure for regular community dissemination. Rather it is subject to funding and the requirements of the NNGO and their donors:

> *"The feedback process is often dependent on the evaluator, the value the commissioners of the evaluators place on feedback, whether a*

communications plan has been considered for the evaluation findings and also if budget has been built in to cover the feedback." (P4)

Interviewees' personal experiences in the field confirmed a desire within communities for self-evaluation, and they expressed confidence that the inherently reflective nature of the CCM process could easily be adapted to include more purposive community-owned evaluation. There were signs that this reflective capacity was starting to be built upon; but it had not, to date, been fully exploited in a systematic manner.

In order for CCM to gain legitimacy as an authentic partnership model, collaborative dissemination - donor, Tearfund, partner and community - is vital. A democratic and participatory process of knowledge creation, irrespective of whether consensus of outcome is reached, will challenge the beliefs and norms of those involved and may result in social change that extends further than the boundaries of the CCM communities targeted through the Tearfund intervention.

5. Conclusion

The introduction to this paper highlighted the increasing breadth and depth of NGO influence and power as unelected representatives in a changing global landscape, challenging state sovereignty and resulting in exigency for concrete evidence to legitimate the function and outcomes of a $135 billion global aid industry (Anderson, 2015).

Both theory and the primary research here within, have shown that an NGO's mode of legitimation is highly dependent on the complex ontological and epistemological positions that underpin their organizational definition of poverty, wellbeing and development, and how they construe their role in its actualization; whether derived from a market-based apolitical mentality or a critical, political stance on global power inequalities.

Historic aid modalities, based on hierarchical principal-agent relationships, increasing funding conditionalities and "public demand for evidence of value for money" (Copestake et al., 2016a, p14), have led to a managerial logic approach to performance measurement, emphasizing practical, tangible and easily quantifiable results of cause and effect. Yet, NNGOs are also returning to their original social transformation roots, with growing engagement with a political-economy discourse and the adoption of grassroots, empowerment-based development ideologies. This sees agencies, including my case study Tearfund, attempting "to reconcile demands for clarity within a hierarchical audit culture, with aspirations to be more transformative, adaptable and consensual" (ibid), through an authentic partnership model of stakeholder engagement.

To legitimate a partnership model of development, such as Tearfund's CCM intervention, as a valid typology of poverty reduction, convincing accounts of performance are required. Hulme (in Hayman et al., 2016 ,piii) proposes that "one of the main ways that NGOs can 'make a difference' is by creating alternative forms of knowledge that challenge orthodoxies". However, he believes that, "NGOs are being sucked into the donor-driven pursuit of 'evidence' and 'results' that privileges technical specialists, professionals and foreign experts". There is a "presumption that knowledge and evidence are inherently good things" (Hayman et al., 2016, p2). However, if they are generated to conform to industry norm, act as a site of unhealthy power in a principal-agent relationship or, if the elusive search for evidence to legitimate a process that is inherently unmeasureable stifles innovation or partnership, then a new approach to impact should be sought.

The transcendent value-based nature of supporter alignment to Tearfund's CCM ideology, and the lack of institutional funding it requires, affords the opportunity for Tearfund to be bold and unorthodox in the way that it presents accounts of CCM performance. As previously outlined, CCM is "a process not focused on any one change, but on enabling people to decide what changes they want and might make" (Scott et al., 2014, p6). For this reason, pursuing a reductionist evaluation methodology, where outcomes are defined through easily quantifiable and tangible changes, risks missing the rich complexity of transformation that could and is occurring through CCM, and presenting a narrow market-based version of legitimacy.

Though recording and learning from reported tangible community change is useful as an organizational development tool, Tearfund's emphasis on the relational dimensions of poverty offers the potential for a legitimacy paradigm shift, through the holistic presentation of performance as the messy process of building authentic stakeholder partnership, focused on the unpredictable changes that are enacted in mindsets, norms and behaviour as a result of this relationship. In effect, to see the relationship and the resultant participatory understanding[31] as a legitimate goal in itself, rather than as a means to a measureable set of outcomes.

This would be a bold, uncompromising attempt at transparency; a process of collective self-interrogation that would generate positive and negative reports of CCM performance that could both offend and challenge staff, partners and supporters. However, a willingness to embrace, legitimate and publicize the diverse stakeholder interpretations of CCM outcome is the only way to build authentic partnership. If this isn't done, Tearfund risks perpetuating the top-down westernized conceptualisations of stakeholder relationship, and missing the most powerful essence of the partnership process itself.

[31] "The participatory activity of coming to joint understanding…rather than … joint action per se" (Kelly and Van Vlaenderen, 1995, p371)

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7. Appendices

Appendix 1

Literature Review Methodology

To build a rich body of literature I utilized a number of sources:

- Bath University library and online journal databases – books, peer-reviewed journals, dissertations and theses, located via a purposive keyword search and bibliographic search of material already collected;
- Bath University academic relationships – sharing of both published and unpublished work;
- Google Scholar – purposive keyword search;
- NGO websites and online corporate documentation;
- Previous personal research from my MRes, PGCert and BA (Hons);
- Tearfund documentation via Communities of Practice and personal connections;

Appendix 2 - Rational and Moral Accountability

Power (1994, in Hilhorst, 2003, p130) describes accountability as a process by which trust is created out of mistrust, a method for proving that what is claimed is, in fact, correct. In order for this to be achieved the credibility of the accountability process must be taken for granted. There is an assumption of separation and insulation from everyday political and cultural distortion and that the myriad reports produced by evaluators are a true and unbiased reflection of the actual events and processes they describe. This is based on a rational conceptualization of accountability and a belief that accountability produces transparency. In this depiction, there is clear separation between 'the authorities' and the 'accountable actor', and a belief that accountability can occur through formal reporting mechanisms (Weber, 1964). The organization is seen as 'a machine' (Morgan, 2006) and accountability as a device to ensure that all parts of the machine function appropriately, "making everyday organizational performance visible, in order to control it from a distance" (Hilhorst, 2003, p128, see also Foucault's work on surveillance and discipline in Simons, 1995, p28).

The possibility of rationality, though potentially desirable, is contested in literature by those who believe that organizational life and accountability processes are deeply entwined and contingent on each other. Durkheim describes, instead, a moral or 'everyday' accountability, (Hilhorst, 2003, p127), situating an organization as part of a larger society, "bound together through organic solidarity". For Durkheim, a society (or organization) can only function efficiently if individuals are forced "to surrender to shared norms and values and

to fulfill their part in the division of labour on the basis of a 'moral contract'" (ibid). In order for this moral accountability to occur, the sanctioning of behavior comes through law, or via informal exclusion or correction through stories, ironic remarks or gossip. It is not transparent, instead it may radiate through discourses surrounding behavior or ideologies that are "portrayed as exemplary" (ibid). Moral accountability can be formal or informal; horizontal - played out within social groupings; or vertical - through dual-directional hierarchy (Fox, 1992).

Hilhorst depicts moral accountability as a forced, largely negative process of coercion and manipulation, with alignment to organizational values. A source of conflict and demoralization rather than a catalyst for solidarity. Mowles (2008a, p5) suggest that "this is because the prevailing perceptions of values as instruments of management or as elements in some inchoate mystical whole render the power relationship between staff and managers undiscussable". Values, therefore, whether religious or ethical, act as a site of power and obedience, their 'non-negotiable' status a source of frustration. On the other hand, Chambers (2006, p79) suggests the utilization of common values in the creation of a 'congruent culture', where an individual's values align to the organization. He views them as practical and as a contribution to "a common commitment and organizational culture".

Many NNGOs emerge out of moral or religious organized institutions with stated values that transcend the ordinary accountability relations of an organization to include alignment with a higher purpose or code of conduct. These

transcendental values, and the texts from which they are extracted, can be used to unify a body of people towards a common social goal. For example, in Christianity, believers are told: “to do justice, and to love kindness” (The Bible, 2011, Micah 6 v8), and to “look after orphans and widows in their distress” (ibid, James 1 v27). They can also be employed to enrich an individual’s awareness of their capability set: a person’s ability to do valuable acts or reach valuable states of being (Sen, 1993, Sen, 1989) or to inform an organisation’s discussions on their ‘social competences’ (Stewart, 2013) or collective capabilities (Ibrahim, 2013): what institutions can be or do.

However, due, in part, to the prevailing theory of secularisation[32] in academia, the impact of religious values, spaces and theological resources in development and social mobilisation has failed to be fully appreciated to date (Devine et al., 2015). This view is challenged by authors such as, Deneulin and Zampini Davies (2016, p7) who claim that, because some religious narratives (in their example, biblical parables) “deal with perennial dilemmas of human social existence, such as issues of ‘power’ or ‘oppression’ generally linked to economic systems, they can be relevant for seeking solutions to socio-economic problems in the public sphere irrespective of religious beliefs”.

[32] The transformation from religious values and institutions to non-religious values and secular institutions in a society.

Appendix 3 - Power in Accountability Relationships

An NNGO's development approach, their core values, procedures and philosophy of change (or institutional logic – see section 2.4) influence the importance placed on, and attention given to their myriad stakeholder accountability relationships (James, 2012). Murtaza (2012) suggests that to understand the strength of the accountability arrangement between an organization and its stakeholders it is also necessary to consider a number of dimensions of involvement, as show in Table 5. Firstly, the breadth and regularity of each stakeholder's involvement and their places of influence; secondly, their level of authority in the relationship, degree of scrutiny and the formality of their involvement, and, finally, their spaces of participation, from the practical/functional level to the organizational strategic level.

Table 5: Stakeholder Accountability Strength

Stakeholder Accountability Strength Criteria	Example
Breadth of involvement in accountability process	International, national or local
Regularity of involvement in accountability process	Usually, frequently, occasional
Degree of influence in NGO decision-making	Deciding alone; managing the process; participating in the process; being consulting during the process
Level of formality of involvement in NGO work	Legally required, administratively required by NGO Board policy, informally involved at NGO staff discretion
Concentration of authority over NGO	Sole authorities of their type e.g. home government; one of a limited number with the ability to coordinate e.g. donors, host governments; one of many with limited coordination possibilities e.g. recipient communities
Level of scrutiny potential/exercised over NGO	High scrutiny e.g. recipient community; medium scrutiny e.g. collection of independent data; low scrutiny e.g. relying on information provided by NGO or external evaluator hired by NGO

Source: James (2012), based on Murtaza, 2012

Murtaza (2012) states that:

"the strongest accountability over NGOs will be exercised by an entity which participates at the strategic and functional levels in all three phases of NGO accountability, with high frequency, span, influence, formality, scrutiny and concentration of authority and is able to employ a wide range of performance and data collection tools".

If this is true, in traditional development interventions, beneficiaries lack the necessary power or influence to claim their accountability rights. There involvement is likely to be at a low functional level, with little sanctioning power or broader strategic input. Their only place of strength being in the area of scrutiny. This means that for effective downward accountability to take place, an organization will need to purposefully decide to 'be accountable', rather than be compelled to be by stakeholder power. Kilby's (2012, p115) research suggests that this voluntary accountability is more evident where an organization's overarching values and world-view are already focuses on empowerment.

On the other hand, stakeholders considered to be upward or inward of an NNGO, such as institutional donors, government regulators and Board members may be "involved in all three phases of an NGO project, hold sanctioning power, have regular, generally formalized and influential involvement and considerable concentration of authority" (James, 2012, p5-6). It is not surprising, therefore, that despite the rhetoric of beneficiary accountability in NNGOs, accountability mechanism still continue to favour the satisfaction of these stakeholders.

Appendix 4 - A Note on Power

Contesting the misuse of power, and resultant poverty and injustice, is at the heart of many INGO mission statements. However, to transform power inequalities people must first understand how power manifests in society, so that it is no longer hidden or invisible. The rhetoric of empowerment in development has grown strong, with the emergence of beneficiary participation and a rights-based response, an attempt by agency's to give aid recipients control over their own development (Chambers, 1997, Cornwall, 2008). This conceptualization has been criticized as assuming that power is a commodity that is owned by the rich and given to the powerless poor. This is at odds with Foucault's belief "that power is enacted and 'is everywhere'", is "fragmented and diffused", and "negotiated through struggle to co-produce outcomes" (Flowers, 2015, p7 on Foucault, 1981, p93). A focus on power as 'zero-sum', where finite quantities of power are shared between actors lacks a consideration for how people enact their own agency within relationships (Chambers, 2006) to combat harmful norms (Gallagher, 2008).

Gaventa (2006) suggests attention should be given to divergent expressions of power. Firstly, power 'over' describes the subordination of others; power 'to', the use of agency or capacity to act; power 'within' alludes to a sense of identity and capacity or confidence to act; and power 'with' is concerned with collective action through relationship and collaboration.

Flowers (2015, based on , Lukes, 2005) describes the forms in which power manifests as dynamic and interrelated.

"For instance, dominant actors may argue there is space for people to participate but ensure the decisions made are for their own interests (visible power) through shaping the way in which people can participate (hidden power). This in turn makes the powerless feel the norm is for them to be not included, and accept that as the status quo (invisible power)". (ibid, p7)

Though visible power is the most apparent and, thus, often that which is concentrated upon in INGO advocacy campaigns or internal restructuring, hidden and invisible power may be harder to reveal, accept complicity in, or change, given its connection to embedded cognitive, cultural, social or political values, norms or traditions (see DiMaggio 1994, Granovetter 1985, in Williamson, 2000). Invisible power is "the way social institutions and norms are internalized, so that the marginalized reinforce their own marginalization; the 'most insidious exercise of power' is to prevent people having agency 'because they can…imagine no alternative, they see it as natural'" (Flowers, 2015, p8, quoting Lukes, 2005).

Williamson (2000) describes the "four layers of social analysis" that need to be considered when understanding spaces of power (Figure 3 below), demonstrating how social levels impact one another. In his diagram, solid lines from top to bottom indicate a constraining influence, while dashed lines indicate feedback. Level 1 is shown to be embedded and the most influential over lower order groups. However, to date, institutional economists have concerned themselves principally with the power found in Levels 2 and 3 - governance and

the ‘rules of the game’ - as Level 1, where traditions, norms and values are found are considered too difficult to change. These concepts are embedded but “are in need of greater theoretical specification” (Smelser et al., 1994, p18) and, given their considerable power to influence organizations, a pluralistic, rather than reductionist approach to power analysis, where diversity and complexity is embraced should be employed when attempting to redress inequality.

Figure 3: Economics of Institutions (Williamson, 2000)



Figure 1. Economics of Institutions

Giddens (1990) also relates power to spaces of influence in his discussion on agency and how it can be constrained or enabled by structural or social norms, suggesting that transformation can occur where there is “empowerment in the spaces between agency and structure” (Flowers, 2015, p7), citing participation as an attempt to “create a space for this social re-imagining” (ibid). In an INGO context, spaces of influence may be *closed* to restrict participation, for example by INGOs who fail to include beneficiaries in the planning of development interventions or *invited,* where beneficiaries are given a space in the project cycle but this space is limited and controlled by the INGO who still remains dominate. Spaces may also be *claimed*, when individuals gain enough power ‘within’ and power ‘with’ to exert their power within a given setting or project. Finally, levels of power can be seen as global, national or local. Gaventa (2006, p25) combines these levels, spaces and forms of power diagrammatically as a ‘Power Cube’, as shown in Figure 4 below.

Figure 4: The ‘power cube': the levels, spaces and forms of power (Gaventa, 2006, p25)



Appendix 5

QUIP: An Introduction
The Qualitative Impact Assessment Protocol

(Directly quoted from www.bath.ac.uk/cds/projects-activities/assessing-rural-transformations/documents/quip-introduction-sept-2015.pdf)

"The QUIP is a relatively simple and cost-effective way of finding out directly from intended beneficiaries of a development activity what they think are the most significant drivers of change in their lives, livelihoods and wellbeing. There are strong ethical grounds for asking people directly about the effect of actions intended to benefit them, and doing so can contribute usefully to learning, innovation and public accountability. But for responses to be credible it is necessary to address potential response biases. The QUIP does this by ensuring that interviewers and respondents are given no information about the project being evaluated. It also uses simple software to make analysis and reporting timely and auditable. By working alongside routine monitoring of key indicators of change it is also possible to estimate the magnitude as well as the nature and direction of the main causal drivers of change.

The QUIP is the product of a recently completed three-year action research project called 'Assessing Rural Transformations' conducted by the University of Bath with UK government funding. The project set out specifically to design and test a credible way to assess the impact of multifaceted development activities in complex contexts where other approaches to impact evaluation, such as randomised control trials, are not appropriate. By relying on self-reported attribution rather than statistical inference to generate evidence of causation it also avoids the need for a control group. Underlying this design is an emphasis on generating evidence that is both credible and cost-effective.

During the 'ART Project' the University of Bath worked with two NGOs, Self Help Africa and Farm Africa, to assess the impact of four of their rural development projects - two in Malawi and two in Ethiopia. A quantitative monitoring tool called the IHM was used alongside the QUIP to measure changes in household level disposable income relative to basic food needs. The four projects all aimed to strengthen household level food security in the context of both rapid commercialisation and climate change. A large number of interconnected, uncertain and hard-to-measure confounding factors (Z) affected the casual links between project activities (X) and impact indicators (Y). The QUIP generated evidence of attribution through respondents' own blinded accounts of links between X and Y alongside Z rather than relying on statistical inference based on variable exposure to X. This was used to generate standard tables showing the frequency of unprompted reference by respondents to different drivers of change, cross-analysed against project theories of change and exposing both obvious gaps where links were expected, and unintended consequences." For further information visit www.go.bath.ac.uk/art.

Appendix 6 – directly quoted from Tearfund (2015c)

THE LIGHT WHEEL: AN INTRODUCTION

As an organisation we want to see communities and individuals transformed and flourishing. But what does this mean? How will we know when we have got there? How can we assess whether or not we are making progress towards this? The LIGHT Wheel has been developed to help answer some of these questions.

The Wheel provides a way of assessing the changes within a community that, when taken together, suggest that the community is flourishing. It is a way of measuring the impact of our activities and can be used at the country strategy, programme or project level.

The Wheel contains nine spokes each of which represents a different aspect of what it means to be flourishing. By considering each spoke a holistic view can be taken that brings together physical, social, economic and spiritual wellbeing.



Measuring The Change

Progress can be assessed by identifying where the community is along a spectrum. To make this assessment easier five stages have been identified:

-  **Stage 1: "Dormant"**. This is like a seed that has fallen to the ground, it exists but there are no signs of life. Communities at this stage are unlikely to acknowledge that there is an issue.
-  **Stage 2: "Sprouting"**. Stage 2 is when the community begins to accept that there is an issue, what was a dormant seed is now showing signs of life and shoots are beginning to form; change is however fragile. People will acknowledge the issue but will be looking to others to do something about it.
-  **Stage 3: "Budding"**. By now the once dormant seed is growing rapidly, the fragile shoots are stronger and are beginning to form buds. The community not only recognises the issue but also sees that they are not powerless and dependent on others; they too can make a difference.
-  **Stage 4: "Flowering"**. At this stage the buds have blossomed and flowers and fruits are appearing. The community is now actively addressing the issue and change is starting to happen; there is a sense of empowerment and momentum.
-  **Stage 5: "Multiplying"**. The fruits are now evident and seeds are beginning to form through which the plant can replicate itself. Real change has happened in the community and there is a desire to share their story with others helping others to make a difference in their own communities.

Indicators and the Maturity Model

A "Maturity Model" has also been developed to help identify which stage a community is at for each spoke. This provides a description of what a typical community might look like at each stage along a spoke. In addition a number of indicators have been identified which can be measured at the beginning, mid-point and end of the intervention. When entered into a pre-formatted Google sheet this will provide an estimate of the stage that the community are at. This estimate is intended to be a basis for discussion and refinement with the community rather than the final result.

Visualising the change

The wheel has been designed so that it can provide a visual picture of progress using a polar diagram. By plotting the scores against each spoke at the baseline and again at the mid-term and final stages, the areas of change and those where little change has been achieved are immediately obvious. This can then be used to stimulate discussion on these areas. The chart can be drawn out manually or the scores can be entered into a pre-formatted Google sheet which will produce the chart automatically.



When to use it

The wheel can be used throughout the project cycle. As part of programme design it can help a community identify areas of development that may not have been immediately obvious and to prioritise the areas on which they wish to work. At project initiation it can be used to establish a baseline. It can also be used as part of a mid-term evaluation to identify any early changes or to identify areas where change seems harder to achieve. Finally it can be used at the end of the project to identify the changes within the community and the impact that has been achieved.

It is strongly recommended that the wheel is used to support country strategies. It can be used at the at the start of a strategy to form the baseline, again at the midpoint and finally towards the end of the strategy to establish the impact. As the level of change measured by the Wheel will take time to achieve. it is not recommended as a suitable tool for short-term programmes of less than two years.

How do you use it

The wheel can be used in a number of different ways and it is recommended that several of these are used in conjunction with each other. This allows an element of triangulation between sources and increases the reliability of the assessment. It is suggested however that group discussion should always form a key part of any assessment

- **Group Discussion.** This is perhaps the most powerful approach as it allows the community to engage and to assess themselves. The debates during the discussions can help mobilise the community and increase participation. A series of focus group discussion questions and a facilitator's guide have been produced to help lead these discussions. Group discussions with the community can also be supplemented with interviews and discussions with key stakeholders
- **Household Survey**. The household survey can be used to introduce a more objective perspective into the more subjective group discussions. If conducted beforehand the

results can be used by a facilitator to challenge participants' assessments during group discussions. The survey is available as both a downloadable paper version and as an electronic version for use with mobile phones or tablets on Kobo Toolbox.

- **Direct Observation**. Direct observation of the community, particularly if collected regularly over time can also help support the use of the Wheel. An observation guide has been produced that can act as a checklist for those visiting the community. If observations are collected in a structured manner over time then changes can be identified.
- **Secondary Data**. Two types of secondary data can be used. Any project will have a reporting regime and these reports are likely to contain a mix of quantitative and qualitative information. A desk review of these reports prior to any group discussion will provide an initial perspective on the stage that the community has reached. In addition, a number of other sources such as local government agencies, healthcare services, the police and the judiciary are likely to be collecting data some of which can be used to confirm or challenge local perceptions. A checklist has been produced that suggests what data could be found.

Training

The quality of the assessment will depend on the quality of the facilitators and of their understanding of the wheel and the spokes. To that end training resources will be provided and a train the trainers course provided [To Follow] which will complement this facilitator's guide.

Case Studies

The Wheel has been piloted in Zimbabwe and Mozambique and tried in a number of other countries. Case studies are published separately.

Appendix 7 – Student Ethical Approval Form

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Appendix 8 - Interview Consent Form

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Appendix 9

Table 6: Summary of Tearfund CCM Guides and Evaluation Reports – Objectives and Outcomes

Name of Report	Year	CCM Definition/Objective (if specified)	Outcomes Reported	Source
Umoja (CCM) Facilitator's Guide	?	About bringing energy an excitement to churches and communities concerning positive changes they can make themselves. It seeks to build on the resources they have and encourages the discovery of new skills and expertise within a community.	Suggested Evaluation - Individual Project-based evaluation- did we do what we said we would? Did we make a difference? Could we have used our skills and resources more effectively?	(Lukes, 2005, p24, cited in Flowers, 2015, p8)
Basic Informal CBA of Advocacy and CCM in Uganda	2015		Quantitative measures of service delivery through advocacy action - roads, health clinics, schools. Value for money.	
Partnership for Change -A CBA of Self Help Groups in Ethiopia	2015		Quantitative measures - income, schooling, capital formation. Social drivers of change - confidence, relationships, empowerment discussed. Value for money.	(2000, p596)
Light Wheel Impact Guide (not an actual evaluation)	2016		Qualitative and quantitative. Holistic measurement of wellbeing indicators - material, emotional, spiritual and relational elements.	(Njoroge et al., 2009, piii)
The Church and Community Mobilization Process	2015	To empower people to read into their reality, and take charge of it in order to determine their destiny.		(Tsegay et al., 2013)
Participatory Awakening Process Evaluation	2013	To empower people to holistically transform their situation using God-given local resources through deep analysis of their situation and development of the desire to transform it, taking full responsibility to transform their situation and people joining hands to transform their situation.	Qualitative and quantitative. Relational - church, individual unify, gender relations. Material - buildings, food security, income.	(Tearfund, 2016b)
Assessing the Spiritual Impact of the PEP Programme	2013		Qualitative. Spiritual and emotional impact - church attendance, mindsets, humility. evident pride and joy. Relational - reduction in domestic abuse, lifestyle changes (giving up alcohol), reduction in oppression and exclusion (HIV+, gender), unity with other faiths. Material - livelihoods, education, health.	(Tearfund, 2015b)
Evaluation of Capacity Building Myanmar	2008	To enhance the capacity of local churches and community leaders to undertake community development activities.	Quantitative - numbers trained, knowledge and skills improvement, satisfaction with training, application of training in community. Perceived benefits - awareness-raising, leadership skills, problem-solving skills, unity in community	(Yugi, 2013)
CCM Investment Scoping Report	2014		Qualitative. Relational - improved relationships. Spiritual - biblical understanding. Emotional - self-belief and confidence. Material - practical project outcomes.	(Lubett, 2013)
Partner Evaluation Report - CRWRC Cambodia	2010	To what extent do the churches have the ability to implement community development?	Quantitative and Qualitative. Knowledge and experience in community transformation. Support for community transformation. Capacity to engage in practical projects. Quant levels of participation. Material changes - agriculture, health	(Thawng and McClintock, 2008)
Cheas Ponleu (Shining Light)	2011		Quantitative and qualitative - number of churches trained, % support from local means, practical projects spawned from training. Relational - unity between church/community, church/church and within the community, church/other faiths.	(Bulmer et al., 2014)
An Evidence-based Study of the Impact of Church and Community Mobilization in Tanzania	2014	CCM helps local churches and communities build on the resources and skills they already have. It inspires and equips people with a vision for determining their own future with their own resources.	Quantitative analysis of qualitative data - physical - agricultural methods, health, mortality, food. Relational - how people felt about the community, sense of unity. Social - changed mindsets - positive, empowerment. Spiritual - Christ-like characteristics, humility, love, sharing. Political - advocacy.	(CRWRC, 2010)

CCMP Learning Review Sudan	2006	To stimulate churches to understand God's concern for the world and with the resources available to them, to take action themselves and with the community to address needs identified in their locality.	Qualitative. Spiritual impact. Material - new projects, church income. CBA discussion but not formally conducted - time against measureable outcomes.	(SEDECA, 2011)
PEP Uganda	2008		Relational - unity among churches and between church/community, within community. Emotional/Social - awareness of agency and capabilities - gender relations. Material - income, projects	