People of concern: The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is characterized by ongoing conflict, poor or non-existent infrastructure and highly challenging logistics, all of which make access to refugees and other populations of concern quite difficult. Due mainly to the conflict in the eastern part of the country, approximately 430,000 refugees from the DRC remain in neighbouring countries, particularly Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania. The scale of displacement within and outside the DRC remains serious. There are some 2.7 million Internally Displaced People (IDPs) within the country in 2014 due to ongoing armed conflict in the east. (Source: United Nations Refugee Agency) Photograph by Sam D. Cruz/Shutterstock.com

HYBRIDITY IN OPERATIONAL CONTEXTS
Traditional forms of leadership augmenting governance

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N THE FIELD of international relations, the term *hybrid* implies the potential synergy generated among organizations and groups in collaboration, hence the axiom, the whole is greater than the sum of the parts. This article will examine *hybridity* as it relates to three different spheres of influence within the operational environment. Firstly, experts increasingly focus on today's *hybrid threats* often stemming from radically inspired terrorism. Secondly, whole of government efforts to stabilize and reconstruct failing or failed states may also be characterized as a *hybrid* response to such threats — interagency approaches, supported by the military. Thirdly, and the major focus of this article, context will be explored as it relates to the public space of operations where civilian populations and their governments co-exist, while operations are conducted and concluded.

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Creating lasting stability where internal conflict has ravaged societies has not been easy to achieve. The global south has been particularly susceptible to such turmoil. Constructive ideas as to how to establish stability and enhance governance are much needed. In the third world, *hybridity,* in terms of more traditional forms of leadership at the grassroots contributing to the functioning of central governments, is one such concept. Finally, by way of example in the African context, the chiefdoms of Botswana will be examined for their contribution to governance with leaders at the national level.

Hybrid threats

Relating to today's operational environments, among those early to employ the term *hybrid* was Frank Hoffman. Referencing more specifically the modality of conflict, he poignantly spoke of the blurred or blended nature of combat. "We do not face a widening number of distinct challenges, but their convergence into *hybrid* wars."[1] This would translate into con-

fronting groups drawing from a "whole menu of tactics and technologies, blending them in innovative ways to meet their own strategic culture, geography, and aims."[2] Continuing, Hoffman saw this as a melding of "conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts that include indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder."[3]

As NATO adjusts its training emphasis to accommodate *hybrid* applications pertinent to contemporary operations, joint exercises — Army, Navy, Air Force and Special Forces elements — are of increasing relevance. Imparting to personnel a working knowledge of the operational context is indispensible to its success. As an example, this year's TRIDENT JEWEL 15 exercise maximized attention on "manag[ing] joint focus during a complex political and civil Crisis Response Operation," and worked through a "failing state scenario."[4] Stretching out before military and civilian leaders alike is this indubitable test of adapting and responding to the complexity of *hybrid threats*.

Hybridity: third generation of civil-military relations

An approach to meeting such *hybrid threats*, political scientist, Frederik Rosen of the University of Copenhagen, illumines that the U.S. military has implemented a command structure which creates a more intimate affiliation between interagency modalities and its military.[5] The United States African Command (USAFRICOM) exemplifies this *soft power* mandate, inclusive of a civilian presence, at some of the highest levels of Command. Demonstrative of what Rosen identifies as *third-generation civil-military relations* — an inference of *hybridity* — it reflects an amalgam of military and civilian capabilities, far exceeding the interagency cooperation known to today's Provincial Reconstruction Teams *(second-generation civil-military relations)*, and, from the strategic perspective, the way forward.

This approach is a blending of interests "from building and bolstering security institutions for watching over development projects, to humanitarian aid delivery, to disease management."[6] Rosen identifies *first generation civil-military relations* with the earlier "blue helmets" where in the 1990's the United Nations Security Council deployed troops to "low-intensity" missions in virtual conflict zones where humanitarian organizations en-

deavoured to aid civilian populations caught in the crucible of conflict. African security policy expert, Sean McFate, acknowledges that the impetus for closer *third generation civil-military relations* originates in the recognition that "lethal force alone is no longer the decisive variable in military campaigns,"[7] prescient lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan.

Underscoring the whole of government emphasis, McFate insists that achieving sustained security is inextricably tied to solving the challenges of development, which goes to the core of the security-development nexus. "Failure to heed this linkage results in a 'security-development gap', where the lack of security prevents development from taking root, thus perpetuating conflict and compromising development in a vicious cycle."[8] In her report to the United States Congress reference USAFRICOM and greater civil-military synergy *(hybridity)*, analyst Lauren Ploch echoes McFate's call for "a broader 'soft power' mandate aimed at building a stable security environment incorporat[ing] a larger civilian component from other U.S. government agencies to address the challenges."[9]

A movement toward more *hybrid* strategies in confronting today's intrastate conflict has emerged as a viable approach. Knowledge of the cultural mechanisms at work in a given operational context is key to aiding whole of government personnel — civilian and military — to function effectively. The following will explore traditional/tribal leadership as one such cultural mechanism and its collaborative potential to strengthen central governments within third world contexts, particularly pertinent to conflict prone regions of Africa.

Hybridity: traditional forms of leadership aiding central governments

Researchers out of the Australian Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies (Brisbane) are posing probing questions while offering cogent suggestions to seeing fragile states revitalized. From a historical perspective, they contend that much of the instability known to the global south can, in great part, be traced back to the move toward "decolonization" following the Second World War. Many of today's new states — a number of them known to the African continent — came into being during that time. Researchers such as Volker Boege, Anne Brown, Kevin Clements and Anna Nolan suggest that

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TRIDENT JEWEL 15 Scripting Workshop: The exercise maximized attention on managing joint focus during a complex political and civil crisis response operation and worked through a failing-state scenario. Photograph by JWC PAO.

these independence movements were partially driven by the exhaustion of the colonial powers and some of the more specific international dynamics of the post-war period. Both the political elites and the international community at large welcomed the newly achieved statehood, often confusing the formal declaration of independence with the formation of a state, without taking into sufficient account the myriad of obstacles these newly formed states still faced.[10] Much emphasis has been placed on the benefits of statehood with a paucity of recognition as to its social costs in terms of the sacrifice of existing identities and structures that appear to run counter to hierarchies and systems being put in place — nascent statehood.[11]

The authors raise reasonable concerns regarding state institutions claiming authority over large territories, which may only give evidence to distant "outposts" in regions that may, to a large extent, remain stateless. Central governments often experience difficulty in extending sufficient, let alone consistent, influence beyond their national capital regions. In such instances, it is not uncommon to find the vestiges of traditional/tribal systems of governance functioning similarly to a time prior to colonial rule. It is in this expanse of territory, great distances from any central authority, "where state 'outposts' are mediated by 'informal' indigenous societal institutions that follow their own logic within the (incomplete) state structures."[12] Here, the identity of "citi-

zen" and the "notion of the state" find it difficult to take root. Overcoming this relative disconnectedness from the state is challenging for national leadership when expectations are low among the people in terms of receiving much from the central government, much less any sense of responsibility among the "citizenry" to fulfill obligations. Despite the best efforts of the international community, extending adequate security and other basic services to the more distant points of the state, in many instances, has been difficult to achieve.

Historically, for many former colonies, transitioning to statehood often meant a marginalization of more traditional forms of societal governance by elites in an effort to establish authority. Where representation of central government has been weak, a concomitant dearth of allegiance to the state by the people has followed. Compounding this further has been the relative ease by which "other entities" have moved into the vacuum — where the state has failed to provide adequate security and basic services, others have gained support of the local populace due to their ability to address these needs. Often, it is the lack of depth to the subjective notion of statehood among the people that lessens a sense of citizenship. People profess loyalty to their group — whatever that may be — instead of the state. "As members of traditional communities, people are tied into a network of social relations and a web of mutual obligations, and these obliga-

tions are much more powerful than obligations as a citizen."[13] Fragile statehood in many parts of the global south exhibits diverse and competing claims to power and logics of order that coexist, overlap and intertwine. The result has frequently proven to be a layered and complex convergence of more "formal" structures of statehood, traditional "informal" societal order, combined with the effects of globalization, all of which may be compounded by the social fragmentation associated with ethnic, tribal and religious forms.[14] Volker Boege et al. define this as *hybridity of leadership*.

Within fragile states, *hybrid political orders* of this nature are more the norm. In establishing governance and expanding development, whole of government personnel are frequently confronted with sustaining change within such *hybrid systems*, especially in regions where effective representation of central governments struggles to be a consistent presence. The danger lies in "trying to produce a state that people do not recognize as their own, or from which they feel alienated in important ways."[15] The authors cite cases where the lack of understanding of *hybrid political orders* has undermined efforts to revitalize the state in comparison to instances where central governments have successfully incorporated more traditional forms of societal structures/leadership into governance. In their estimation, conflict has often resulted where political elites have resorted to a more "top-down" imposition

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"Culture is the soil in which conflict-handling mechanisms sprout and take root..." Non-Violence Sculpture at the UN Headquarters, New York. A gun tied in a knot as symbol for reaching peace; gift from the Government of Luxembourg. Photograph by Marco Rubino.

of values, as opposed to sustaining change in the recognition of more "bottom-up" formation of political communities committed to peacebuilding and development. Accordingly, it is important to stress the positive potential rather than the negative features of so-called fragile states, focusing on *hybridity* generative processes, innovative adaptation and ingenuity, perceiving community resilience and customary institutions not so much as spoilers and problems, but as assets and sources that can be drawn upon in order to forge constructive relationships between communities and governments and between customary and introduced political and social institutions.[16]

Contextualization and hybridity — a closer look at Botswana

Leaders from the global north must guard against the presumption that western ideas hold within them the answers for conflicts in other parts of the world, disregarding rich and untapped peacebuilding mechanisms that other cultures may possess. Celebrated peacebuilder, John Paul Lederach, contends that "mov[ing] from stagnant cycles of violence toward a desired and shared vision of increased interdependence emerge[s] creatively from the culture and context."[17]

Such contextualization encapsulates how "appropriate responses for constructively responding to conflict are understood and rooted in the social realities — as perceived,

experienced, and created by the people in the setting."[18] He acknowledges that, "(...) culture is the soil in which conflict-handling mechanisms sprout and take root."[19] For this reason, he continues, "the international community must see people in the setting as resources, and not recipients."[20]

Traditional/tribal leadership, and the grassroots systems of governance that they represent within the African context, characterizes a cultural mechanism worthy of consideration. The concept of *hybridity*, and its potential to enhance stability, becomes much more germane to peacebuilding and development initiatives emanating from the external when seen in the light of the need for cultural compatibility within recovering states. Volker Boege et al. cite Namibia, South Africa, Ghana, Mozambique, Uganda, Zambia and Cameroon as having "(re) incorporated traditional leaders officially into state hierarchies in recognition of their ongoing influence as local players."[21] Where state institutions are relatively weak, a *hybrid* approach of traditional leaders assisting central government by performing certain state functions has contributed to a resurgence of customary rule. Some re-formulation has accompanied these new functions; nevertheless traditional leadership is playing an active role.[22]

Adding Botswana to the list of African nations to embrace a *hybrid* form of governance, authors Dipholo, Tshishonga and Mafema[23] offer further insight — its opportuni-

ties and challenges. Much of what is to follow is a summary of their research: Among the Tswana, the public meeting place in the village is the *Kgotla* where debates on public issues are held and cases under customary law are heard. This traditional authority system continued to function under the Protectorate (British rule) where the traditional leader's role (Chiefdoms) complimented the colonial administration. The post-colonial period saw tribal leaders positions transferred into the new independent state. National political parties continued to use the *Kgotla* as a means for political mobilization.

Botswana operates on a two-tier system of government: the central government at the apex with local government constituting the next level. Here, governance is spread over district/urban councils or municipalities, District Administration, Land Boards and Tribal Administration. Designated personnel assist traditional leaders in carrying out their duties. As such, traditional leaders are public servants, paid from public funds.[24] This *hybrid* approach continues to this day, albeit not without its challenges.

Although the House of Chiefs, now renamed *Ntlo ya Dikgosi*, is enshrined in the Constitution, it is designated more of an "advisory body" on customary issues, coming into effect at independence in 1966. The same year, the Botswana Parliament struck The Chieftainship Act, subordinating Chiefs to the Ministerial level and the policies they impose. Today, tradi-

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TRIDENT JUNCTURE 15 Scripting Workshop at JWC. Photograph by JWC PAO.

INSURGENCIES WITHIN THE BORDERS OF NATIONS ARE INCREASINGLY BECOMING REGIONAL ISSUES, DEFYING CONTAINMENT.

S.K. Moore served as a Padre in the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) for 22 years, retiring in 2012. His operational tours include pre-Dayton Accord Bosnia (1993), Haiti (1997-1998) and the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team, Afghanistan, where he conducted doctoral research (2006), completing his Ph. D. in 2008. The experience of engaging the religious leaders of greater Sarajevo left an indelible mark on his life — men of faith and leaders of communities, endeavouring to lead their people during a time of war. Dr Moore's last three years in uniform were with now, the Canadian Army Land Warfare Center, Kingston, Ontario where his post-doctoral research resulted in the development of the chaplain capability, Religious Leader Engagement (RLE), now Policy (January 2013) with the CAF Chaplain Branch and Doctrine (July 2013) with the Canadian Army. A member of the International Directing Staff, RLE has been incorporated into curriculum at the United Nations Training School Ireland, Dublin. During the years 2012-2014, he developed a Graduate Diploma Programme in Integrative Peacebuilding at Saint Paul University, Ottawa, now in the accreditation process. His recently published book is entitled, "Military Chaplains As Agents of Peace: Religious Leader Engagement in Conflict and Post-conflict Environments" (Lexington Books, 2013).

tional leaders function in accordance with these parliamentary statutes. They administer justice through customary courts, resolve disputes in their villages and oversee tribal ceremonies. As Sharma notes, "The Chiefs play a significant role in presiding over the customary courts, which handle about 80% to 90% of civil and criminal cases in the country."**(25)**

In addition, the District/Urban Councils are charged with the responsibility of development planning and oversight at the local level. Chiefs actively participate with the District Development Committees in the deliberations and coordination of district development plans and their implementation — a vital role.**(26)** Officials continue to look to them due to their influence at the grassroots, as the citizenry still identifies with these traditional leaders. The chiefdoms remain the oldest, most accessible and recognized institution in rural Botswana. They continue to be a dynamic focus for local initiatives, deemed an essential bridge between local governments and the people.

If managed properly in the African context, such *hybridity* in governance may prove to be of inestimable value in stabilizing recovering states in peacebuilding and development initiatives — a cultural mechanism that whole of government personnel should take into account when engaged in peacebuilding and development in third-world contexts.

Conclusion

A pre-occupation of the international community for some time to come will be to discern and develop effective responses to intervening in the stabilization and reconstruction of failing or failed states. Compelling western governments to invest in sophisticated educa-

tion and training is the complexity of today's *hybrid threats.* Insurgencies within the borders of nations are increasingly becoming regional issues, defying containment. Additional concerns mount as the insidious nature of "home-grown radicalization" is on the increase — a *hybrid threat* now eliciting a domestic strategy as well as foreign intervention — realities of the twenty-first century.

Most are in agreement; the African context will garner its share of international attention in the future. Political instability of the post-colonial era and coveted resources are among the driving factors in creating the continued unrest evident in certain regions of the continent. Such turmoil may pull NATO and, by extension, the EU into its orbit.

Exercise TRIDENT JEWEL 15, now concluded, was focused and substantial, preparing both civilian and military personnel to function jointly in what may prove to be some rather inhospitable regions globally. Exercise TRIDENT JUNCTURE 15 will follow suit. The requirement for *hybrid* responses is undeniably a reality of the present and will undoubtedly persist on into the future. Concomitant to such training is the need for greater insight into the cultural contexts where stabilization and reconstruction endeavours will play out. Much benefit exists in the capacity to acknowledge and adapt to the inherent cultural mechanisms that resonate with the people at the grassroots. In time to come, *hybrid* systems in regions of the third world — collaboration between traditional/tribal and central forms of governance and the potential stability such balance affords — may prove invaluable to whole of government personnel and their peacebuilding and development endeavours. ✦

END NOTES:

(1) Frank Hoffman, "Hybrid Warfare and Challenges" JFQ, Issue 52, 1st Quarter, 2009, p 37.
(2) Hoffman, 2009, 35.
(3) Hoffman, 36.
(4) "Training Takes Top Priority in January" Inci Kucukaksoy, NATO Joint Warfare Centre, http://www.jwc.nato.int, accessed 22 February 2015.
(5) Frederik Rosen, "Third-generation Civil-military Relations" in Prism 2. No.1, (Dec 2010): 28.
(6) Rosen, 2010, 27.
(7) Sean McFate, "U.S. Africa Command: A New Strategic Paradigm?" Military Review 17 (January-February 2008): 17.
(8) McFate, 2008, 16.
(9) Laura Ploch, "Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa," CRS Report for Congress (Mar 2008): 7-8. Security Operations in the 21st Century: Canadian Perspectives on the Comprehensive Approach, eds. Michael Rostek and Peter Gizewski (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2011), 2.

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(10) Volker Boege, Anne Brown, Kevin Clements and Anna Nolan, "Building Peace and Political Community in Hybrid Political Orders" in International Peacekeeping, Vol. 16, No. 5, November 2009, 601, (599-615).

(11) Christopher Clapham, "The Global—Local Politics of State Decay", in Robert I. Rotberg (ed), When States Fail: Causes and Consequences, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004, p.86 cited in Volker Boege, Anne Brown, Kevin Clements and Anna Nolan, "Building Peace and Political Community in Hybrid Political Orders" in International Peacekeeping, Vol. 16, No. 5, November 2009, 602.

(12) Boege, Brown, Clements and Nolan, 2009, 603. The authors offer the following word of caution in their notes (#12). It bears repetition here. "Traditional' or 'customary' institutions are taken as ideal types. Obviously, traditional societies have not been left unchanged by the powers of—originally European—capitalist expansion, colonialism, imperialism, evangelism and globalization. In practice, therefore, there are no clear-cut boundaries between the realm of the exogenous 'modern' and the endogenous 'traditional'; rather there are processes of assimilation, articulation, transformation, and/or adoption in the context of the global/exogenous—local/indigenous interface. An ideal type of 'traditional' or 'customary' institutions of governance is employed to elaborate as precisely as possible the specifics of phenomena that do not belong to the realm of conventional institutions originating in the West, which were imposed in the South. It would be misleading, however to think of this traditional realm as unchangeable and static. Custom is a constant flux and adapts to new circumstances, exposed to external influences, which allows traditional and introduced Western approaches to be combined so that something new—that is not strictly customary any longer, but rooted in custom—might emerge."

(13) Boege, Brown, Clements and Nolan, 2009, 606.
(14) Boege, Brown, Clements and Nolan, 2009, 606.
(15) Boege, Brown, Clements and Nolan, 2009, 608.
(16) Boege, Brown, Clements and Nolan, 2009, 611-12.
(17) John Paul Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 1997), 84.
(18) Lederach, 2000, 47.
(19) Lederach, 2000, 47.
(20) Lederach, 1997, 94.
(21) Boege, Brown, Clements and Nolan, 2009, 604.
(22) Boege, Brown, Clements and Nolan, 2009, 604.
(23) Kenneth B. Dipholo, Ndwakhulu Tshishonga and Eve Mafema, "Traditional Leadership in Botswana: Opportunities and challenges for enhancing good governance and local development" in The Journal of African and Asian Local Government Studies.
(24) Keshav C. Sharma, "Role of Traditional Structures in Local government for Local Development—The Case of Botswana," Community Empowerment and Social Inclusion Program (CESI), World Bank Institute, Washington, 5, http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/153055/BOTSWANA.pdf, accessed 8 March 2015.
(25) Sharma, 7.
(26) Sharma, 9.

An excerpt from SACT's Introductory Remarks to NATO Transformation Seminar — Washington, 25 March 2015

"Since 66 years, and certainly for the last decades, NATO's coherent, consistent and enduring Transformation has enabled NATO forces to respond to emerging crises when they were tasked to do so. I believe it is crucial to keep and even increase the pace of our dynamic Transformation, as our forces will likely face a hardened security environment in the foreseeable future, and I would highlight three main reasons:

— First, more and more state and non-state-actors may feel unconstrained by international laws and may look to strike our nations even on their own territories. On a Russian model, some of them will synchronize their efforts and act with higher ambiguity. This hybrid modus operandi will likely be very innovative, even disruptive.

— Secondly, our adversaries may trigger swiftly simultaneous and diverse crises to challenge our planning, preparation and decision-making process, putting also at risk the solidarity of the Alliance.

— Last, but not least, our opponents will deploy more anti-access and area-denial weapon systems to threaten our forces in their strategic, operational and tactical depth and challenge the Alliance's ability to re-posture.

For adapting our forces to cope with these mid- and long-term threats, I would stress five guiding principles, which ensue from our recent Bi-SC "Future Framework for the Alliance Operations" analysis.

— First, to make any appropriate decision, in every single operation, there is a permanent need to improve our strategic awareness through information sharing, joint intelligence building, real-time surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, and not to forget the indispensible human expertise. In looking into the future, a reliable strategic awareness is not an option, but a pre-requisite.

— Secondly, in this future operational environment, our forces have to remain a first strategic shock absorber. In times of enduring budget constraints and pressing environment, we should coordinate, consolidate our shared resilience through selected redundancy and measures of protection for critical infrastructure, decision-making centres, networks, population and other centres of gravity.

— Thirdly, to engage these opponents, our forces will have to be highly agile and modular, trained in the full spectrum of warfare. The enduring implementation of our Connected Forces Initiative (CFI) will be paramount in preparing, educating and training them in the right balance of our three core tasks.

— Fourthly, in any context, including hybrid, our Alliance has to gain the battle of the narrative, through effective Strategic Communications (StratCom).

— Last, but not least, our partners, committed to support our troops over the past decades have become part of the Alliance's DNA. We have to ensure the highest level of interoperability of these forces with our forces to enable them to take their full share in our future coalitions, and to cope with their own regional security. As a mutual benefit, they deserve enhanced involvement in the decision of the Alliance's future."